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Abstract 
This thesis examines George Eliot's novel Middlemarch (1872) and Thomas 
Hardy's Jude the Obscure (1896) in the context of the philosophical quest for 
salvation in a secularising nineteenth century. This is a quest which retains an 
exalted ideal of human seif-realisation, and foregrounds an ethical basis to the 
relationship between self and the world, individual and society. In the struggle 
between the potential for seeing the human as a reduced and ephemeral being, 
condemned to wander without object or value in an essentially purposeless 
world, and the quest for a still-transcendent vision of human possibility and a 
progressive future, pessimistic and optimistic visions of human place and the 
world are central. Fiction and non-fictional literature of the period interrogate 
the questions of human place, ethics, and destiny in both individual and social 
terms, and the role of philosophy in offering an alternative to religious 
constructions of the world is key for both Eliot and Hardy. Arthur 
Schopenhauer's pessimism is often recognised as having been influential on 
Hardy's work, while Ludwig Feuerbach's optimism is noted as having influenced 
Eliot. These two philosophies will be examined in detail, and measured against 
their value of and accessibility for ordinary existential human individuals in the 
world. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to current thinking by showing 
the extent to which Eliot's Middlemarch and Hardy's Jude develop dynamic 
relationships with both Schopenhauer's and Feuerbach's philosophical 
constructions of the world. This thesis shows that questions of optimism and 
pessimism rely on a complex set of relations, both in these two novels and in the 
philosophies of Schopeithauer and Feuerbach themselves, which belie previous 
critical tendencies to place all four writers in a polarised "pessimistic" or 
"optimistic" position, and reveals that both novels develop nuanced engagements 
with both pessimistic and optimistic visions of ethical salvation. 
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Introduction 
Pessimism, Optimism, and Philosophical Salvation. 
'The age of systems is past... System is the childhood of 
philosophy; the manhood ofphilosophy is investigation.' 
George Eliot 1855' 
'Let every man make a philosophy for himself out of his 
own experience.' 
Thomas Hardy 19012 
In 1855 George Eliot agrees that "The age of systems is passed... System is the 
childhood of philosophy; the manhood of philosophy is investigation" as 
'expressions' can only 'have their origin purely in the observations of the senses' 
(Eliot "Future" 133, 135). Eliot translated the works of a number of European 
philosophers in the mid-Victorian period, including German philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach whose deconstruction of Christianity as a belief system 
simultaneously invigorates Victorian secularism with a new belief and direction. 
For Eliot, Feuerbach's philosophy reveals an inspirational present and future life 
without God, but which retains key (Christian) ethical values and the object of 
salvation in the world, and enables Eliot to suggest that: 
The fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of 
development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is 
not man: and.., the idea of god, so far as it has been a high spiritual 
influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the 
human). (Eliot Selections 453) 
Nonetheless Eliot rejects the idea of an holistic system of philosophy, even whilst 
embracing the shift from a religious to a philosophical framework grounded in 
the existential world 'of the senses' ("Future" 135) in fundamental terms. In 
those for whom religious belief is a thing of the past, questions of human place, 
individual and social direction, and the moral code of human relations take on a 
new urgency in letters, articles, philosophical treatises, and fiction of the period. 
George Eliot "The Future of German Philosophy". Selected Critical Writings. Rosemary Ashton 
(ed). Oxford: OUP, 1992, 133. 
2 Thomas Hardy The Lfe of Thomas Hardy; 1840-1 928. London: Macmillan & Co., 1962,3 to. 
The central focus for many is the secularised quest for human seif-realisation - 
for salvation here on earth - and is bound to the question of ethical human 
relations which transfer core Christian values into a secular interpretation of 
human existence. Barbara DeMille recognises that: 
the question of moral standards and ideal conceptions, the notions of the 
perfectibility of man according to intangible paradigms... were seriously 
sapped of their vitality by religious scepticism and scientific discovery by 
the mid-nineteenth century but their teleological and deontological 
promptings lingered in the cultural consciousness long after their 
respective.., creeds had waned. (704) 
Eliot renounces systematisation for the pragmatic philosophical ground and 
direction of the senses - albeit in her earlier non-fiction career this appears to be 
a somewhat exalted direction revealed by 'treading the uphill a posteriori path 
which will lead, not indeed to heaven, but to an eminence whence we may see 
very bright and blessed things on earth' ("Future" 137). Almost half a century 
later, Thomas Hardy also rejects the idea of an holistic philosophical system 
whilst also emphasising the necessity of grounding philosophy in the existential 
world. Hardy argues that 'every man' should 'make a philosophy for himself out 
of his own experience' (Life 310, original emphasis), yet also suggests that 
'Pessimism (or rather what is called such) is... playing the sure game' as it 'is the 
only view of life in which you can never be disappointed' (311). Apart from the 
overtly optimistic Feuerbach, Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy also 
foregrounds a secularised quest for ethical salvation in the world, and also 
becomes increasingly well-known in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
although Schopenhauer's philosophical position is expressly pessimistic. In mid-
I 850s Britain, one critic terms Schopenhauer's philosophy 'the most 
disheartening, the most repulsive, the most opposed to the aspirations of the 
present world' (Oxenford 394) whilst Feuerbach, as Eliot shows above, appears 
to offer an optimistic and exalted potential for human realisation. Like Eliot, 
Hardy also read prolifically, including European philosophy, and took an active 
interest in the contemporary debates about the ethical and practical direction of 
the individual and social human in a secularising world. Whilst Eliot's 
relationship with Feuerbach's philosophy is recognised by a number of critics in 
fairly general and invariably optimistic terms, as will be discussed shortly, 
Hardy's relationship with pessimism is equally well-recognised, but also often in 
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rather general terms, In Hardy's surviving letters and non-fiction writings his 
perspective on human fellowship tends not to be inclined towards a Feuerbachian 
exaltation of human existence, even whilst he recognises a necessity for social 
change. When asked to 'define his concept of progress' (Orel 253), Hardy wrote 
'I favour social re-adjustments rather than social subversions - remembering that 
the opposite of error is error still' (Hardy Personal 253). Whilst agreeing on 
another occasion that a society of 'Thinkers' offers 'ways' in which we can 
discover where 'salvation lies' (if 'the Thinkers are to get themselves listened to 
by the Doers', that is), Hardy also questions 'if there be any salvation at all for a 
world that has got itself into such a deplorable welter, which seems to threaten a 
new Dark Age, to last may be for centuries before "the golden years return" 
(253). Whilst both of these latter comments occurred in the years immediately 
after the 1914-18 War and thus indicate a particular context for Hardy's 
pessimism, Hardy's musings on his 'every man' pessimistic philosophy occur 
two decades earlier at the turn of the century, a few years after his final novel 
Jude the Obscure is published. Whilst both authors appear to reject the idea of 
an holistic philosophy of life in their non-fiction writings, Eliot's 'uphill... path' 
to a new friture where 'we may see very bright and blessed things on earth' 
("Future" 137) marks a sharp contrast with Hardy's 'sure game' of 'Pessimism' 
(Life 311), yet this thesis will show that the question of whether either writer is 
"optimistic" or "pessimistic" is not as straightforward as this may seem to 
suggest. This thesis makes an original contribution to current thinking by 
examining the relationship between pessimism and optimism in George Eliot's 
Middlemarch and in Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure, and indeed within the 
philosophical systems of Arthur Schopenhauer and Ludwig Feuerbach. This 
thesis shows that questions of optimism and pessimism rely on a complex set of 
relations, both in these two novels and in the philosophies themselves, which 
belie previous critical tendencies to place each writer in a polarised "pessimistic" 
or "optimistic" position. 
Helen Garwood argues that the 'opposing terms' of pessimism and 
optimism 'are incapable of definition', but finds that the issue of purposelessness 
is the deciding factor as this denotes pessimism whereas an underlying purpose is 
therefore necessarily optimistic (19). Further, one person 'cannot at the same 
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time be both pessimist and optimist' (16) as, '[i]f the sum of his pessimistic 
moments exceeds his optimistic then he is a pessimist, and vice versa' (16). 
Rather than a question of purpose or a sum of moments, however, this thesis 
argues that the terms denote the philosophical relationships between the human 
and the world on a number of levels which can indeed leave one person with both 
pessimistic and optimistic positions, and which do not necessarily cancel one 
another out. Whilst these philosophical relationships include the question of 
whether the world is recognised as a predominantly "good" or "bad" world 
(whether or not a purposive First Cause enters the equation), the question of 
whether and to what extent the human individual in that world has a 
predetermined and unalterable character or can exhibit ethical choice is more 
important, as this affects how the individual can recognise their relationship with 
the world and operate within it. Further, whether or not character is fixed and 
determined, the question extends into whether that character is seen as innately 
positive or negative in the sense of both moral/behavioural terminology and 
existential value. Most crucially, all of these relationships necessarily include the 
question of whether the basis of ethics is democratic and accessible to ordinary 
existential human individuals, and whether self-realisation or salvation is an 
accessible reality for real people in the world. As such, this thesis recognises the 
terms pessimism and optimism to be denoting a complex set of relationships 
between self and world which, in the end, are balanced against the positive value 
both of and for the existential individual. A pessimistic or optimistic recognition 
does not therefore necessarily denote a "bad" or "good" perspective in itself as 
the qualitative factor is placed in the question of individual human value - of 
philosophical grounds, means and ends and the philosophical, psychological and 
corporeal impact of these on existential human individuals. Thus, contra 
Garwood, one person, one philosophy, one perspective can at the same time be 
both pessimistic and optimistic, and these terms themselves do not necessarily 
denote a "bad" or "good" value. A purposive philosophy can contain pessimistic 
negativity if it entails a form of salvation which is effectively unattainable in real 
terms, or if it negates existential lives along the way - whether philosophically, 
psychologically, or materially. Equally, a macrocosmic purposelessness could 
nonetheless offer a positive optimism if it aims to effect genuine benefit to 
human individuals during that purposeless existence. The questions of 
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pessimism and optimism depend upon the implications in real terms for real 
people of the ground, means, and endpoint of a particular vision of human reality 
and "salvation", most particularly in the realisable value of the individual human 
and of the ethical and salvationary present and future they aspire towards. 
The expressly pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer and the exalted 
optimistic philosophy of Feuerbach form the central theoretical framework of this 
thesis. Each will be analysed regarding the extent to which the key aspects of 
their philosophies can be seen to be pessimistic or optimistic, and the particular 
focus of the analyses will be the philosophical construction and place of the 
human in the world, the basis of ethics, and the ground, means and accessibility 
of salvation. The implications of each analysis will focus on how each 
philosophical system relates to the existential human subject in particular, and 
questions whether each philosophy can be seen as respectively "pessimistic" or 
"optimistic" in such polarised terms. The central focus will be the form of 
ethical salvation that each delineates, discussing the implications of how these 
two apparently oppositional philosophical positions might be grasped by their 
readers. 
Schopenhauer's key philosophical work, The World as Will and Idea, will 
be analysed in Chapter 1, with occasional references to his other philosophical 
writings where appropriate. The examination of Schopenhauer's pessimism will 
discuss Christopher Janaway's question of why the existence of evil in any form 
can never be counteracted by any amount of good for Schopenhauer, thus 'any 
suffering at all invalidates the whole world' (Janaway "Pessimism" 332). That 
Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will is of a pessimistic nature this thesis does 
not refute, but it agrees with Gerard Mannion in identiing 'the question' of 
'whether [Schopenhauer's] metaphysics leads necessarily to a world of evil and 
suffering or whether there is ground for hope' (14, original emphasis). Chapter 1 
shows that Schopenhauer's ethical writings cast doubt on the tendency to see his 
worldview as finally and absolutely pessimistic, as salvation and ethics are, as 
Mannion recognises, 'the most crucial part of his philosophy, because their 
subject matter is humanity itself' (37). Yet Mannion finds that Schopenhauer's 
philosophical salvation finally resides in the mystical and thus 'functionally 
resembles religious systems' (foreword), whereas this thesis shows that 
Schopenhauer's ethical framework is fundamentally grounded in human 
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existential suffering, and in most key respects, salvation from suffering is 
accessible to all (albeit with qualifications) rather than just the "saintly" few. 
Chapter 1 shows how Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism simultaneously 
recognises a more optimistic accessibility which qualifies that pessimism to a 
significant and essentially realisable degree. 
Chapter 2 will examine Feuerbach's philosophical deconstruction of 
Christianity in The Essence of Christianity, which Charles Wilson summarises as 
the recognition that 'divinity is not finally about abstract reason but has a flesh-
and-blood character to it', thus positing 'God-as-human transacts the overcoming 
of our self-alienation (experienced as sin)' (394). Wilson also finds that 
Feuerbach uses 'Christology' (394) in coming to see in religion itself 'the 
founding of a community, not an individualized consciousness' (390, original 
emphasis). Chapter 2 will show, however, that the relationship between 
individual consciousness and community is the site where the extent to which 
Feuerbach's philosophy can realistically attain its objective is decided. Thomas 
Wartenberg recognises Feuerbach's objective to be the point where 'human 
beings could come to realize their own divinity, thus creating a world in which 
the human race could fully realize its potential as a species' (viii). Chapter 2 will 
show that Feuerbach's philosophical consciousness effectively precludes the 
realisation and the potential of the existential individual human on key levels, 
even whilst it identifies the means of salvation from the alienation that 
Christianity and other artificial social constructs effect. 
Chapters 1 and 2 will show that the categorisation of a philosophical system 
as either "pessimistic" or "optimistic" is a questionable undertaking, evidenced 
in the analyses of the different levels on which such terminology can depend. 
Thus the uncritical acceptance of each philosophy as respectively "pessimistic" 
and "optimistic" in unqualified terms fails to engage with the negotiability and 
accessibility of their positions to the individual in search of self-realisation or 
salvation in the world. As such, the influence that these two philosophers may 
have had on the fiction of Eliot and Hardy is consequently a far more complex 
relationship than is often recognised. 
Chapter 3 will examine how some of the key issues raised in the analyses 
of pessimistic and optimistic philosophical thinking, as delineated by 
Schopenhauer and Feuerbach, are also under discussion amongst a range of 
thinkers in Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century. Both 
philosophers are introduced to their British readership almost simultaneously in 
the 1850s, albeit Schopenhauer only really getting a substantial foot-hold by the 
1 870s by which time Feuerbachian thinking has already become assimilated into 
the common parlance of secularist theory to a significant extent. The central 
focus of Chapter 3 will be how both conservative and liberal thinkers during this 
latter Victorian period raise key questions about the roles of ethics, character and 
community, and human destiny in a secularising society. This chapter will show 
that, even amongst a range of secularist social theorists who would all be likely 
to see themselves as batting for the same side in the quest for a secularist 
direction in human ethical and social life, there are as many contradictions 
between pessimistic and optimistic views of human nature and the individual and 
social future of the world as there are affinities. Both Eliot and Hardy were 
themselves influenced by, and engaged in discussing, a broad range of ideas and 
philosophies which are concerned with ethical and moral issues and the question 
of individual and social human destiny, and they will both be contextualised in 
Chapter 3 within their contemporary discussions and within the current critical 
framework. Both Eliot and Hardy were keen to work through these issues in 
their fiction, and the core focus of this thesis is an examination of two novels 
published in the last 30 years of the nineteenth century, Eliot's Middlemarch in 
1872 and Hardy's Jude the Obscure in 1896. Following two short Chapters, 4 
and 6, which discuss Eliot's and Hardy's direct associations with 
Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian philosophy, and the specific critical context 
for the analyses of the two novels, a substantial chapter will be devoted to the 
analysis and discussion of each novel. Chapters 5 and 7 will examine 
Middlemarch and Jude respectively in the light of the theoretical framework, and 
will show that each novel evidences fascinating engagements with both 
pessimistic and optimistic thought. These two chapters will show that Eliot and 
Hardy entered deep and comprehensive engagements with both Schopenhauerian 
and Feuerbachian delineations of the human and the world, yet from very 
different perspectives. The original approach of this thesis is a reassessment of 
both Eliot's and Hardy's relationships with optimistic and pessimistic thought, 
and with Feuerbach and Schopenhauer in particular. 
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Critical approaches to Eliot's philosophical relationships in her literature 
tend to concentrate on "optimistic" philosophies, of which Feuerbach's is 
deemed a key influence. Whilst Eliot undertook a comprehensive engagement 
with Feuerbach's philosophy through translating his primary work, critics who 
assess her literary relationship with Feuerbach rarely examine his potential 
influences in detail, but tend to acknowledge an often generalised connection 
from an optimistic viewpoint. Rosemary Ashton recognises the influence that 
German philosophy had on Eliot's writing and, whilst her discussion focuses on a 
number of German philosophers and theorists, Ashton finds that Eliot's novels 
all predominantly 'testify to her unchanging belief' in Feuerbach's influence, 
including 'I-Thou relationships, the "divine" efficacy of human love, [and] the 
redeeming influence of man on man' (German 160). This optimistic 
Feuerbachian influence is echoed by Peter Jones (52) and is interpreted in more 
general positive-humanist terms by Peter Widdowson (18-21), but is taken into a 
specifically Comtean perspective by T. R. Wright (Humanity 180). Like Ashton, 
Gisela Argyle also recognises the significance of German philosophy for Eliot in 
equally positive terms, concentrating more on J. W. Goethe and Heinrich Heine 
than Feuerbach in her own discussion of Eliot (4). Argyle also foregrounds a 
strongly optimistic-humanist emphasis in Eliot's work and, like many other 
critics, tends to place Feuerbach's influence in general rather than detailed terms. 
Most critics do not assess the implications that the less optimistic aspects of 
Middlemarch might have for Eliot's acceptance of Feuerbachian thought, nor 
assess the more pessimistic aspects of Eliot's ethical or salvationary framework 
from either a Feuerbachian or Schopenhauerian perspective. Argyle finds that 
Dorothea is 'sensuous force controlled by spiritual passion', echoing Matthew 
Arnold's argument 'in favour of a union of the Hellenic and the Christian spirit' 
(Argyle 50), thus Dorothea's quest is for 'the companion concept to the good to 
be reconciled with beauty', which is 'truth' (58). Chapter 5 will argue that 
Eliot's novel does foreground both the senses and what can be termed 'spiritual 
passion', and both of these form key relationships in the novel which are focused 
through a reconciliation, but this is not a reconciliation of 'beauty' and 'truth' 
(Argyle 58), or the Hellenic 'and the Christian spirit' (50). It is instead a 
- albeit Jones broadens his own approach across a range of European and British thought. 
(4] 
[4 
reconciliation of the material and the transcendent in terms which foreground the 
value and import of the existential human individual, and which raise significant 
questions about Eliot's acceptance of Feuerbach whilst also marking a 
fundamental relationship with Schopenhauerian thinking. 
E. A. McCobb's discussion of Eliot's relationship with Schopenhauer in 
Daniel Deronda4 
 is a useful starting point for examining Eliot's own exposure to 
Schopenhauer, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 below, while Penelope 
LeFew-Blake's analyses of Schopenhauer's influence on a number of women 
novelists introduces an interesting interpretation of Schopenhauerian thinking in 
Middlemarch. LeFew-Blake argues that Dorothea's quest is a Schopenhauerian 
struggle 'between.., the need to be and the desire to cease to be' (24). Chapter 5 
will show that Dorothea's struggle for seif-realisation not only refuses 'to cease 
to be' but emphatically recognises 'the need to be' (24) in much more radically 
Schopenhauerian terms, with significant implications for ethics and salvation in 
the novel. Gillian Beer's central focus is on Darwinism and science rather than 
German philosophy, yet her discussion of Middlemarch identifies a number of 
parallels with this thesis in finding Eliot's novel to be 'a study of process and 
relations' (149), both 'process' and 'relations' being key ways of thinking about 
the philosophical analysis of Middlemarch undertaken here. Beer also recognises 
the equal significance of the imagination and 'the imagery of transcendence, of 
the invisible world' (141) for Eliot, because '[p]rojects cannot rest in the present' 
as 'they rely upon extension and fliturity' (142), and this recognition is both 
pertinent and troubled in the analysis of Eliot's novel in Chapter 5. Beer's own 
study is not directly connected to the analysis undertaken here, as this thesis 
shows that the theme of process and relations which underpin Eliot's novel are 
not wholly bound to scientific Darwinism but have other implications in Eliot's 
engagements with philosophical optimism and pessimism 5 . The extent to which 
imagination and transcendence can be seen to relate to 'extension and fliturity' 
and to what Beer terms Eliot's 'domestic epic' (140) will be shown in Chapter 5 
to have an unexpected bearing on Eliot's relationship with both Feuerbachian and 
E. A. McCobb: "Daniel Deronda as Will and Representation: George Eliot and Schopenhauer", 
and "The Morality of Musical Genius: Schopenhauerian Views in Daniel Deronda". 
Beer's focus is on Darwin's 'Variation Under Domestication' which she finds casts Dorothea's 
'domestic epic' (140) into the light of the universal process and endless movement of evolution 
(144). 
Schopenhauerian philosophy. Chapter 5 will show that the process and relations 
which are central to Dorothea's self-real isation act to undermine Feuerbachian 
salvation on a number of levels, whilst also foregrounding fundamental aspects 
of SchopeiThauerian philosophical thought in the ground, means and endpoint of 
ethical salvation. This is particularly significant in what the 'domestic' sphere 
represents in Middlemarch in a number of respects, not least how the ideas of 
both the 'domestic' and 'extension' become a conscious necessity in the novel 
even while the idea of 'fliturity' (Beer 140-2) is both limited and questioned. 
The critical reception of Hardy as a fatalistic pessimist who is frequently 
seen in opposition to Eliot's positive humanist-realism is emphasised by Peter 
Widdowson (18-21). Virginia Hyman's core focus in her discussion of Hardy is 
'the theory of ethical evolution as it came to him through Comte, Mill, Darwin, 
and Leslie Stephen', and thus Hardy believes 'time was the great illuminator, 
destroying past illusions and revealing more sober and necessary truths' (3). 
These issues are central to the analysis of Jude here, and will be shown to have a 
significant relationship with both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian philosophy. 
A number of critics draw a relationship between Schopenhauerian pessimism and 
Hardy's novels, albeit a relationship frequently delineated in rather generalised 
terms in much the same way Eliot's relationship with Feuerbach is often framed, 
and rarely discussing the less pessimistic elements of Hardy's work 6. Deborah 
Collins focuses on Schopenhauer's influence in somewhat more detail than a 
generalised impression, albeit only exploring facets of the role of a blind 
purposelessness (46) which is only one aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy and 
of Hardy's Jude, as this thesis will show. A number of critics recognise Hardy's 
elusiveness regarding his influences and eclecticism regarding his 'every man' 
(Hardy Life 310) philosophy7 , yet, like Collins, most predominantly focus on the 
role of an essentialist, non-moral universe in his novels. Interestingly, Collins 
does occasionally mention Feuerbach, finding that Hardy 'agreed in principle... 
that "Man has his highest being, his God, in himself" (Collins 24, quoting 
Feuerbach Essence 281). Robert Schweik also recognises that Feuerbach had 
some influence on Hardy, but again this is only a somewhat general recognition 
6 A number of critics also conflate Schopenhauerian influences on Hardy with Eduard von 
Hartmann's philosophical pessimism, but which differs from Schopenhauer's in fundamental 
respects, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 7 below. 
See Schweik (68) and BjOrk Oxford (388), for example, and Chapter 6 below. 
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of 'Feuerbach's idea that the Christian god is the product of man's need to 
imagine perfection' (66). Despite arguing that in both Tess and Jude Hardy is 
'particularly concerned with the inimical relationship of religious mores to 
human lives.., in contexts which suggest that Christianity is a pervasive 
hindrance to the fulfilment of human aspiration' (56), Schweik's central focus in 
Jude is how 'human aspirations are dwarfed in the vast dimensions of 
archaeological time' (61-2). Chapter 7 will show that in Jude the Feuerbachian 
recognition of the potential perfection of the human has significant resonances, 
and relates directly to the 'pervasive hindrance[s] to the fulfilment of human 
aspiration' (Schweik 56) in fundamentally Feuerbachian terms. This thesis 
agrees with David DeLaura that Hardy insists on a 'more humane basis for 
morality in Tess and Jude', a morality DeLaura finds 'firmly situated in the late-
Victorian debate over modernism in the Churches' as Hardy is 'braver and more 
consistent than the majority of his fellow rationalists, almost none of whom 
challenged the ethics ofVictorian Christianity frontally' (388). This thesis will 
show that Jude's confrontation of 'the ethics of Victorian Christianity' extends to 
all artificial social constructs, however, and further, recognises the extent to 
which these effect so inhumane a form of morality on the individuals who are 
subject to their oppressive practices and precluded thereby from attaining 
salvation. William Siebenschuh's argument that there is a potentially positive 
relationship between person, place and time (774) operating in Jude offers some 
pertinent insights into the relationship between Jude and landscape in the novel, 
but this thesis will argue that both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian resonances 
pervade Jude's relationship with his landscape, and these in largely negative 
terms. Chapter 7 will examine how a specifically Feuerbachian consciousness 
raises questions about the relationship between pessimism and qualifications to 
that pessimism in Hardy's novel, and show that optimism retains a subtle and 
pervasive presence in Hardy's novel in markedly Feuerbachian terms. 
In the mid-1850s, at about the same time Schopenhauer and Feuerbach are 
introduced to Britain, Matthew Arnold's poem "Stanzas From the Grande 
Chartreuse" (1852-5) laments the loss incurred once religious faith has gone, 
leaving the human inhabiting a spiritual void and facing an unknown and 
uncertain present and future: 
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Wandering between two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born, 
With nowhere yet to rest my head, 
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn. 
(Arnold "Stanzas" lines 85-8) 
Arnold's poetic speaker becomes a ghost, haunting the periphery of both worlds, 
unable to pass back into the 'dead' world of faith nor into the unborn world of 
acceptance and certainty. Equally alienated from both worlds, the secularised 
quest for salvation is suspended between the loss of religious belief and the 
realisation of a positive human present and future. This thesis will show that in 
both Schopeithauer and Feuerbach there is an oscillation between the two worlds 
of pessimism and optimism, the existential human individual forming the key 
focus of both philosophical systems and the measure of the ethical value that 
each expresses. The quest for human salvation in the latter half of nineteenth 
century Britain also recognises the presence of both optimistic and pessimistic 
positions, Arnold reflecting this in enigmatic terms in the contrast between some 
of his poems and his non-fiction prose, the latter perhaps reflecting a more 
optimistic vision, as Chapter 3 will discuss. Once God has been displaced as the 
object and the vehicle of human salvation, human destiny has been placed firmly 
in human hands, and questions of ethics and salvation continue to haunt this 
secularising society and the philosophical quest for human place and object, in 
both individual and social terms. Whilst Eliot and Hardy refuse to place the 
existential human into an holistic philosophical system, this thesis will show that 
both novelists utilise and interrogate the philosophies of both Schopenhauer and 
Feuerbach in negotiating the quest for human salvation in the world. In Eliot's 
Middlemarch and Hardy's Jude the Obscure, the central protagonists become the 
site of that quest where the theoretical framework is put into practice. 
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Chapter 1 
Schopenhauer and the Pessimistic Vision of Salvation. 
'For the world is Hell, and men are on the one hand 
the tormented souls and on the other the devils in it.' 
Arthur Schopenhauer 1851' 
I. Schopenhauer and the positive experience of HelL 
Arthur Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 1819, translated as 
The World as Will and Idea (or Representation), became widely known in Britain 
from April 1853 onwards, following John Oxenford's discussion of 
Schopenhauer's philosophy in his article "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy" in 
The Westminster Review. British exposure to Schopenhauer via Oxenford was to 
a fairly comprehensive overview of his philosophical ideas, as Oxenford outlines 
the specific areas of Schopenhauer's work and quotes pertinent extracts from The 
World as Will and Idea 2 . Oxenford's primary admiration of Schopenhauer is 
regarding his accessibility, geniality and ingenuity - as well as admiring his 
invective against his philosophical peers - but he finds 'the doctrine taught... the 
most disheartening, the most repulsive, the most opposed to the aspirations of the 
present world' (394). Oxenford sums Schopenhauer's philosophy thus: 
All that the liberal mind looks forward to with hope, if not with confidence 
-the extension of political rights, the spread of education, the brotherhood 
"On the Suffering of the World", Essays and Aphorisms from Parerga und Paralipomena, 48. 
2 Whilst this chapter will primarily focus on Schopenhauer's most well-known work, The World as 
Will and Idea, a number of references will also be made to his other writings, his Essays in 
particular, and On the Basis of Morality, as these also became more widely read in the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century. The translation of Die Well als Wille und Vorstellung as The 
World as Will and Idea by Jill Berman is the central text used in this thesis, a translation which 
acknowledges the distinction between Schopenhauer's thing-in-itself as the will-to-lift rather than 
the will-to-live, the latter emphasis often leading critics to interpret Schopenhauer's Will as 
advocating a quasi-suicidal hastening of death. The World as Will and Representation translated 
by E. F. J. Payne is referred to particularly in respect of "The Metaphysics of Sexual Love", 
Chapter XLIV in Schopenhauer's Vorstellung, as this is only briefly rather than fully reproduced in 
Berman. 
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of nations, the discovery of new means of subduing stubborn nature - must 
be given up as a vain dream.., a professed "Pessimist"; it is his grand 
result, that this is the worst of all possible worlds.., so utterly unsusceptible 
of improvement, that the best thing we can do is to get rid of it altogether, 
by a process which he very clearly sets forth. (394) 
Oxenford's reading of Schopenhauer is one commonly repeated, and is one 
which does not address other implications of Schopenhauer's thought. Despite 
mentioning SchopeiThauer's ethics of art, and the 'bad man, the just man, the 
good man, and the whole rabble of vice and virtue' (405), Oxenford is not alone 
in producing a reading of Schopenhauer's philosophy that settles a final and 
unremitting pessimism onto all of his work. Informed by Schopenhauer's 'more 
austere personage yet' (Oxenford 405), the severe ascetic, who denies the will to 
life unto the point of 'death.., as the completion of their wishes... [with] 
annihilation... [as] the greatest boon that can be desired' (407), this ultimate 
position comes to stand in for all of Schopenhauer's thought and its pessimistic 
designation, without considering whether other aspects of Schopenhauer's 
philosophy might find a more optimistic realisation, nor indeed, how the position 
of ascetic self-denial itself might offer a form of hope. Whilst this thesis will not 
be arguing that Schopenhauer's philosophy is optimistic rather than pessimistic 
after all, it will trouble the notion that Schopenhauer's philosophy is 
unremittingly pessimistic in its outlook, and ascertain how its interpretation and 
accessibility might be seen to provide glimmers of hope to those bound within a 
pessimistic world. 
Schopenhauer introduces a world in which sensory perception and human 
experience is of significance, at the same time as advocating the voluntary 
removal of that experience in order to attain a more permanent form of 
secularised salvation. Yet, this more permanent salvation is something 
Schopenhauer considers is only accessible to relatively few, advocating other 
routes to salvation in some form for most people. For Schopenhauer, scientific 
and philosophical interpretations of the world that do not recognise the primary 
position of the relationship between our self-knowledge and our perceptions of 
the rest of the world are approaching the problem from the wrong angle 
(Schopenhauer The World as Will and Idea (WWJ) Book I, 12-24; and II §19, 
37). The world is one in which the "will to life" is the thing-in-itself the essence, 
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and is the life-force behind and in all phenomena; phenomena are merely the 
degrees of its manifestation or objectivity, from the lowest inorganic matter and 
"natural forces", through successively more complex objectifications of itself in 
plants, then animals, then the human. The will-to-life: 
is the inmost nature, the kernel, of every individual thing, and also of the 
whole. It is manifest in every force of nature that operates blindly, and it is 
manifest, too, in the deliberate action of man; and the great difference between 
these two is a matter only of degree in its manifestation, not in the nature of what 
is made manifest. (WWIII §21, 42) 
The whole world is, in one aspect, the manifestation and objectification of 
will (III §30, 97) and the will is 'the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; 
yet [the will] in itself., is unconscious' (II Supplement, 87). At the same time, 
the will is also idea in being 'the aspect of the knowable' (I §1, 4-5) for the 
perceiving subject. Phenomena are manifestations of the will but are also "ideas" 
born out of our subjective relationship with objects of perception, appearing in 
'time, space and causality' as 'only forms of knowing' (II §23, 45). Christopher 
Janaway sees this idealism as a problem in Schopenhauer as 'material things 
would not exist.., without the mind' (Janaway Schopenhauer 17). Yet 
Schopenhauer clearly refutes the transcendental 'purport of theoretical egoism, 
which as a consequence holds all phenomena, excepting its own individual self to 
be phantoms, exactly as practical egoism does in respect of practical matters - a 
man regards and treats only his own person as a real person, and all others as 
mere phantoms' (WWJ II §19, 37)3, 
 and this is significant to his vision of 
salvation. Schopenhauer insists that the living human is the necessary basis and 
object of philosophy and also the necessary basis of all knowledge (II § 19, 36-7), 
and it is fundamental to his thinking that 'pain and pleasure... are by no means 
ideas, but immediate affections of the will in its manifestation, the body' (II 
§ I 8m 33). Janaway later allows that Schopenhauer's delineation of 'acts of 
will.., places the human subject firmly within the material world' (Schopenhauer 
Schopenhauer criticises all philosophical 'attempt[s] to construe the thing in itself according to 
the laws of appearance' (Schopenhauer "On the Antithesis of Thing in Itself and Appearance", 
55). 
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29), but does not examine how Schopenhauer's philosophy does so in more 
significant terms. 
The placing of the will as the Kantian thing-in-itself is evident, for 
Schopenhauer, through understanding that our own self-knowledge is a: 
double knowledge which we have of our own body that gives us 
information about it, about its activity and its response to motives, and also 
about what it suffers as a result of outside intervention.., about what it is, 
not [just] as idea, but... what it is in itself.. as a will... [therefore] at once 
both will [in essence] and idea [as perceived object]. (Schopenhauer WWI 
II §19, 36) 
For Janaway, Schopenhauer oscillates between positing our ability to have 
immediate 'knowledge of the thing in itself directly', and the qualification that 
'even the act of will which we know "immediately" is an event in time, and is 
therefore part of our representation, rather than the thing in itself (Schopenhauer 
32-3). Janaway does acknowledge that Schopenhauer emphasises the will does 
not appear to us "quite naked" but 'has "to a great extent cast off its veils" in 
our "inner" awareness of action', thus 'we come closer to knowledge of the thing 
in itself (Schopenhauer 33). Schopenhauer's position is that this knowledge of 
will as one's 'real inner nature' provides 'the key to the knowledge of the inmost 
being of the whole of nature.., all those phenomena... given to [human 
perception]... as idea alone' (WWI II §21, 41) and also signifies the micro-
macrocosmic relation between all things as manifestations of the will-to-life (II 
§29, 83). This gives rise to the potential for reading aspects of Schopenhauer's 
philosophy in more immediately optimistic terms, as a result of the positive 
knowledge of self and world which recognises what Schopenhauer sees as the 
true nature of the world and our position in it. Yet, the optimistic potential of this 
insight into will as the thing-in-itself seems to be undermined by Schopenhauer's 
insistence that discord is essential to the will. For Schopenhauer, the will 
consumes itself in the ceaseless drive to sustain itself as '[e]very grade of the 
will's objectification competes with the others for matter, space, and time', from 
plants struggling against each other for light and water, to parasitic plants and 
animals eating plants and other animals, to the final 'terrible clarity' of 'homo 
homini lupus' (II §27, 74): human preying upon fellow human. The will 
engenders only pain and suffering, as: 
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all endeavour springs from deprivation - from discontent with one's 
condition - and is thus suffering as long as it is not satisfied; but no 
satisfaction is lasting, rather it is always merely the starting-point of a new 
striving... [which is always] frustrated in many ways, everywhere in 
conflict, and therefore we always see it as suffering. Thus, if there is no 
final goal or purpose in striving, there is no due portion, no purpose in 
suffering. (WWJ IV §56, 195) 
For Schopenhauer, life offers only endless but pointless suffering, and leads to 
his refutation of an optimistic 'best of all possible worlds' for Dante's 'hell' (IV 
§59, 205) as 'everyone is nothing but this will itself, whose manifestation is an 
ephemeral existence, an always vain, constantly frustrated endeavour' (IV §68, 
250). Whilst the will itself has no goal as such, merely a limitless 'endless 
striving' (II §29, 84), Schopenhauer sees the ultimate goal of existence as 
annihilation, a goal which proves that life has no value in itself as '[b]efore us, 
certainly, remains only nothingness.... what resists this disintegration into 
nothing, our nature, is simply only the will to life' (IV §71, 261). 
Schopenhauer's atheistic philosophy is one in which suffering proves that the 
world is a pointless accidental happening and not the chosen creation of an 
omniscient God, and the optimistic world-view is 'not merely... absurd' but 'a 
bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity' (IV §59, 206). Evil is 
a positive force in the sense of being experienced, whilst "good" is only relief 
from suffering, thus negative: 'we are not hilly conscious of the assets and 
advantages we actually have.., for they gratify us only negatively by keeping 
suffering at bay... [whilst] yearning, privation, suffering, is the positive, 
communicating itself directly to us' (WWI IV, §58, 202)6. 
If then, for Schopenhauer, the world 'is Hell, and men are on the one hand 
the tormented souls and on the other the devils in it' ("Suffering" 48), where does 
this leave the secularised quest for human salvation? 
If life 'were something possessing value in itself, something which ought unconditionally to exist, 
it would not have non-being as its goal' ("On the Vanity of Existence", 54). 
See also Schopenhauer "Suffering": 'two things cry out against... [a Leibnizian] view of the 
world as the successful work of an infinitely wise, infinitely good... infinitely powerful being: the 
misery of which it is ulill and the obvious imperfection of... man, who is indeed a grotesque 
caricature' (48-9). For Schopenhauer's critique of teleological optimism, see WWI II §27, 76; IV 
§56, 196. 
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II. Human consciousness: suffe ring, ethics, and time. 
Schopenhauer recognises suffering as intrinsic to existence: everything is will in 
phenomenal form, and the will endlessly consumes itself to perpetuate its own 
existence. As such, the will is the source of all evil and existence is pointless to 
the extent that 'our condition is so wretched that total non-existence would be 
decidedly preferable' (WWI IV, §59, 204). For Janaway, given Schopenhauer's 
concession that most manage to strive after their goals 'with enough success to 
protect them from despair, and enough failure to preserve them from boredom' 
(Schopenhauer quoted Janaway "Pessimism" 331), it is 'still unclear why that is 
a kind of existence not to be chosen above non-existence', and why the existence 
of evil in any form can never be counteracted by any amount of good, thus 'any 
suffering at all invalidates the whole world' (Janaway "Pessimism" 331-2). 
Janaway agrees with Georg Simmel 7 that Schopenhauer 'seems guilty of ignoring 
or stipulating away positive feelings that occur within the pattern of willing and 
attainment' (Janaway "Pessimism" 333). Yet, Janaway argues against David 
Cartwright's 8 
 suggestion that 'having a desire does not entail being in misery', by 
claiming that, for Schopenhauer, 'every episode of striving entails some degree 
of painful lack or dissatisfaction', marking a distinction between Schopenhauer's 
use of 'striving' rather than 'mere wanting' (Janaway "Pessimism" 329). For 
Janaway, Schopenhauer's claim is that 'all lives, even those free of [actual] 
misery, inevitably contain numerous, if miniscule, dissatisfactions'; most 
people's lives contain 'some misery and some lives contain mostly misery' 
("Pessimism" 329-30). Cartwright's point regarding desire or striving as not 
necessarily painful is, however, a valid one. It relates as much to the positive 
experience of anticipated happiness, for '[e]xpected happiness is truly 
experienced... more by a pleasurable sensation than a painful one' as Simmel 
puts it (Simmel 64, cited Janaway "Pessimism" 333), as it does to 
Schopenhauer's sidelining of the moment of happiness as a positively 
experienced moment. Allowing for pleasure in the experience of striving or 
6 The will is in its essence 'sinful and reprehensible... [being] the source of all wickedness and 
evil' ("On Affirmation and Denial of the Will to Live", 63-4); see also "Suffering", 41. 
Georg Simmel Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, discussed Janaway "Schopenhauer's Pessimism", 
333. 
desiring may be seen as a problem in Schopenhauer, as he appears to allow the 
prime experience here to be of suffering, with pleasure as a merely illusory 
secondary factor: 
Eternal becoming, endless flux, is essential to the revealing of the will's 
nature. We see the same thing in human aspirations and desires; the 
fulfilment of these masquerades as the ultimate objective of our willing, but 
once we have attained them, they no longer look the same, so that soon, 
forgotten and out of date, they are almost always set aside (even if we do 
not admit it) as vanished illusions.., desire constantly passes into 
satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it 
is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow... (Schopenhauer WWI II §29, 
85) 
If we are lucky, each desire once attained immediately gives way to the next, but 
if were are unlucky and desire falters, the result is 'dreadful, stultifying boredom, 
in lifeless yearning without a definite object, a deadening languor' (85). Yet 
Schopenhauer does not refuse the position of happiness here altogether, he asks 
that we recognise its necessarily transient and momentary nature. Sated desire 
immediately moves ever-onwards to the next object, and he clearly sees the state 
of desiring as preferable to that of boredom. Schopenhauer's delineation of 
salvation also offers moments of satisfaction, even joy, as will be discussed, and 
emphasises the distinction which needs to be made between his necessarily 
pessimistic recognition of what he sees as the true nature of the world and the 
ultimate pointlessness of existence as such, and what he sees as the necessary 
quest for salvation in 4fe,  which, despite his frequent rhetorical flourishes 
suggesting that it would be better if the world did not exist (IV, §59, 204), forms 
the basis of his philosophy and imparts genuine value onto human life. Mark 
Migotti also recognises this distinction, suggesting that, whilst 'there is nothing 
that makes being human worthwhile... [Schopenhauer] does offer his readers a 
next best thing to an unconditioned good, something that can at least make it 
worthwhile to live out one's days' (654, original emphasis). Migotti recognises 
that "pure joy" is accessible via 'will-less contemplation', and claims that what 
Schopenhauer offers is an emeritus or stand-in good of 'complete self-effacement 
of the will', as 'only by living on can one hope to efface one's will and thereby 
contribute to the redemption of the world' (657). Migotti does not examine the 
David E. Cartwright "Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of 
Metaphysics", 51-66. 
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implications of these issues in Schopenhauer's thought, however, either ethically 
or in terms of human value, nor indeed does he raise the implications of hope 
itself. 
Whilst life, for Schopenhauer, is suffering and misery, and its ultimate goal 
aimihilation, he also recognises that life and the world are as we perceive them to 
be. The will is the thing-in-itself, and individual manifestations of phenomena in 
time and space are part of that will, each being 'one and the same, both by its 
nature and in its concept' (Schopenhauer WWI II §23, 45). It is 'only through the 
medium of time and space' that the will 'appear[s] as different, as a plurality of 
co-existent and successive phenomena. Time and space are in consequence the 
principium individuationis', the principle of individuation, of individuality, 'the 
potential for plurality' and the understanding that 'time, space and causality do 
not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only forms of knowing' (44-5). As such, 
individual death should not be feared as it is a natural and inevitable part of life, 
the individual 'is only phenomenal' and 'receives his life as a gift, rises out of 
nothing, then suffers the loss of that gift through death, and returns again to 
nothing' (IV §54, 177). Indeed death is desirable in nature once procreation is 
achieved as the preservation of the species is Nature's only aim (178). Whilst 
this offers a transient and ultimately pointless view of individual human life, it 
does not denigrate the experience of suffering or the value of the individual as 
recognising this truth is necessary in order to allow our false perceptions - and 
suffering itself - to be overcome. Individual consciousness does not continue 
after life has ended as it is not needed then. Consciousness is 'a mere accident of 
our being... a fruit, a product, of the rest of the organism... [and] merely serves 
the purpose of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the organism with 
the external world' (II Supp. 87)10. 
 The point here is that, for Schopenhauer, 
Death is in fact an 'awakening' from life, the latter being a 'dream' - appearance only - to which 
the individual belongs by virtue of their perceiving consciousness; thus death is the 'return to [a 
state] originally our own from which life has been only a brief absence' (Schopenhauer "On the 
Indestructibility of our Essential Being by Death", 70), a state which we only perceive as 
annihilation. 
Consciousness is 'merely an expedient for helping the animal get what it needs [to survive]', 
which, whilst reaching 'its peak in us', provides 'cognition only of phenomena, [therefore] is 
altogether superfluous' ("Indestructibility" 71) after phenomenal life has ended. The will is all that 
persists after phenomenal life hasended, but this is 'the indestructible primal being' not individual 
consciousness: see "Indestructibility", 73; and WWI IV, §54, 184-5. Also, see Schopenhauer WWR, 
XLIV "Metaphysics", esp.559, for Schopenhauer's specific discussion of the next generation and 
the species as a whole as that in which the human being-in-itself exists. In both of these discussions 
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consciousness or intellect is a merely accidental and secondary occurrence to that 
of the will (which is the First Cause) (87). As such, intellect is demoted from a 
primary essence, but its importance is elevated through its having reached a stage 
of development in the human that enables: 
self-conscious reflectiveness which ranges over the future and the past, 
and, as a consequence, deliberation, careful concern, the capacity for 
premeditated action independent of the present, and.., the altogether 
distinct consciousness of one's own decisions as such. (II §27, 77)11 
It is also the case that the intensity of our suffering is itself a direct result of our 
intellectual ability: 'as knowledge attains to distinctness and as consciousness 
intensifies, there is a proportionate increase in pain, which accordingly reaches 
its highest degree in man;... the more distinctly a man knows... the more pain he 
feels' (IV, §56, 196). The implications of this relate to all our perceptions of the 
world, and act to further exacerbate our own suffering as our understanding 
extends into time, space and causality, thus we are preoccupied with thinking 
about the 'lost paradise' (111 §38, 122) of the past and our hopes and fears for the 
future' 2 . This is Schopenhauer's basis for seeing all striving as suffering in one 
form or another. Yet, at the same time, our intellect also ensures that we would 
be bored with life without willing, and thus without suffering as: 
Such is life for almost everyone; they desire, they know what they desire, 
and they strive after it with sufficient success to keep them from despair, 
and sufficient failure to save them from boredom and its consequences. 
From this comes a certain serenity, or at least unconcern, which wealth or 
of that which does continue to exist beyond the life of the individual, it is again clear that 
pessimism is to a limited extent qualified in terms of offering a consoling view of death. Whilst 
the individual is indeed annihilated and individual consciousness does not survive, the essence 
does survive, whether in the macro-cosmic will, or the individual's specific progeny and the 
species. For Schopenhauer, the sexual impulse of the will-to-life also affirms and perpetuates the 
essence, the will, but in also perpetuating the existence of suffering, it is not therefore to be 
welcomed philosophically-speaking, although he does concede the possibility of a positive, even 
happy, male-female relationship (WWR "Metaphysics", 553-8). The will-to-life fools individuals 
into believing they will be happy together, thus, once the 'genius of the species achieves its object' 
(553) and the sexual urge has been fulfilled, 'everyone who is in love finds himself duped' (540) as 
the reality of their incompatibility becomes apparent. 
Through intellect, we can 'refer sensation to its cause, and at last perception: whereupon the 
world will be there, appearing in space, time and causal connection', thus illustrating the role of 
intellect and 'the merely phenomenal existence of the external world' ("On Philosophy and the 
Intellect", 121-2). 
12 See also Schopenhauer "Suffering": 'everything is powerfully intensified by thinking about 
absent and future things, and this is... the origin of care, fear and hope, which, once they have been 
aroused, make a far stronger impression on men than do actual present pleasures or sufferings 
[and] the measure of suffering increases.., far more than the enjoyment, and is very greatly 
enhanced specifically by the fact that he actually knows of death... having it in view.., all the time' 
(44, original emphasis). 
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poverty really does not alter; for... [none] enjoy what they have.., but what 
they hope to attain. (IV §60, 207)' 
Our intrinsic suitedness to willing, then, arguably refines the suggestion that 
Schopenhauer definitively posits this as 'the worst of all possible worlds' 
(Oxenford 394, and Janaway "Pessimism" 321), suggesting, paradoxically, that 
this is not the worst of all possible worlds for us as we are manifestations of the 
endlessly desiring will, thus suited to the world in which we find ourselves. As 
such, we have an intrinsic need to desire, and we are also able to recognise both 
the will and our place in the world, which gives rise to immediate implications 
for attaining salvation. Janaway argues against what he sees as Schopenhauer's 
reasoning that the world is the worst possible (as, for Schopenhauer, if it were 
any worse the world would be unsustainable), by countering that it could indeed 
be worse and still exist ("Pessimism" 32 1-2). My point here is that, for 
Schopenhauer, we are inherently suited to the world as it is, thus it is not the 
worst possible world, although any consolation that might be gained from this 
point alone is, of course, limited. Other aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy 
argue more distinctly against recognising the world as the worst possible, as will 
become clear. 
Our hopeful relationship with time lies in the 'anticipation of a happy 
future which, together with the enchanting products of the imagination which 
accompany it, is the source of most of our greatest joys and pleasures' 
(Schopenhauer "Suffering" 45) (thus our intellect intensifies our anticipatory 
pleasure), hope is therefore a false position, tied to our false perceptions of time 
as it is. If, then, 'no man is happy but strives his whole life long after a supposed 
happiness which he seldom attains', life itself is positioned as 'living ad interim' 
("Vanity" 53, original emphasis); passing by without regard in endless 
expectation of something else, and time is revealed (or reveals itself) as 'that by 
virtue of which everything becomes nothingness in our hands and loses all real 
value' (51). Here, life as it is lived is as much tied to intellect as it is to the will- 
u See also WWI II §29, 85; plus Schopenhauer "Suffering": 'we require at all times a certain 
quantity of care or sorrow or want ... [as] if every desire were satisfied as soon as it arose how 
would men occupy their lives, how would they pass the time?.., some men would die of boredom 
or hang themselves, some would fight and kill one another, and thus they would create for 
themselves more suffering than nature inflicts on them as it is. Thus for a race such as this no 
stage, no form of existence is suitable other than the one it already possesses' (43, original 
emphasis). 
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to-life, can be seen to negate itself in being effectively ignored, and is a 
miserable, pointless and valueless existence anyway. Paradoxically, negating life 
appears to be the ultimate ideal of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the more 
permanent solution he offers to the suffering inherent in existence: knowledge of 
our true situation leads to denial of the will-to-life as a means of transcending 
this world of suffering, gaining redemption, and attaining a form of salvation. 
Yet, whilst our intellect distorts our perception of our true situation at the same 
time as intensifying it (intensifying the pain we feel), it is our relationships with 
space and time which are the key here. In our preoccupation with thinking about 
past ideals or sufferings and future hopes and fears instead of life as it is lived in 
the present, our "hopeful" perceptions of time and existence denote our false 
relationship with the world. This is the difference between a focus on 'real 
objects' which 'are only in the present' and a more dream-like existence 
focussing on 'the past and the future', which 'contain only concepts and fancies', 
whereas 'the present is the essential form of the phenomenon of the will, and 
inseparable from it' (WWI IV §54, 181) 1 . We are always desiring happiness 
outside of the moment in which we live, and ignoring the present even though, as 
Schopenhauer insists, 'we must distinctly recognise that the form of the 
phenomenon of will... the form of life or of reality, is really only the present, not 
the future or the past... the present alone is the form of all life, and is... also its 
sure possession which can never be wrested from it' (180, original emphasis). 
This recognition is crucial, and has significant, positive implications. Whilst our 
intellect increases our suffering, at the same time it allows us to recognise the 
true nature of self and world, and leads to the possibility of salvation. That 
salvation, in whatever form, is itself a possibility in l(fe offers the first and crucial 
glimmer of hope in the midst of Schopenhauer's pessimistic world view. 
Schopenhauer's explicit claim to pessimism is a later and occasional 
addition to his philosophy, as Janaway recognises, ("Pessimism" 319), but 
Schopenhauer consistently recognises a pessimistic stance as the only true 
representation of the world, castigating the optimists and rationalists, whose 
views are 'a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity' (WWJ IV 
" See also WWJ III §38, 122; and IV §54, 180-3; and "Vanity" 53. 
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§59, 206) 1 . Beneath such explicit points, the pessimistic emphasis of his 
philosophical position is of course unavoidable, yet Schopenhauer's pessimism is 
qualified by his placing of the world as one of suffering and atonement. In 
providing the potential for redemption and salvation, Schopenhauer offers forms 
of hope, and that this is a practical and attainable hope lies in its being placed as 
accessible in life, rather than deferred to after life has ended. This is intensified 
by the positive potential that his emphasis on reality being only the present 
moment provides, as 'the present alone is the form of all life, and is... also its 
sure possession which can never be wrested from it' (IV §54, 180). Alongside 
this, the intellectual capacity and reflective consciousness that the human has 
realised is not primary, but secondary to the will (II Supp. 90-I). This has two 
implications. One is its accidental role as a mere 'mechanical aid... needed at 
this stage of the will's objectification for the preservation of the individual and 
the... species' (II §27, 76). The other is more significant as it is that through 
which 'the world as idea comes into existence... with all its forms, object and 
subject, time, space, plurality, and causality' (II §27, 76), and is therefore crucial 
in recognising the real conditions of existence and attaining salvation. 
Schopenhauer's philosophy explicitly examines the human, in essence and 
subjectivity, in ethical terms, and retains the ideal of salvation as an objective for 
the human individual. Schopenhauer views each character as determined or 
fixed, and as such, ethical behaviour is only available to those who have the 
required character and motive, have perceived the true pessimistic nature of the 
world, and thus use their knowledge to override their own will to relieve 
suffering in the world (WWI IV §55-56, 187-195). There is no "free will" as 
such as each individual 'is not free, but subject to necessity... in spite of all his 
resolutions and reflections he does not alter his conduct' (II §23, 46). As 
'individuality is a dominant feature of mankind', and as each 'person has a 
character of his own; hence the same motive has not the same influence on 
everyone' (23, 51). Each individual's 'actions follow with absolute necessity 
from the coincidence of character with motives' (IV §55, 190), thus each 
IS 
 See also Schopenhauer "On Law and Politics": those who see the world as "an end in itself' and 
thus... an altogether splendid structure, a regular abode of bliss', and who falsely attribute the 
'colossal evil of the world.., entirely to governments' (154) are an absurdity for Schopenhauer as 
such views ignore the reality of suffering and its cause. For Schopenhauer's specific comments on 
rationalists, see also "On Religion" 195-6. 
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individual is unique, and responds uniquely - but nonetheless predictably, in line 
with their individual character - to motive. As the manifestation of the will-to-
life in each individual shows itself in 'the ambition of [each] inmost nature, and 
the aim [each] pursues accordingly, this we can never change by outside 
influence' (193), that is, the essential character of each individual cannot be 
changed. The will-to-life is blind' 6 and, in endlessly seeking to manifest itself 
'undisturbed by knowledge... does, in general, occupy human life' (IV §59, 
206). In this the human who is dominated by willing is egoistic, seeking only to 
affirm their own will-to-life, inevitably at the expense of someone or something 
else's. There are many forms of egoism, which differ only by degree, and 
whether it involves murder, violence, coercion or lying, the egoistic act is 'as 
such wrong because.., it aims... to extend the authority of my will to other 
individuals, and so to affirm my will by denying theirs' (IV §62, 214) 1 . With 
egoism, 'each individual is given to itself directly as the whole will and the 
whole subject of ideas, all the other individuals are given to him initially only as 
his ideas' (IV §61, 211). Therefore the egoist 'regards and treats only his own 
person as a real person, and all others as mere phantoms' (II §19, 37) rather than 
material reality, affirming her or his own will to the extent that 'the same will 
manifest in another individual' (IV §62, 212) is denied. Yet, intellect allows us 
to transcend the will and 'there results either the aesthetic challenge to 
contemplate' the inner nature of the world 'or the ethical challenge to renounce' 
(IV, §60 207). Deliberately egoistic behaviour can use intellect to inform 
behaviour intended to compel another's will to serve the egoist's will (IV §62, 
214) and as such, the position of the egoist is as far away from redemption as it is 
possible to be (IV §60, 207). In using their knowledge of the true "evil" nature 
of willing to deny the will, thus deny its impinging on another's will, the 
individual not dominated by the egoistic will moves away from egoism towards 
salvation. Salvation, or release from the suffering will, can be achieved on a 
temporary basis in aesthetic contemplation which, as will be discussed, provides 
16 
'striv[ing] only blindly, dumbly, partially, and immutably... [the] will denotes the being-in-
itself... and the sole kernel of every phenomenon' (WWI II, §23, 50-I). 
" The egoist's '[u]njust or wicked actions are.., signs of the strength of [the egoist's] affirmation 
of the will to live, and thus how far he still is from true salvation, which is denial of this will, and 
from redemption from this world' ("Affirmation" 65). Lies and cunning are, however, acceptable 
means of self-defence with which to deflect another's egoistic will (On the Basis of Morality § 17, 
158-9). 
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a unique access to knowledge as well as a position in which willing is suspended 
for a time, although this is necessarily short-lived and has less immediately 
ethical connotations. More lasting redemption from suffering can only take place 
through deliberate denial of the will, which arises out of knowledge and a 
recognition and acceptance of the true pessimistic nature of existence rather than 
false perceptions, whereas the egoistic use of knowledge still involves a false 
recognition of self and world. After the will-led position of egoism, there are 
three ethical positions or characters, the first offering a clear and positive 
departure from egoism, and the other two moving even further away from the 
will, the final position of severe ascetic self-renunciation offering a more lasting 
form of redemption, albeit the most pessimistic of all Schopenliauer's routes 18 . 
These ethical positions not only offer the optimistic element of hope for 
individual redemption, but also of human value. Leaping from the egoist, the 
furthest from salvation, to discuss Schopenhauer's ultimate ideal of true and 
more lasting salvation, the position of extreme asceticism, this provides the 
ultimate pessimism outlined by Oxenford and Janaway, amongst others, wherein 
true redemption of 'the world's guilt' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §63, 216) 
(imposed by virtue of its culpable will) and salvation from the world of suffering, 
can be attained. 
Severe self-denial is Schopenhauer's ultimate ideal, offering '[t]rue 
salvation, redemption from life and suffering, [which] cannot even be imagined 
without total denial of the will' as, until then, 'everyone is nothing but this will 
itself, whose manifestation is an ephemeral existence, an always vain, constantly 
frustrated endeavour' (IV §68, 250, my emphasis). Asceticism is recognised by 
most critics as Schopenhauer's only vision of salvation, however, a position 
which in effect brings an end to the world for the individual in order to attain 
release from suffering. The ascetic sees through our false perceptions of the 
world, recognising the pointless and endless suffering that life entails, and our 
false relations with time, hope, and one another, thus deliberately renounces life 
for the 'peace and felicity.., found in the life of saintly people' (IV §68, 246). 
To achieve this, the will has to be totally subdued, leaving the subject as: 
IS These latter two ethical positions are not to be confused with Schopenhauer's two paths to his 
ultimate position, ascetic denial of the will. These are: 'recognition... induced by suffering which 
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a pure, knowing being, the undimmed minor of the world. Nothing more 
can trouble him, nothing can move him, for he has cut all the thousand 
cords of will which keep us bound to the world, and which, as desire, fear, 
envy, anger, tear and pull us hither and thither, inflicting constant pain. (IV 
§68, 246) 
The pessimistic aspect of this is clear: in order to achieve release from suffering 
one has to renounce the world, which effectively ceases to exist for the ascetic 
subject. Ascetic self-denial appears to deny that any value can be found in 
existence and provides SchopetThauer's ultimately pessimistic viewpoint, leaving 
Oxenford and many others to find Schopenhauer's entire philosophy 'the most 
disheartening, the most repulsive, the most opposed to the aspirations of the 
present world' (Oxenford 394). Such a path can be seen to offer a form of hope, 
however, albeit at its bleakest, in at least offering an avenue through which the 
individual has the potential of attaining a form of release from suffering - of 
salvation - in life. Thus, whilst hope is recognised as a false position, by offering 
a tangible escape route from this world of suffering in life a form of hope is 
effectively reinserted. Such a narrow hope afforded by severe asceticism may be 
fi.,rther tempered by its primary availability being for the practising individual, 
the alleviation of another's suffering being an incidental (albeit deliberate) 
refusal to impinge upon another's will. Whilst Schopenhauer does not preclude 
the severe ascetic also actively relieving the sufferings of others, the primary 
concern seems to be the attainment of one's own Nirvana, a peaceful release 
from suffering through ascetic self-renunciation. For Schopenhauer, asceticism 
is a position in which one also seeks out as much self-inflicted pain as possible, 
including flagellation and deprivation, thus any benefit this might offer to other 
individual people is only by virtue of the ascetic's no-longer-willing will ceasing 
to struggle against another's will 19 . There is a distinction which needs to be 
made between the two paths Schopenhauer recognises as the route to asceticism 
in terms of any hope which may be offered here. Whilst asceticism by choice 
offers the individual a limited form of hope in obtaining release from suffering 
through that person's own actions, the second path to ascetic renunciation is 
is merely and purely known (and which we freely make our own by penetrating the principium 
individuationis), or by suffering which is directlyfelt by us personally' (WWI IV §68, 250). 
19 For Schopenhauer, 'if there is no final goal or purpose in striving', which is merely the perpetual 
state of the will, 'there is no due portion, no purpose in suffering (WWJ IV §56, 195), yet he also 
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formed incidentally in the individual by the personal experience of unbearable 
suffering (rather than knowledge leading to chosen self-mortification) 20. In this 
case, it is a form of salvation attained when the individual is effectively 
transfonned by complete loss of all hope through circumstance rather than choice 
(Schopenhauer WWI IV §68, 248-9). Although even here, the 'complete 
resignation' brought about by 'fate' offers purification and sanctification, 'peace' 
and 'sublimity' (247), and even 'inward joy and the fill peace of heaven' (245, 
my emphasis) (not only when death approaches), and Schopenhauer recognises a 
clearly exalted view of the 'gleam of silver which suddenly emerges from the 
refiner's fire of suffering... salvation' (248). 
Whilst asceticism offers a quasi-mystical, exalted salvation, this is 
Schopenhauer's most extreme and most permanent form of salvation, whether 
asceticism-by-choice or by circumstance. Nonetheless, even this is not a state of 
permanence as it involves an ongoing battle with the will-to-life as this always 
seeks to reassert itself, being, of course, the individual's true essence and the 
body is the will's manifestation. The ascetic-by-choice needs to constantly and 
intentionally break their own will by 'seeking out the disagreeable, the freely 
chosen life of penance and self-chastisement for the continual mortification of 
the will' (IV §68, 247, my emphasis). Whilst ascetic self-denial offers a clearly 
limited form of optimism, it nonetheless reclaims the idea of individual hope in 
offering an escape from one's own suffering in life, accessed by one's own 
deliberate actions, thus its pessimism is tempered. Schopenhauer's emphasis on 
reality being only the present moment, as 'only the present, not the future or the 
past... is the form of all life, and is... also its sure possession which can never be 
wrested from it' (IV §54, 180), enables the present to become that in which the 
hope that suffering can be alleviated is enacted 21 . Whilst recognising that 
Schopenhauer's view 'of our nature, which none of our strivings has the power to 
alter, [insists] some suffering is inevitable and great suffering perfectly possible 
for any of us... is somewhere near the truth', Janaway asks 'what attitude should 
we [therefore] adopt towards life if it is thus correctly described?' ("Pessimism" 
claims that self-inflicted suffering to subdue the will provides the ultimate ascetic route to 
salvation, thus does give this suffering a perverse "purpose" at least. 
20 See footnote 18 above. 
21 See Schopenhauer "Vanity": the 'fleeting present' is 'the sole form in which actuality exists' 
(51). 
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334). Janaway sees Schopenhauer's solution of asceticism to be the only answer 
he offers, and rightly points out the pessimism of becoming 'indifferent to 
happiness and unhappiness, unattached to the body, not wedded to the 
furtherance of any goals which an individual being might pursue' that attaining 'a 
state of detachment from living as an end' ("Pessimism" 340) involves. Janaway 
points out that this state of Nirvana is attained through 'an exceptionally anti- 
egoistic vision', but argues that 'the pathos of Schopenhauer is that, revealing to 
us our "true nature" in the will to life, he sees precisely this as what we must 
disown before our existence can claim to have value' ("Pessimism" 341). Before 
this extreme state of ascetic self-renunciation, however, Schopenhauer's anti- 
egoistic recognition has other, much less pessimistic implications. Whilst 
knowledge and a pessimistic acceptance of the world as it really is can lead to 
deliberate ascetic self-denial, recognition of the world and one's place in it also 
leads to a denial of the will which provides the other forms in which redemption 
can be attained. The underlying basis of Schopenhauer's ascetic position is of an 
ethical nature, arising from a true recognition of self and world. This 
recognition, which is delineated in Schopenhauer's discussions of the I-thou 
relationship, has much more positive and potentially optimistic implications 
regarding the two ethical positions which arise between the two extreme points of 
the egoist and the ascetic: that of the "just" human and the compassionate human. 
Whilst removing the idea of certainty22 , intellect frees the human from 
being 'bound to the present' of willing, a state in which less self-conscious 
animals remain, and enables us to reflect with 'careful concern' upon both past 
and future, and, crucially, thereby 'the capacity for premeditated action 
independent of the present' (Schopenhauer WWI II §27, 76-7) becomes possible. 
The present becomes positive through knowledge of it as the only form of reality, 
thus removing it from its perpetual negation through false consciousness (where 
the present is ignored by conscious effort focusing on future anticipation or past 
loss), at the same time as it becomes positive through being the place in which 
knowledge of consequence can be enacted. Those with the necessary character 
22 The 'unerring confidence and regularity with which the will] worked till now in inorganic and 
merely vegetative nature, depended upon its being active exclusively in its original being, as blind 
impulse, will... without interference from a second and entirely different world, the world as 
idea... and [which] now meddles in the sequence of its phenomena' thus 'unerring certainty comes 
to an end' (WWI II §27, 76). 
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and motive to do so are enabled by intellect, and the perception of our true 
relationship with time and the world, to positively and ethically inhabit the 
tangible moment. Intrinsically aligned with the human capacity for intellectual 
thinking - our perceptions of the world, the knowledge and intensity of our 
suffering, and our capacity for abstract conception of time and consequence - is 
Schopenhauer's much-ignored ethic of compassion rather than of accusation 
towards others. Here: 
The suffering which he sees in others touches him almost as closely as his 
own... He becomes aware that the distinction between himself and others, 
which to the wicked person is so great a gulf, belongs only to a fleeting, 
deceptive phenomenon... recognis[ing] directly and without argument that 
the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others, namely the will 
to life, which constitutes the inner nature of each and everything.., indeed, 
that this applies also to the animals and the whole of nature, and hence he 
will not cause suffering even to an animal. (IV §66, 235)23 
Janaway finds SchopeiThauer's delineation of compassion difficult to reconcile 
with his insistence that the primary impulse is that of egoism, and that 
individuation is "mere phenomena" rather than ultimately part of reality' 
(Schopenhauer 8 1-3), seeing only Schopenhauer's asceticism as 'the individual's 
renunciation of his or her individuality... [and] the only attitude which can 
compensate for.., existing at all' (84). Yet for Schopenhauer, 'everyone has to 
regard all the suffering of the world as his own', as the 'happy temporal life... 
23 Schopenhauer's human ethic is not Eurocentric: he emphatically denounces the enslavement and 
brutality meted out by 'devils in human form, these bigoted, church-going, Sabbath-keeping 
scoundrels' upon 'their innocent black brothers whom force and injustice have delivered into their 
devilish clutches' ("On Ethics" §5, 138). Whilst Schopenhauer makes clearly misogynistic 
statements, such as that women are 'childish, silly and short-sighted.., a kind of intermediate stage 
between the child and the man, who is the actual human being' ("On Women", §3, 81; see also §1-
9, 80-88), these are those very traits highlighted and condenmed as resulting directly from the way 
women are treated, both philosophically and socially, during this broad period by thinkers such as 
Mary Wolistonecraft (A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 1792, esp. Chapters 24) and J. S. 
Mill (The Subjection of Women, 1869, esp. pages 4 -21). Interestingly, however, Schopenhauer 
delineates that men genetically bequeath to a child 'the will [which is] the principle of bondage', 
whilst women bequeath intellect, which is 'the redeeming principle' ("Affirmation", §5, 64), and 
explicitly claims that whilst 'women are as a rule inferior to men in the virtue of justice, and thus 
of uprightness and conscientiousness... On the other hand, they surpass men in the virtue of 
philanthropy or loving-kindness, for the origin of this is in most cases intuitive and therefore 
appeals directly to compassion, to which women are decidedly more easily susceptible' (Morality, 
III, §17, 151, original emphasis). As David Cartwright points out, Schopenhauer 'believes he can 
show that compassion is the basis of all virtues', which offers valuable evidence to Carol Gilligan's 
argument that in Schopenhauer's own terms 'the misogynistic Schopenhauer has more of a 
woman's morality than a man's' (Cartwright "Introduction" On the Basis of Morality xxviii; & 
th27, Gilligan In a Different Voice, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982). Schopenhauer also extends 
his ethic to non-human animals, and, whilst this is not immediately relevant to the discussion here, 
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amid the sufferings of countless other people... is only... a dream from which he 
must awake in order to find out that only a fleeting illusion had separated him 
from the suffering of his life' (WWI IV §63, 218). The 'misery both experienced 
by oneself and inflicted upon others.., always affect the one and the same inner 
being' (219), and thus the knowledge of suffering and shared existence allows 
the individual to recognise that 'this thou art' (220). As such, 'virtue must spring 
from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the 
same essence as in our own', and 'ethical value' becomes 'the chief business in 
human life' (IV §66, 230, my emphasis) which finds its 'expression not in words, 
but only in deeds, in action, in the course of a human life' (232). 
In positioning the present in the positive terms of lived reality as 'only the 
present, not the ffiture or the past... is the form of all life' (IV §54, 180), these 
terms provide an optimistic viewpoint in the potential for positive action 24. In 
this present actuality, human actions - whilst always pre-determined due to 
character and motivation - are wholly attributable to the individual, who is 'a 
specific personal character.,, the empirical character - marked by the necessary 
development in time and the division into separate actions that time imposes' (II 
§28, 81). As such, 'every person has constant aims and motives in accordance 
with which he directs his conduct, and he can always account for his individual 
actions' (II §29, 84)25. 
 This is because human intellect is capable of reasoning 
consequences and the existence of choice in action is realised: 'in man not only 
does the faculty of ideas of perception... reach the highest degree of perfection, 
but the abstract idea, thought, i.e., the faculty of reason, and with it reflection, is 
added' (11 Supp. 89, original emphasis). Whilst the will and the intellect are 
subject to 'a curious interplay within us' (90), the 'intellect calls the tune, and the 
will must dance to it... behav[ing] like a body which is moved.., the 
understanding behav[ing] like the causes which set it in motion, for it is the 
the implications for ethical behaviour necessarily extending to other creatures is evident (also see 
Schopenhauer's footnote 2, WWJ IV, §66, 235 and "Religion" §3, 187-9). 
24 See also Schopcnhauer "Indestructability" as that 'alone which persists' is 'the present, which is 
in the strictest sense the sole form of reality, [and] has its source in us' (69, original emphasis). 
23 See also Schopenhauer "Affirmation": The 'apparitional form of his own, utterly free and primal 
will.., has created for itself the intellect appropriate to it; so that all his actions, however 
necessarily they may be the result of his character in conflict with the motivations acting on him at 
any given time, and however necessarily these again may arise as a consequence of his corporeity, 
are nonetheless to be attributed wholly to him' (56). 
31 
medium of motives' (9 1)26. 
 Thus reasoning can overrule will and act according 
to the "moral good" rather than the inherently "evil" will as 'Knowledge can 
always counterbalance' (IV §66, 234) the will in each individual. Each 
individual can act in a "virtuous" compassionate manner as a direct result of the 
recognition that all phenomena - both land thou - are manifestations of the same 
will. Recognition of the commonality of suffering leads to deliberate acts of 
'renunciation' that are practised 'in order to relieve the sufferings of others' 
(235), and are 'the source and essence of love and nobility of character' (IV §68, 
237) of the compassionate individual 27 . It is important to clarify that this 
"renunciation" is acting to relieve another's suffering by not affirming one's own 
will at another's expense, rather than asceticism, however, as the ascetic takes 
this a stage further, being 'even ready to sacrifice his own individuality if others 
can be saved thereby' (237). Compassion effectively reverses the false position 
of egoism, which Schopenhauer vilifies as equal to that of 'theoretical egoism, 
which... holds all phenomena, excepting its own individual self to be phantoms' 
(II §19, 37, original emphasis). Whilst asceticism also involves the I-thou 
recognition of all phenomena as manifestations of the same will, Schopenhauer's 
human ethic includes the realisation that all 'true and pure love.., and even all 
spontaneous justice, results from our seeing through the principium 
individuationis' 28 , thus recognising that there is no distinction between I and 
thou, and 'our doing so with perfect clarity brings about complete sanctification 
and redemption' (IV §68, 250, original emphasis) 29 . This opens the way for the 
compassionate "good" human to attain redemption through compassionate 
26 See also Schopenhauer "On Psychology": 'Reason deserves also to be called a prophet, for it 
holds the future up to us (namely as the coming consequence and effect of what we are now 
doing). This is precisely why it is calculated to keep us in check when... desires... threaten to 
mislead us into courses which we would later be bound to regret' (171, original emphasis). 
27 Compassionate actions include 'tolerance, patience, forbearance and charity' (Schopenhauer 
"Suffering" 50). 
28 The principle of the individuation of things - for Schopenhauer, a false recognition: 'plurality is 
necessarily conditioned by space and time, and is conceivable only in them; and in this context we 
call them the principium individuationis' (WWIII §25, 59). 
29 See also WWJ IV §61, 210-11; §63, 218-19; and Morality III §16, 144; and see "Ethics": 
Compassion arises through the sensation of 'pity', which makes 'the wall between Thou and 1... 
thin and transparent', even to the point of removing it altogether 'whereupon the distinction 
between I and Not-I disappears' (134). Pity is not a lofty or patronising sentiment, born out of 
superiority over one less fortunate as can be construed in English usage, but is one of equality, of 
compassion for one's comrade-in-suffering. Compassion: - das Mitleid (charity, commiseration, 
compassion, mercy, pitifulness, pity, ruth, sympathy), or das MitgefUhl (emotion, feeling, 
sentiment); Pity: - das Mitleid, or das Erbarmen (mercy). 
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behaviour in life, thus providing an avenue to salvation which falls short of 
Schopenhauer's ultimate ascetic stepping out of life altogether. 
For Schopenhauer, justice provides the first ethical position which offers a 
clear departure from egoism, but this should not be confused with social 'justice" 
as a punitive justice system can merely disguise cruel and wicked behaviour 
behind the veil of law (IV, §66, 23 1-2; and §65, 227). For an individual to 
exhibit true justice is to 'show[] by his behaviour that he also recognises his own 
nature' in another individual and 'in so far as he places the other being on a par 
with himself: he does the other no harm' (IV §66, 233, original emphasis) 30 . To 
actively and deliberately relieve the sufferings of others enacts the next step, the 
"good" or compassionate human, offering redemption by a clearly less extreme 
route than asceticism offers. Whilst the "just" and compassionate positions are a 
less "ideal" form of salvation that asceticism, offering a less perfect or permanent 
redemption from suffering in Schopenhauer's exalted terms, they provide more 
optimistic and accessible routes than total ascetic self-denial. Attaining ascetic 
salvation is for those rare "saintly" individuals, but the qualities that enable the 
realisation of the 'just" and the compassionate human appear to be common to 
most people as 'ethical value' is 'the chief business in human life' (230). The 
movement 'to positive benevolence and beneficence, and to philanthropy' is 
something which 'may happen irrespective of the strength and energy of the will 
manifest in such an individual', as 'knowledge can always counterbalance it in 
him' (234) 1 . Thus the intellect, for Schopenhauer, whilst being a purely 
secondary element, acts to enable I-thou recognition in each individual, and 
offers the potential to override the dominant will and act with compassion 
30 See also Schopenhauer "Suffering": we should view the 'so-called imperfections of the majority 
of men, i.e. their moral and intellectual shortcomings... without surprise and certainly without 
indignation: for we shall always bear in mind where we are and consequently regard every man 
first and foremost as a being who exists only as a consequence of his culpability and whose life is 
an expiation of being born... [thus] instil in us indulgence towards one another... [our] fellow 
sufferer... [which] makes us see other men in a true light and reminds us of what are the most 
necessary of all things: tolerance, patience, forbearance and charity, which each of us needs and 
which each of us therefore owes' (49-50). 
' Whilst in WWI Schopenhauer also finds that 'most people know of the countless sufferings of 
others... but do not make up their minds to alleviate them, because to do so would require some 
sacrifice' (IV §66, 234, my emphasis), thus suggesting that his intuitive ethical empathy is actively 
ignored by the egoistic majority, in On the Basis of Morality, he argues that 'the appeal... actually 
exists in everyone to act justly and do good, or counterbalance the strong tendencies to injustice 
and harshness' (Ill §12, 120, my emphasis). The 'virtue of philanthropy or loving-kindness.., is in 
most cases intuitive', and, interestingly, is a virtue to which women are 'more easily susceptible' 
(III, §17, 151, original emphasis): see also fn 23 above. 
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towards one's fellow sufferers. Günter Zöller recognises that Schopenhauer 
disagrees with philosophical tradition by placing the intellect as 'neither the sole 
nor necessarily the main factor of the self, and 'distinguishes two alternative but 
complementary conceptions of selihood: one in which the will forms the core of 
the human being and one in which the human being achieves selthood through 
the cultivation of the intellect' (18). As discussed earlier, Janaway agrees with 
Simmel (64) that Schopenhauer overlooks seeing 'positively felt satisfactions' as 
happiness, wherein 'Life might still be worth living, at least for what feelings of 
satisfaction it does contain, if that is where we should look for its worth' 
(Janaway "Pessimism" 333). Yct Schopenhauer implicitly sees value in 
positively felt satisfactions, as long as they arise out of recognition of the true 
nature of self and world rather than egoistic relations that seek to fulfil one's own 
will at the expense of another. He rates the experience of redemption from the 
state of willing in exalted terms that suggest this is experienced as happiness 
even where he does not explicitly use the word. Setting out a lengthy ethics of 
justice and compassion to actively relieve suffering in the world clearly 
recognises the value of each suffering individual. As Schopenhauer also argues 
that happiness is merely relief from suffering, as such, behaving with justice and 
compassion in the world must therefore at the very least make positive happiness 
a possibility. Even outside of deliberate denial of the will, however, happiness 
appears to be possible for Schopenhauer: 
happy marriages are rare... [but] passionate sexual love is sometimes 
associated with.., real friendship based on harmony of disposition, which 
nevertheless often appears only when sexual love proper is extinguished in 
its satisfaction. That friendship will then often spring from the fact that 
the... physical, moral, and intellectual qualities of the two individuals, from 
which arose the sexual love... [for a child to be produced] are also related 
to one another with reference to the individuals themselves.., and thereby 
form the basis of a harmony of dispositions. (WWR "Metaphysics" 558) 
So, whilst love is literally blind for Schopenhauer (553), fooling people into 
believing they will be happy in love whereas they will soon find out they have 
been 'duped' (540), happiness in love, in life, which is not associated with denial 
of the will is nonetheless possible. 
Janaway does recognise that Schopenhauer 'is also prepared to describe 
aesthetic experience.., as a special kind of pleasure or enjoyment', whereby 
Schopenhauer appears to differentiate the happiness he associates with 'the 
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cessation of willing' (Schopenhauer 60, my emphasis) from the happiness 
associated with willing. Whilst such satisfaction and happiness are temporary 
sensations, and Schopetthauer would argue that they are also moments in which 
willing, thus life, is transcended rather than positively experienced, the problem 
for seeing Schopenhauer's philosophy in purely pessimistic terms remains, not 
least in his advocating that such satisfactions are sought for in 1(fe by individuals. 
It is worth mentioning the question of suicide here as critics often presume 
Schopenhauer's philosophy advocates self-destruction or suicide 32 . Whilst 
Schopenhauer views the truly hopeless and resigned individual as 'joyfully 
embracing death' (WWI IV §68, 247) when it finally arrives, he does not 
advocate suicide as he sees this as actually affirming the life of the egoistic 
individual - who is merely dissatisfied with their own lot in life thus seeks to 
annihilate the individual phenomenon rather than the will-to-life itself - and this 
is clearly an important distinction for him ([V §69, 250-54). Even where 
'anyone is oppressed by the burdens of life, who desires life and affirms it but 
abhors its torments, and in particular can no longer endure the hard lot that has 
fallen to him personally' has 'no deliverance to hope for from death, and caimot 
save himself by means of suicide' which, in Schopenhauer's ethical emphasis, 
'show[s] itself in a light even less favourable' (IV §54, 183). This is an 
interesting paradox when following Schopenhauer's delineation of salvation, as, 
unlike asceticism, genuine justice and deliberately compassionate behaviour, 
suicide effectively removes value from existence as it does not offer the 
possibility of ethical salvation in 4fè. 
32 As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 below. 
" Schopenhauer also claims that the 'only cogent moral argument against suicide is that it is 
opposed to the achievement of the highest moral good, inasmuch as it substitutes for a true 
redemption from this world of misery a merely apparent one' ("On Suicide" 78), thus the question 
of 'the highest moral good' is paramount for Schopenhauer. At the same time, Schopenhauer 
exalts the beauty of I-thou recognition where it is 'most clearly and beautifully evident in those 
cases in which a human being already on the brink of death is anxiously and actively concerned 
with the welfare and rescue of others' ("Ethics" 140). The other individual is recognised as oneself 
in another manifestation (WWI IV §66, 235), thus self-sacrificefor the sake of the will to ljfe  as 
man (fested in another individual is somehow valuable, again arguing against Schopenhauer's own 
points that it would be better if life did not exist (IV §59, 204), and that people are 'as a whole, 
worthless' (IV §63, 216). 
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Ill. Schopenhauer and salvation: individual transformation, hope, and value. 
In this world of Hell, then, human intellect allows the individual to perceive the 
true pessimistic nature of their relationship with the rest of the world, the 
suffering inherent in existence, of cause, effect and consequence, and compassion 
for one's fellow sufferer, thus enabling consciously ethical choices and actions. 
Equally crucial here is the actuality only of the present moment in time in which 
ethical practice and individual redemption can be enacted, even merely "hoped 
for" and worked towards. In positing a world of inevitable suffering, 
Schopenhauer is not saying that suffering should be inflicted34 , but that this is 
how the world is, and his pessimism itself is that which informs his ethic of 
compassion and salvation. Those who deliberately act to cause suffering to 
others are placing themselves (and those around them) ftirther from redemption 
and salvation, whilst those who subsume their own will and devote themselves to 
behaving with generosity and charity toward others are redeeming themselves at 
the same time as relieving the suffering of others. The positions of the 'just" 
human, the compassionate human, and the ascetic provide alternatives to the pure 
willing egoist, and all three ethical positions appear to differ from one another by 
degree in the same way that the forms of egoism differ only by degree 35 . For 
Schopenhauer, whilst will is common to all, 'in man not only does the faculty of 
ideas of perception... reach the highest degree of perfection, but the abstract 
idea, thought, i.e., the faculty of reason, and with it reflection, is added' (WWI II 
Supp. 89)36. 
 Compassionate denial of the will provides redemption from this 
world of suffering, and is potentially available to all - subject to character and 
motivation - but is nonetheless providing a form of optimism and hope through 
the notion that suffering can be deliberately relieved by human agency where 
possible. Release from suffering is enacted both in the compassionate agents 
who forgo their own will (and thus its consequential pain), and in those whose 
suffering they act to (temporarily) relieve. This provides the potential for hope 
and therefore forms of optimism at the same time as it imbues life with value. If 
Apart from the deliberate pain and self-chastisement sought by the extreme ascetic presumably. 
See page 25 above. 
36 Knowledge is also 'where one may distinguish oneself as 'great' in not allowing 'a preponderant 
agitation of will take his consciousness over altogether, however much he is urged to do so' 
(Schopenhauer "Psychology" 175). 
36 
individual lives have no value, why bother to delineate an ethics of virtue 
wherein suffering can be relieved in oneself and in others, in life? 
Alongside his ethical framework, Schopenhauer's other avenue to 
salvation is aesthetic contemplation. Whilst this offers a brief and temporary 
form of salvation, it also in a sense transforms the individual in two ways by 
offering a unique avenue to both knowledge and transcendence. It enables the 
individual to perceive the true nature of the world by grasping a kind of Platonic 
Idea of the will's manifestation. By attaining such pure, will-less knowing, the 
individual and thus suffering is transcended at the same time as the individual 
experiences peace and an intense emotional response to the beauty of the Ideal 
form. Aesthetic experience allows knowledge of the inner nature of things in 
apprehension of the Ideal form of the will, and it effects a sublime-beautiful 
sensual experience through entering a state in which one negates the self and 
"becomes" 'the self-consciousness of the knowing subject, not as individual, but 
as pure will-less subject of knowing' (III §38, 119, original emphasis). The Ideal 
form or Ideas 'are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing in-itself.., the 
will', which art isolates from the rest of the world - 'the stream of the world's 
course' - whereby 'this particular thing, which in the stream was a minute part, 
becomes for art a representative of the whole, an equivalent for the endless 
multitude in space and time' (*36,  109). By not only producing, but 
contemplating art, we become privy to how art 'pauses at this particular thing; it 
stops the wheel of time, for art the relations vanish; only the essential, the Idea, is 
its object' (109), thereby time and individual relational subjectivity is 
transcended and we perceive the true nature of the world. Whilst salvation 
attained through aesthetic experience might be brief, then, it appears doubly 
valuable as it allows for the simultaneous experiencing of insightful knowledge 
and redemption from suffering, offering, as Janaway recognises, 'high cognitive 
value, not merely the enriching or therapeutic value of entering into a certain 
psychological state' (Schopenhauer 60). For Schopenhauer, art appears to 
literally become a medium, isolating and allowing access to the thing-in-itself in 
the form of the Ideas in which it manifests itself, at the same time it becomes a 
vehicle of momentary salvation, of release from suffering. Like ethical 
behaviour, art is potentially open to all human beings, although, like asceticism, 
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it is a redemption experienced at its most pure by a rare few individuals. For 
Schopenhauer: 
the most beautiful part of life, its purest joy (if only because it lifts us out 
of real existence and transforms us into its disinterested spectators), is pure 
knowledge to which all willing is alien, pleasure in the beautiful, true 
delight in art.., is granted only to a very few, because it demands rare 
talents, and even to these few it is granted only as a fleeting dream. (WWI 
IV §57, 200) 
The different fonns of artistic representation allow a gradation of perception of 
the will in its ideal forms, and of redemption from the world, depending on how 
successfully they allow for a disinterested objective contemplation by removing 
all the relations that tie our knowledge to our own wilting self and allow our 
knowledge to become 'subject purified of will, a clear minor of the essence of 
the world' (III §36, 109). The different forms in which we experience aesthetic 
contemplation encourage the predominance of either the insightful knowledge 
into the inner nature of things, or the release from ourselves as willing subjects, 
hence the different intensity of feeling associated with different art forms, from 
the experience of raw nature and onwards into deliberate art in progressively 
significant forms (38, 119). 
The contemplation of architecture and 'the inorganic and vegetable worlds' 
allows 'the pleasure of pure will-less knowing [to] predominate, because the 
Ideas which are here apprehended are only low grades of the will's objectivity, 
and are therefore not phenomena of deep significance and rich content', thus the 
"higher" the grade of the will's manifestation (in representations of animals and 
people), the greater the aesthetic pleasure in 'the objective apprehension of these 
Ideas', which offers 'the greatest richness and deep significance'(42, 135). In 
aesthetics as in ethics, Schopenhauer insists that all human individuals and all 
human actions have significance, as 'in everyone and through everything the Idea 
of man unfolds gradually' (48, 145). This highlights his insistence that artistic 
representations of the human should balance individuality of character with the 
beauty of the Ideal form (145), although Janaway argues that here Schopenhauer 
is contradicting his claim that 'the point of art is always to express Ideas' 
(Schopenhauer 67). Cheryl Foster argues that, for Schopenhauer, there are 
different forms of human representation in art, pertaining more effectively either 
towards the species or the individual: whilst 'beauty is attributed to the shape or 
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form of a species in general... expression is linked with the character of the 
particular human individual' (237). As such, the art form chosen is effective 
depending on the intent of the representation, beauty being better represented by 
the spatial and temporal possibilities of sculpture, and expression or character 
through the detail of painting (Foster 237). If the intention is to reveal more of 
the "inner truth" of the human (and the world), then the medium should be 
poetry. This is because 'human cognition encompasses self-conscious 
memory... [thus] the highest degree of will's objectification is obtained in the 
representation of a series of actions as they occurred through time' (239). 
Significantly, the potential abstraction into the universal that this idea of "inner 
truth" might afford is specifically argued against by Schopenhauer, as Foster 
recognises (239). Schoperthauer claims the writer is able to use the imagination 
to 'precipitate' from concepts 'the concrete, the individual, the perceptible idea' 
(WWI III §51, 153). Schopenhauer's aesthetic owes a debt to J. W. Goethe, as he 
himself acknowledges (WWI III §45, 142), and suggests an aesthetic kinship with 
George Eliot and Thomas Hardy as artists who recognise the significance of the 
representation of individual, even mundane, human lives and actions. Both Eliot 
and Hardy echo Schopenhauer's own ethical perspective which validates the 
individual, as will be discussed in later chapters in this thesis. Literature, if it 
involves 'the more objective kinds of poetry, especially in the novel, the epic, 
and the drama', offers access to 'the revelation of the Idea of man... chiefly by 
two means: by accurate and profound drawing of significant characters, and by 
the invention of poignant situations in which they reveal themselves' (WWJ III 
§51, 158). Music offers the purest form of will-less knowing, expressing the 
'essential nature' of emotions themselves rather than 'particular and definite' 
(168) incidents, thus echoing 'our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and 
far removed from its pain' (171). In this, music becomes both a universal 
language and precise, according directly to the thing-in-itself rather than 
phenomena, thus 'precedes all form' (170) and thereby the aesthetically-
redeemed individual steps out of time and particularity. 
31 Whilst allowing that it is not possible to prove his argument (WWI III §52, 163), Schopenhauer 
sees music as 'the copy of the will itself (164, original emphasis) rather than representation of the 
Ideas that other art forms enact. For Schopenhauer, music copies the will's own gradation from the 
lowest Ideas (base notes are equivalent to base organic matter) through to the highest self-reflective 
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Whilst Schopenhauer recognises only the rare individual as capable of 
attaining the most pure will-less knowing and salvation that aesthetic 
contemplation allows, the faculty 'must exist in all human beings in a smaller and 
different degree' to that of the genius artist, as all are capable of enjoying art and 
experiencing 'the beautiful or the sublime.., of knowing the Ideas in things, and 
consequently of setting aside their [own] personality for the moment' (III §37, 
118). For Schopenhauer, tragedy is 'the high-point of literature' as it reveals 'the 
internal conflict of the will.., at the highest grade of its objectivity, and shows 
itself as something to be dreaded' (51, 159). Whilst this is concerned with the 
'suffering' caused by the will-to-life at the back of nature, it is significant that 
this also 'proceeds... through the conflicting desires of individuals', and 'through 
the malice and perversity of the majority' (160). It is in the 'kind of tragedy' 
caused 'by human action and character' which 'shows us that those powers 
which destroy happiness and life are such that their path to us... is always open' 
(161-2), as both victim and perpetrator, and as the ethical human individual able 
to act within and against these elements of tragedy. Aesthetics then, for 
Schopenhauer, are also always concerned with the question of suffering, and the 
ethical value of the individual. 
For Schopenhauer, human culpability leads to the punishment of life, and 
then death, but at the same time to the possibility of atonement and redemption. 
Gerard Mannion recognises the importance of Schopenhauer's ethical and 
aesthetic stance, and that the offering of hope itself qualifies Schopenhauer's 
pessimism: 
what best interprets Schopenhauer's worldview and the part which 
pessimism plays in this, is not the logically deterministic and thus 
unconditionally inevitable sense of pessimism. If that were so, there would 
be no room in his philosophy for an objective basis of morality, or of 
release in any form from suffering, be it via the arts, music, contemplation, 
mysticism or otherwise. Finally, there would be no room for a doctrine of 
salvation, and hence hope would be groundless in this world. (37) 
For Maimion, mysticism is the most significant factor in Schopenhauer's 
philosophy, however, finding this ultimately leads to a philosophy that not only 
manifestation of the will that is manifest in the human, realised by the digressions and endless 
return that are enacted in the melody (167). 
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'functionally resembles religious belief systems' (Foreword), but one that itself 
becomes a theological system in positing something "beyond" this realm of 
suffering experience' (284) as the endpoint of his philosophy. Mannion claims 
that Schopeithauer's 'belief in a moral significance to the world' arises out of 
finding "religious" longings more intellectually satisfying than the older 
dogmatic systems which he had now set aside', a path which Mannion sees as 
one that 'leads into a greater engagement with morality' (284). Mannion argues 
that only through "religious" belief systems that posit a form of reality outside of 
human experience can one become deeply engaged in the quest for a moral basis 
in existence, claiming that 'religion and morality are often interrelated because 
they share common subject matter and are at one in purpose - namely, the 
fulfilment/salvation of the human being and community, in relation to the ground 
of being itself' (285). Mannion fails to recognise that religious systems are a 
vehicle for human concerns, including moral concerns, but are secondary to the 
human, seeing religious constructs instead as somehow standing by themselves 
with secularised moral concerns trying to keep up. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, Feuerbach recognises religion to be nothing more nor less than reified 
human aims and relations, and as such opens the door to deconstructing the 
alienation of the individual that religious constructs effect. Schopenhauer 
recognises elements in religion that uphold his own arguments, but argues against 
the attempt to transcend the reality of human experience in life for a form of 
salvation beyond life. His advocacy of salvation is the relief of suffering in 
human existence, and as such occupies an accessible terminology rather than 
seeking to attain union with some form of final reality beyond it. Schopenhauer 
explicitly draws upon Eastern religions and philosophies, particularly Hinduism 
and Buddhism, at least as much as Christian theology, as Janaway recognises 
(Schopenhauer 15). Eastern religions express the creation and return of life from 
and to the sublime nothingness of Nirvana (Schopenhauer WWI IV §64, 220-22), 
recognise our perceptions of existence in space and time as false (I § 1, 8), and 
advocate the ideal of ascetic salvation 38 . Yet at the same time, Schopenhauer 
clearly foregrounds his salvationary ethic in practical human terms, albeit terms 
that can lead to a form of psychological transcendence for the "saintly" few. 
See also Schopenhauer "Religion" 190. 
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Schopenhauer does explicitly argue that the "truth" of Christian ethics 'is 
indestructible' (IV §68, 243), as Janaway recognises in Schopenhauer's aligning 
of his own view with 'the ethical core of Christianity proper' ("Pessimism" 320), 
but that Schopethauer recognises this as a (rightly) pessimistic system (321). 
Schopenhauer is 'primarily offended by the notion that the world we inhabit is a 
fine place, and by the idea that it fulfils some end in itself, indeed by the idea that 
it, and we, are here for any purpose at all' (Janaway "Pessimism" 321). Janaway 
argues that Schopenhauer's advocacy of 'an abolition of the will within oneself 
as the path to what is ethically good... [leads] ultimately to a kind of resigned 
mystical salvation' (Schopenhauer 23). But for Janaway this is contra 
Mannion's positive mystical salvation as it leaves the individual 'not only 
worthless, but... the very obstacle that must be broken down before true value is 
glimpsed' (99). In retaining an ethos of salvation, Schopenhauer does 
paradoxically offer an optimistic route in offering hope in the first place. Most 
significantly, however, he imparts a value in existence, particularly in his 
emphasis on ethical behaviour as worthwhile for individuals in this life, 
emphasising that ethical behaviour exists a priori of religious delineations as 
ethical feeling is inherent to our understanding of the world and our relationships 
with others, and thus salvation from suffering is concretely realisable in human 
existence. Whilst the goal of existence is the final return to nothingness, the goal 
in existence is, at the very least, to act justly towards our fellow sufferers, better 
still, deliberately act to relieve suffering where we can, thus human knowledge 
informs behaviour and acts against the non-ethical goal in existence that is 
dictated by the blindly voracious desiring will. 
Whilst refuting the existence of God and positing a world of inevitable and 
perpetual suffering, Schopenhauer retains an objective of salvation in his 
philosophy. He characteristically expects only a few to achieve the ultimate 
redemption attainable through severe asceticism as this route is 'inappropriate to 
the great majority of people' (WWI IV §68, 242). Across the range of his ethical 
delineations, Schopenhauer draws a clear distinction between the idea of a life of 
inevitable suffering to a lesser or greater degree for all and the idea of 
deliberately condenming our fellow sufferers to suffer for all eternity, which is 
nothing less than egoism, whether framed within religious dogma or otherwise. 
Schopenhauer places the finite world of suffering as one which offers the 
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potential for salvation to those who would deny their own will for the sake of 
others, the determination of character being a reason why most would not, in fact, 
be able to attain this in its most extreme ascetic form. In several respects, 
SchopeiThauer's views on the Christian religion coincide with Eliot's and Hardy's 
own atheistic concerns, particularly in terms of the abhorrence of dogma, of 
punishment or reward after death - and the refusal to recognise the significance 
of the real world that arises from this - and their insistence that equality rather 
than hierarchy should distinguish human relations 39 . Eliot's ethical deliberations 
in Middlemarch will be shown in Chapter 5 to bear significant relationships with 
Schopenhauerian thinking on a number of levels, not least in the form that 
salvation takes in the novel, albeit Eliot refusing asceticism. Schopenhauer in a 
sense recognises a doctrine of the chosen few in his advocacy of ascetic self-
denial as the ultimate ideal of salvation, as this is an avenue that only a few 
remarkable and "saintly" people would be capable of attaining. Despite this, he 
places the majority of the human race into the categories of "just" human and 
"good" human as he insists that compassion is, in fact, a natural urge in everyone 
(apart from egoists, presumably). This suggests that our predetermined character 
and motivations, whilst they cannot be changed, thus fall into the "just" or 
"good" human categories as a norm for most people. Despite his clear atheism, 
Schopenhauer recognises essential "truths" in the New Testament story of The 
Fall into sin40, because the will itself is the source of all evil in the world, and we 
are will in phenomenal form (WWI IV §70, 258-9), thus we redeem ourselves 
through self-denial (68, 242-3) 1 . Schopenhauer agrees with the Christian 
emphasis that its 'god should become man' as 'salvation and redemption from 
the sorrows of this world can come only from the world itself' (59, 206), an 
emphasis on the necessity to ground ethics in the human world which both Eliot 
and Hardy foreground. For Hardy, the idea that it is the wider world itself which 
must come up with the goods as far as ethical redemption and human realisation 
is concerned is central to the discussion of Jude the Obscure in Chapter 7, and 
Schopenhauer's essay, "Religion", was published in Parerga und Paralipomena in 1851, four 
years earlier than Eliot's equally vociferous attack on the doctrine of the few chosen by God for 
eternal salvation in "Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming" 1855. 
40 
contra Pelagianistic innocent birth, and Rationalism: see Schopenhauer "Religion" 194-5. 
41 See also Schopenhauer "Suffering": 'this world [is] a place of atonement, a sort of penal 
colony... [placing] every man first and foremost as a being who exists only as a consequence of his 
culpability and whose life is an expiation of the crime of being born' (49-50). 
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Hardy's relationship with Schopenhauer's thinking forms a key part of this 
framework. 
That Schopenhauer's view of salvation is a potentially optimistic ethic is 
clearly visible, offering as it does tangible forms of hope of release from 
suffering, at the very least for the actually lived present, and even the immediate 
future. Whilst, as Janaway recognises, the present for Schopenhauer always 
means 'we shall begin willing anew [as] [e]ach present will contain a wish or 
desire that looks ahead to its own resolution' ("Pessimism" 323), Schopenhauer's 
goal of salvation can act within this cycle in perpetually seeking to act against the 
egoism of the will in the present, lived-in world. Salvation is as related to the 
idea of intellectual understanding as suffering, and suffering itself adds 
motive/momentum to choice in the deliberate act to relieve the suffering we see 
all around us. Schopenhauer sees the present moment not as one in which 
hedonism should reign 42 but as one in which a positive sense of human 
compassion is attainable. That all human actions are the responsibility of each 
individual places the emphasis on our intellect enabling us to choose to relieve 
suffering through denial of the will, albeit subject to the individual having the 
character and motive to do so. Our relations with the rest of humanity should be 
informed by compassion rather than accusation, thus providing the ground for 
Schopenhauer's ethics. Schopenhauer himself claims his ethics: 
demonstrates theoretically the metaphysical foundation of justice and 
charity, and then indicate[s] the goal to which these, if practised in 
perfection, must ultimately lead. At the same time it... confesses the 
reprehensible nature of the world and points to... denial of the will as... 
redemption from it. ("Affirmation" 63) 
Schopenhauer retains the quasi-religious element of salvation in his philosophy, 
albeit a secularised ideal which does not hint towards the existence of God-after-
all, but to a state of human transcendence which seeks to relieve suffering in the 
world through its attainment. Schopenhauer recognises that we can attain 
temporary relief from suffering, as well as transformative knowledge, in the arts 
(including philosophical contemplation 43), and offers an ethical renunciation of 
the will as the route to salvation from perpetual suffering. In this, Schopenhauer 
42 See Schopenhauer "Vanity", 52. 
Although intellectual genius transcends the individual body and exists more in the rest of the 
world, rather than transcending the world altogether: see Schopenhauer "Philosophy", 129-32. 
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places value in the lived present, and, whilst this is a moment in which one 
recognises life at the same time as the ascetic ideal seeks to transcend life, it is a 
moment in which ethical behaviour necessarily acknowledges that each 
individual life does indeed have value (and seeks to improve that value for the 
existential individual). The important issue here is that Schopenhauer's 
pessimism is not unmitigated but qualified by offering forms of hope, both in the 
present and the immediate future, of effecting genuine salvation from suffering. 
Chapter 2 
Feuerbach, Optimism, and the Accessibility of Salvation. 
'The single man for himselfpossesses the essence of man neither in 
himself as a moral being nor in himself as a thinking being. The 
essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man 
with man; it is a unity, however, which rests only on the reality of 
the distinction between land thou.' 
Ludwig Feuerbach 1843' 
I. Feuerbach and the essence of the reaL 
Ludwig Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums (1841) was first translated into 
English, The Essence of Christianity, by George Eliot in 18542. 
 The main 
emphasis of this work is Feuerbach's deconstruction of Christian theology to 
reveal its source and true object as nothing more nor less than human nature. The 
aspects of Feuerbach's position which are of primary interest here are his 
construction and placing of the human, his ethical position and its relationship to 
human consciousness, and the reality and value of his vision of human salvation 
in relation to his position as a whole. The ramifications and accessibility of 
Feuerbach's overtly optimistic philosophical salvation form the central focus of 
this thesis, and his recognition and deconstruction of the means of individual 
alienation by social constructs also has a significant bearing. This chapter will 
assess Feuerbach's philosophical system, and examine the extent to which his 
optimism may actually be undermined within its own framework, as well as by 
its relationship with the existential world. Feuerbach's Principles of the 
Philosophy of the Future (1843) offers elaborations on Feuerbach's position as 
set out in The Essence of Christianity, although The Essence was the most widely 
disseminated of his writings in Victorian Britain, and thus forms the core of this 
examination of Feuerbach's position. 
'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, §59, 71. 
2 The George Eliot translation is the edition utilised in this thesis: New York: Prometheus Books, 
1989. 
Feuerbach's philosophical career began more than a decade after 
Schopenhauer's began, and for several years, Feuerbach and Schopenhauer were 
writing and publishing their respective works concurrently with one another 3 . 
Feuerbach was a pupil of Schopenhauer's antithesis Hegel, but he disagreed with 
Hegel in crucial areas. These disagreements not only lead to his grounding of 
philosophy in radically different terms to Hegel's, but Feuerbach's own vision of 
the human reveals areas of significant interest when juxtaposed with 
Schopenhauer's position, as will be discussed in this chapter. Feuerbach's 
position will be addressed from his philosophical ground first of all, moving into 
the key role that human consciousness plays, before addressing the reality and 
value of Feuerbachian salvation. Feuerbach's delineations of the human and 
salvation on all levels are densely interrelated, however, particularly to the 
central issue of human nature as this forms the key to his philosophical position 
in every respect, and Feuerbach's apotheosis of salvation-through-consciousness 
is a constant presence. 
First of all, Feuerbach's philosophical construction of the human sets the 
ground of his optimistic position. Whilst Feuerbach's dialectical approach and 
use of the concept of alienation is Hegelian, his philosophy is one that critically 
argues against a 1-legelian grounding and endpoint in Absolute Reason 4 . 
Feuerbach's salvation is proposed as a form of human self-realisation in a 
secularised but ifindamentally corporeal world, and is a vision that Feuerbach's 
departures from Hegelian abstraction appear to make possible. Feuerbach 
declares his starting point to be: 
Schopenhauer read at least some of Feuerbach's work as he criticises 'Herr Feuerbach, a 
Hegelian (c'est tout dire) [that says it all]' for his high estimation of Fichte's ideas as 'even more 
sublime than Kant's' (Morality 11 §11, 119 fn36). For Schopenhauer, Fichte's works are written in 
a 'diffuse and tedious style... and really with the idea of misleading, not instructing, the reader' 
(118), Fichte having now 'displaced... Kant's philosophy.., by bombastic superlatives, 
extravagances, and nonsense in the mask of profound thought' (119). Thus Schopenhauer 
apparently dismisses Feuerbach by virtue of the latter's Hegelianism and his admiration for the 
"sublimity" of Fichte. Feuerbach, on the other hand, terms Schopenhauer 'an idealist infected with 
the epidemic of materialism' (quoted Marx Wartofsky 384). 
Charles Wilson, in examining the relationship between Feuerbach and Hegel, argues against a 
tendency he sees amongst other critical approaches to place Feuerbach as beginning with Hegcl 
and then going on to develop his own independent critique of his former mentor. Wilson posits 
instead Feuerbach's primary independence, but one that later 'takes from 1-legel a unitive 
conceptuality' (385). 
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not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract, merely conceptual 
being, but a real being, the true Ens realissimum - man5 ; its principle, 
therefore, is in the highest degree positive and real. It generates thought 
from the opposite of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; 
it has relation to its object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before 
defining it in thought. (The Essence of Christianity, Preface, xv, original 
emphasis) 
Thus Feuerbach marks a significant distinction between his own approach and 
what he sees as the problem in Hegel's abstractions. Feuerbach recognises the 
corporeal, existential human as the ground for his philosophy, at the same time as 
displacing Hegel's primacy of thought into a secondary manifestation which 
arises from this experiential source. In both these aspects, central to Feuerbach's 
position, he echoes Schopenhauer's insistence that philosophy must necessarily 
be grounded in the material world, with consciousness arising out of sensual 
experience of this world, thus placing intellect as a secondary and uniquely 
human development6. Also like Schopenhauer, Feuerbach sees human 
consciousness to be of crucial concern to his philosophical position. 
Nonetheless, in examining the ground, reality, accessibility, and value of 
Feuerbach's optimistic vision of salvation, his placing of the human - particularly 
in relation to the role of individual consciousness itself - will be seen to 
undermine his overt optimism in significant terms. 
Feuerbach's defining work is one in which he, like Schopenhauer, 
recognises a "truth" in religion (Essence IV, 54). For Feuerbach, this is not a 
pessimistic recognition of the fbndamental culpability of the will-to-life as the 
cause of the perpetual suffering in the world (or "original sin"), and the 
culpability of the human as manifestation of this will and the necessarily self-
denying route of redemption from it. Feuerbach's position is one that places the 
human as the exalted species and the true divine object of religion, as, behind all 
its dogmatic and metaphorical disguises, religion is that which 'fundamentally, 
not in intention or according to its own supposition, but in its... essence, believes 
in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature' (Preface, xvi). 
Feuerbach, like Schopenhauer, represents the human via the generic Mensch which translates as 
"human" or "person" rather than gender-specific Mann, but Eliot follows the time-honoured 
tradition of terming the human as "man". Thomas Wartenberg (xxvi fnl8) claims that Eliot's 
translation obscures Feuerbach's terminology, but Feuerbach's specific emphasis on the 
importance of gender is clear in her translation. 
6 See Chapter!, especially 20-21. 
ril;3 
Through religion, the human has become alienated from its own nature which is 
objectifled outside of itself into the Divine form of God. Feuerbach also places 
previous philosophical thought-systems as the cause of alienation, as here the 
figure of God becomes an equally abstract Absolute (Principles § 10, 12-13). In 
the religious pursuit of salvation the human is seeking to unify itself with its own 
nature, which in Christianity is through Christ (reified and deified human nature) 
as unifying object. For Feuerbach, that the divine object of religion is a God with 
human characteristics, and that the happiness and eternal salvation of humankind 
is His object, not only reveals that human nature is the true object of religion in 
disguised form but that human nature is itself therefore divine to the human 
(Essence I, 30). By recognising the true aim of the human as its own "divine" 
nature, the two being one and the same thing, the human can finally overcome 
this alienation, a recognition which would come about through Feuerbach's 'new 
philosophy' (Principles §57, 71) itself and concretely act to transform both the 
individual and society. As Thomas Wartenberg recognises, 'Feuerbach 
proclaimed the need for an "anthropological and materialist" philosophy, one that 
would begin with human beings as they concretely existed and would not posit 
any reality beyond that in which they lived', believing that '[w]ithout the 
presence of religious and philosophic abstractions... human beings could come to 
realize their own divinity, thus creating a world in which the human race could 
fully realize its potential as a species' (viii). Charles Wilson goes further, 
arguing that on a significant level Feuerbach uses 'Christology' as it 'guards 
against abstraction, against identif'ing divinity.., with pure... abstract, reason' 
because it 'represents religious consciousness' own good sense to oppose the 
abstract' (394), Feuerbach coming to see in religion itself 'the founding of a 
community, not an individualized consciousness' (390). Warren Breckman 
pursues this argument into one of direct politicization, arguing that Feuerbach 
works against the 'debilitating social and political effects' of Protestant 
'inwardness' whilst recognising that the 'redemptive power' of love, alongside 
recognition of the divinity of humanity, 'make it the potential ally of the true 
human society if the intensity of its inward feeling could be converted into 
external activity' (458). In revealing that religion is, therefore, nothing more nor 
less than 'the immediate object, the immediate nature, of man' (Essence xxii, 
original emphasis), Feuerbach offers salvation from human disunity or alienation 
1] 
in a secular teleological process of realisation wherein the universal human 
condition can be improved, contra Schopenhauer's recognition of stasis from 
which the individual can attain temporary transcendence but the human condition 
itself cannot be changed. This chapter will examine the implications, stability, 
and accessibility of Feuerbach' s optimistic vision. 
The essential nature of the human, for Feuerbach, is a tripartite group of 
elements or essences. These are 'Reason, Will, Affection' 7 and also form the 
'ultimate aim' of the human, as this 'ultimate aim is also the true basis and 
principle of a being' (I, 4). An aim is itself a necessity, thus a fundamental 
aspect of the human (4). The aims of Reason and Affection are simply reason 
and love themselves as object, and of Will 'Freedom of the will' (3). These 
forces are 'perfect existence' to human perception through the experience of 'an 
infinite joy' (6) they arouse, although this is only regarding positive or "good" 
original powers or essences, as "good" essences are Feuerbach's only claim 8 . 
Reason and Affection appear to be antithetical essences which, in opposing one 
another, seem in perpetual disunity. Reason is 'the self-consciousness of the 
species', having 'relation to existences, as things' (as parts of the whole), and is 
therefore also 'the annihilation of personality' (Appendix §4, 285). Affection or 
Feeling on the other hand, is 'sympathy... [which] arises only in the love of man 
to man... [therefore] only in community', and is 'aesthetic, human sensation' in 
which 'man is related to his fellow-man as to himself., alive to the sorrows, the 
joys of another as his own' (App. §2, 283). Feeling, contra reason, 'has relation 
to existences.., as persons', being 'the self-consciousness of individuality', and 
the 'heart sacrifices the species to the individual' (App. §4, 285, my emphasis). 
For Feuerbach, it is only in the human species as a whole where human nature 
(Reason, Affection and Will) is in its perfect form (1, 7). The individual human 
is a limited and finite - therefore imperfect - manifestation of the species (App. 
Kit Christensen (350) and Wartofsky (261-4) argue that here Feuerbach is echoing Greek 
hilosohy and the delineation of the tripartite human "soul". 
For Feuerbach, the proof that the human is the "hidden" true object of religion lies particularly in 
the nature of Affection or feeling, as it is in and through feeling that religion/God/human essence is 
experienced and known: '[i]f... feeling is the essential organ of religion, the nature of God is 
nothing else than an expression of the nature of feeling' (Essence 1, 9), and a religious object 'is 
itself a religious one only when it is not an object of the cold understanding or memory, but of 
feeling' (10). Feeling is in itself only "good", and this is how he claims feelings as both the essence 
of the human, and of the divine, asking '[i]f feeling in itself is good, religious, i.e., holy, divine, has 
not feeling its God in itself'?' (10). 
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§1, 281) and of these elements (I, 23; II, 34). These defining forces are infinite 
'because every perfect existence, every original power and essence, is the 
immediate verification and affirmation of itself (1, 6), thus infinite in the 
perpetual revelation of themselves spatially and temporally in the species. The 
individual recognises self-limitation, finiteness, only by virtue of recognising 'the 
perfection, the infinitude of his species', and thus any limitation the individual 
recognises in the self which they then attribute to the whole of the human race is 
in error, for the 'essence' of the human is both unlimited and perfect (7)9• 
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"bad" element is individual fault, lack of perfection, and as such, an issue which 
needs to be addressed is what happens to the less positive human emotions and 
experiences in Feuerbach's ethic of salvation. 
The Will is the 'energy of character' through which we exert our human 
and individual character-as-object, and we will 'that we may be free' (3), free 
will being the Feuerbachian Will's ultimate aim. Yet freedom is only attainable 
through the understanding, which is itself necessary if we are to exhibit our Will 
as '[o]nly he who thinks is free and independent' (II, 39). Intellect can also free 
the individual from corporeal and emotional subjectivity, 'from the anguish of 
the heart', through effecting objectivity, "want[ing] nothing" and thereby "not 
to subject ourselves to things" (34). This echoes Schopenhauer's intellectual 
transcendence of suffering wherein knowledge of the objective whole, of the 
world-as-will, effects freedom from individual subjective willing. The operation 
offree will, for Feuerbach, arises from knowledge, from the intellect, as only the 
thinker can exert free will (39), yet at the same time the Will appears to be a 
manifestation of species-essence rather than of the individual as such. 
Feuerbach's Will acts to overcome individual limitation, being 'the force of 
morality' which suppresses passions or renounces a habit by filling 'thee with 
The issue of human perfection also relates to Feuerbach's delineation of aesthetic pleasure, which 
reaches the height of perfection in the contemplation of the human form. Whilst this might be seen 
to echo Schopenhauer's elevation of aesthetic contemplation in art being that which depicts the 
human (in all art, but particularly in literature), as this allows access to the Ideal human 
manifestation of the will (an Ideal the will is perpetually seeking) at the same time as it allows 
access to the individual, for Feuerbach this is because the human (species) is the apotheosis of 
existence, thus is perfection in this sense. The 'absolute, the perfect form, can delight without envy 
in the forms of other beings' (Essence I, 7 Lb 1) as it finds itself 'more beautiful, more sublime', 
having that which enables it to reach 'the highest form of self-assertion, the form which is itself a 
superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good'; it has 'consciousness' (7). To find the individual human 
form beautiful, however, is vanity (6), thus a representation can only be perfect if it represents the 
ideal, the species, rather than the imperfect individual. 
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indignation against thyself and thy individual weaknesses', and thus 'achievest a 
victory over thyself' (I, 4), the selfish individual' 0 . Feuerbach's Will overrides 
what he sees as the weakness or imperfection of the individual who is therefore 
falling short of the perfection of the species; phenomena contra essence. Here 
Feuerbach's moral will appears on one level to act in the equivalent role of 
Schopenhauer's ethical intellect, which overrides the blind-will-as-essence's 
egoistic self-affirmation, albeit with a crucial distinction. Schopenhauer's 
intellect-driven ethical behaviour arises from I-thou recognition of one's fellow 
sufferer, and thereby the individual (subject to character) can choose to override 
his or her own egoistic will or instinctive behaviour to ensure this does not cause 
thou suffering. Schopenhauer's ultimate position of deliberate self-denial, 
asceticism, is also one of choice, ensuring that the individual manifestation of the 
will does not cause thou suffering whilst at the same time lifting I out of 
subjective willing. Although on one level predetermined by the unique character 
of the individual, Schopenhauer's ethical behaviour (and ascetic self-negation) 
nonetheless offers itself as a choice that individuals can make. For Schopenhauer 
the primary essence which seeks to override the individual and assert itself is the 
blind will-to-life, but which can itself be overridden by the intellectual ethical 
intent of the individual. For Feuerbach on the other hand, the 'force of morality', 
whilst apparently related to species-consciousness (thus reason) in opposing 
individual limitation, is not 'thy own personal power' but is an almost external 
force which steps in and 'seizes the mastery of thee' (Essence I, 4). The moral 
good of the species is an all-seeing essence which overrides the egoism of the 
imperfect and erring individual, appearing to make egoistic behaviour or evil acts 
essentially "unnatural", even impossible. How can an individual do harm if the 
moral will steps in and 'seizes the mastery of thee' (4)? For Feuerbach, the 
species is both predicate and essence, thus the moral force of the species arises 
and overrides the imperfect and failing individual in spite of themselves. 
Feuerbach also posits Feeling or 'love' as something which is 'stronger' 
than 'the individual', being, again, not his or her 'own individual power' but 
somehow above and beyond the individual, and this is even a 'death-conquering 
power' (4). The same applies to Reason, 'which governs and absorbs thee' (4). 
'° Wartofsky explains Feuerbach's Will as the 'divine morality and justice of God's perfect 
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The unity of Reason, Will and Affection are the 'divine trinity in man', they are 
'the animating, determining, governing [absolute] powers' and as such are 'above 
the individual man' (3), and are that out of which the human is formed, that is 
they predetermine the human. That these are defining and absolute powers for 
Feuerbach is clear in that he sees the powers of Reason, Affection and Will to be 
a priori forces in control over the individual human and, therefore, the 'absolute 
to man is his own nature' (5, original emphasis). Feuerbach's "holy trinity" of 
Affection, Reason, and Will control individual human beings despite themselves 
as their "good" species-essence overrides individual "bad" 'passion' or 'habit' 
(4). Species essence, then, not only 'governs' but 'absorbs' (4, my emphasis) the 
individual. The philosophical ground of Feuerbach's relationship between the 
alienated individual and divine human essence effectively negates and thus 
devalues the individual on a number of levels. 
goodness, and... the tension between divine law and divine mercy' (263). 
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II. Human consciousness: the ethics of community, and the question of 
salvation. 
Human consciousness is at the root of what it means to be human, forming the 
ground of Feuerbach's ethical position and the means by which alienation is 
overcome to attain unity, the 'joy' (Essence App. §3, 284) of salvation". The 
significance of Feuerbach's recognition that human consciousness is above that 
of other sentient creatures lies in the ability the human has to think about itself, 
not as an individual but as a species, thus: 
.a being to whom his own species, his own nature, is an object of thought, 
can make the essential nature of other things or beings an object of 
thought... [thereby]... is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in 
the place of another, for this reason, that to him his species, his essential 
nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of thought. (I, 2) 
For Feuerbach, human nature and human species are the same thing, this thing 
being in essence "good" and the object towards which all human beings 
necessarily tend (4). His delineation of I-thou recognition is part of this object. 
Religion, particularly Christianity for Feuerbach, takes the place of that I-thou 
inner cognition which pertains only to and between human beings regarding the 
human species in its 'infinite nature' (2). In showing how religion is conflated 
with human species-consciousness at the same time as it obscures this relation, 
Feuerbach posits this unveiling as itself the key to human ethics, and the 
individual-species unity that is human destiny (Principles §57, 71). For 
Feuerbach, two persons (I and thou) provide 'the principle of multiplicity and all 
its essential results' the second person being 'the self-assertion of the human 
heart as the principle of duality, of participated life' (Essence VI, 68). 
Feuerbach's I-thou relationship affirms a positive sense of self and world as it 
confers meaning onto existence as, without the fellow human through which one 
recognises that which is essentially the same and thus that which is essentially 
different, the world is meaningless (VIII, 82). This also confers a positive 
recognition of individuality (82) to self-consciousness, and opens the door to 
ethical human relations. As Eugene Kamenka emphasises, for Feuerbach ethics 
Feuerbach posits his own philosophy as that which enables unity through understanding, and 
thus overcomes the alienation that religion and (previous forms of) philosophy have effected 
(Principles §57, 71). 
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must be 'grounded both logically and empirically in man's nature and man's 
desires... [and] derive moral principles from man and not man from moral 
principles' (124). On a fimdamental level, however, 'man's being went beyond 
his individual self and could not be understood without going beyond it' 
(Kamenka 119), and here, for Feuerbach, the individual also recognises the self 
as essentially limited, as the 'powers of humanity [are] not of man as an 
individual' (Essence VIII, 83) but of the species as a whole. 
For Feuerbach, human nature is the divine, perfect and infinite good, and 
presents itself as: 
• an infinite plenitude or multitude of predicates which are... so different 
that the one does not immediately involve the other, [and] is realised only 
in an infinite plenitude or multitude of different beings or individuals... 
Each new man is a new predicate, a new phasis of humanity... It is true 
that there are the same elements in every individual, but under such various 
conditions and modifications that they appear new and peculiar. (I, 23, my 
emphasis) 
These human powers are positive and 'infinite' (VIII, 83) powers only when 
realised spatially and teleologically in the species (83). Whilst this consciousness 
of self and other must be understood as grounded in the corporeal, experiential 
world, in 'concrete or living totality', this is also where 'the identity of self-
consciousness exists only as the pregnant, complete unity of I and thou' (VI, 66, 
original emphasis): an expectant unity which always recognises the individual 
self as essentially limited without such unity. This unity 'rests only on the reality 
of the distinction between I and thou' (Principles §59, 71) and, for Feuerbach, 
reality is that which also exists for others, that is, is not thought only (25, 39) - 
thus reality, existence, occurs only in the participation that is found in 
community. This is particularly exalted in terms of intimate male-female 
relations (gender-distinction itself being essential to personality), and such 
relationships are more profound for Feuerbach than 'the monotonous thou 
between friends' (Essence IX, 92). Both Feuerbach and Schopenhauer see sexual 
love as an essential object of life. For Schopenhauer this is an essential impulse 
of the will as it affirms and perpetuates the will-to-life, but in thus perpetuating 
the existence of suffering it is not a good thing (although he does concede the 
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possibility of a positive, even happy, male-female relationship' 2). For Feuerbach 
sexual love also affirms the "essence", but for him this is 'thy whole principle' 
(IX, 92), the divine essence that is human nature, thus a good thing. In being 
self-consciously 'at once I and thou' (I, 2, my emphasis), love occupies the 
unifying aspect, which in Christianity is the position of the Holy Spirit in the 
Father-Son-Holy Ghost trinity: for Feuerbach it is I-thou-love (VI, 67) and is a 
unity effected through Feeling. Indeed, Affection or Feeling 'is the essential 
organ of religion, the nature of God is nothing else than an expression of the 
nature of feeling' (1,9). As Wilson suggests, for Feuerbach: 
Both divinity and the individual undergo a dialectical externalization... 
[whereby divinity] instantiates itself in the individual when the individual 
rises to species-consciousness... [and] Religion's need to be concrete and 
communal can be honoured; philosophy simply... decodes the 
Christological moment into a dialectical othering, the famous I-Thou 
relationship which produces divine humanity itself (394) 
Whilst this potentially places both self and other in positive terms, claims the 
ground of human ethics in real, lived human community and offers a positive 
ethic of salvation in and through the unity that community offers, the 
accessibility of such unity for the individual is still open to question. Kit 
Christensen, drawing a link between Feuerbach's I-thou and Hegel's delineation 
of reflexivity of consciousness as mediator of the recognition of self and other' , 
sees that in a real sense the self-awareness of I is dependent on the perceived 
relations with thou (343). Because the 'relationship between myself as an 
individual and the species, and my relationship to myself, are both necessarily 
mediated by other persons' (Christensen 343), community becomes the formative 
factor for individual self-consciousness. Christensen fails to examine the 
ramifications of this in anything other than the positive tthns that Feuerbach 
himself envisages in the exalted form of a unified species-community, however. 
Whilst recognising that the self-conscious reflection of subjectivity also involves 
the 'capacity to take the "point of view" of the conscious other' (344), 
Christensen discusses neither the potential ethical relationship this signposts, nor 
how it might impact on Feuerbach's individual self-consciousness of essential 
imperfection. On this level alone the relationship between the self-conscious I 
12 WWR "Metaphysics" (558), and see Chapter 1 (34) above. 
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and thou might form itself in a variety of different ways. The self-conscious I 
might recognise another individual thou as another alienated finite and imperfect 
individual or as the desired object of divine unity, thus paving the way for 
compassionate human relations. I might equally recognise thou as more perfect, 
however, or understand that thou also recognises Is failings, therefore 
compounding the self-consciousness of failure, of diminishing worth. 
Christensen echoes Feuerbach's delineation of I-thou relations in purely positive 
terms, ignoring the possibility that these could be negative or damaging to an 
individual's sense of self that the essentialising of I as imperfect and thou as 
perfection is equally capable of enacting. Feuerbachian I-thou consciousness has 
further negative implications, however, and on a number of significant levels. 
In claiming that 'Love does not exist without sympathy, sympathy does not 
exist without suffering in common... Sympathy presupposes a like nature' 
(Essence IV, 54), Feuerbach appears to echo Schopenhauer's grounding of ethics 
in human consciousness off and thou as the same in terms which recognise the 
experience of suffering. For Feuerbach, however, this arises from the recognition 
of a human species which is in essence good, perfect, and divine rather than 
Schopenhauer's ethic of individual compassion for one's fellow sufferer, trapped 
in stasis within a world of endless will, desire and perpetual suffering' 4 . Thus for 
Feuerbach suffering will be dissolved in and by communal human relations. 
Feuerbach largely effaces the question of suffering, only attempting to answer 
this problem through his optimistic vision of teleological human destiny wherein 
human unhappiness - which arises through alienation of the individual from 
human nature - can always be overcome through species-consciousness. 
Wartofsky argues that for Feuerbach suffering is always reduced to 'the 
humanity of God, or... the exaltation of human compassion, human self-
sacrifice, human suffering for the sake of another, as divine' (291-2). Suffering, 
when it does exist for Feuerbach, becomes a quasi-Christian self-sacrifice for the 
sake of the species as 'to suffer for others is divine' (Essence V, 60), with the 
danger that, as Kamenka recognises, 'much of [Feuerbach's] work suggests a 
concem to subordinate individual "happiness" to the common weal' (142). The 
G. W. F. Flegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), J. B. Baillie trans., New York: Harper 
Torchbook edition, Harper and Row, 1967, pp229-231. 
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ramifications of Feuerbach's placing of the essence of human nature as the good, 
the divine (Essence I, 9-10) extend from the psychology to the fundamental 
nature of human existence. This is in terms of both individual and species, and 
concerns the present limitation or disunity (and even culpability) of the 
individual and the necessary objective of human destiny: 
The holy is in opposition to me only as regards the modifications of my 
personality, but as regards my fundamental nature it is in unity with me. 
The holy is a reproach to my sinfulness; in it I recognise myself as a sinner; 
but in so doing, while I blame myself, I acknowledge what I am not, but 
ought to be, and what, for that very reason, I, according to my destination, 
can be; for an "ought" which has no corresponding capability does not 
affect me, is a ludicrous chimra without any true relation to my mental 
constitution. But when I acknowledge goodness as my destination, as my 
law, I acknowledge it, whether consciously or unconsciously, as my own 
nature. Another nature than my own, one different in quality, cannot touch 
me. I can perceive sin as sin, only when I perceive it to be a contradiction 
of myself with myself - that is, of my personality with my fundamental 
nature. As a contradiction of the absolute, considered as another being, the 
feeling of sin is inexplicable, unmeaning. (28) 
Human disunity - and consequently unhappiness - arises from the alienation of 
the human individual from its own nature, and both religion and philosophy 
(from early speculative to Absolute idealism (Principles §10, 12-14; §24, 38-9)) 
enact this alienation. The true object of salvation for Feuerbach is human nature 
itself, as the quest and desire for moral goodness and eternal human happiness 
that is projected onto God as His aim for human destination reveals this to be 
what the human desires the destination of the human should be (Essence I, 30). 
The human search for goodness is also the search for happiness, suggesting that 
God (therefore the human) 'wills that man should be good, happy - for without 
goodness there is no happiness' (30). Feuerbach reveals how Christianity 
attempts to posit that only God is good - and is only good - whilst the human is 
'wicked, corrupt, incapable of good' (28), thus reclaims goodness for the human 
who must possess it if able to not only recognise goodness but deify it also (28). 
The impulse to do "good" is a divine instinct as it is 'an inward necessity' sprung 
'out of the human nature' (V, 60), but is not external to the human in the form of 
an abstract God as 'the antithesis of divine and human is... illusory', and should 
be recognised instead as 'the antithesis between the human nature in general and 
14 Feuerbach's ethic is exclusively pertaining to the exalted human whereas Schopenhauer's 
the human individual' (I, 13-14). Yet despite the human species being seen in 
such positive, indeed exalted terms, the question of whether the individual 
remains essentially and perpetually in the negative role of alienation is a crucial 
one. As the 'holy' is essentially 'in opposition to me... as regards the 
modifications of my personality' (28), this may present an insurmountable 
problem that undermines the extent to which Feuerbach's vision of salvation can 
be termed "optimistic". Salvation is attained in unity with the species through I-
thou-love species-consciousness, and alienation is also overcome through 
individual aim or objective as part of this process, but is equally effected through 
human consciousness. Feuerbach's apparent perpetuation of the religious 
bifurcation of the holy-divine from the sinful-human has significant ramifications 
for individual self-consciousness, and the accessibility of salvation for the 
individual. 
In terms of the aim or objective of the individual, for Feuerbach human 
existence has an aim as a necessity as the human 'is nothing without an object', 
and this aim is always related to 'this subject's own, but objective, nature' (4). 
The 'manifested nature' of each individual is their 'true objective ego' (5, 
original emphasis), and is the modified form of essential human nature that each 
individual expresses. Their individual aspiration in life is 'the conscious, 
voluntary, essential impulse of life' and itself acts to effect 'the unity of the 
material and spiritual in the individual' (V, 64). Each individual's aim in life 
also becomes that through which each can/should overcome their own alienation 
as an individual (the material limited manifestation of human nature) from their 
essential nature (their "spirit" or essence), by acting as the medium through 
which their perfect and divine self is realised. Wilson recognises that Feuerbach 
is seeking a way in which Christianity's 'separation of nature and spirit must be 
overcome' (389), and that he is looking for 'a middle ground between sheer 
acceptance of the sensual (as materialists do) and sheer renunciation of it (as 
religions do)' (398). Human consciousness for Feuerbach is equally part of 
human destiny, as the human 'is destined not merely to action, but also to 
contemplation' (Essence I, 5). Whilst intellectual and aesthetic contemplation 
can effect their own objective transcendence (II, 34) and thus species- 
extends to all manifestations of the will: see Chapter 1(30) above. 
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consciousness, the role that human self-consciousness plays is clearly 
fundamental to his philosophical position. Feuerbach offers a positive vision of 
individual value in claiming 'that alone is holy to man which lies deepest within 
him, which is most peculiarly his own, the basis, the essence of his individuality' 
as manifested in the particular aims of the individual, whether through what that 
person recognises as the divine, their version of God (V, 63), or in their own 
personal objectives in life (I, 4). This manifested aim is a kind of projected 
image of the alienated self; thus affirmation of an objective is always self-
affirmation (6), and in a sense forms a "middle ground" between the individual 
and the species in being the individual manifestation of human essence. This 
middle ground is one that Feuerbach recognises as politically and concretely 
transformative for both individual and society, as Breckman recognises in 
Feuerbach's attempt 'to overcome the depoliticization of Christian civil society 
by grounding human action in a meaningful communal context' (457). This 
transformation is, however, in terms that take it into the realms of a divine 
salvation that again acts to absorb the individual into the species, and thus attain 
her or his sublime destiny: 
Work is worship... And the higher the occupation, the more completely 
does a man identify himself with it... But through his aim, through the 
activity in which he realises this aim, man is not only something for 
himself, but also something for others, for the general life, the species. 
He... who lives in the consciousness of the species as a reality, regards his 
existence for others, his relation to society, his utility to the public, as that 
existence which is one with the existence of his own essence - as his 
immortal existence. (Essence XVIII, 171) 
As such, the aim - the work - of the individual becomes a means of overcoming 
their alienation, each realising their human essence or "perfect" potential by 
uniting with the species in a conscious appreciation of their role within the 
community, the species. Feuerbach has reclaimed goodness for the human, and 
attempts to place work/aspiration as a means to concrete seif-realisation in that it 
becomes a unifying salvationary force. Yet consciousness is 'self-verification, 
self-affirmation, self-love, joy in one's own perfection' which 'is the 
characteristic mark of a perfect nature... exist[ing] only in a self-sufficing, 
complete being' (I, 6) in relation to self as consciously part of the divine 
goodness that is the human species. With the potential difference between work 
as it is actually experienced and Feuerbach's ideal of work as 'worship' (XVIII, 
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171), alongside the other negative implications regarding self-consciousness and 
communal relations, both personal and public, already touched upon earlier, there 
are clearly problems here. What are the implications for the imperfect individual, 
for their consciousness of the not-good, of imperfection, in themselves (28), in 
their relationships with others, in their own aim in life, their less-than-divine 
work, and in existence, particularly the experience and knowledge of pain and 
suffering? If salvation is attained through individual aim united with the species 
through consciousness, the question also needs to be asked how the individual 
alienated by external relations, whether religious, philosophical, social, personal, 
or related to their aim in life itself in the real conditions of work for instance, is to 
attain salvation? 
In terms of human feelings, for Feuerbach 'feeling, as such, is religious' 
(10) and is finally that through which I-thou community is attained. That feeling 
is religious in itself causes 'the distinction between specifically religious and 
irreligious, or at least non-religious, feelings... [to be] abolished [as] a necessary 
consequence of the point of view in which feeling only is regarded as the organ 
of the divine' (10). In Christianity, '[e]ven anger appears... an emotion not 
unworthy of God, provided only there be a religious motive at the foundation of 
this anger' (25). Whilst Feuerbach is ultimately placing all feelings as religious, 
the question is whether feelings - directly religious or otherwise - are always 
positive, and what happens to those feelings which might be deemed negative. 
This problem is particularly pertinent in the external relations of each individual, 
subject to the material reality of existence in the world, whether a specifically 
religious framework or other social structures and relations within society. As 
Karl Marx points out, Feuerbach idealises human nature and relationships and 
thus: 
never arrives at the really existing active men, but stops at the abstraction 
"man"... know[ing] no other "human relationships" "of man to man" than 
love and friendship, and even then idealised... giv[ing] no criticism of the 
present conditions of life... [for] the individuals composing it. (Ideology 
Part 1,64) 
In discussing those less idealised human elements, Feuerbach suggests that the 
same religious objectification of human nature that projects this onto the divine 
form of God also places undesirable elements onto the equally supernatural form 
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of the Devil - but without examining the nature of these elements in respect of his 
own quest for unity: 
Christians made mental phenomena into independent beings, their own 
feelings into qualities of things, the passions which governed them into 
powers which governed the world, in short, predicates of their own nature, 
whether recognised as such or not, into independent subjective existences. 
Devils.., witches, ghosts, angels, were sacred truths as long as the religious 
spirit held undivided sway over mankind. (Essence Introduction §2, 22) 
In this Feuerbach does suggest that the less positive aspects of human nature are 
nonetheless part of the human. In his delineation of the good and divine that is 
human nature, however, Feuerbach appears to effectively retain the position of 
the less positive aspects of the human and human experience in the individual-as-
imperfect, the culpable 'sinner' (I, 28), and thereby undermine the optimistic 
vision he is keen to frame. By positioning the object of existence in the bliss of 
salvation that union with the perfect goodness of the species effects, Feuerbach 
appears to leave the individual in a state of essential and perpetual imperfection, 
thus remaining in the unhappiness of disunity and alienation. As human essences 
are in themselves 'perfections... realities', and essentially infinite, having their 
'immediate verification and affirmation' (6) in the human species, Feuerbach 
claims that only negative, untrue elements can be negated at the same time as he 
clearly places these negative elements in the limited phenomena that is the 
individual in essential terms: 
Religion abstracts from man, from the world; but it can only abstract from 
the limitations, from the phenomena... from the negative, not from the 
essence, the positive, of the world and humanity: hence, in the very 
abstraction and negation it must recover that from which it abstracts, or 
believes itself to abstract... [if] what is denied by it is something essential, 
true, and consequently incapable of being ultimately denied - it 
unconsciously restores [this] in God. (27) 
Here Feuerbach is also again insisting that the human species-essence is also 
moral, true, and essential, and thus divine (28-30), but the finite 'phenomena' 
"man" is the 'negative' 'limitation' (27). If anger can be attributed to the divine 
only if 'there be a religious motive at the foundation of this anger' (25), 
presumably fear, pain, anxiety, misery and hatred are also part of the good that is 
human nature only ifmotivated by "religion". Other than "religiously motivated" 
(however that might be defined but presumably, in the terms of Feuerbach's 
philosophical position, motivated by species-consciousness) these less positive 
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attributes are related to individual feelings of limitation and imperfection in the 
knowledge that "goodness", perfection, exists only in and as the species (28). 
This may leave the individual human always in a position of self-conscious 
alienation from goodness, and the individual aim perpetually languishing in an 
imperfect form of realisation. 
In Christianity then, negative feelings are still considered in the same realm 
as the divine in being somehow superhuman, supernatural, thus essences of the 
human reified as the Devil (22), whilst "bad" or "evil" feelings being termed by 
religious theology also as human qualities marks a distinction (26-8) (and 
therefore alienation) between the perfect divinity of God (or species-essence) and 
the imperfect human, and firmly places the individual human closer to the Devil 
than to God, closer to evil than to goodness. Yet for Feuerbach, despite 
removing the cloak of religion to reveal the true object of human nature as its 
own divine self; those less positive human elements not "religiously" motivated 
remain that which falls short of species-perfection. Any human element which 
does not pertain to the perfect "goodness" of the species (however that might be 
defined) is thus negative, not "true" or essential, is deniable and presumably is 
one of those individualistic limitations, "bad" or 'sinful[]' (28) passions or habits 
which the force of Feuerbach's moral Will seeks to override. Affirmation can 
only occur with positive essences, and the individual, in being necessarily a 
limited and finite modification (23), is still negative to the divine positive. The 
individual is self-consciously imperfect, negative, and deniable and as such 
always comes second to species, sacrificed to the positive truth of species-
essence. Feuerbach's individual is philosophically and self-consciously alienated 
from the perfection of the divine species, thus self-consciously alienated by and 
from its own salvation. The final question is how accessible Feuerbachian 
salvation is in practical and effective terms. 
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Ill. Teleological salvation and the individual: reality and value. 
For Feuerbach, salvation is attained when the individual overcomes the alienation 
from her or his own essential nature that religion and non-Feuerbachian 
philosophies have enacted. This leads to the 'joy' (Essence App. §3, 284) of 
unity-through-feeling that is the destiny of the human. This salvation must be 
grounded in existence, and time plays a key role here for Feuerbach, as it does 
for Schopenhauer. Wilson argues that through being able to 'soften the negative 
and locate it within the infinity of reason', Feuerbaeh is able to 'understand the 
infinite, not as the end of the finite, but as the unfolding of the finite' and that this 
'endorses a more incamational view of the relationship of infinite to finite' (385), 
although Wilson does not discuss the significant role that time has in this 
"unfolding". In terms of the essential human elements Reason, Affection and 
Will, whilst the species-essence is that which pertains to the infinite and the 
perfect, each individual human has these elements albeit 'under such various 
conditions and modifications that they appear new and peculiar' (Essence 1, 23). 
As such, the 'inexhaustible fiilness of the divine predicates is... human nature 
considered as an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but, consequently, 
phenomenal being' (23). This is the form in which the infinitude of predicates is 
enacted over time, and 'Time' itself 'not the Hegelian dialectic, is the medium of 
uniting opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject' (23), thus 
becomes the point of synthesis. This occurs on one level in each individual 
subject-over-(life)time, but true unity is attained in the species over (infinite) 
time, thus the real, existing subject in time and space is the species itself (23). 
Wilson's suggested "unfolding" of the finite is a useful way of appreciating how 
individual realisation might operate here, but the question of the accessibility of 
salvation for the essentially alienated individual remains an issue. 
Feuerbach places time, and his conception of where the infinite and where 
reality lies, differently to Schopenhauer for whom the will-to-life as the thing-in-
itself is the infinite form, outside of time and space; the individual manifestations 
in time and space being finite and transient but, crucially, existential reality. 
Feuerbach positions real existence in the infinite rather than the finite. The 
infinite is 'a being of really infinite qualities or predicates' (23, my emphasis) 
and can only manifest itself in space and time, in and through the species as a 
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whole, yet this manifestation is only real existence in this macrocosmic form not 
in the finite and imperfect individual form' 5 . It is only in the temporal and spatial 
phenomena of the species that the infinite, divine and perfect, un(fIed nature of 
the predicates exists. On the one hand Feuerbach marks the distinction that needs 
to be made between fantasy and reality as 'the infinite fulness [sic] of various 
predicates is a conception without reality' if it is 'detached from the nature of 
man', leaving it therefore 'without the truth of sensible existence' (23). Yet it is 
clear that it is only in and across the human species en masse as the phenomenal 
form of 'the nature of man' (23) that both real existence and the unity that is 
salvation is attainable. For Feuerbach, qualities are essential to existence (15) 
and, whilst asserting that '[e]verything that exists has value, is a being of 
distinction', this is 'at least.., true of the species' (7, my emphasis). Feuerbach 
places salvation, value, distinction, existence, only in the species. The alienated 
individual attains the salvation of unity through the consciousness of community, 
the species-consciousness of I-thou feeling or recognition, and the species is that 
in which the perfection and divine goodness that is human nature is spatially and 
teleologically realised: in and through the de-individualised 'infinite plenitude or 
multitude of different beings or individuals' (23) united as the perfect essence of 
the species. Christensen acknowledges that Feuerbach's delineation of individual 
self-consciousness includes the understanding of finitude and limitation 'in 
relation to the "essence of man" as such', and that this 'entails the experience of 
the schism between my own particularity and the universality of "essential 
human nature" (352). At the same time, however, Christensen recognises 
Feuerbach's intent to affirm the individual as having real, concrete human 
existence in the historical reality of the human species as one that effectively 
helps the individual to overcome the consciousness of limitation. By enabling 
Feuerbach defines a predicate as 'divine in its nature... because it expresses no limitation, no 
defect' (Essence 1, 24). As the subject is existence, and the predicate is the essence, the 'reality of 
the predicate is the sole guarantee of existence' (19), thus a God 'who has abstract predicates has 
also an abstract existence [as] Existence, being, varies with varying qualities' (20). A feeling, such 
as morality, is a predicate, and whilst this also appears to be related to the subjectivity of 
knowledge in that we only know through our intellectual engagement with our sensual existence, 
and what we feel we know to be true, the predicates exist independently of the subject. For 
Feuerbach 'in no wise is the negation of the subject necessarily also a negation of the predicates 
considered in themselves. These have an intrinsic, independent reality; they force their recognition 
upon man by their very nature; they are self-evident truths to him' (21) in being divine qualities in 
themselves, dictated by the essence of the species. 
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the recognition 'that they after all do participate in "unlimitedness" by virtue of 
their being members of the human species' (Christensen 354, original emphasis), 
this is where 'the relationships between the species as universal and the person as 
particular... find their most fundamental and "real" expression', and thereby 'the 
human race taken as a historical whole is freed from... [limitation], particularity, 
and is thus unlimited and in effect "perfect" (355). Here Christensen echoes 
Feuerbach's intent, and Feuerbach's failure to adequately address the experience 
of alienation for the individual in a delineation of species-essence that appears to 
perpetuate it. Feuerbach insists that qualities are essential to existence (Essence 
I, 15) and that it is only 'in the realm of the senses, only in space and time... 
[that] there exist[s] a being of really infinite qualities or predicates' (23). Whilst 
'[e]verything that exists has value, is a being of distinction', in the end, 'at least 
this is true of the species' (7). Feuerbach appears to exclude the real possibility 
of unity, of salvation, or even of value for the self-consciously negative, 'sinful[]' 
(28), imperfect and limited individual whilst it affirms a sense of positive 
existence, of unity, perfection and goodness, and both reality and value only in 
the species. 
For Feuerbach happiness and unhappiness are directly related to self-
knowledge and self-consciousness, and to whether or not one knows oneself as a 
"higher being", the divine human. To 'know blessedness and not oneself to 
enjoy it, is a state of disunity, of unhappiness' and the human knows no 'higher 
human good than to love, . . .be good and wise; and.., no higher human happiness 
than to exist' (18). As such, Feuerbachian salvation is, in the end, equated with 
the conscious happiness of unity with the species. But if one knows one exists 
yet is unhappy in a world where happiness is possible, where lies salvation? For 
Feuerbach existence is happiness, which appears to place the unhappy individual 
in a state of suspended existence, waiting for real existence to arrive. This denies 
that the experience of unhappiness, pain, misery, is real, at the same time that 
Feuerbach is placing the positive reality of existence as such only in the unity and 
happiness that is accessed through species-consciousness. Either way, on this 
level too the real experience of the human individual is negated, and salvation 
endlessly deferred. As Wartofsky recognises, Feuerbach's insistence 'on the 
specificity of human action as time and space bound.., remains a suggestion and 
goes unfulfilled' (421). For Schopenhauer, it is only during moments of 
happiness that one transcends individual existence, but this is only ever a 
momentary affect. What we usually term happiness is largely a state of mind, a 
psychological condition in which we ignore life as it is lived in the perpetual 
quest for a happy future (or the yearning for a long-lost idyllic past)' 6 . 
Corporeal, sensual existence is only positively felt when one suffers, yet the 
consciousness of suffering is where immediate salvation from suffering can be 
effected in the present time and space of the existential world. For Feuerbach 
happiness is attained by overcoming alienation and attaining conscious unity with 
the divine perfection of our true nature, but this only appears to be possible 
outside of individual subjective experience. Feuerbach's delineation of intellect 
effecting freedom from subjectivity allows aesthetic and intellectual 
contemplation to access "true" existence, which can only occur when the 
individual is in objective, contemplative unity with species-consciousness. In 
placing the individual human somehow outside of reality altogether, however, as 
an essentially limited form of the essence of the human, Feuerbach also claims 
that the '[d]read of limitation is dread of existence' as all 'real existence.., is 
qualitative, determinative existence' (Essence 1, 15). Here Feuerbach is 
positioning two senses of existence: that dread of existence felt by the limited 
individual, and the real existence attained only through and in species-unity. 
Knowledge of one's self as the imperfect, limited individual is a state of dread 
and a suspension of real existence, while real existence is only found in and 
through a conscious knowledge of self-as-species: to exist is happiness, therefore 
happiness and real existence can only be found in the species, never in the 
individual' 7
. Whilst Feuerbach attempts to liberate the alienated individual by 
exposing the ground and means of individual subjection to the displacing forces 
of religion and philosophy, and thus opens the door to overcoming this 
16 Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, Schopenhauer does concede that happiness is possible in 
the world: see Chapter 1 (34) above. 
17 Whilst the essential human essences (which are also predicates) Reason-species and Affection-
individual appear equally balanced oppositional essences, thou is, in the end, only the same as 
species for Feuerbach. The potential synthesis the moral Will and Feeling effects is through 
overriding the individual and asserting the ethical position of the species, thus potentially effecting 
the unity off with thou (I attaining moral sympathy with 1/iou) at the same time as absorbing .L 
That all three elements are necessarily in modified, limited, and unequal form in the individual also 
precludes this force acting as a true, unifying synthesis. The problem of Feuerbach's moral Will 
(and Reason and Affection) as a priori and external to the individual appears to remain one that 
excludes individual free will, and most significantly individual value. 
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alienation, his own ground of existence, delineation of I-thou self-consciousness, 
and means to salvation enacts and perpetuates its own form of alienation. 
On one level, Feuerbach appears to reflect Schopenhauer's insistence that 
the attaimi-ient of happiness is both temporary and fleeting in his own recognition 
that there is a discrepancy between what is desired in life and actual experience, 
as '[i]n life the feelings are interrupted; they collapse; they are followed by a 
state of void, of insensibility' (App. §2, 283). Feuerbach suggests that the 
'religious problem... is to give fixity to feeling in spite of the vicissitudes of 
life.., to separate it from repugnant disturbances and limitations: [thus] God... is 
nothing else than undisturbed, uninterrupted feeling.., for which there exists no 
limits, no opposite' (283). Feuerbach posits feeling as that through which 
alienation is overcome, as the individual attains salvation in the freedom and 
limitless 'joy' that the feeling of unity with essence effects through 'escape from 
the sense of limitation into unlimited feeling' (App. §3, 284). This, the 'highest 
feeling of self, freed from all contrarieties or disagreeables' is attained once 
individuals free themselves from the feelings of 'desire, passion, the conditions 
of time and place [which are]... limits.., thou strugglest against... By means of 
the will, or the imagination, thou negativest limits, and thus obtainest the feeling 
of freedom' (284, original emphasis). Feeling or Affection is the human essence 
which acts as the unifying force, uniting its fellow limited human essences of 
Reason and Will to overcome alienation in itself effecting the I-thou-love of 
species unity. Whilst the "noble" aims of work can effect a form of species-unity 
for the individual, it is feeling (meaning the happiness of unity) which is the 
secular-religious apotheosis. Feuerbach attempts to unite the spiritual and the 
material through the feeling that reason's species-consciousness effects, but at 
the same time, effects a unity that negates the real. As Wilson recognises, 
Feuerbach 'wants to save the reality of the world while still sublating it into 
reason. Sensual particularity must die but not for the sake of a religious afterlife, 
but for a reason that lives within the sensual' (398). Marx emphasises the 
problems in Feuerbach's view 'that the existence of a thing or a man is at the 
same time its or his essence, that the conditions of existence.., are those in which 
its "essence" feels itself satisfied' (Ideology 61), Feuerbach's failure stemming 
from this view also holding that the human is a universal "essence" rather than a 
socio-historical product (62). For Marx, "liberation".., is not advanced a single 
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step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance... to "self-consciousness" (61) 
but by practical means and by historical acts. Liberation or salvation cannot be 
effected through Feuerbach's resolution of 'the religious essence into the human 
essence', where it is not 'inherent in each single individual' as 'its reality.., is the 
ensemble of the social relations', thus Feuerbach 'is compelled... to propose an 
abstract - isolated - human individual' (Marx Theses VI, 122, original 
emphasis). Salvation from alienation, for Feuerbach, is attainable for the 
individual but only psychologically; and the feeling of joy that recognising self-
as-unlimited-species releases occurs at the same time that the element of 
limitation - the individual self - is effectively negated. The implications for the 
individual, self-consciously aware of their own limitation and imperfection and 
of their real experiences of the world, is to perpetuate the alienation Feuerbach 
intends to overcome and even acts to compound it. 
The consciousness that one is unhappy in a world where happiness is 
possible, is imperfect in a world where perfection and happiness are not only 
possible but the sole object of existence and reality itself leads to a compounded 
sense of self-failure which echoes the religious alienation of the imperfect 
individual from the divine object in fundamental terms. This also affects the 
individual's consciousness of how others see them, which in turn impacts on how 
they see others - the personal manifestations of thou. The conscious recognition 
of self as a failure because thou-as-species is perfection, could inform more 
humane perceptions of thou-another-individual and lead to empathy with 
another's own self-doubt, which effectively leads us back to Schopenhauer's 
ethical stance of I-thou recognition of the equality of suffering. Equally, the self-
conscious failure I could also imagine that other individuals recognise me in the 
same inferior light, thus compounding the diminishing sense of self. I might also 
recognise the other, personal thou as more perfect than me, thus propelling the 
self further from perfection, and the ever-receding happiness of salvation. Whilst 
Feuerbach's I-thou sympathy between persons is intended to effect the transition 
from disunity to unity through a psychological recognition of self as part of the 
species, his philosophical position also places I as seeking unity with the whole 
human species (thou), not as self with another valued individual as such. Here 
the individual is absorbed into thou, thus positive individual human relations 
slide into the facelessness of species-essence. Beyond the philosophical, 
psychological, and material bathers to I-thou unity faced by the individual in 
immediate terms, there are the psychological and corporeal bathers effected by 
thou in broader terms. Feuerbach's salvation through I-thou consciousness 
philosophically undermines the accessibility and optimism of individual 
salvation by leaving the individual without existential meaning and value and, 
crucially, fails to acknowledge human relations on both the personal and the 
social scale in anything other than positive terms. Feuerbach ignores the material 
reality of existence - including human relations and the real experience of work 
and other aims - in the human world. That Feuerbachian salvation necessarily 
relies on consciousness of alienation, and the means to overcome this being 
effected en masse, relies on all other manifestations of thou to be working 
towards the same end. Feuerbach delineates the means by which the human is 
alienated from realising a sense of their true potential in life, in community and 
in aspiration, by the human constructs of religion and philosophy in particular, 
and as such opens the door to realising a positive salvation in life. In failing to 
accommodate the reality of existence for the alienated individual, however, 
Feuerbach fails to delineate a practical or effective escape from alienation or an 
immediately accessible form of salvation in a world where the human individual 
and their aspirational aims continue to find themselves effectively alienated by 
the "noble" aims of work, by human relations and community, and indeed by the 
ground, means, and object of Feuerbach's own philosophical salvation. 
Schopenhauer's focus is on the thing-in-itself of existence and the realm of 
human knowledge and conscious agency within this, whereas Feuerbach's 
philosophy is primarily concerned with conscious, human existence and its 
forms. Whilst Feuerbach and Schopenhauer differ in terms of the philosophical 
background to human existence, and their placing of the human in seemingly 
oppositional "optimistic" or "pessimistic" terms, it is evident that they both 
consider the grounding of philosophy in living human experience and in ethical 
human behaviour as central to their positions. Not only Feuerbach's sacrifice of I 
for thou, but whole I-thou ethic, echoes Schopenhauer's own on significant 
levels, despite the polarised optimistic and pessimistic starting points of each, 
and the effective reversal of "pessimism" and "optimism" in each in the 
accessibility of salvation in the end. Even Feuerbach's assertion that 'to suffer 
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for others is divine' (Essence V, 60) echoes Schopenhauer's affirmation of the 
beauty of self-sacriflc& 8. Whilst both posit the existential individual as a being 
of value, seeking individual ends at the same time as seeking the joy of salvation 
that release from suffering or limitation is expected to bring, both see egoistic 
selflslmess or individualism as reprehensible. This egoism can be overridden by 
one's reasoning ethical choice for Schopenhauer (subject to individual character), 
or apparently involuntarily, despite one's individual self for Feuerbach. Intellect 
allows free will for Feuerbach, but at the same time Will is not a manifestation of 
the individual as such but of species-essence, and overrides the individual who 
can thus never really be free. Free will is also subject to the will-to-life and the 
determined character of the individual for Schopenhauer, although intellect for 
him does allow deliberate choice in the individual, overriding (or allowing) the 
egoism of the will-to-life. Whilst Schopenhauer appears to prioritise the 
experience and temporary or finite but palpable salvation of the individual, 
Feuerbach ultimately absorbs the individual into the infinite and abstract 
salvation that is the perfect unified destiny of the species, thus removing value 
from the individual in fundamental terms. Feuerbach's optimistic premise is that 
the human species is in essence good, perfect, and infinite, and that the individual 
can attain conscious unity with the species as the divine object, as its destiny and 
salvation. This occurs through a psychological recognition of self as part of the 
whole (whether through human aims or human relations), and is accessed 
through (and simultaneously attaining) the feeling that pertains to a sense of 
unity. Whilst the exalted feeling of unity that overcoming alienation through 
species-consciousness effects is psychological, it is also emotionally experienced 
which does afford a form of positive existence for the individual in this at least, 
but also it seems at most. Feuerbach's individual is perpetually alienated by the 
self-consciousness of essential limitation, and by the real conditions of human 
existence, thus Feuerbach's salvationary point remains tantalisingly out of reach. 
Feuerbach draws aside the veils of theological, philosophical, and ritualistic 
metaphor to reveal the negativity of abstract constructions of existence, thereby 
revealing the true object of both religion and philosophy as nothing more nor less 
than human nature. In showing how these artificial constructs alienate the 
' Schopenhauer WWI IV §59, 204. 
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individual from realising their own true nature, Feuerbach intends that his 
philosophy itself can enact the necessary transformation whereby the individual 
can overcome their alienation and attain the 'joy' (App. §3, 284) of unity with the 
essence and aim of human existence 19 . Feuerbach grounds his philosophy in the 
real, experiential human, seeking to enact a positive recognition of self and other 
that confers meaning onto individual existence through community, and posit 
value on and into the human species in essential terms that incorporate an 
optimistic vision of human existence and destiny. This optimistic vision is 
undermined by its recognition of and reliance upon only positive human 
relations, its placing of the finite and imperfect individual in self-conscious 
opposition to the infinite perfection that is both the essence and the object of its 
own nature, and in the accessibility of salvation being equally self-consciously 
abstract in the non-immediate space and time and perfect unity that is the species. 
Salvation, for Feuerbach, appears to lead to the subsuming of the individual into 
the essence, the species, and thereby the real individual human effectively ceases 
to exist. That this occurs through I-thou self-consciousness also places the sense 
of perpetual failure firmly in individual experience (of both self and world). 
The positive and the negative aspects of Feuerbachian I-thou relations and 
salvation will be shown in Chapter 5 to have pertinent resonances in George 
Eliot's Middlemarch, raising questions about Eliot's unqualified acceptance of 
Feuerbach. In the discussion of Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure in Chapter 7, 
a number of aspects of Feuerbach's delineations of salvation will be shown to 
have significant resonances in the ground and the extent of Hardy's pessimism. 
Feuerbach's recognition of the means, forms, and affects of alienation does open 
up opportunities for a more pragmatic salvation, effected through practical 
change to the artificial constructs of society. Feuerbach's own delineation of 
salvation ensures the individual remains alienated, however, perpetually running 
on and on towards the happiness of self-realisation that always exists beyond 
itself, in both time and space. Feuerbach's very assertion of teleological progress 
towards a vision of salvation itself, alongside a lack of concrete means of 
For Feuerbach, the 'unity of mind and heart.., consists, not in extinguishing or glossing over 
their difference, but... in that the essential object of the heart is also the essential object of the 
mind' for which he posits his 'new philosophy' (Principles §57, 71) itself as unifying object. 
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realisation, ensures that it is one that endlessly remains out of reach, and the 'joy' 
of 'paradise' (App. §3, 284) remains a shimmering apparition. 
73 
Chapter 3 
Victorian Britain and the Loss of God: 
Is Life Worth Living? 
'It is impossible to conceive that this awakening, this 
discovery by man of himself will not be the beginning of 
his decadence; that it will not be the discovery on his part 
that he is a lesser and a lower thing than he thought he 
was, and that his condition will not sink till it tallies with 
his own opinion of it 
William Mallock, 1879' 
I. Pessimism and optimism: a sh jfling paradigm. 
The previous two chapters have shown that the seemingly polarised positions 
Schopenhauer's pessimism and Feuerbach's optimism appear to occupy are 
destabilised within their own philosophical systems, and also share significant 
points of contact between them. Both insist on the importance of real, 
experiential human existence as their ground, and on human ethics as central to 
their positions. Human consciousness is as necessary to both in terms of the 
grounding of reality, ethics, and salvation and, of course, each retain the ideal of 
salvation itself thereby at the very least offering the hope of relief from human 
suffering or alienation in this life rather than the next. Both argue that the veil of 
illusion that Christianity and previous philosophical systems have cast over what 
each see as the real circumstances of human existence must be cast off, in order 
to reveal to human consciousness the "true" object of human destiny outside of 
theological propositions. One purports to be a pessimistic philosophy, yet its 
salvationary ethic is both accessible and pragmatic, giving practical direction to 
the immediate relief of suffering, and as such its pessimism is at the very least 
qualified. The other purports to be optimistic, yet effectively perpetuates the 
alienation of the individual it exposes, holding salvation just out of reach. As 
JsL(/e WorthLiving? 1879, 151. 
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such, its optimism is undermined although it does offer a more practical 
consciousness with the potential to effect genuine social change in its 
deconstruction of the alienating effects of artificial social constructs. 
In an increasingly secularising nineteenth century Britain, the question of 
what now constitutes individual and social human destiny outside of religious 
delineations concerns many social thinkers, for whom issues of morality are of 
equal if not greater concern. European philosophy is read, translated, and 
discussed in Britain in the search for a philosophical answer to the question of 
where a moral form of human destiny might be found outside of a traditional 
religious framework. Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, published in 
English in 1854, follows a number of optimistic-secularist works which 
deconstruct religious doctrine and directly discuss more "humanist" versions of 
moral doctrine and social development 2 during the nineteenth century, whilst 
there are relatively few works during this period which overtly discuss 
pessimism. Whilst Schopenhauer' s The World as Will and Idea (1819) and his 
other works were not directly available in English translation until the I 880s 3, his 
works were of course available in German from 1819, and a number of 
secondary sources were available in German, French, and English during the 
1 860s and 70s. All of the sources in English were preceded by John Oxenford's 
2 Other works includeD. F. Strauss Life of Jesus (1842) Birmingham: Taylor &c, 18424; Charles 
Hennell's An Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity (1838) London: Smallfield & Son, 
1838; and Auguste Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive. (183042), Paris: [nk], 183047. 
Schopenhauer's first translations into English are as follows: 
Beethoven: With a Supplement from the Philosophical Works by Arthur Schopenhauer (1880) by 
Richard Wagner [includes "On visions and matters connected therewith" (1851) & "On 
the metaphysics of music" (1818)]. tr. Edward Dannreuther. London: Reeves, 1880. 
Religion: A Dialogue, and Other Essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, selected and translated (from 
Parerga and Paralipomena (1851) by T. B. Saunders. London: S. Sonnerschein & Co, 
1889. 
Select Essays. tr. G. Droppers and C.A.P. Dachsel. Milwauke: Sentinel Co, 1881. 
Studies in Pessimism: A Series ofEssays by Arthur Schopenhauer, selected and translated by T. 
Bailey Saunders. London: S. Sonnerschein & Co, 1891, and 1892. 
The Complete Essays ofArthur Schopenhauer trans T. Bailey Saunders, New York: WilIcy, 1896. 
The World as Will and Idea (1819) tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 3 Volumes, London: 
Triibner!Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1883; 1886. 
Two Essays: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On The Will in 
Nature. tr. Mme Karl Hillebrand, London: Bohn's Philosophical Library/cL Bell & Sons, 
1889. 
WWI 1819; On the Will in Naturel Ober der Willen in der Natur 1836; On the Basis of Morality 
and Freedom of the Will! Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik 1839/1841; Essays/Parerga 1851. 
Critical studies about Schopenhauer and pessimism available during the 1860s and 70s include: 
Gwinner, Wilhelm von. ArthurSchopenhauerauspersönlichenUmgange dargestellt 
[...] (1862). 
Leipzig: [publisher nk], 1862. 
Schopenhauer und seiner Freunde[ 
... ] ( 1863). Leipzig: [publisher nk], 1863. 
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review of Schopenhauer's philosophy in The Westminster Review in 1853. Ralph 
Goodale argues that the I 870s was a time when Schopenhauer became more 
widely known, that by 1 879 'every person alive to the development of the day 
must have heard of him.., and by 1883 an educated man could not think of 
pessimism without thinking also of Schopenhauer' (242). Goodale warns, 
however, that 'in investigating the influence of Schopenhauer one must beware 
of ascribing to him what is due to Hartmann or the exponents of Buddhism' 
(243), and must remain conscious of what he terms 'the roots of pessimism under 
consideration in a number of causes, all of which had begun to operate before 
Schopenhauer's views were made known' (249). Schopenhauer openly 
acknowledges the influences of Eastern religious philosophy on his system 6, and 
Eduard von Hartmann's philosophical pessimism is derived directly from 
Schopenhauer's. Von Hartmann seeks a reconciliation between Schopenhauer's 
denial of the Will and 1-legel's Absolute Idea, a marriage which develops the 
Schopenhauerian Unconscious will into an evolving Consciousness, thus 
becoming a Conscious Will which is now aware of the 'torment' which 'is 
perpetuated endlessly' (Hartmanri 142) in existence. As this emergent 
Consciousness now recognises the suffering in the world, there results the 
'complete victory of the logical over the alogical [which] must therefore coincide 
with the temporal end of the world-process, the last day' (131). Von Hartmann's 
Conscious Will logically chooses to extinguish itself in a kind of de-
individualised mass-extinction 'without residuum' (141). Christopher Janaway 
recognises von Hartmann's significant indebtedness to Schopenhauer 
(Schopenhauer 106), although von Hartmann's pessimism moves far beyond 
Schopenhauer's pessimism in its evolutionary Consciousness, Absolute Logic, 
Ribot, Theodule. La Philosophie de Schopenhauer. (1874). Paris: [publisher nk], 1874; 2 d and 3 
editions 1885 and 1893. 
Sully, James. Pessimism: A History anda Criticism. (1877) London: Henry S. King & Co, 1877; 
2' edition Kegan Paul, 1891. 
Zimmern, Helen. Arthur Schopenhauer, His Life and Philosophy. (1876). London:[publisher nk], 
1876. 
6 See WWIIV §64, 220-2; and see Chapter 1(41) above. 
An extinction which occurs via a sort of inverted Feuerbachian individual sacrifice for the good 
of the whole (Hartmann 101): the 'utmost world-progress [is] the "strength" of the pessimistic 
consciousness of humanity' (115); and once the 'illusions are dead, hope is extinct' (117) and 
humanity as a whole 'foregoes all positive happiness, and longs only for absolute painlessness, for 
nothingness' (117-8, original emphasis). 
and deliberate extinction, and has very limited relevance to the examination of 
pessimism in this thesis. 
In 1853 Oxenford produced a fairly comprehensive outline of many aspects 
of Schopenhauer's position, and directly led to Schopenhauer's philosophy 
becoming more widely known in Britain (and in Germany) 8 . Yet Oxenford finds 
Schopenhauer's doctrine 'the most disheartening, the most repulsive, the most 
opposed to the aspirations of the present world' (394, my emphasis) 9 . The 
aspirations of Oxenford's "present world" are, however, far less clearly definable 
as the unified voice that he suggests. Despite mentioning in passing 
Schopenhauer's ethics of art, and the 'bad man, the just man, the good man, and 
the whole rabble of vice and virtue' (405) in his review, Oxenford does not 
discuss these issues, their implications in Schopenhauer's philosophy, or their 
potential utilisation in the secularised quest for human salvation. Oxenford was 
amongst those Victorian Britons interested in European, particularly German, 
philosophy and able to read German to a highly competent extent. George Eliot 
was another, and she introduces Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity to 
mainstream Britain in providing the first English translation, published in 185410. 
Eliot also translated David Strauss' Lfe of Jesus (published 1846) and Baruch 
Spinoza's works, although her translations of Spinoza were not published at the 
time " . Eliot's other direct philosophical readings include J. W. Goethe and 
Auguste Comte, and she published a great number of critical essays and reviews, 
Oxenford also lists Schopenhauer's major works and German publication details in his article, 
including Die Well a/s Wi/le and Vorstellung (WWI), 1819, Parerga und Para/ipomena (Essays 
and Aphorisms) 1851, and Die beiden Grundprob/eme der Ethik (The Two Fundamental Problems 
of Ethics: On the Basis of Morality and On the Freedom of the Will), 1841. Arthur Hubscher has 
pointed out that Schopenhauer was also mentioned in Britain from as early as 1832 (HUbscher 505, 
fnl) in Wilhelm Tennemann's A Manual of the History of Philosophy, published Oxford: D.A. 
Talboys, 1832. This work does not actually discuss Schopenhauer as such, however, his name and 
rvwi are mentioned, with a footnote (in German) stating that the work also includes a criticism of 
Kant's philosophy (Tennemann 466, 467, fnS). 
Even three decades later, in The Saturday Review in 1882, Paul Cams remarks that with 
Schopenhauer '[e]verything is destroyed, the reality of God, of duty, of man's personality, and the 
morality of science.., with the denial of free will, conscience and moral obligation necessarily 
disappear, and virtue is resolved into a form of self-love' (quoted Neugebauer 12). Paul 
Neugebauer also lists a large number of publications which discuss Schopenhauer, beginning with 
Oxenford in 1853, and becoming prolific by the 1870s through to the 1890s (96-100). 
The translation currently available. Feuerbach's original publication Germany 1841. 
According to Timothy Hands, this was due to George Lewes' dispute with the publisher at the 
time of the completion of Eliot's translation of Ethics in 1856 (47) during the period of Eliot and 
Lewes' long collaborative relationship. According to Hands, Eliot's translation of Spinoza's 
Tractatus theologico-politicus 'has not been found' (22). Rosemary Ashton notes that Eliot's 
translation of Spinoza's Ethics was finally published in 1981 (Ashton "Introduction" Eliot Selected 
xviii). 
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particularly throughout the 1840's and 1850's, in which she engages in questions 
of morality and human destiny. Thus Eliot herself contributes to the literary 
debates of the latter Victorian period concerning these issues to a significant 
extent. Most critics have not examined Eliot's exposure to Schopenhauer, which 
certainly included the Oxenford article as she was editor of The Westminster 
Review at this time and recommended the article to her friends George Combe 
and Sara Hermell as 'one of the best in that number' (Letters v.11, 95; VIII, 73-
74). Oxenford's literary 'present world' then, has been introduced to both 
Schopenhauer and Feuerbach almost simultaneously, but whether all of 
Oxenford's contemporaries share his own 'aspirations' (394) is another matter. 
H. Victorian Britain: "Is Life Worth Living", and if so, how? 
In 1879 the essayist, satirical novelist, and economic and social critic William 
Mallock published a non-fiction work which asks the question Is Lfe Worth 
Living? Here Mallock examines secular optimistic thinking, and discusses 
pessimistic visions of the present and the future. Whilst Mallock does not 
discuss Feuerbach or Schopenhauer directly in this particular work, he is writing 
more than 20 years after both philosophers have been introduced to Victorian 
Britain and engages with issues which both philosophers particularly address. In 
an essay on George Eliot published the same year' 2, Mallock's discussion shows 
that he was certainly familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy, albeit, like 
Oxenford, ignoring Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion, human morality, and 
salvation, and focusing only on Schopenhauer's pessimistic view of the world. 
In Is Life Worth Living?, Mallock aims to reveal obvious truths which 'might be 
before everybody's eyes; but instead they are under everybody's feet... trampled 
into [the mud] by a headstrong and uneducated generation... [whose] 
insolence.., ignorance, and.., stupidity' (vii-viii) have placed them there - to 
what he sees as the fatal detriment of society. These insolent, ignorant and stupid 
people are the optimistic secularists, who do not pertain exclusively to Comte's 
Positivist system of thought nor to T. H. Huxley or Frederic Harrison and their 
expositions of scientific and evolutionary agnosticism and positivist humanism, 
but to that wherein all secularist thinkers 'explicitly agree' (xxiii). Mallock terms 
all such thinking as "positivism", and Herbert Spencer points out the tendency 
amongst what he terms the 'theological party' to think of 'the antagonistic 
scientific party, under the title of "positivists" (3) whether or not they are indeed 
Comtean Positivists. The secular-optimists, so castigated by Mallock, form part 
of Oxenford's commonly-aspiring 'present world' who find Schopenhauer's 
pessimism 'disheartening' and 'repulsive' (394), yet 20 years later Mallock fears 
that optimistic secularist thinkers are themselves tending 'towards pessimism' 
(Living xvii). Mallock's critique is of the fUndamental flaws which he believes 
permeate all forms of secularist thought, expressing his fears that the optimistic-
progressive world-view is paradoxically leading to both individual and social 
2 Mallock's 1879 review of Eliot's Impressions of Theophras:us Such entitled "W. H. Mallock on 
George Eliot" is discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
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degeneration. Yet in a further paradox, Mallock himself has a deeply pessimistic 
view of human nature. 
Mallock's polemic against secularism in Is Life Worth Living? addresses 
questions of social happiness and the "highest good", human nature, morality and 
society, the value of existence, and salvation. Mallock criticises both optimistic 
secularism and pessimism, yet himself argues from a deeply pessimistic 
perspective. In enquiring into 'the true value of this human life of ours... and to 
ask dispassionately if it be really worth the living' (I), Mallock argues that it is 
secularism itself that has 'produced a moral deterioration' (xvi) in society as a 
direct result of its refusal of the 'supernatural moral element' (xv). The loss of a 
supernatural basis of morality leads Mallock to fear that the optimistic 'promised 
land' of earthly human salvation that positivist 'leaders of progress' claim to be 
in sight might not 'be splendour, but desolation' (24) - because secularism has 
removed value from life by removing the possibility of spiritual salvation itself as 
an end. Mallock argues that spiritual salvation was previously the one thing 
which conferred 'an immeasurable meaning' both in and onto life in the very 
transformative nature of the proposition that there is 'something more to come' 
(8). The belief in eternal salvation ensured that misery and worthlessness 
became 'altogether transmuted' in view of the 'ends that were invisible - to 
spiritual and eternal destinies, to triumphs beyond all hope, and portentous 
failures beyond all fear' (8). Christianity, and in particular the Christian God as 
'the father of the human soul, and its judge... its rest.., its joy, and its desire', 
enabled the human to appear and feel 'an ampler being' in that 'every detail in 
the life of a human soul became vaster, beyond all comparison, than the depths of 
space and time', and thus takes on 'supernatural' (16) proportions. The sense of 
'degradation' that has accompanied the fall of this vision is equally intense and 
even 'more definite' (16, my emphasis), compounded by the profound loss of 
hope that Mallock feels this has consequently engendered (16). In the religious 
belief in Heaven and Hell then, human life was invested with profound meaning 
and value, whereas it has now been equally profoundly degraded in the attempt to 
posit value in the very place that it is impossible to find it: in the essentially 
limited time and space of 'the human race' (9) itself Mallock has failed to be 
impressed by the quasi-religious intensity that some forms of optimistic 
secularism have sought to bestow onto human life and endeavour for its own 
sake, a view that Feuerbach's exalted vision of the human overtly seeks to deify 
and which a number of secularists very much take on board. 
Frederic Harrison's 'intellectual objection to "subliming religion into an 
emotion, and making an armistice with science" (DeLaura 387-8, original 
emphasis) does not prevent Harrison from recognising with Feuerbach that 
Christianity engenders a "pessimism as to the essential dignity of man" (quoted 
Mallock 17, original emphasis). Such a recognition is seen by Mallock as itself a 
'degrading' (17) factor, however, arguing that the increase in scientific 
development is actually removing human dignity by removing the mystery and 
imagination that living in the world and the wider universe previously enabled. 
As a result life and the world are denigrated, 'treated like a courtesan, rather than 
like a goddess' (19), because such knowledge encourages superficial utilisation 
rather than profound worship. Ironically, a number of secularist thinkers also 
express concerns regarding the elision of the less quantifiable areas of human 
experienc& 3
. For Mallock, secular optimism has encouraged a detrimental form 
of 'intense self-consciousness.., in the world' which he finds - 'is something 
altogether new to it' (19), but is one he sees as absent from Christian self-
consciousness. Here Mallock views religious faith as one that does not include 
the same self-consciousness of 'looking before and after', or of taking 'to pieces 
all motives and actions' (19), despite earlier explicitly referring to the intensity 
that living with the certain prospect of either eternal salvation or damnation 
engenders (16). This is not because - in the religious context - Mallock views 
such a destiny as predetermined thus outside of the concerns of conscience, but 
rather that he sees the removal of such clear-cut certainty as itself the problem. 
The exchange of previously-held "facts" for the knowledge that they are only 
'ideals' is a key factor in the degeneration of concrete effectiveness in 
'restrain[ing] or curb[ing]' (20) human behaviour. Whilst Mallock's primary 
concern is the necessity of controlling human behaviour then, he fails to 
recognise that secularist ideals are equally seen as facts by those who espouse 
them, at the same time as he ignores the 'intense self-consciousness' (19) that the 
certainty of God's reward or punishment is equally capable of engendering. 
Feuerbach's premise itself becomes an equally "religious" quest for what is 
13 See J. S. Mill "Bentham" (65-8) for example; and see discussion below. 
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recognised as the "truth" that 'the highest power for man... is the essential, the 
divine.., the certainty which human feeling has of itself, as the.., absolute 
power' (Essence XII, 121). What appears to concern Mallock the most here is 
that the removal of what was certain knowledge (that a higher supernatural 
authority holds the casting vote over individual salvation or damnation in His 
hands) has also removed a means of curbing human behaviour that can not be 
paralleled outside of this framework (Living 20) 1 . This necessity of curbing 
human behaviour appears to be at the heart of every argument against secularist 
thinking that Mallock puts forward. 
In analysing the content of utilitarian claims for social happiness, wherein 
society should aim towards effecting the happiness of humankind rather than 
one's own happiness (38), Mallock finds the specific aims of this to be not really 
"happiness" but merely the pre-conditions of happiness. Securing such 
commonly-agreed basic requirements as life, health and wealth does not in itself 
'secure us happiness', it 'simply leaves us free to secure it, if we can, for 
ourselves' (39). Thus the optimist-secularists 'confuse the negative conditions of 
happiness with the positive materials of it' (40), and the specific identification of 
what actually constitutes this "happiness" being sought remains elusive' 5 . 
Mallock's point is, however, clearly recognised by some of those secularist 
thinkers he condemns. J. S. Mill's advocacy of utilitarianism is one that has 
happiness as 'the only thing desirable as an end', yet he regards both the 
objective of 'morality' and of 'rational conduct' as 'not solely the pursuit of 
happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness' (Utilitarianism 190, 
my emphasis). As such, Mill holds the Schopenhauerian view that happiness 
may in fact be 'chimerical' in which case 'there will be all the greater scope 
and... imperative need' for the mitigation of unhappiness, 'so long at least as 
H Mallock's illustrative point here is that terrorising a child with stories of 'a black man' coming 
'down the chimney' to 'take it away' will restrain that child only if the child does not know that 
this is 'only an ideal', a story (Living 20). 
Mallock also sees a clear confusion in secularist thinking between the ideals of personal and 
social happiness, despite the frequent conflation of one with the other, which lies in their hiding a 
moral contradiction. This contradiction itself arises at least partly from Mallock's own pessimistic 
view of human nature, however: 'The social happiness of all of us means nothing but the personal 
happiness of each of us; and if social happiness has any single meaning - in other words, if it be a 
test of morals - it must postulate a personal happiness of some hitherto unexplained kind. Else 
sociology will be subsidiary to nothing but individual license; general law will be but the 
protection of individual lawlessness; and the completest social morality, but the condition of the 
completest personal un-morality' (Living 44). 
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mankind think fit to live' (Mill Utilitarianism 190), and in this last, Mill strongly 
echoes Schopenhauer's insistence on the necessity to live on in order to work 
towards the "highest moral good": the relief of suffering. Arguing that the 
secularist goal of the 'highest good' must be a distinguishable 'actual attainable 
thing... for flesh and blood creatures' (Mallock Living 29) rather than what he 
calls 'transcendental ecstasies' (31), Mallock insists that it must be recognisable 
to all as 'not only... [must it] satisfy the virtuous of the wisdom of their virtue, it 
must be able to convince the vicious of the folly of their vice' (31). This is 
because the human race is 'ever inclined' to immorality, perpetually 'choos[ing] 
vice instead of virtue.., considering the lower or the lesser happiness better than 
the greater or the higher' and consequently 'the moralist has to meddle with 
human nature mainly because it is inconstant and corrupted' (32, my emphases). 
Mallock takes a seriously pessimistic view of what he sees as inherent human 
immorality and thus the destination of what optimistic thought sees as human 
"progress" is brought into question. For Mallock the key necessity is that human 
behaviour should be curbed. Whilst he concedes that there is 'good in humanity' 
(albeit only minimally and briefly mentioned), he criticises the Feuerbachian 
argument for 'Man as distinct from, and holier than, any individual men' (193), 
arguing that this does not remove the 'fact of moral evil' as this is 'at least an 
equivalent match' for goodness, indeed 'in most battles hitherto it is evil that has 
been victorious' (193). Here Mallock echoes Schopenhauer's position regarding 
the prevalence of "evil" and suffering to a significant extent, and touches upon a 
problem within Feuerbach's position in terms of the refusal to adequately 
acknowledge the presence of "evil" in human intentions or acts. The question of 
the holy is, however, one that Mallock takes further, critiquing the religiosity that 
such systems espouse as he sees this very element bringing secularised morality 
to the point of collapse. 
In Feuerbach's quasi-religious salvation, seeking to "return" the human to 
itself and overcome the alienation effected in the individual through the religious 
objectification of human essence, he reveals the object of religion as nothing 
more nor less than human nature, in which resides the essence and aim of the 
human and the self-realisation of the individual (salvation) in union with the 
species. Despite turning God into the human, Feuerbach retains the element of 
mystery, of infinitude and the divine, placing this within the essence of human 
nature; thus the human becomes God. Feuerbach's human is the ground of 
religious feeling - and thus morality - and thereby argues against Mallock's 
inherently corrupt human. In its subsequently deified form, human nature has 
'the ideal, the species, humanity in the fullness of its perfection and infinity', and 
as 'in the moral as well as the physical and intellectual elements, men 
compensate for each other' and unity or salvation is attained through the 
'imagination' (Feuerbach Essence XVI, 155). Feuerbach's unity aims to absolve 
all failings and imperfections by absorbing both difference and individuality into 
the perfection of the species, and thus effect a unified organism, the individual 
parts of which all work with one aim: its whole and perfect self. The practical 
applications of this are intended to extend from individual aims into the 
community. Two years before Mallock's Is Life Worth Living? is published, 
William Clifford recognises society in exalted and political Feuerbachian terms, 
arguing that 'Belief is a 'sacred faculty which prompts the decisions of our will, 
and knits into harmonious working all the compacted energies of our being, [and] 
is ours not for ourselves but for humanity' (Ethics 3). Clifford sees society as 
'the highest of all organisms' where "actions which, as individual, are 
insignificant, are massed together into.., important movements. Co-operation... 
is the life of [society]" (Clifford, quoted Mallock 37). Further, it is co-operation 
(or 'band-work') that has created 'two specially human faculties, the conscience 
and the intellect', the former of which 'gives us the desire for the good, and the 
latter instructs us how to attain this desire by action' (ibid). Whilst offering a 
more overtly practical direction for human aims, Clifford strongly echoes 
Feuerbachian ideals, both in the delineation of the individual and society and in 
the recognition of both life itself and human intentions as good and wholesome. 
Mallock argues from the opposite perspective and claims that such a deification 
of the human 'reduce[sJ goodness to nothing but the higher part of humanity' 
(my emphasis) which 'at its best can but blaze for a while, and at its brightest can 
throw no light beyond this paltry parish of a world', and thus its deflection from 
the possibilities that may exist beyond life onto the existential world actually 
deprives goodness 'of its whole meaning and hold on us' (Mallock Living 194). 
Despite thinkers such as Clifford identifying a strong sense of positive action in 
the social 'movements' of 'co-operation' then, for Mallock, the religiosity at the 
heart of the exalted view of secularised morality is dismantled by a reversal of 
the rationalistic argument that sought to dismantle Christian dogma. He points 
out the contradiction of the secularist use of 'vague' and 'unsubstantial' religious 
terminology, and 'low and lofty' sentiments, as these form part of the religious 
'dreamland' (166-7, original emphasis) that secularism rejects' 6 . Thus 'truth as a 
moral end has even more of religion in its composition than happiness has, and... 
when this religion goes, its value will even more hopelessly evaporate' (116), 
bringing secularised morality to the point of collapse. This inability to posit any 
sense of positive feelings, ability, endeavour, or actions in and onto the human 
outside of religious morality, leaves Mallock with a very gloomy vision indeed. 
Quoting Matthew Arnold, who is conscious 'of a void that mines the 
breast' (152), Mallock takes Arnold's questioning of the impact that the loss of 
religious faith has effected to an extreme point, arguing that without religion, 
'life, in so far as it is worth living at all, is worth living not essentially but 
accidentally', and at bottom, 'it can have no abiding value' (137). For Mallock: 
It is impossible to conceive that this awakening, this discovery by man of 
himself, will not be the beginning of his decadence; that it will not be the 
discovery on his part that he is a lesser and a lower thing than he thought he 
was, and that his condition will not sink till it tallies with his own opinion 
ofit. (151) 
Despite bleaker nuances in some of his poetry and non-fiction prose, Arnold 
disagrees with Mallock in insisting that, whilst the present and future of 
secularist thinking must maintain what he sees as Christian virtues of 'pureness' 
and 'charity', 'the signs of the times point far more to the emergence and 
progress of.. [the common good] than to its depression' (Arnold "Christmas" 
237). Yet for Mallock secularism has generated a contagious - and terminal - 
disease, 'a state of moral consumption' (Living 148) which will make steady 
progress throughout this generation and onward through subsequent generations. 
This will lead not so much to 'the helpless yet reluctant yielding to vice' as to 
'the sadness and the despondency with which virtue is practised', people finding 
it impossible to experience either 'honor or disapproval' (148) as the world is 
rendered 'morally colourless' both 'without' and 'within' (149). Mallock 
envisages secularism as a kind of slow, moral and emotional suicide (in a strange 
emotionally-pessimistic echo of von Hartmann). Whilst suggesting that if 
16 See also discussion of James Cotter Morison and J. S. Mill below. 
optimism is 'simply the exuberance of health.., pessimism is, in its very nature, 
the gloom and languor of a disease' (139), Mallock also effects his own 
pessimism. Mallock terms his own vision not as 'the denial of human happiness' 
or 'the denial of human hope', but a 'hypothetical' rather than 'absolute' 
pessimism as 'human life will degenerate [onlyJ if the creed of positivism be ever 
generally accepted' (141, my emphasis) - thus does seem rather absolute on that 
front at least. Whilst Mallock does recognise salvation as a possibility, it is 
attainable only through the re-imposition of an unquestionable form of restraint 
upon the 'inconstant and corrupted' (32) human. Such a form of restraint for 
Mallock is found only in the Roman Catholic Church, which offers the 'moral 
sense of mankind organised and developed under a supernatural tutelage' (xx) 
necessary to invest life with value, and control the inherently immoral human 17 . 
He rules out a return to Protestantism as this is 'evaporating into a mere natural 
theism', and as such, is - crucially for Mallock - 'losing all restraining power in 
the world' (xix, my emphasis). This necessity for a 'restraining power' is at the 
hub of Mallock's arguments, finally betraying that it is not just secularism but 
everything outside Catholicism that is to blame for the moral degeneration 
Mallock perceives all around him 18. For Mallock, the supernatural moral 
element is itself the answer, seeing the form of restraint that the certainty of 
Heavenly Judgement and fear of Hell would impose on the inherently immoral 
human as the only means of saving a human species apparently intent on 
galloping onwards into secularism, and thereby its own moral destruction. 
Whilst Schopenhauer also uses value-laden terminology such as "the 
highest good", he identifies these in the practical and accessible terms of 
relieving suffering rather than leaving the vague and undefined notion of either 
morality or social "happiness" so criticised by Mallock. Schopenhauer's own 
critique of secular optimists focuses on their seeing the world as 'an end in itself 
7 
Mallock does not recognise any contradiction in seeking to 'restrain[] or curb[]' (20) the 'ever... 
inconstant and corrupted' (32) human with an unquestionable system which he argues 'must be 
able to convince the vicious of the folly of their vice' (31), whilst claiming that this necessary 
system, the Catholic Church, also exercises 'justice that comes of sympathy for those that cannot 
receive [her teachings]... condemns no goodness... condemns even no earnest worship, though it 
be outside her pale' (217): so not even Mallock expects the Spanish Inquisition. 
' Feuerbach argues that 'Catholic morality' is 'mystical' whilst Protestant morality is 
'rationalistic', and as such, the latter offers a more "truthful" religion in mingling 'the Christian 
[mystery] with the man, the natural, political, civil, social man' (Essence XIV, 139), thus 
Protestantism grounds the object of morality in the experiential human, albeit still displaced by the 
objectification of the essence of human nature onto the form of God. 
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and thus an 'abode of bliss', and for attributing the 'colossal evil of the world... 
entirely to governments' (Schopenhauer "Politics" 154). As such, their failure to 
recognise the inherent nature of suffering in the world is the basis of 
Schopenhauer's refusal to accept optimistic visions of universal happiness as in 
any way valid. Yet Schopenhauer's own pessimistic vision of human existence 
as one of perpetual suffering does not lead to Mallock's vision of terminal moral 
degeneration, nor to suicide, but to ethical salvation. Schopenhauer insists that it 
is only by living on that one can contribute to what he determines the 'the highest 
moral good', whereas suicide merely 'substitutes for a true redemption from this 
world of misery a merely apparent one' ("Suicide" 78). Schopenhauer also 
places the basis of morality in inherent feelings of compassion for our fellow 
sufferers, keeping the issue of morality at the centre of his philosophy in terms 
that recognise the existence of evil and selfish egoism but avoids Mallock's 
condemnation of human nature per Se. Schopenhauer also avoids the necessity 
for morality to be based on faith and the supernatural in some form, contra both 
Mallock and Feuerbach. Nonetheless, Feuerbach does at least open the door to 
practical change in deconstructing the artificial systems of social form as a 
practical aim, as Clifford recognises in his more explicit delineations of practical 
aims and effects in society 19 , with or without the divinity of the human as exalted 
object. 
James Cotter Morison briefly identifies the focus of Christianity in 
Feuerbachian terms as 'an anthropomorphic deity' who is 'an infinitely glorified 
and exalted man' (Morison 43), and recognises that religion 'often produce[s] as 
much anxiety and mental distress as it does of joy, gladness and content' (241), 
yet also exhibits rather Mallockian concerns. Unlike Mallock, Morison is 
concerned with issues of secular social transformation, arguing that not all 
Socialism 'involves slavery' as he believes 'there is a good Socialism as well as a 
bad; a Socialism of love and mutual help' (xix) 20 . Like Mallock, however, 
Morison also presumes that 'wickedness and sin' are 'naturally' part of 'human 
nature' (55), fearing that 'the prevalent anarchy in thought is leading to anarchy 
in morals' (10). Yet, contra Mallock, Morison believes that Christianity 'is not 
favourable to morality', arguing that 'members of civilized society can... judge, 
' See Clifford Ethics, and Mallock Living 37. 
20 See Mallock Classes, and Socialism. 
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tolerably well how they ought to act' but they 'want a motive to their duty' (88, 
original emphasis). Feuerbach insists that an aim in life is vital and that this has 
social direction, 'only activity with a purpose, which is the union of theoretic and 
practical activity, gives man a moral basis and support, i.e. character [thus] 
[e]very man.., must place before himself a God, i.e. an aim, a purpose' (Essence 
VI, 64). Feuerbach places work as itself a quasi-divine object, related to the 
individual's perception of their own utility to the wider community (the species) 
and thus '[e]veryone... justifiably regards his occupation... as the highest; for the 
mind of man is nothing but the essential mode of his activity', and, therefore, 
'[w]ork is worship' (XVIII, 171). Like his one-sided view of human nature as 
only good, Feuerbach sees work as an ideal, outside of the material conditions 
actually experienced by working people, as Marx recognises (Ideology 64)21. 
Mill also insists that an aim is itself important, although Mallock criticises Mill's 
emphasis that it is 'this alone... [that] could give any meaning to work, or make 
possible any kind of virtue' (Mallock Living 28). Mill also considers this 
question in rather Schopenhauerian terms, feeling that if 'the pleasures of life... 
[were] no longer kept up by struggle and privation, [they] would cease to be 
pleasures' (Mill, quoted Malloek 28). Schopenhauer asserts that life without an 
objective is no kind of life worth living, the result being a 'dreadful, stultifying 
boredom, in lifeless yearning without a definite object, a deadening languor' 
(WJ+7 II §29, 85). Arnold emphasises the necessity for purpose in life, but 
echoes Mallock's concerns about the fallibility of the ordinary human without the 
rigid moral/behavioural structure that Christian morality offers as 'rules to hold 
possession of our conduct, and to keep us in the right course through outward 
troubles and inward perplexity' (Arnold "Marcus" 142, my emphasis). This 
'right course' (142) is attained through 'prescribing to human life fixed principles 
of action, fixed rules of conduct' (141). Whilst Arnold views 'the school from 
which [Mill] proceeds' to be 'doomed to sterility' (144), he finds that Mill 
himself deserves 'all attention and respect' due to his "inspirational" 'perception 
of [Christian moral] truths' (144)22. 
 Arnold claims that these 'truths' (144) have, 
21 See also Chapter 2 (61 and 68-9) above. 
22 Mill actually embraces a broader sense of what constitutes the "truth", arguing that Christian 
ethics are not 'irreconcilable' with what 'a comprehensive morality requires', thus 'other ethics... 
must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind' as the 
'interests of truth require a diversity of opinions' (Mill Liberty 126-7): see also discussion below. 
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however, through the theological dogma of 'reward and punishment... [become] 
strangely overpressed by many Christian moralists, to the deterioration and 
disfigurement of Christianity' (158). Arnold clearly argues against Mallock's 
position here, and echoes Feuerbach to some extent although with emphasis on 
the detrimental impact on the religion rather than on the individual. In terms of 
human behaviour, or "virtues", Arnold ennobles altruistic motives and actions, 
claiming these to be an essential part of human nature (158), a view Feuerbach 
and Schopenhauer also share but that Mallock appears to find impossible: only 
overt religious proscription enables altruistic behaviour (rather than feelings) for 
Mallock. At the same time, Arnold acknowledges an equally Schopenhauerian 
revelation - and acceptance - of 'the hollowness and transitoriness of human life 
and grandeur' (163). Whilst both Feuerbach's and Schopenhauer's positions 
agree with Arnold's emphasis that the object of moral human life is 'social' (164) 
in terms of benevolence, altruism, and self-denial, Arnold also deems Aurelius' 
own "noble" qualities to be both exceptional and difficult to maintain amid the 
'meanness and perversity of fellow-creatures' (165). Here Arnold is echoing 
shades of Mallock's pessimistic view of human nature to some extent, albeit 
singling out a few exceptionally "noble" characters in much the same way 
Schopenhauer recognises the "saintly" few 23 . Feuerbach's idealised view of 
human relations recognises actions of meanness and perversity to be the result of 
the alienation effected by religious and philosophical dogma, whilst 
Schopenhauer's position is that allowing the egoistic will-to-life to dominate 
their actions is what causes individuals to behave less than altruistically towards 
their fellow sufferers. Mallock on the other hand finds that all human beings are 
inherently immoral, inconstant, and corrupt (32). For Mill morality consists of 
two parts, and how these operate for him raise issues about the inherent qualities 
of the human, and the nature of morality itself Morality is both: 
self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affection 
and will... [and the] other and co-equal part, [is] the regulation of his 
outward actions, [which] must be altogether halting and imperfect without 
the first; for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect 
even the worldly interests of ourselves or others, unless we take in, as part 
of the question, its influence on the regulation of our, or their, affections 
and desires? (Mill "Bentham" 71) 
21 See Chapter 1 (33) above. 
Mill seems to be suggesting that ethical thoughts/behaviour are not inherent in 
each person or automatically in play, and that ethics is, therefore, in danger of 
becoming possible only through deliberate effort to self-train one's responses. 
Whilst Mill insists on the corporeal reality of the human, he also values 
those elements difficult to evaluate in factual terms, considering the 
accommodation of human imagination, emotions, and aspirations vital in 
understanding and pursuing human well-being. This is not least because our self-
knowledge leads to a broader understanding, and thus ethical behaviour arises out 
of our contemplations of our own experience. Mill explicitly rejects the 
uncompromising kind of Comtean secularism which considers 'only the facts 
themselves' (Comte Positive 8) as exhibited by Jeremy Bentham. For Mill the 
recognition of the human 'as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as 
an end; of desiring for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his 
standard of excellence, without hope or fear of evil from other source than his 
own inward consciousness' ("Bentham" 68), is crucial. Whilst Mill's emphasis 
is an almost Feuerbachian recognition of 'spiritual perfection' in the human, as 
both aim and consciousness, Mill refutes any 'systemizing' of the human into a 
single altruistic motivation, asking: 
Why is it necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and 
be cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the fact 
that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, obtain a 
greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the rules and 
conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each makes the good 
of the rest his only object, and allows himself no personal pleasures not 
indispensable to the preservation of his own faculties? (Mill "Comte" 337) 
Comte believes that social salvation will be found by applying positive 
philosophy to 'the study of social phenomena', leading to 'a single body of 
homogeneous doctrine' through which the 'final triumph of the positive 
philosophy will take place spontaneously, and will re-establish order in society' 
(Comte Positive 29-30). Comte argues that 'the existing evil consists above all in 
the absence of any true organization' (29) and that 'a fixed social order' is 
therefore the desired objective of human endeavour, will rid society of evil, and 
is attainable only through positive philosophy itself This would lead to 'the 
return of modem society to a truly normal state' (64-5), Comte positing social 
salvation as attainable through an evolutionary progression that is in effect a 
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return, 'somehow lead[ing] society back to a state of peaceflul normality' 
(Bruiming Salvation 66, original emphasis). Feuerbach recognises the human as 
separated from its true state, its own nature, an unnatural position effected by 
religion which his philosophy seeks to overcome, thus Feuerbach is also keen to 
"return" the human to its own essential and Edenic nature. That Mallock rejects 
all forms of optimistic secularism might be seen as rather ironic given his own 
yearning for a "return to order", the difference being that for Mallock, order can 
only be imposed through supernatural rather than teleological-progressive social 
beliefs of a human-led 'homogeneous doctrine' (Comte Positive 30) or a 
conscious recognition of the alienation engendered by artificial social constructs 
such as religion (Feuerbach Essence I, 30). 
Like Mill, many secularists argue against Comte's position, ironically in 
part echoing Mallock's own concerns over the eclipsing of imagination and 
"mystery". Arnold dismisses Comte's 'pedantry' which attempts to displace 
'that with which our feelings and affections have become intertwined' 
("Christmas" 231). Whilst Walter Buckley argues that both 'Spencer and Comte 
have been noted primarily as summarizers and synthesizers of the knowledge 
current in their age' (Buckley viii), Spencer disavows Comte's Positivism, 
claiming that contemporary scientific thinking is 'the common heritage 
bequeathed by the past to the present' and that 'adhesion to this scientific 
doctrine in no sense implicates them with M. Comte' (Spencer 6). As T. R. 
Wright argues, the ultimate 'failure' of Positivism as a system in itself by the end 
of the nineteenth century was due in part to its attempt to replace religion with 
institutional scientific "worship" on the one hand, and its curtailing of 'mystery, 
of areas of experience beyond the explanations of scientific rationalism' 
(Humanity 275) on the other. The Feuerbachian rather than Comtean focus of 
teleological "optimism" in this thesis also engages with the less quantifiable 
elements that many Victorian writers were keen to accommodate. Whilst Eliot 
has argued that 'the only hope of extending man's sources of knowledge and 
happiness is to be found in positive science, and in the universal application of its 
principles' ("Progress" 18), she found Comte's Positivist system a too-rigid and 
finally unrealisable vision, recognising that 'living, generous humanity - mixed 
and erring, and self-deluding' ("Meister" 131) would not - and should not - be 
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compressed into a philosophical system 24 . As Gordon Haight has pointed out, 
Eliot's 'adherence to Positivism.., never accepted the details of the system, never 
went beyond the central idea' (Haight Selections 318). Eliot's own concerns 
with 'mixed and erring, and self-deluding' ("Meister" 131) humanity will be 
shown in Chapter 5 to trouble optimistic delineations in favour of more 
Schopenhauerian concerns. Lennart Björk argues that Comte had a strong 
influence on Thomas Hardy, particularly 'the belief that "man is essentially an 
affective being", whilst at the same time Hardy 'may have had reservations 
about Comte's optimistic belief in the growth of altruistic feelings and the anti-
individualistic basis of positivist social psychology' ("Reading" 112) 25 . 
Nonetheless, Björk does agree with Basil Willey that 'Hardy was in accord with 
the general objectives of Positivism: "The grand aims.., are the amelioration of 
the order of Nature where that idea is at once imperfect and most modifiable, i.e. 
human society; and the triumph of social feeling (altruism) over self-love" 
(Bjork 112, quoting Willey 206-7). This points equally strongly towards 
Feuerbach, of course, not least the recognition that the constructs of social form 
are artificial thus changeable. Bjork places Hardy as 'more concerned about 
emotional, intellectual and spiritual social problems', being 'a man whose social 
criticism approaches to a considerable extent.., the humanistic idealism 
characteristic of so much of Matthew Arnold's criticism of nineteenth-century 
society' ("Reading" 119). Yet Björk also argues that Hardy was 'ambiguous 
about democracy', and that 'the evidence in the "Literary Notes" indicates that he 
was still more hesitant about socialism' (118). Mallock argues that 'the lot which 
is commonly called the lot of the poor is not, as such, a fit subject of any 
commiseration' as this is 'the normal type of human life', and thus we must put 
any consideration of their condition 'aside' as they are 'not in any sense a sign or 
product of anything special in our modem industrial system' (Classes 139, cited 
Ball 383), a view Hardy's work clearly argues against 26. Mallock's view of the 
24 See also Brunning Salvation, 63-92. 
25 Geoffrey Harvey also notes that 'Hardy could not entirely share Comte's evolutionary optimism' 
(15). Björk notes Hardy's long-lasting and close friendship with Frederick Harrison, their letters 
'suggesting a harmony of attitudes and taste in various areas' including 'political and social events' 
and 'the Positive view of the Universe', though also notes their friendship ended in 1919 'when 
Harrison criticised the pessimism of Hardy's Moments of Vision' (Oxford 183). 
26 Mallock later denounces socialism as iniquitous as 'the class which the socialists fix upon as the 
subjects of this moral transformation, is precisely... the most notorious, and... incorrigible' 
(Socialism 128). 
extreme poverty and misery in which a substantial body of the population exists 
in a sense echoes Schopenhauer's pessimism concerning the inevitable suffering 
that existence engenders, but clearly refuses Schopenhauer's ethical call to 
relieve that suffering. Mallock's position is one that, as John Mason recognises, 
explicitly argues against the intrusion of 'moral and political considerations... 
into the application of correct economic theory' (Mason 5 66)27. David DeLaura 
agrees with Irving Howe that 'the "problem" in Hardy' is 'the fact "that in 
accepting the secular determinism of Huxley, Mill, and Spencer, and white 
regarding it as a kind of intellectual liberation, Hardy should have responded not 
with their combative energy and hope but with his own low-keyed melancholy" 
(DeLaura 395, quoting Howe 28). For Andrew Radford, in his earlier career 
Hardy 'refuses to be trapped by an overwhelming feeling of malaise' and 
'conquers it' by 'using arch humour as an expression of defiance' (101). In 
contrast, Hardy's later career sees Jude the Obscure in particular evidencing 
itself as 'a symptom of the general malaise', while 'the brutal therapy of Time' 
shows Arnoldian potential 'stripped of ameliorating vision' (Radford 203). For 
DeLaura Hardy's 'eye is consistently on the painful exigencies of modernism, its 
human cost, and not on its liberating effects' (396). Hardy 'challenges.., a dying 
Christian tradition', particularly through the utilisation of Hellenism in Tess and 
Sue, but these 'are not developed into a coherent view of life' (396). Yet Hardy 
not only foregrounds that very 'normal type of human life' (Mallock Classes 
139) at the centre of Jude, but also show his understanding of the material causes, 
effects, and impacts of 'emotional, intellectual and spiritual social problems' on 
those "normal types". In so doing, Hardy does forge 'a coherent view of life' 
(DeLaura 396) in Jude by engaging with both Feuerbachian and 
Schopenhauerian delineations of the world. 
Whilst the secularist thinking that Mallock criticises largely considers itself 
optimistic and progressive, it is clear that there are a number of contradictions of 
27 Dan Stone regards Mallock as an active member of the movement of 'aristocratic and Tory 
revivalism of the Edwardian period.., correctly understood as a reaction to the rise of feminism 
and organized labour, and the concomitant shifts in society and politics... [whose] class-based 
theories.., vehemently condemned the new, radical movements' (Stone 406, and see his fn32 on 
422). For Mason, Mallock 'almost single-handedly sought to shift the conservative Party's defence 
of property and inequality from a traditional to a scientific [economic] basis' (566). 
28 Irving Howe "Hardly Hardy" The New York Review of Boo/cs. Dec. 1, 1966, 32. Harvey finds 
that '[t]he evolutionary struggle for existence described by Darwin chimed with Hardy's fatalistic 
temperament, and undermined his religious faith, as it did that of so many Victorians' (12). 
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opinion here. The more negative social views of some are clearly not shared by 
the equally teleologically-progressive hopes of Oxenford, who earlier enthuses 
over '[a]ll that the liberal mind looks forward to with hope, if not with 
confidence - the extension of political rights, the spread of education, the 
brotherhood of nations', although even Oxenford betrays a lack of 'confidence' 
(394). Jeffrey Von Arx argues that it is the progressive evolutionary perception 
itself that informs the disillusioned perspectives of a number of Victorian 
intellectuals, as present reality fails to fit into the mould they have prescribed to 
it, thus they denied 'as retrogressive any tendencies they considered in conflict 
with progress' (202)29. Mill, Harrison, Arnold, Clifford, Spencer and Morison 3° 
were influenced by other philosophies as well as Feuerbachian arguments and 
Comtean Positivism, but they all adapted influences to suit their own positions 
and often disagree with one another, as has been shown. Mill's concerns with the 
importance of those unquantifiable aspects of human experience are shared by a 
number of his contemporaries, and Mill also places a particular emphasis on the 
value of the individual, insisting that self-realisation should not be at the expense 
either of the self or of others. As such, Mill in particular shares a number of 
concerns with Schopenhauer and Feuerbach, as well as with Eliot and Hardy. 
Mill recognises the problems in both asceticism and egoism, as one makes 
'everything else painful', and the other 'implies.., the equivalent depression of 
other people' (Mill "Comte" 337). Here Mill's position implicitly recognises and 
refuses the extremes of Feuerbachian absorption into the unified and 
homogenous species (elsewhere also arguing explicitly against the dangers 'of 
making all people alike' (Liberty 145)), as well as Schopenhauer's most extreme 
form of salvation, ascetic self-denial. At the same time, Mill echoes 
Schopenhauer's concerns regarding the ego-driven basis of human suffering. As 
discussed earlier, Arnold places high value on Christian moral 'truths' ("Marcus" 
144), and whilst Mill does not consider Christian ethics themselves as 
'irreconcilable' with what 'a comprehensive morality requires', insists that 'other 
ethics... must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral 
29 Von Aix discussing Leslie Stephen, William Lecky, John Morley and James Froude in 
ç articular: see Von Arx, esp. 208. 
0 See for example Harrison The Present and the Future: A Positivist Address London: Reeves & 
Turner, 1880; Morison The Service of Man: An Essay Towards the Religion of the Future. London: 
Kegan Paul Trench & Co, 1887; and Clifford The Ethics of Belief London: [publisher nk], 1876, 
reproduced in The Contemporary Review January 1877. 
regeneration of mankind' as the 'interests of truth require a diversity of opinions' 
(Liberty 126-7). Mill's broader ethical approach to arrive at an eventual "truth" 
also recognises a need for moral 'regeneration' rather than the quasi-religious 
term "salvation" as the desired human object. As such, on one level Mill echoes 
the optimistic belief in teleological human progress that Feuerbach overtly deifles 
(a deication Mill does not share) and Schopenhauer refutes, whilst on another 
level implicitly recognises society to be in need of moral regeneration. This 
perhaps denotes a less optimistic vision of existing human social relations, whilst 
avoiding Mallock's pessimistic side of the coin which sees a society of active 
moral degeneration3t . 
That, for Mill, half of morality consists of 'self-education; the training, by 
the human being himself, of his affection and will' in order to be able to act as an 
equal part with 'the regulation of his outward actions' ("Bentham" 71), morality 
is something that needs to be deliberately learned in order to be effective. For 
Schopenhauer ethics can not be taught, and need not be so, as ethical behaviour is 
to a significant extent intrinsic to human nature, arguing that 'genuine goodness 
of disposition, disinterested virtue, and pure nobility of mind do not result from 
abstract knowledge... but... a direct intuitive knowledge, which can be neither 
reasoned away, nor arrived at by reasoning' (WWI IV §66, 232)32.  Mallock's 
human is essentially corrupt and immoral with no innate compassion, needs 
external coercion in order to be controllable rather than ethical, thus is more 
deeply pessimistic than Schopenhauer's intrinsically ethical and compassionate 
human (subject to individual character) who needs no such external control. For 
the state to act as external legislator, as 'an institution for spreading morality and 
For Jeffrey Von Arx, the later social pessimism of Leslie Stephen, William Lecky, John Morley 
and James Froude is a result of what they see as a regression back to the very High Church 
interference into political life (18) that Mallock is demanding, alongside their 'unsympathetic 
response to contemporary political developments' (201). It is ironic that Mallock's own fears 
regarding mass democratisation and socialism in any of its forms are shared to greater and lesser 
extents by Liberals and sceptics by the end of the nineteenth century (see Von An 20 1-8). 
32 Subject to the character of the individual, some particular individuals being more egoistic (given 
over more completely to the striving of the will) than others, thus intrinsically less ethical, the 
'ultimate foundation of morality... [is] in human nature itself' (Schopenhauer Morality III § 16, 
144), and is 'an appeal that actually exists in everyone to act justly and do good, or counterbalance 
the strong tendencies to injustice and harshness' (12, 120). Further, Schopenhauer's sceptical 
view of externally-imposed laws exposes the pessimism inherent in Mallock's view of human 
nature. For Schopenhauer, if the belief that external 'compulsion and coercion have bridled and 
restrained everyone' is imagined 'abolished', the thinking person 'recoil[s] at the expected scene', 
showing 'what little confidence' society really has in 'the efficacy of religion, conscience, or the 
natural foundation of morals' (13, 129). 
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edifying instruction', is a distortion of morality for Schopenhauer, echoing Mill's 
concerns in seeing the dangers of 'doing away with personal freedom and 
individual development, in order to make men into mere wheels of a... machine 
of State and Religion' (Schopenhauer Morality § 17, 153). The attempt to 
sanction cruelty through the 'orthodoxy' (WJ'VI IV §66, 231) of social form does 
not change the act, 'the same degree of wickedness' is effected whether defined 
as a 'crime' or 'expressed... through... intrigues, oppression, and machinations 
of every kind' (232). Mill's vision of morality affirms a strong sense of 
individuality within a mutually-beneficial society, where 'there is need of a great 
increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others... [but] the self-
regarding virtues.., are only second in importance, ifeven second, to the social' 
(Liberty 148, my emphasis) - albeit Mill effectively relying on each individual 
self-consciously and deliberately "training" themselves to behave morally 
towards others 33 . Schopenhauer's individual needs no such intervention, acting 
instead with complete spontaneity and thus avoiding either the fears of social 
breakdown outside of the external (and internal) impositions of religion, or the 
necessity for state-regulation, the need for which both Arnold and Mallock 
explicitly argue, with Mill's individual self-conscious "education" as needflil. 
Feuerbach echoes Schopenhauer in finding morality intrinsic to human nature, 
being 'the inward impulse to do good', but it is always a self-sacrificing love for 
the other, 'the divine instinct of benevolence which desires to make all happy, 
and excludes none' (Essence V, 60) still overrides the individual as it is 'given 
from without, takes [the individual] by violence... [t]he heart overcomes, masters 
man' as 'his God' (59). Feuerbach's morality is an "external" species-essence 
which controls the individual, essentially denying the individual volition, choice, 
and individuality itself This leaves Schopenhauer's position regarding the moral 
relationship between individual and society as less essentially pessimistic than 
Arnold, Mill, Morison, or Feuerbach, with Mallock the most pessimistic of all. 
Like Mill, Eliot is concerned about the balance between individual and 
social realisation, understanding that society is 'in bondage to terms and 
conceptions which, having their root in conditions of thought no longer existing, 
John Mason argues that Mill believes the human species is 'not yet highly enough developed 
morally to make a success of socialism' (Mason 569), Mill anticipating some of the subsequent 
analyses of the failure of various Communist Revolutions (Hook, 2-3). 
have ceased to possess any vitality' ("Progress" 19), concerned that the moral 
'line' society attempts to draw 'between the virtuous and the vicious, so far from 
being a necessary safeguard to morality, is itself an immoral fiction' ("Morality" 
132). Eliot also argues that Christian morality, freed from its dogmatic form, will 
'strike a firm root in man's moral nature, and entwine itself with the growth of 
those new forms of social life to which we are tending' ("Progress" 32), as there 
is a 'tendency towards good in human nature [which] has a force... no creed can 
utterly counteract, and which ensures the ultimate triumph of that tendency over 
all dogmatic perversions' ("Evangelical" 170). Whilst Hardy's concern with the 
struggle between the individual and external elements includes evolutionary 
ideas34 , he also recognises the roles that social form and other artificial 
proscriptions of human behaviour play here, and is particularly concerned about 
allowing for natural human emotions. BjOrk believes that it is from Charles 
Fourier that Hardy 'assimilated.., anti-rationalism, his notion that it is not reason 
but passion that is the primary motive power in human life' as Fourier argues that 
'the greatest obstacle to human happiness is the inability of the modern social 
order to satisfy the claims of the passions' ("Reading" 107). Hardy also claims 
that, by 1865, he knew Mill's On Liberty 'almost by heart' (Life 330). Bjork 
notes that 'Hardy heavily marked' a passage in his own copy which argues that 
'[t]here is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic: a conception 
of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to 
be abnegated', and "Pagan self-assertion" is one of the elements of human 
worth, as well as "Christian self-denial" ("Reading" 106). 
George Lewes recognises that a fixed view of history can direct adherents 
of a particular system to claim historical evidence for their own viewjioints, thus 
'have a sort of unity given them by the pretension they all have of being founded 
on history' and thereby the 'Eclectics, the Catholics, and the humanitarians all 
point to the attestation of history in proof of their systems' (Philosophy 643). 
Yet Lewes falls foul of this himself as, in his own attestation of the progressive 
social-evolutionary approach, he finds in Comte's Positivist system the 'unity of 
thought' (650) that will provide the monumental key with which to 'decipher' the 
Hardy notes from The Examiner in 1876: 'Science tells us that, in the struggle for life, the 
surviving organism is not necessarily that which is absolutely the best in an ideal sense, though it 
must be that which is most in harmony with surrounding conditions' (Literary Notebooks vi. entry 
392, 40). 
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past, itself essential 'if we would understand the present and predict the future' 
(652). Lewes does concede, however, that applying such a unified and unifying 
theory to all phenomena may have certain qualifications, finding 'phenomena 
relating to mankind.., obviously more complex than those relating to the 
individual man' (653) as 'the effects of these [Positive] laws' are modified by 
'the action of individuals on each other, curiously complicated by the action of 
each generation on its successor' (653-4, original emphasis). As long as this is 
taken into consideration, Comte's Positive system still offers the unifying theory 
Lewes deems necessary. Whilst Lewes emphasises that the past should remain 
as the past, that it 'should have historical, not absolute significance... [as] it is 
our Ancestry, and not our life' ("Poetry" 132), his developmental view of human 
"progress" still betrays absolutist and rather Comtean universal ideals 25 years 
later. In 1878 Lewes argues that: 
When science has fairly mastered the principles of moral relations as it has 
mastered the principles of physical relations, all Knowledge will be 
incorporated in a homogeneous doctrine rivalling that of the old theologies 
in its comprehensiveness, and surpassing it in the authority of its 
credentials. ("Science" 326) 
The differences between aspects of 'the aspirations' of even associated secularist 
thinkers over the decades of Oxenford's 'present world' (394) are clear, and raise 
questions regarding the critical polarisation of "optimism" and "pessimism" in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Mallock argues that 'if science can take from man his religious faith, it 
leaves him a being without any moral guidance' (Living 168). The bottom line 
for Mallock is that the 'choices which our life consists of are definite things', 
consequently, the 'rule which is to guide our choices must be something definite 
also' (204), a particular concern in respect of his deeply pessimistic view of the 
inherently immoral and corrupt human individual 35 . It is only the threat of 
" Mallock's view of human nature is extremely negative in respect of the species as a whole, 
including historically, but particularly racially. When faced with 'the moral difficulties' thrown up 
by 'the enonnous period of his existence for which man has had no religious history, and has been, 
so far as we can tell, not a religious being at all; and the vast majority of the race that are still 
stagnant and semi-barbarous', Mallock asks ls it possible that of the swarms, vicious and aimless, 
that breed upon [the earth], each individual - Bushman, Chinaman, or Negro - is a precious 
inmiortal being, with a birthright in infinity and eternity?' (Living 199-200). As argued in Chapter 
1 above, Schopenhauer finds such views as Mallock's disgusting, denouncing the opinions and 
subsequent brutality meted out by 'devils in human form, these bigoted, church-going, Sabbath- 
purgatory that 'can bring a belief in future rewards and punishments into 
anything like accordance with our notions of what is just or reasonable' (222). 
For Mallock, the question Is Ljfe Worth Living? cannot be answered without 
considering another 'decisive question': 'Are we moral or spiritual beings, or are 
we not?.., to say Yes without fear.., then there will be little more to fear... From 
this belief in ourselves we shall pass to the belief in God, as its only rational basis 
and its only emotional completion' (244) and as such, human nature 'will be 
redeemed visibly from its weakness and from its littleness - redeemed, not in 
dreams or infancy, but in fact' (246, my emphasis). For Mallock then, salvation 
(or moral redemption) is only attained through and in religious faith, and is of 
course only attained after death rather than in life. Eliot recognises religious 
constructs in Feuerbachian terms, particularly the elitist constructions of 
salvation effected by Evangelical dogma which dehumanises fellow human 
beings and is thus 'obstructive of true moral development' ("Evangelical" 168). 
This is a position Mill, Schopenhauer, and Feuerbach echo in their arguments 
against egoism 36, and Chapter 7 will show that the terms under which Hardy also 
sees religious dogma as a barrier to salvation reveals a significantly Feuerbachian 
vision. 
The issue of salvation forms an important focus for Victorian philosophical 
and social thinkers, whether explicitly or implicitly termed and whether 
concentrating more on individual or social salvation, although social 
responsibility resonates at the heart of the issue. For Mallock social control is 
central, illustrating his inability to believe in the capacity of the individual or 
collective human to have social responsibility as such, leaving the only hope for 
human redemption and the reversal of what he sees as the effective degeneration 
of British society to be in a return to the certainties of Catholicism. This 
supernatural element imbues the human with profundity, value, and meaning 
(Living 8-16), but also imposes strict behavioural codes (20) without which 
keeping scoundrels' upon 'their innocent black brothers whom force and injustice have delivered 
into their devilish clutches' ("Ethics" §5, 138). Feuerbach's arguments also implicitly recognise 
the philosophical alienation in Mallock's position here (see Essence Preface xvi; Principles §10, 
12-13). 
36 Mill values the Comtean 'direct cultivation of altruism, and the subordination of egoism to it' 
("Comte" 339); Schopenhauer argues against both individual and 'theoretical egoism' as both treat 
'all others as mere phantoms' (WWJ 11 §19, 37); Feuerbach denounces egoism as 'criminal 
arrogance' (Essence XI, 116), although it could be argued that his own position holds the opposite 
danger of individual negation at the hands of the community/species. 
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Mallock concedes no ethical content within the mere human being who is 'ever 
inclined' to immorality, essentially 'inconstant and corrupted' (32). Basil 
Willey, in his study of the history of religious and moral ideas in the nineteenth 
century, claims that Christianity survived the century of 'biblical criticism and 
scientific agnosticism' by being founded upon 'Faith' in 'our central experience 
as moral beings, upon all that responds to value - to truth, beauty, goodness, and 
the sense of duty... [and] upon modes of knowing higher than the understanding 
or mind of the flesh' (40). Whilst this echoes Feuerbach's delineation of - and 
necessity for - faith in the secularised human and as the effective basis of 
morality in one sense, it argues against Mallock's own position, the hub of which 
is not so much a return to religious Faith as "truth" but as a certainty of social 
order, both hierarchical and controlling. Whilst secularists might well be united 
on one level in the movement away from the dogma of religious constructions of 
the human and society, and of morality and salvation, the directions this 
movement might take is fraught with contradiction, from wondering to what 
extent they need to denounce Christianity in order to be able to move on at a11 37 , 
to debating the question of whether 'Salvation' is 'necessary?', asking 'What are 
we to be saved from?... What for?... [and] How?' (Royle 126). Different aspects 
of each thinker's questions, and their proposed direction towards which the 
human now needs to aim, involve both optimistic and pessimistic elements. The 
question of how the individual and the community can live on in a society where 
the previous certainties that religious structure seemed to afford are crumbling 
around them, still has as its basis concerns of morality and behaviour, faith and 
direction, inform fictional literature as much as philosophical and social treatise, 
and recognise Lewes' "curious complications" at every turn. For those 
Victorians for whom a return to religious belief is neither possible nor desirable, 
they sought for hope and belief in another direction, albeit a direction that also 
asks questions about human morality, value, and duty, at the same time as 
seeking a higher form of understanding that keeps questions of earthly life - that 
fragile flesh - very much in view. 
See Royle (42 and 65). 
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III. Aesthetic salvation: 'Will the dreams not continue, when the reality has 
passed away?' 
Mallock argues that, whilst religious belief might be termed 'dream-land' by 
secularists, 'it is only for the sake of the dreams that visit it that the world of 
reality has any certain value for us', asking finally 'Will the dreams not continue, 
when the reality has passed away?' (Living 247). Mallock's final question is 
unanswerable this side of the grave in a religious context, but is afforded other 
realms in which answers might be addressed. For those unable to return to faith 
in religion the questions also remain, and the realm of "dreams" arguably extends 
into the role that literature as an art form plays in the questions of human 
morality, value, and salvation that continue to be asked. 
Whilst for Arnold 'Art refreshes us, art liberates us, precisely by carrying 
us into... [a world of fantasy], and enabling us to find pleasure there' as well as 
'call[ing] into play our imagination' ("Playgoer" 140), he is amongst those who 
argue that literature has a highly significant role to play in engendering a more 
profound sense of human development 38. In considering human actions and 
character, Mill values the role that aesthetic experience plays equally to that of 
moral and sympathetic experience (Mill "Bentham" 84), placing a particularly 
high value onto the capacity of artistic creation to 'educate the feelings of 
abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual horizons of people of the world' 
("Comte" 324). As Royle recognises, education is considered '[o]ne of the most 
important elements in radical activity' (119) during the latter Victorian period, 
and fictional literature is seen as an important medium of social debate and 
didacticism, with the theme of morality in fiction of central concern particularly 
regarding the impact a text may have on the morals of its readership. As Kenneth 
Graham argues, 'whether they regretted or approved', Victorian critics 'found 
themselves discussing the credentials of fiction with a greater urgency than ever', 
concerning 'its moral function in society; its claims to intellectual and 
imaginative profundity; and the aesthetic principles of its form' (1). Whilst 
recognising the validity of the question of whether 'to meet the needs of our 
Rather unsurprisingly Mallock deems that an's 'power and greatness' lies in the "fact" that the 
'grand relation of man is not first to his brother men, but to something else beyond humanity' 
(Living 106), that is it represents the 'struggling, or failing to struggle, not after natural happiness, 
but after supernatural right' (104). 
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modem life' the predominant subject for education 'ought... to pass from letters 
to science', Arnold argues that 'a genuine [literary] humanism is scientific' 
("Literature and Science" 57) and a significant 'help to knowing ourselves and 
the world' (58). A purely science-based education without literature is in danger 
of 'leav[ing] one important thing out of their account: the constitution of human 
nature' (61). For Arnold 'the powers which go to the building up of human life' 
are 'conduct.., intellect and knowledge... beauty, and the power of social life 
and maimers' (6 1-2), and we seek to relate these to one another through 'the 
sense which we have in us for conduct', 'beauty' and 'good[ness]' (63). This is 
'the instinct for self-preservation in humanity' (63), and thus literature appears to 
offer a necessary place in which the less quantitative aspects of the human find a 
means of sustenance and development for Arnold, to balance scientific 
knowledge and feeding what he terms the 'humanist.., soul' (72). Arnold's 
thinking regarding human morality and contemporary society contain 
occasionally conflicting elements, but his emphasis on the value and importance 
of a literary education is unequivocal - in terms of 'quality' ("Playgoer" 136) 
literature anyway39 . Lewes argues that in literature, 'our moral sense requires to 
be gratified' and any disappointment here occurs 'when poetical justice is 
violated' ("Bronte" 91), also focusing on the moral aspects of literature as 
intrinsically related to aesthetic appreciation. Feuerbach posits 'aesthetic 
comprehension' as innately within human nature, arguing that our ability to 
'perceive the beauty that is presented to [us] externally' is evidence 'to the 
individual man [ofl the holiness and goodness of human nature' (Essence I, 28). 
Yet Feuerbach also values "high art" rather than the aesthetic representation of 
less sublime issues, as art can only be such if it represents the ideal, the species 
(7), as to represent the individual human form is only vanity (6), a position 
presumably extending to representations of the imperfect individual in every 
respect. Schopenhauer also holds that aesthetic comprehension is innate to all 
human individuals and reveals the "essence" to the individual, acting as a double 
knowledge through which the essence, the will-to-life, is revealed whilst 
Arnold clearly does not mean all literature here as he marks a distinction between literature 
which has 'a quality' resumably that which appeals to these "ennobled" aspects of the human), 
and that which might appeal to those members of society he terms 'a little wanting in soul and very 
much wanting in clear vision' ("Playgoer" 136) (namely literatures that engage with what he terms 
'French life' (136) in dealing with infidelity and intrigue, such as Madame Bovary). 
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simultaneously transcending subjectivity (WWI III §38, 119). As such, aesthetics 
access a form of salvation through a cessation of willing and suffering, albeit 
only temporarily. At the same time Schopenhauer finds aesthetic representation 
of the unique individual equally valid (III §51, 153), as are all forms of 'poignant 
situations in which they reveal themselves' (158), and tragic representation above 
all reveals 'that those powers which destroy happiness and life are such that their 
path to us... is always open' (161-2). Whilst claiming his work to be the 
exposition of a single thought, Schopenhauer also makes a pertinent point about 
literature: 
a single thought, however comprehensive, must preserve the most perfect 
unity. if, all the same, it can be split up into parts for the purpose of being 
communicated, then the connexion of these parts must.., be organic, i.e. of 
such a kind that every part supports the whole just as much as it is 
supported by the whole; a connexion in which no part is first and no part 
last, in which the whole gains in clearness from every part, and even the 
smallest part cannot be fully understood until the whole has first been 
understood. But a book must have a first and last line, and to this extent 
will always remain very unlike an organism, however like one its contents 
may be. Consequently, form and matter will here be in contradiction. 
(WWR vi, xii-xiii, original emphasis) 
Literature, then, will necessarily disrupt organic unity through the contradiction 
between its physical structure and the content, at the same time as it needs to be 
viewed as a whole in order to ascertain the relationships between its parts. The 
works of fiction discussed in the following chapters also bring 'form and 
matter... in[to} contradiction' (WWR vi, xiii) as they explore the relationship 
between the quest for salvation and the existential individual human negotiating 
that quest; the potential for contradiction between the theory and the practice that 
Lewes also recognises (Philosophy 653-4). 
Like Mill, Eliot places high value on aesthetic experience, arguing that it is 
the most effective form of education as 'aesthetic teaching' is 'the highest of all 
teaching because it deals with life in its highest complexity', and this is a 
medium thsough which she herself works to 'make certain ideas thoroughly 
incarnate' (Selections, 318). As Suzanne Graver recognises, Eliot sees literature 
as 'not only an index but also an agent of social evolution' (186), Eliot 
attempting in her own fiction 'to capture... the forms of belief that characterized 
past and present communities... [as well as] create.., new forms of belief (260). 
Yet Graver sees Eliot's fictional texts as finally embodying a failure of intent in 
103 
what Graver recognises as their testament to 'a myth or vision of organic unity' 
(308). The analysis of Middlemarch in Chapter 5 will argue that Eliot's novel 
does not "intend" to define human existence in such neatly-packaged optimistic 
terms. The problem with positing a failure in Eliot's fiction to deliver a 
perceived promise in her non-fiction writings is due to attempts to position Eliot 
as an optimistic-positivist humanist rather than examine the relationship between 
optimistic and pessimistic thinking in her work. Mallock recognises her 'entire 
philosophy... [as] an impassioned protest against pessimism' ("Eliot" 457) yet 
asks whether Eliot 'overestimate[s] the causes for hope?' (458), thus he 
implicitly recognises a contradiction between these positions in her work. Hardy 
recognises the contingencies of fashion in literature whereby contemporary art is 
interested once more in the formerly 'dormant principles' of 'great dramatic 
motives - setting forth that "collision between the individual and the general" 
("Candour" 126). This now 'demands.., original treatment' by showing 
contemporary concems such as 'Nature's unconsciousness not of essential laws, 
but of those laws framed merely as social expedients by humanity' (127). The 
relationship between the individual, 'essential laws' and 'social expedients' 
(Hardy "Candour" 127) in Jude the Obscure will form the focus of Chapter 7. 
For Hardy one of the key problems in the aesthetics of literature in particular is 
that the necessarily 'honest portrayal' of life as 'a physiological fact' in literature 
is proscribed by 'English society' (127-8) with its 'censorship of prudery' (129). 
This is dominated by the magazines and 'Grundyist' (130) circulating libraries, 
which enforce the production of 'puerile inventions' of which 'thoughtful 
readers' are 'weary... and famishing for accuracy' (127). Hardy illustrates his 
point by arguing that if literature by Shakespeare, Milton and other "classic" 
authors 'were issued as new fiction', they would be 'exclude[d] from circulation' 
and even deemed 'profan[e]' (130-1, fi). Hardy's own determination that the 
'position of man and woman in nature, and the position of belief in the minds of 
man and woman' should 'be taken up and treated frankly' (133) led, of course, to 
such uproar that Hardy finally abandoned novel-writing entirely, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. Graham discusses Hardy's indignation at those who find 
"theories" in his novels, arguing that, for Hardy, any 'moral effect of fiction' 
should be 'part of the total impression of the book', which is itself the 
imaginative construction of 'the instinctive pictures of life' (80). Whilst Hardy's 
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"coyness" regarding particular theories in his fiction is at least in part connected 
with criticisms of his pessimism, Hardy's reading was extensive 40, and his ideas 
on morality and life are, like Eliot's, unavoidably caught up in the philosophical 
ideas of the period. Deborah Collins argues that the 'divergent patterns in 
religious and philosophic thought' (29) during the nineteenth century, through 
which 'Humanity had not only fallen from grace but from guidance as well' (31), 
leaves Hardy's 'lifelong refusal to commit himself to a single theoretic position' 
as a result of the 'dense and richly woven' (29) times in which he found himself. 
What seems more likely is that Hardy's rejection of the 'anti-individualistic 
basis' (Bjork "Reading" 112) of Comte's Positivist system, for instance, echoes 
in his equal rejection of the attempt to fit the complexity of the individual and 
their unique circumstances into a rigid system, an ethical aesthetic he shares with 
Eliot. As Chapter 7 will argue, Hardy finds this not only inappropriate but 
damaging to the 'actual shapes' (Hardy Jude IV.i, 245) of the individuals 
concerned. Hardy argues that 'literature' is 'no exception to the general law' in 
being 'conditioned by its surroundings like a river-stream' ("Candour" 125), and 
in seeking answers to questions of self-fulfilment and individual human destiny 
in their fiction, Eliot and Hardy place their characters into contemporary 
philosophical and social contexts. Both also recognise that the worlds their 
characters inhabit reflect Lewes' "curious complications" (Philosophy 654) on a 
number of significant levels. 
In examining the 'struggle between the opposites' of 'laughter and despair' 
in Victorian novels, U. C. Knoepflmacher sees these forces as 'alternative models 
of reality in which.., anxieties could be scrutinized and, ideally, be allayed, 
arrested, or countered' (Laughter xi-xii) in a kind of shared cathartic experience 
between author and reader through the medium of the text. For the Victorian: 
In a human reality no longer ordered by divine design, despair seemed 
harder to vanquish [and thus the Victorian novelist,] who was forced to 
recover paradise in a world where social institutions could provide the only 
measure of stability.., found that his efforts to correct despondency were, 
by necessity, far more fragile... [and] the gains attained.., seem 
deliberately muted. (Knoeptimacher Laughter xii-xiii) 
° See Hardy Literary Notebooks for example, and Björk "Reading" 103-5. 
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Whilst for Knoepflmacher, laughter in Middlemarch attempts to 'reconcil[e] 
reader and author to the limitations which the characters are forced to accept' 
(and exposes what Knoepfimacher sees as Eliot's forced 'compromise') (204), in 
'Hardy... laughter becomes ferocious; though still self-protective, it now blends 
with despair' (xiv). The question of reconciliation in Eliot's Middlemarc/i will 
be shown to be a fundamental element in the text, and the necessary precursor to 
survival in quite radically pessimistic terms. In recognising the conflict between 
the opposites of transcendent optimism and despair in the individual, Eliot's 
novel examines how the exclusion of either essentially precludes salvation. For 
Hardy, whilst the ironic laughter does verge on a 'ferocious.., despair' in Jude, 
the novel's pessimism is identified on two key levels. One of these is an 
unchangeable and essential part of existence, and the other is haunted by the 
possibility of a more optimistic vision of salvation which moves Hardy into 
Feuerbachian delineations of existence in fundamental terms. 
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Chapter 4 
George Eliot, Feuerbach and Schopenhauer: 
Between Hope and Despair. 
That George Eliot is exposed to Feuerbach's philosophy to a deep and significant 
extent is clearly evident in her providing the first English translation of The 
Essence of Christianity in 1854 1 , and her enthusiasm for his philosophy is 
equally evident in a letter written that same year in which she states that '[w]ith 
the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree' (Selections 132). One of the central 
tenets of the next chapter, which examines Eliot's penultimate novel 
Middlemarch, is that Eliot's relationship with Feuerbach is not as unproblematic 
as this appears to suggest. 
Critical readings of Eliot's philosophical relationships in her literature tend 
to concentrate on "optimistic" philosophies, of which Feuerbach's is one. As 
outlined in the Introduction above, despite her close engagement with Feuerbach 
in translating his primary work, those critics who assess Eliot's literary 
relationship with Feuerbach rarely examine his influences in her writing in detail 
but posit an acknowledged and generalised connection, frequently alongside 
other influences considered from an "optimistic" viewpoint whether implicitly or 
explicitly termed. Rosemary Ashton has aligned Eliot with brief but optimistic 
readings of Comte, Goethe, and Feuerbach (German 166-70), and the ethical 
altruism of Baruch Spinoza (158-9), argning that all of Eliot's novels 
predominantly 'testify to her unchanging belief in Feuerbachian thinking, 
including 'I-Thou relationships, the "divine" efficacy of human love, [and] the 
redeeming influence of man on man' (160), an 'unchanging belief this thesis 
questions. For Ashton the influences of these thinkers on Eliot include the 
importance of 'the use of the senses and the faculty of the imagination as central 
to religious myth and the exercise of moral duty alike' (166), and thus "religious" 
Feuerbach's original publication Germany 1841; revised edition 1843. Eliot's translation is still 
the currently available edition. 
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feeling is 'channell[ed] into human feelings towards fellow humans' (170), the 
terms of which will be examined in Chapter 5, alongside alternative implications 
regarding Ashton's claim that Feuerbach (alongside Spinoza) offers Eliot 'an 
ethic and a psychology applicable to men in their unheroic everyday' (159). 
Peter Jones discusses the philosophical relationship between ego and imagination 
in Middlemarch and, whilst acknowledging influences including a Kempis, 
Rousseau, Comte and Mill, Jones discusses Eliot mainly in relation to Charles 
Bray and G. H. Lewes (52-3; 60-65), seeing her relationship with Feuerbach 
predominantly one in which 'man is the criterion of truth, and... religion is 
reducible to anthropology and psychology' (52). Jones does makes some 
observations pertinent to the examination of Middlemarch in Chapter 5, where 
the characterisation of human individuals, their relationships and human aims 
will be shown to raise questions concerning the optimistic emphasis that 
Feuerbachian delineations of the human engender. Eliot, then, is frequently 
either implicitly or explicitly termed an optimist (Argyle 4) or a positivist-
humanist (Widdowson 18-21) by critics, and her views are often seen as 
reflecting the Victorian period in representative terms. Basil Willey argues that 
Eliot is probably the single writer who 'fully epitomises the century; her 
development is a paradigm.., of its most decided trend... [moving] from 
Evangelical Christianity... through doubt to a reinterpreted Christ and a religion 
of humanity: beginning with God, it ends in Duty' (215). T. R. Wright argues a 
case of Eliot's 'veneration for the founder of the Religion of Humanity [Comte]' 
(Humanity 180), and that the 'moral framework' of her novels 'is based upon 
Positivist principles, in particular the channelling of egoistic instincts in altruistic 
directions by habits of prayer and worship and the need to live openly and rely on 
the beneficent influence of public opinion' (180). Wright also points out, 
however, that for Eliot 'Positivist concepts are.., sometimes found wanting' 
(181). Chapter 3 has shown that Eliot's relationship with Comtean thought is 
clearly problematic 2, and one of the issues Chapter 5 will examine concerns the 
other side of the altruistic coin: the danger this might represent to the individual, 
and how 'the beneficent influence of public opinion' might also be seen as rather 
a misnomer. K. M. Newton sees Eliot embodying an optimistic Romantic 
2 See also Brunning Salvation (64-7). 
humanism within which context Feuerbach assists Eliot's perception that 
'morality was rather a natural product of the social life of man; its basis was in 
human feelings which had become transformed into moral ideas through the 
interaction of men and society' (Romantic 26). This concept will be discussed in 
relation to Middlemarch, particularly in terms of the problematic aspects of the 
Feuerbachian consideration of only optimistic human relations, a Feuerbachian 
aspect this thesis will argue Eliot's novel challenges. The relationship between 
'knowledge', 'truth', and 'subjective feeling' (Newton Romantic 125) in 
Middlemarc/i will be shown to have significant ramifications for seeing Eliot's 
work in a less optimistic light. U. C. Knoepflmacher argues that 'Feuerbach's 
contention that his man-centred faith would only further the primacy of "Love" 
in the world of change, suffering, and total extinction, softened considerably the 
evolutionary ideas that [Eliot] had so stoically accepted' (Humanism 54). In 
seeing Feuerbachian influence as an optimistic means of overcoming the 
pessimism of an evolutionary world, Knoepflmacher interestingly suggests a 
more pessimistic ethos underlying some of her work, albeit in respect of a 
relationship with evolutionary pessimism. Gillian Beer has examined Eliot's 
work in relation to evolutionary and scientific social Darwinism, arguing that for 
Eliot 'the multiple past, both genetic and cultural' (187-8) leads to social 
enrichment, and that '[p]rojects cannot rest in the present' as 'they rely upon 
extension and fuffirity' (142), yet Beer also claims that by the end of her writing 
career Eliot's earlier 'dependence of the future on the past is brought into 
question' (169). Beer relates this "change" to what she sees in Comte and 
Darwin as an emphasis on 'the unstayable and ever-extending movement of all 
phenomena' (180), but in Middlemarch this questioning of the 'dependence of 
the future on the past' (Beer 169) moves Eliot's engagements with both 
'extension and futurity' (142) in her 'study of process and relations' (149) 
outside of direct agreement with Feuerbachian teleological-optimism in radical 
terms. Suzanne Graver has examined Eliot within the context of an organic, 
progressive social optimism, arguing that Eliot regards 'human nature not as 
constant but as continuously developing, moving slowly but comprehensively 
Gillian Beer does recognise less overtly optimistic aspects of Eliot's work, which she relates to 
Darwinism (See Beer Darwin's Plots 193), but largely finds the 'belief in fixed laws is a sustaining 
element in George Eliot's sense of the moral nature of plot' (223): see also Introduction (9) above. 
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toward the improvement of mankind' (16), an improvement brought about 
through 'tolerance' and 'brotherhood' (57). Graver claims for Eliot the belief in 
literature itself as 'an agent of social evolution' (186), and that she 'wanted to 
create through her fiction new forms of belief (260) towards that optimistic 
evolutionary end. Yet Graver sees Eliot's fictional texts as finally embodying a 
failure of intent in their testament to 'a myth or vision of organic unity' (308). 
The next chapter will examine how Middlemarch explicitly problematises the 
idea that human existence can be defined in these progressive-optimistic terms, 
and how the relationship with Feuerbachian delineations of human place, ethics 
and destination in Middlemarch suggests that Eliot's relationship with Feuerbach 
is not as unproblematic as her own explicit "agreement" appears to suggest. 
Whilst Pauline Nestor also aligns Eliot philosophically with Feuerbach, Comte, 
Goethe, and Spinoza in fairly generalised positivist-optimistic terms, Nestor does 
raise the importance of recognising the 'complex, unstable and frequently 
contradictory aspects of Eliot's texts' (161). 
Most critics do not examine Eliot's exposure to Schopenhauer's 
philosophy, nor address her work more generally in relation to pessimism. 
Eliot's exposure to Schopenhauer certainly began at least as early in her literary 
career as her exposure to Feuerbach's work with the publication of John 
Oxenford's article on Schopenhauer in The Westminster Review in 1853g. Eliot 
was the editor of The Westminster Review at the time and recommended 
Oxenford's article to her friends George Combe and Sara Hennell as 'one of the 
best in that number' (Letters v.11, 95; VIII, 73-74). According to E. A. McCobb, 
however, Eliot also later read Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea 
directly. It seems likely that this occurs nearly two decades after Oxenford's 
article is published, but at least 10 years earlier than Schopenhauer's work is 
McCobb argues that Eliot's first exposure to Schopenhauer's philosophy began a year earlier, 
from at least 1852, via the Westminster Review, identifying several references to Schopenhauer in 
The Westminster Review over the 12 months prior to the publication of John Oxenford's article, as 
well as in other journals and books, both in English and German publications. See E. A. McCobb 
"Daniel Deronda as Will and Representation: George Eliot and Schopenhauer", 533-4. McCobb's 
earliest source, W. Tennemann's A Manual of the History of Philosophy, was in fact published 20 
years earlier than this in 1832, although this work only mentions Schopenhauer very briefly and 
does not discuss any facets of his philosophy. 
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published in English translation and thus available to a wider audience 5 . 
McCobb suggests that the evidence points towards Eliot reading Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung between September 1872 and February 1873, but most 
likely not until 'immediately after Tristram Shandy' (McCobb "Representation" 
535, fhl I) which, according to Timothy Hands, Eliot is reading in January 1873 
(Hands 129). It is not possible to assert the date conclusively, however, as Eliot 
does not date the entry itself or refer to the year in which she read the book, but 
includes Schopenhauer's work in a list of books with the note 'Read since 
September' (quoted McCobb "Representation" 535)6• 
 McCobb's conclusions 
regarding the date are drawn from various sources of evidence, including the 
order in which Eliot lists the books, her manuscript notebooks, letters, and 
George Lewes' diary (McCobb "Representation" 535). Having established this 
link between Eliot and Schopenhauer immediately prior to Eliot beginning work 
on Daniel Deronda, McCobb discusses the relationship between Eliot's treatment 
of gambling, moral debt and redemption in Daniel Deronda in relation to WWI, 
and elsewhere discusses Eliot, Schopenhauer, and music in relation to the same 
nove1 7. Significantly, McCobb also notes that Lewes read Schopenhauer widely 
between January 1869 and 1876 ("Representation" 534), Lewes and Eliot having 
been living together since 1854, although McCobb does not explore the 
likelihood or implications of Lewes discussing Schopenhauer's philosophy with 
Eliot. 
Lewes began his reading of Schopenhauer with The Fourfold Root in 
January 1869 (Schopenhauer's precursor to WWJ), moving on to The World as 
Will and Idea itself almost 2 years later in November 1870, the month Eliot 
begins to write what is currently a story called "Miss Brooke" which has not yet 
become part of the early germs of her latest novel (see Hands 118). Eliot's ideas 
have coalesced into Middlemarch by December 1870, and she has completed 
Books I and II with work progressing on Book III (see Hands 120-123) by the 
$ See E. A. McCobb "Representation" (535). 
6 This by no means proves that Eliot did not read Schopenhauer before this date, however, even in 
part. As William Baker points out, Eliot does not always record her reading in her diaries, Baker 
showing Sir Thomas Browne's work as an example of this, Browne is 'frequently cited by G. 
Eliot' including in Middlemarch yet 'there appears to be no mention of reading him in either G. 
Eliot's or G. H. I_ewes' diaries', and the edition of Browne's work in Dr. William's library 
'contains various pencil linings by both George Eliot and Lewes' (Baker xlvii). 
E. A. McCobb "The Morality of Musical Genius: Schopenhauerian Views in Daniel Deronda" 
Forum for Modern Language Studies 1983 VI 9, pp32 1-330. 
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time Lewes goes on to read Parerga und Paralipomena/Essays and Aphorisms8 
the following November, 1 871 g. Eliot's completed Middlemarch Books are 
published in succession from December 1871 onwards, Eliot producing Books 
IV to VIII over the subsequent year with the "Finale" completed in October and 
published on l December 1872 (Hands 123-7), and within two months, by 
February 1873 at the latest, Eliot has read The World as Will and Idea for herself 
(McCobb "Representation" 535). What might have impelled Eliot towards 
finally reading Schopenhauer is impossible to say without documented evidence 
but it seems not unlikely that conversations with Lewes, whose knowledge of 
Schopenhauer since 1869 is first-hand, may well have prompted her own interest 
regardless of the generally growing awareness and discussions of Schopenhauer 
mentioned amongst Eliot's acquaintances' 0 . Even if Lewes or other of Eliot's 
acquaintances never discussed Schopenhauer with her, however, Eliot's direct 
engagement itself suggests that her exposure to Oxenford's discussion of 
Schopenhauer 20 years earlier was finally insufficient to sustain her own 
questions. Whilst McCobb investigates some aspects of Schopenhauerian 
influence in Daniel Deronda, claiming that the 'empirical evidence suggests that 
Schopenhauer's works may have exerted some influence during George Eliot's 
transition from "optimistic realism" to the "pessimistic non-realism" of her last 
novel' ("Representation" 533), how Middlemarch itself may mark a shift in 
Eliot's position forms the focus of this thesis. 
Ralph Goodale points out that Eduard von Hartmann was another 'German 
pessimist [who] stood very close to Schopenhauer in popularity' in nineteenth 
century Britain, and warns that 'in investigating the influence of Schopenhauer 
one must beware of ascribing to him what is due to Hartmann or the exponents of 
Buddhism' (242-3). Von Hartmaim's philosophical pessimism is derived 
directly from Schopenhauer's, however, and Schopenhauer explicitly recognises 
the relationship between his own philosophy and Buddhism and other Eastern 
Lewes also reads a book about Schopenhauer's philosophy by Wilhelm Gwinner in November 
1871 (see McCobb "Representation" 534). There are two possible contenders: see bibliography 
below and COPAC. 
Lewes' reading of Schopenhauer listed McCobb "Representation" 534. 
See McCobb ("Representation" 535-6) for a brief discussion of Eliot's acquaintances as possible 
Schopenhauerian sources, although McCobb does not appear to consider Lewes a serious 
contender here. 
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philosophy". Whilst von Hartmann's philosophical approach may have 
interesting areas to devote to the issue of the unconscious, either with or without 
regard to the relationships between himself, Schopenhauer, and Freud, his final 
vision of salvation is a deeply pessimistic evolutionary species-Consciousness, 
the final endpoint of which is voluntary mass-extinction' 2 . Lewes was certainly 
familiar with von Hartmaim, and whilst the firmest evidence shows that Lewes 
appears to be reading secondary material on von 1-lartmann until after 1873, there 
is some evidence to suggest that he may have been reading von Hartmann 
directly in 1869 and 1872 13 . Nonetheless, von Hartmann's brand of pessimism is 
not pertinent to the relationship between optimism and pessimism in 
Middle,narch discussed in Chapter 5, although it has minimal relevance to 
Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure as Chapter 7 will discuss. With Lewes 
reading all of Schopethauer's works from 1869 onwards, and Eliot reading WWI 
between September 1872 and February 1873 at the latest, the evidence suggests 
that her exposure to Schopenhauer may have been quite comprehensive by this 
time. Most significantly, it also indicates that the issue of pessimism is of 
interest to her by the time she is finishing her work on Middlemarch. 
Whilst it is evident from her recommendations to Hennell and Combe that 
Eliot is at least familiar with Schopenhauer from at least 1853, she does not 
indicate what her opinion of his philosophy is, however, although her 
appreciation of Oxenford's article could imply her agreement at this point in time 
with his critique and rejection of what he sees as Schopenhauer's unremitting 
See Chapter 1(41) above. 
12 See Chapter 3 (76) for discussion of Von Hartmann. 
13 See William Baker George Eliot - George Henry Lewes Library: Gustav Knauer Das Facit aus 
E. von Hartmann 's Philosophy des Unbewussten, Berlin, [publisher not known] 1873 (Baker entry 
1164, p110); Adolf Lasson "Eduard von Hartmann und seine neuesten Schriften", Deutsche 
Rundschau, 8, (September 1876) pp391417 (Baker 1220, 114); Wilhelm Tobias Grenzen der 
Philosophie, constatirt gegen Riemann and Helm oltz vertheidigt gegen Von Hartmann and Lasker, 
Berlin, [publisher not known], 1875 (Baker 2160, 200). The Baker listings of Eliot and Lewes' 
library also includes books on pessimism: Edmund Pfleiderer Der moderne Pessimismus, Berlin, 
1875 (Baker 1676, 157); and James Sully Pessimism: A History and a Criticism, 1877 (Baker 
2110, 196), which discusses both Schopenhauer and von 1-lartmann in detail. 
Lewes' possible primary contact with von Hartmann before these dates: McCobb has found a 
reference to Lewes reading a Philosophie des Unbewussten in December 1869 and April 1872, 
which may be von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious although no author is mentioned. 
McCobb also notes that Flausemann's book of the same title in the Lewes Collection at Dr. 
William's Library was only published in 1874 (McCobb "Representation" 537, fnl8). There are 
no listings on COPAC which would suggest that Lewes' reading here may have been anything 
other than von 1-Iartmann's Philosophie des Unbewussten which was first published in 1869 in 
Berlin. As such, it is quite possible that Lewes is reading von Hartmann simultaneously with his 
first exposure to Schopenhauer. 
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pessimism. Whilst Oxenford admires Schopenhauer's style and critique of 
transcendental philosophy (401), he finds Schopenhauer's doctrine 'the most 
disheartening, the most repulsive, the most opposed to the aspirations of the 
present world' (394), present aspirations that Oxenford clearly relates to the 
whole ethos of his contemporary society' 4 . Oxenford rejects Schopenhauer's 
philosophy, concentrating his final polemic against Schopenhauer's advocacy of 
asceticism, 'that gradual extinction of all feelings that connect us with the visible 
world... [til] they receded from the visible world and gradually extinguished the 
"will to live", till death... came as the completion of their wishes' (407). As 
argued in Chapter 1 above, this is clearly a one-dimensional reading, even 
misreading, of Schopenhauer, and does not address his ethical position at all. 
Nonetheless, Eliot was at the very least aware of Schopenhauer's philosophy 
(albeit most likely only through Oxenford's eyes at this stage) from at least April 
1853, a matter of months before she herself introduces Feuerbach to the British 
readership. Whilst there is little documentary evidence in her surviving papers to 
suggest what her opinion of Schopenhauer's philosophy might be, it is tempting 
to read her positive response to Oxenford's article (in recommending it to her 
friends) as tacit agreement with his conclusions. Whilst this is by no means 
clear, it is nonetheless the case that this occurs nearly 20 years before 
Middletnarch is published, by which time any earlier agreement there may have 
been could well have changed or at the very least offered too sparse a resource to 
engage sufficiently with Eliot's subsequent questions. 
Apart from McCobb, another significant critical reading of Eliot and 
Schopenhauer is Penelope LeFew-Blake's work discussing the influence of 
Schopenhauer on four women writers. Whilst LeFew-Blake notes 
Knoepflmacher's brief mention of 'several Schopenhauerian characteristics in 
Middlemarch' (LeFew-Blake 16)15, 
 and George Levine's suggestion of 'a 
Schopenhauerian quality to [Eliot's] letters' (14) 16 
 during her nursing of Lewes' 
son Thornton during his fatal illness, LeFew-Blake's own basis for Eliot's 
14 See Chapter 3 above for discussion of a number of the diverse viewpoints in Oxenford's 'present 
world' (394) of the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
' U. C. Knoepflmacher Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel. Princeton, 1965; and see 
McCobb "Representation" 536. 
16 George Levine "The Hero as Dilettante: Middlemarch and Nostromo" in George Eliot: 
Centenae'y Essays and an Unpublished Fragment. Anne Smith ed. London: Vision P, 1980, 
ppl 52-180. 
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exposure to Schopenhauer also appears to be based entirely on McCobb's 
evidence' 7 . Yet LeFew-Blake cites Oxenford's 1853 Westminster Review article 
on SchopeiThauer as having 'earned great praise' (13) and an 'excited response' 
(8) from Eliot, but does not cite her source: presumably LeFew-Blake is referring 
to Eliot's letters to Sara Hennell and George Combe here. LeFew-Blake also 
suggests that Oxenford unproblematically 'welcome[s]' (10) Schopenhauer, and 
interprets this as Eliot having 'enthusiasm for Schopenhauer's work' (13), the 
former of which is clearly not the case and the latter is again unsourced. As such, 
LeFew-Blake's claims for Eliot's enthusiasm and excitement for Schopenhauer 
at this time appears to contradict the most compelling evidence, as Eliot's 
recommendation of Oxenford's article actually does no more than imply 
agreement with Oxenford's position at this stage in her career. LeFew-Blake 
performs a critical reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda based on a 
reading of Schopenhauer's philosophy, although LeFew-Blake does not unpack 
his philosophical position beyond fairly generalised interpretations. LeFew-
Blake's analysis will be discussed in ChapterS. 
Eliot's exposure to Schopenhauer appears most likely, then, to have been 
through secondary sources only before her work on Middlemarc/i is coming to an 
end, thus any direct impact this may have had on Eliot's approaches to issues in 
Middlemarch can only be conjectural, leaving the novel itself to provide any 
illustration of what might have led her to explore the question of 
Schopenhauerian pessimism further. That what little documented evidence there 
is includes neither Eliot's support for, nor clear rejections of, Schopenhauer's 
position leaves an examination of how the issues he addresses are treated in 
Eliot's writings as the central source of speculation. Nonetheless, even if Eliot 
had declared a direct influence, the nature of that influence would still remain a 
question, not least whether it is positively or negatively expressed in the novel. 
Eliot's experience of Schopenhauer, following the earlier contact through 
17 See LeFew-Blake, 13. LeFew-Blake also sources Deborah Guth's work on Eliot, but Guth only 
discusses Schiller in relation to Eliot, not Schopenhauer: see Deborah Guth "George Eliot and 
Schiller: Narrative Ambivalence in Middlemarch and Felix Ho/I". The Modern Language Review. 
94,4 (Oct 1999): 913-24. LeFew-Blake's reference to U. C. Knoepflmacher's Religious Humanism 
and the Victorian Novel acknowledges Knoepflmacher's identification of willing in Midd/emarch 
with Schopenhauer's 'World-Will' (Knoepflmacher Ill). LeFcw-Blakc's research clearly draws 
her argument for Eliot's exposure to Schopeithauer almost entirely from McCobb as her other 
named sources cast less light on the subject than McCobb does. 
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Oxenford's articles in the Westminster Review in the I 850s' 8 , is clearly reaching 
another significant point by the time she is writing Middlemarch. Whether or not 
Eliot had predominantly direct or secondary contact with Schopenhauer before 
September 1872, the analysis of Middlemarch will show that Eliot's penultimate 
novel engages with Schopenhauerian issues in ways that problematise 
Feuerbachian delineations of human nature, human relations, and destination, and 
align Eliot much more closely with Schopenhauer's position than previous 
criticisms of Eliot have suggested. 
Feuerbach insists that there is 'no other essence which man can think, 
dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the absolute, than 
the essence of human nature itself (Essence XXVII, 270), and that '[t]he 
relations.., of man to man.., all the moral relations are per se religious [thus] 
Life as a whole is, in its essential, substantial relations, throughout of a divine 
nature' (271). Throughout Eliot's non-fiction prose writings, including her 
letters, Feuerbach's views resonate, but Chapter 5 will argue that his overt 
deification of human existence, character, relationships, and salvation are 
significantly tempered in her novel Middlemarch. In a letter written twenty years 
after her translation of Feuerbach and two years after the publication of 
Middlemarch, Eliot still echoes Feuerbach albeit with a more corporeal 
emphasis: 
The fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of 
development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is 
not man: and... the idea of god, so far as it has been a high spiritual 
influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the 
human). (Eliot Selections 453) 
She also posits human relations as the true object of morality and as such, they 
urge 'a higher strain of duty... to [an] ideal... [of] human love and moral action', 
and are imbued with 'sacredness' (454). Yet at the same time Eliot suggests a 
'principle of development' (453) which seems to render "teleological optimism" 
contingent upon the state of human relations rather than an inevitability, and she 
persistently recognises a less overtly optimistic vision of human "goodness". For 
Eliot the 'line between the virtuous and the vicious.., far from being a necessary 
!8 McCobb points out that Oxenford published more than one article on Schopenhauer, including in 
'The Westminster Review': see McCobb "Representation" (5334). 
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safeguard to morality' is 'itself an immoral fiction', as anyone who experiences 
'their own falls and their own struggles' (Eliot "Meister" 132) would recognise. 
This is in no sense the pessimistic vision of the inherently immoral human that 
W. H. Mallock holds, and that Arnold seems to betray at times, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 above, but recognises the root not only of "good" but also of "evil" in 
the choices and relationships each individual may make. In this, Eliot echoes not 
only J. S. Mill's position, but also Schopenhauer's own philosophy of the human 
to a significant extent, and the examination of Middlemarch will show even 
greater Schopenhauerian echoes, as the next chapter will argue. 
The consciousness of individual failing, viewed in the light of Feuerbach's 
deification of human essence as Absolute and that which each individual seeks to 
be unified with (as salvation itself), reflects the perpetual sense of individual 
alienation Feuerbach is so keen to overcome but which remains intrinsic to his 
own position. The finite, imperfect individual inevitably falls short of the divine 
perfection of the species thus remains consciously alienated, consciously 
imperfect' 9 . In personal correspondence, Eliot frequently expresses a strong self-
consciousness of personal failing and, in the twenty years between translating 
Feuerbach and finally reading Schopenhauer for herself, she reveals the fatal flaw 
that Feuerbach's positioning of human essence as the divine and sacred ideal of 
perfection presents for the individual. In a letter written the year in which her 
translation of Feuerbach is published, she emphasises that individuals need to try 
to reconcile themselves to this consciousness of self-failure, however difficult 
that may be. She writes, 'to be a failure of Nature and to know it is not a 
comfortable lot. It is the last lesson one learns, to be contented with one's 
inferiority - but it must be learned' (Selections 134). In another letter, written 12 
years later in 1 866 - a few years before the publication of Middlemarch - Eliot 
claims that she has 'a consciousness tending more and more to consist in 
memories of error and imperfection rather than in a strengthening sense of 
achievement' (Selections 318). In her Journal on January V t 1874, just over a 
year afler the publication of the final Book of Middlemarch and her own reading 
of Schopenhauer, Eliot records: 
The happy old year in which we have had constant enjoyment of life, 
notwithstanding much bodily malaise, is gone from us for ever. More than 
19 
 Chapter 2 (57-8) above. 
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in any former year of my life, love has been poured forth to me from 
distant hearts. ... Nothing is wanting to my blessings but the uninterrupted 
power of work. For as to all my unchangeable imperfections I have 
resigned myself. (Journals 144). 
Eliot's personal writings express a consistent preoccupation with the self-
consciousness of personal failing, and her struggle to learn that 'last lesson' is 
clearly a struggle between the desire not to be a 'failure of Nature' (Selections 
134) and reconciling herselL therefore, to the consciousness that this is what she 
feels she is. In resigning herself to all her imperfections, she is thus self-
consciously aware that she will always be alienated from the Feuerbachian 
perfection that Nature "intended" - from attaining a more complete sense of self 
Eliot also recognises a consciousness of human existence here which appears to 
be equally painfully aware of loss and the fragile nature of human "blessings" 
and positive human relations. It takes Eliot at least 20 years to be (apparently) 
finally able to mark that transition between self-doubt and the self-reconciliation 
she deems necessary, and Eliot's recognition of just such a point of self-
reconciliation is itself a crucial issue in Middlemarch. The relationship between 
the quest for perfection - for the highest realisable self - and self-conscious 
imperfection, even despair, in Eliot's penultimate novel will be discussed in the 
following chapter, and its resonance with the questions of I-thou relations Eliot's 
letters also raise will be examined. Eliot's delineations of Dorothea's 
relationships in Middlemarch form the focus of the study in Chapter 5, which 
will examine how the novel questions the optimism that Feuerbachian I-thou 
relations are intended to engender. 
Seven years after the publication of Middlemarch and shortly following 
that of Daniel Deronda, Eliot's contemporary Mallock recognises 'her entire 
philosophy... [as] an impassioned protest against pessimism... present[ing] the 
human life and the human lot to us as worthy of all our piety... love and 
reverence', and this through 'beings who are not isolated, but linked together by 
countless ties of duty and affection; and.., the moral raison d'être of existence' 
("Eliot" 457). Yet Mallock also recognises a tension between this and what he 
sees as an evident pessimism in her novels, claiming that whilst Eliot 'is 
theoretically no pessimist; ... the picture she presents to us of the world we live 
in almost exactly answers to the description given of it by Schopenhauer, as 
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nothing better than a "penal settlement" (457). Further, Mallock argues that in 
Eliot's novels there is 'no happy and rejoicing brotherhood... but a sad and 
labouring race of chained convicts, whose highest glory it is not to attempt 
escaping' (457). Whilst Mallock recognises that Eliot 'does not underestimate 
the causes for despair' then, he also asks whether she 'overestimate[s] the causes 
for hope?' (458). This issue will be discussed further in the analysis of 
Middlemarch in Chapter 5, but it is pertinent to note that Mallock not only 
recognises Eliot's novels in such pessimistic terms, but that he sees her position 
to be close to Schopenhauer's own in relation to Schopenhauer's pessimistic 
delineations of human place in the world. The extent of Eliot's relationship with 
Schopenhauer's philosophy will be shown to be much more complex - and much 
more fruitful - than Mallock's deeply pessimistic viewpoint. 
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Chapter 5 
Middlem arch, 1872. 
'That Roar Which Lies on the Other Side of Silence': 
Despair, Transcendence, and Salvation in 
Eliot's New Real Future. 
'Some discouragement, some faintness of heart at the new real future 
which replaces the imaginary is not unusual, and we do not expect 
people to be moved by what is not unusuaL That element of tragedy 
which lies in the very fact offrequency, has not yet wrought itself into 
the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly 
bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary 
human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's 
heartbeat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side 
of silence.' 
George Eliot Middlemarch 1872' 
1. Dorothea Brook and the elements of salvation: between 'self-despair' and 
'the rapturous consciousness of lj/'e beyond self' 
In Middlemarch, Dorothea Brook is a yearning and passionate young woman, 
fervently desiring 'some lofty conception of the world' (Eliot Middlemarch 
Chapter 1, 10) which will provide an ideal path upon which to fulfil some 
practical but elevated activity. Whilst she longs for a 'directly beneficent' (48, 
455) activity, it must also be a transcendent ideal which reveals 'the highest 
purposes of truth' (2, 20). From the beginning of the novel, Dorothea is aligned 
with St. Theresa, 'soar[ing] after some illimitable satisfaction, some object which 
would never justify weariness, which would reconcile self-despair with the 
rapturous consciousness of life beyond self (Prelude, 7). Such an epic ideal in 
Dorothea's secularising world is, however, 'helped by no coherent social faith 
and order' (7). As such, she faces a struggle to identify and actively fulfil that 
quest, but the aim itself - that yearning for reconciliation between 'self-despair' 
'Middlemarclt 1872, London: Penguin Books, 1994, Chapter 20, 189 
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and 'the rapturous consciousness of life beyond self' (7) - is of crucial 
importance. Whilst "salvation", that 'illimitable satisfaction' (7), is release from 
the misery and weariness of self-despair, it is also at a specific point: the moment 
of reconciliation of self-despair with the 'rapturous consciousness of life beyond 
self (7). Self-despair then, is not entirely transcended but remains a consciously 
apparent human presence. The transcendent consciousness of 'life beyond self 
(7) is also a conscious presence but one which must be reconciled with self- 
despair rather than attained in its entirety, thus both polarised positions become 
something against which one should be wholly bound towards. Dorothea's 
journey of realisation forms the central focus of this chapter, and that her quest 
for salvation must be a place in which she obtains a balanced consciousness of 
both 'self and 'beyond self (7), egoism and altruism, I and thou, individual and 
species, raises significant questions about Eliot's relationship with Feuerbachian 
optimistic thinking, and moves her into a more Schopenhauerian consciousness 2 . 
Dorothea desires to 'see how it was possible to lead a grand life here - now 
- in England' (3, 30) and, whilst her desire for a 'directly beneficent' (48, 455) 
activity helps fuel her work on designing and urging the building of cottages for 
the poor, this work does not provide her with that elusive something which will 
offer her the route to those "greater" possibilities - 'the highest purposes of truth' 
(2, 20) - she is also seeking. This is a quasi-religious quest for a transcendent 
vision which she hopes will determine her means and direction, and her destiny. 
Feuerbach intends this quest to be shifted into a wholly human environment, 
placing human aims (both means and object) as a fundamental and necessary 
aspect of the human, each individual's aim being 'this subject's own, but 
objective, nature' (Feuerbach Essence I, 4). As such, it is their own peculiar 
construction of character, of human essence, made manifest 3 . This Feuerbachian 
grounding of human objectives and delineation of character is illustrated in the 
close relationship Eliot draws between her characters' personalities and 
2 The central argument of this Chapter of the thesis has been presented as a Conference paper 
(unpublished): see Brunning "George Eliot, Feuerbach and Schopenhauer: The Conflict Between 
Optimism and Pessimism in Middlemarch", British Association of Victorian Studies (BAVS) 
Victorian Cultures in Conflict Conference, Liverpool University 79th 
 September 2006. 
Feuerbach recognises each individual as a particular manifestation of the essence of human 
nature, and it is only in and across the space and time of the species that the necessary deficiencies 
of both human individuality and individual human aims become perfect through being unified with 
the whole: see Chapter 2 above. 
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ambitions in the novel. For Feuerbach, affirming human aim is both affirmation . 
of the individual self and the species, and as such, itselfforms the middle ground 
between the individual and the species in acting to effect 'the unity of the 
material and spiritual in the individual' (V, 64, my emphasis). Whilst for 
Feuerbach human aim does not in itself effect salvation (overcome individual 
alienation) as this can only be filly effected through feeling (through I-thou 
species-consciousness), it does offer a route towards this through its mediating 
and affirming role of both the material individual and the "spiritual" species in 
the individual 4. On one level, salvation in Middlemarch appears to be 
Feuerbachian in seeking to reconcile the dichotomy between self-despair (the 
material, subjective, imperfect individual) and the consciousness of beyond-self 
(the "spiritual" element of species-consciousness). Yet, despite retaining this 
aim, Dorothea's journey troubles the ground, means and object of Feuerbachian 
salvation. Whilst I-thou human relations are at the heart of both Feuerbach's 
secularised salvation and Eliot's novel, Middlemarch examines the problematic 
aspects of Feuerbach's vision of human relations, realisation, and destiny, and the 
implications for the individual quest for salvation. Eliot's novel foregrounds the 
obstacles that mar the realisation of a Feuerbachian ideal of I-thou human 
salvation: that 'living, generous humanity - mixed and erring, and self-deluding' 
(Eliot "Meister" 131) which thwarts Feuerbachian perfection at every turn. In its 
delineations of the limitations of individual human knowledge, of individual 
character, and the negative potential of human relations, Middlemarch shows 
how these elements themselves present essential obstacles to individual and 
social realisation. Eliot's novel also shifts the ground of human I-thou ethical 
relations on a fundamental level, and subsequently questions both the 
accessibility and desirability of the Feuerbachian ideal of salvation, but in quite 
radically Schopenhauerian terms. 
With Casaubon's reputation 'as a man of profound learning' (Middlemarch 
1, 13) and Dorothea's initial appreciation of his physical likeness to a 'portrait of 
In seeing the medical profession as 'offering the most direct alliance between intellectual 
conquest and the social good' demanded by his own 'nature' (Middleniarch 15, 141), Lydgate also 
demonstrates Feuerbach's aim as 'the unity of the material and spiritual in each individual' 
(Feuerbach Essence V, 64). Lydgate echoes Dorothea on many levels, not least in that he too is 
'an emotional creature, with a flesh-and-blood sense of fellowship' (Middlemarch 15, 141). 
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Locke' as showing her 'the great soul in... [his] face' (2, 22), Casaubon appears 
to be offering her the key to what she feels she is as yet unable to see: the path 
which will reveal to her those transcendent "truths" she yearns towards. She 
mentally checks her own pre-marital hints of the terrible disappointment to come, 
such as she feels particularly keenly regarding Casaubon's dismissal of her 
projects to provide homes for the living when he 'diverted' their discussion to 
contemplations of the dead and 'the dwellings of the ancient Egyptians, as if to 
check a too high standard' (3, 34). After a struggle with her 'agitation on this 
indifference of his', Dorothea considers she has been 'presumptuous in 
demanding his attention to such a[n implicitly "low"] subject' (34). Her sense of 
her own ignorance leads her to 'constantly doubt[ ] her own conclusions' (7, 64), 
yet Casaubon's dismissal affects Dorothea deeply, her sensitivity evident when 
previous belittlement over her efforts regarding the cottages causes her to cry out 
'[w]hat was life worth - what great faith was possible when the whole effect of 
one's actions could be withered up into.., parched rubbish' (4, 38). In blaming 
'her own ignorance' rather than Casaubon's, Dorothea asks herself 'how could 
she be confident that one-roomed cottages were not for the glory of God, when 
men who knew the classics appeared to conciliate indifference to the cottages 
with zeal for the glory?' (7, 64), trying to reconcile the vast chasm between her 
own aims and ideals and Casaubon's by self-blame. Whilst this may be seen to 
reflect her struggle with what the narrator calls the social 'condemnation' of 
'yearning.., womanhood.., as a lapse' (Prelude, 7), Dorothea's ethical human 
aims are clearly important ones in the novel, forming an initially implicit and 
later explicit relationship with Reform in the novel's political context, but also 
having significant ramifications in terms of Dorothea's own journey, as will 
become clear. Meanwhile, Dorothea views Casaubon's knowledge as both 
omnipotent and elusive, concealed from her within the 'masculine' (7, 64) 
language of learning. She initially attempts to 'fill[] up all blanks' and 'seeming 
discords' in her early relationship with him, at a time when she still sees him as 
her own "key" to understanding, by explaining these blanks as the result of 'her 
own deafhess to the higher harmonies' (9, 73) rather than any failure either on 
Casaubon's part or in their suitability for one another. Dorothea seeks 
'deliverance' from 'her girlish subjection to her own ignorance' through a 
'union' that would 'give her the freedom of voluntary submission to a guide who 
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would take her along the grandest path' (3, 30). Yet on one level, her 
misrecognition of Casaubon as this guide is a mistake which appears to be based 
on her misrecognition of his character and path rather than the act of 
'submission' into a self-subsuming 'union' (30) itself, as this apparently comes 
to fruition for Dorothea later in her relationship with Will. This later relationship 
is one in which she might be argued to have found 'that submergence of self in 
communion with Divine perfection' (26) that Feuerbach delineates in the 
(destined) aim for unity of the alienated self with the perfect essence of the 
human embodied in the divine species (Essence 1, 28-30). The Feuerbachian 
transcendence of the individual is questioned in Dorothea's relationships with 
both Casaubon and Will, however, marking a persistent subjection to individual 
self-despair in the former relationship, and troubling the apparent absorption of 
the individual in the latter. Dorothea's initial quest for a transcendent union 
which will release her from her own subjection is a misrecognition on two fronts, 
not only misrecognising Casaubon as the key to her transcendence, but also both 
the possibility and the desirability of transcendence itself 
In the first of these issues, Dorothea's relationship with Casaubon 
recognises that there are clearly irreconcilable differences between them, both in 
their aims (their visions of salvation) and in their characters (the individual 
manifestation of Feuerbachian human essence), and these are marked by a subtle 
recognition of "elemental" differences that neither is aware of until it is too late. 
Images of light and shadow, life and death, resonate throughout Dorothea's 
relationships with Casaubon and Will, and these images form part of the drawing 
of an intricately 'woven and interwoven ... web' of 'human lots' (Middlemarch 
15, 137) in the novel, forming a delicately-nuanced but irrevocable series of 
relationships. Sometimes these webs are a strongly-felt and more obviously 
coercive 'yoke' and 'harness' (17, 169), but at other times they are 'the 
hampering thread-like pressure[s] of small social conditions' (18, 175) that form 
the 'hindrances' (Prelude, 8) to intentions and desires, but also forge more 
positive relationships. Yet linked by these webs are characters who appear to be 
essentially hindered. Casaubon literally spends his life in his ultimately fruitless 
quest for the "Key to all mythologies", trying to identi& the relationship between 
elements that will realise the whole (22, 215) but which converges instead with 
the false promise of alchemy (48, 458). Alchemy, as 'the quest of gold', is 'at 
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the same time a questioning of substances', however, and as such begets 
important groundwork in that 'the body of chemistry is prepared for its soul' 
(458), a "soul" Casaubon is apparently unable to provide or recognise. This not 
only leads to the failure of his own research, but points to a significant 
delineation of both character and relationships in the novel which have particular 
repercussions concerning the quest for salvation. Whilst social or individually 
controllable conditions play a significant part in the novel, Middlemarc/z uses 
relationships between elements to identify essential conditions which either help 
or hinder the aims and desires of the protagonists. This includes positioning the 
central characters themselves as intrinsically related to particular elemental 
forces, but the elemental nature of these relationships is seen to be unequivocal, 
and has pertinent implications regarding the Feuerbachian quest for salvation. 
Whilst Feuerbach delineates the human in terms of the elemental qualities of 
Reason, Affection and Wi11 5 , Eliot expands this relationship into one between the 
alchemic elements, and by so doing, her use of 'antique form animated by 
Christian sentiment' (Middlemarch 19, 185) echoes Feuerbach's essentialism at 
the same time as she subverts his optimism. 
Dorothea's life-affirming and passionate vitality is expressed by her 
'exalted enthusiasm about the ends of life' being 'lit chiefly by its own fire' (3, 
29), and the symbolic relationship between "fire", "life-affirmation" and human 
passions is subtle, intricate, and pervasive in the expression of Dorothea's 
character. She is emphasised as both elemental 'fire' (1, 16) and 'a breathing 
blooming girl' (19, 183), and the vitality expressed in and by 'the glow in her 
[ ... ] bright full eyes' (3, 28) is drawn always towards light which is itself 
'absorb[ed] into the intensity of her mood' (28), forming a significant and 
repetitive focal point 6 . In desiring a purpose which will engender an activity both 
'directly beneficent' (48, 455, my emphasis) and transcendent in also revealing 
'the highest purposes of truth' (2, 20), Dorothea's feet are also placed firmly on 
the ground. She is seeking a union of corporeal earthly life with emotional, 
intellectual and "spiritual" fulfilment, which places her object within 
Feuerbachian delineations of human aim as the unity of matter and spirit in the 
For Feuerbach, human essence is made up of Reason, Affection and Will, all of which are in 
perfect form across the species but are imperfectly manifest in each individual: see Chapter 2 (50-
53) above. 
6 Middlemarch (9, 75; and 19, 184). 
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individual (Essence V, 64). Dorothea's starting and endpoint is kept very much 
on the ground, whilst expressing this relationship in terms of elemental qualities. 
Casaubon is the antithesis of Dorothea, opposing and choking her life-affirming 
'fire' (Middleniarch 3, 29) in the dust and decay of the 'dead' that he admits 
himself he 'live[s] too much with' (2, 19). Casaubon recognises himself as 
'something like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world and trying 
mentally to construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes' 
(19). Peter Jones recognises that Casaubon's "wanderings" imply 'an undirected 
search, and a willing subscription to a passive theory of perception' (28). Yet 
Casaubon's "wanderings" show a particular failing in his 'undirected search' that 
has significant implications not only for Casaubon and Dorothea, but in the 
novel's delineations of human place, aim and destination. Casaubon is both 
unable and unwilling to engage in the ever-changing and explicitly negative 
dynamic that life, with its 'ruin and confusing changes' (Middlemarch 3, 19), 
appears to involve, yet does not recognise the full implications of his own 
preoccupation. In being kept from the life-giving properties of both 'the 
sunshine and the rain', Casaubon's symbolic earth is subterranean, devoid of all 
capacity for life and thus is directly opposed to Dorothea's life-affirmation, 
offering her only 'a virtual tomb' of a marriage which 'produc[es] what would 
never see the light' (48, 455, my emphasis). The significance of this refusal of 
light into a relationship in which Dorothea is explicitly imprisoned (22, 215) is 
linked to her feeling divorced from existential, sensual and emotional life in her 
marriage. Her 'sense of connection with a manifold pregnant existence' (28, 
265) - of 'participated life' (Feuerbach Essence VI, 68) is severed and she is 
forced to watch as an increasingly 'distant world of warm activity and 
fellowship' recedes from 'the door of the tomb' where 'she... stood' 
(Middlemarch 48, 455). Dorothea's life-affirming fire and quest for a corporeal 
yet spiritually-sustaining object finds 'life made a new problem by new elements' 
(20, 191) as the dry dust of both emotional and spiritual death that Casaubon's 
character, life and work brings starves Dorothea of the other necessary elements 
for life: keeping her away from light and water, both 'the sunshine and the rain' 
(48, 455), and what Casaubon refers to as 'the grosser air' (2, 24). Whilst the 
symbolic part that air and water play in sustaining Dorothea will be discussed 
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later, the most significant element denied to Dorothea's quest and its realisation 
by her relationship to Casaubon is light. 
Dorothea's attraction to light is an analogy for both her human vitality 7 and 
the intense yearning towards that transcendent 'beyond self (Prelude, 7), those 
'highest purposes of truth' (2, 20) that form her quest for that as-yet undefined 
great path she wishes to both identify and live by. Yet light has even greater 
significance in the novel as it forms that "fifth element" that Casaubon's 
'system', forged 'on the basis of the four elements' (22, 215), ignores but which 
embodies the central role that actual living, breathing, human beings must play in 
any philosophical or theoretical framework. This is the necessary "soul" needed 
to transform those basic elements to gold, 'the quest for gold being at the same 
time a questioning of substances, [thus] the body of chemistry is prepared for its 
soul' (48, 458). It is the element of light, of "spirit", that is the "life-force", the 
animating principle in both corporeal and spiritual terms which imbues the 
otherwise dead earth and disorganised elements with the vitality of life and thus 
unity of purpose. In mythic terms, "spirit" or "light" binds and governs the other 
four elements and makes them work in effective harmony 8 . Saleel Nurbhai and 
K. M. Newton discuss Eliot's close relationship with Kabbalistic literature and 
Eliot's exploration of the role of "spirit" as animating principle in relation to the 
Judaic myth of the golem figure, particularly in her subsequent novel Daniel 
Deronda9. The golem figure is the 'unformed mass' of lifeless clay (Adam), 'the 
empty vessel.., without the inspiring breath which imparts life and 
understanding' (Nurbhai and Newton, 1). In Talmudic mythology Adam is so 
linked 'with the earth, [that] any sundering of Adam and the earth is a denial of 
his basic spirit' (3). Middletnarc/i is concerned with the necessity of the unif'ing 
and directing principle of life, without which the otherwise disparate parts will be 
doomed to fail, symbolically represented by the frustrations and failures that the 
other elements effect without its necessary and binding focus. Eliot's epigraph to 
7 Middlemarch (2, 28; 9,75; 19, 184). 
Eliot read several works relating to ancient Mysticism: see William Baker The George Eliot - 
George Henry Lewes Library (xlvii; xxv). Whilst some of those listed by Baker can only have been 
read after the publication of Middlemarch, particularly when Eliot is researching Daniel Deronda, 
a number were published well before 1872. A significant number of Eliot's and Lewes' books were 
sold at auction, many uncatalogued, so the list is by no means definitive. 
See especially Saleel Nurbhai and K. M. Newton Chapter 1 "George Eliot and Kabbalism" (25-
34). 
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Chapter 81 in Middlen-iarch, from Goethe's Faust, is a moment of 'glad new 
birth' for Faust (as Chapter 81 is for Dorothea as it marks the beginning of her 
final union with Will Ladislaw). It takes place at sunrise where '[un gold of 
dawn the quickened world lies gleaming', emphasising the essential connection 
between both aspects of light for human life as one which necessarily involves 
'[t]he throb of life.., with pulses beating' and the 'high resolve... [that] stir[s] 
my soul to prove life's utmost worth' (Goethe Faust II, Act I, lines 67-73, 25). 
"Light" in Middlemarch forms that unifying force in providing the element of life 
and the transcendent principle of "spirit": the animating principle of individual 
human life and the transcendent principle of I-thou consciousness that together 
form the 'palpitating life' (Middlemarch 80, 750) of individual human existence, 
aims and desires, and the transcendent 'beyond-self (Prelude, 7) this also 
involves. This is equally pertinent to both Feuerbachian and Schopenhauerian 
delineations of the human, albeit with crucial distinctions made between the two 
positions, as will become clear. 
Feuerbach emphasises the necessity of grounding all philosophy, all human 
theory, in the living human as without our 'fellow-man.., the world would be... 
not only dead and empty, but meaningless' (Essence VIII, 82). Schopenhauer 
echoes this premise, insisting on the living human as not only the necessary basis 
and object of philosophy (WWJ II §19, 37), but also the necessary basis of all 
knowledge (36). Like Feuerbach and Schopenhauer, Eliot argues against any 
philosophical system or methodological approach that ignores the living and, as 
Gillian Beer recognises, Eliot is disturbed by Comte's position when he claims 
that 'Humanity is composed essentially of the dead' as '[i]f the living are 
admitted it is, except in rare instances, only provisionally' (Comte quoted Beer 
185). Eliot asks if 'our duties are towards [this view of] "Humanity"[,] how are 
the living and those who are to come to be excluded?' (Eliot cited Beer 185)10, 
and herself reffises to move away from living, 'breathing' (Middlemarch 19, 183) 
humanity as the fundamental basis of all theory and practice. This essential 
premise informs both Feuerbach's and Schopenhauer's visions of philosophy, 
ethics, and salvation, insisting these must be grounded in the actual, in 
experiential human lives. Yet Feuerbach's own philosophical ground, process 
'° See also Brunning Salvation (66-7). 
128 
and realisation finally transcend the very reality he insists is fundamental, whilst 
Sehopenhauer's insistence on individual human reality remains clearly in view, 
both of which have significant implications in Middlemarch. In the meantime, 
Dorothea's vibrant life-affirmation is not only in direct opposition to Casaubon's 
life-denial, but to her own earlier attempts at asceticism. This exposes her quest 
to transcend her own subjectivity as a misrecognition of her own essential nature 
on both terms as her essentially life-affirming nature does not sit easily with 
either Casaubon's life-denial or her own attempts at asceticism. Dorothea's early 
ascetic impulses are a false path to the knowledge she seeks, just as her initial 
imaginary perceptions of Casaubon are, and as false a path as Casaubon's 
research proves to be for him. Jones argues that Dorothea's initial 
characterisation as 'self-consciously self-denying' illustrates that: 
constructive imagination may encourage a person to think more about an 
imagined world, whether or not it is set up as a religious ideal or goal, than 
about the actual world. In this respect Dorothea's "theoretic" nature 
resembled Casaubon's search for an a priori explanation of mythology. 
(32) 
Dorothea's quest for a transcendent ideal is, however, always one she intends 
should be 'directly beneficent' (Middlemarch 48, 455) from the start. K. M. 
Newton argues that Dorothea's earlier asceticism and decision to marry 
Casaubon 'must be seen together with her idealistic longing for a complete 
religious explanation of the world and... Casaubon's aim to create the foundation 
for this' (Romantic 128). Newton also argues that Dorothea has 'potentially 
dangerous egotistic tendencies' (124) which 'threaten[] to gain control' (132). It 
is clear, however, that Dorothea's passions perpetually reassert themselves, 
despite her attempts to subdue them (Middlemarch 39, 374), but these are in no 
sense identified as either dangerous or egotistic in the novel. Dorothea's 
passions and aims are consistently positive forces in need of the sustenance of 
direction in the real world. Light represents for Dorothea the animating spark of 
existential human life and her "spiritual" quest for 'illimitable satisfaction' 
(Prelude, 7). Dorothea's yearning for the self-fulfilment of a 'fuller life' (5, 44) 
and for something 'beyond' the 'self' (Prelude, 7) illustrates her hunger for 
participation in the 'world of warm activity and fellowship' (48, 455), the 
'participated life' (Feuerbach Essence VI, 68) that Casaubon refuses. 
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In bringing to her perception of Casaubon 'every quality she herself 
brought' (Middlemarch 3, 25) then, Dorothea presumes her own character and 
aims - her 'manifested nature' (Feuerbach Essence I, 5) - to be shared by 
Casaubon, presuming his intellectual and emotional yearnings are also inspired 
by the element of "light" and therefore someone who could 'illuminate principle 
with the widest knowledge' (Middlemarch 2, 24). Dorothea mistakenly believes 
that Casaubon will thus illuminate for her the path towards the 'directly 
beneficent' (48, 455) activities she seeks. Whilst she envisages only the glory of 
being a 'lamp-holder' (2, 20) for his studies, the irony is of course that from the 
first Casaubon believes that ilmer springs and 'motives' - 'the germinating grain' 
- should be kept 'away from the light' (24, my emphases). The lamps, candles 
and tapers used to illuminate Casaubon's research represent the false will-o'-the-
wisp lights that offer Dorothea a false trail away from life and towards 'her own 
doom' (48, 460), and ensure Casaubon's work does indeed remain away from the 
light of realisation in both senses of the word. D. A. Miller recognises that 
'[m]istaken paths function as implicit reminders of the proper but untravelled 
direction, and ignorant blunders as inferences of perfect but inaccessible 
knowledge' (144-5) in the novel. Yet at the same time there is a pessimism of 
character in Middlemarch which appears to preclude certain individuals from 
attaining salvation, or for enabling the realisation of others around them. 
Will recognises that Casaubon's studies ignore the 'new points of view' of 
the living, which leaves his 'system on the basis of the four elements' "out-of-
date" as 'it is no use now to be crawling a little way after men of the last 
century... and correcting their mistakes' (Middlemarch 22, 215). Yet Eliot uses 
these very elements, albeit by exposing the significance of the missing principle, 
to subvert not only Casaubon's "system" but Feuerbach's overtly optimistic 
delineations of human character, aim, and I-thou relations. Casaubon's diversion 
of the conversation about Dorothea's project to build new homes for the living 
into a discussion of the dwellings of ancient Egypt (3, 34) is indicative of the 
irreconcilable nature of their positions, and further, his preoccupation with the 
dead ignores the living to the extent that he even neglects to try to save the life of 
a condemned man (39). In following his false, fading light '[w]ith his taper stuck 
before him [Casaubon] forgot the absence of windows, and.., had become 
indifferent to the sunlight' (20, 192), and had thus become indifferent to the light 
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of the animating "spirit" of life itself, leaving both his direction and methodology 
equally false. As such Casaubon's quest for the "Key to all Mythologies" is 
fatally flawed as it ignores the necessary fifth element which brings cohesion and 
coherence to both the theory of human life and the practice, and without which 
all else is pointless and both metaphorically and literally dead". Casaubon is 
stranded in 'a world.., not only dead and empty, but meaningless' (Feuerbach 
Essence VIII, 82, my emphasis), and threatens Dorothea with the same fate. 
Casaubon's 'unresponsive hardness' to human life thus ensures his 'earth bears 
no harvest of sweetness' despite calling such 'denial knowledge' (Middlemarc/i 
42, 409, my emphasis). As the novel argues: 
whether we believe in the future perfection of our race or in the nearest 
date fixed for the end of the world; whether we regard the earth as a 
putrefying nidus for a saved remnant, including ourselves, or have a 
passionate belief in the solidarity of mankind [ ... ] [t]here is no general 
doctrine which is not capable of eating out our morality if unchecked by the 
deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men. (61, 
590-1). 
Casaubon's self-centred traits and his aspirations are, however, as equally 
deserving of 'our pity' as all the 'other mendicant hopes of mortals' (10, 83), not 
least because of the devastating effect his denial has on his own life and 
aspirations, thus Middlemarc/i insists that Casaubon should be recognised as an 
equally hopeful and equally suffering mortal. This has implications regarding 
Dorothea's own position, and the novel's relationship with human ethics, and 
includes both the "optimistic" and "pessimistic" viewpoints Eliot discusses here. 
In her marriage to Casaubon Dorothea is brought close to self-despair. This 
'breathing blooming girl' is set against essentially fruitless testaments to the 
dead, from the 'reclining marble' and 'grey drapery' (19, 183) of her honeymoon 
in Rome to her marital home, that 'still, white enclosure which made her visible 
world' (28, 264). Dorothea, like the 'bright fire... burning' in the hearth, is a 
'renewal of life and glow' thus an 'incongruous' presence amongst its cold 
Gillian Beer recognises that Casaubon's 'search for "the key to all mythologies".., gives him no 
access to the lived world' (152-3). For Beer, the 'absence of transformation' is related to the 
scientific 'threads' of connections which 'remain themselves, though part of a total fabric' and 
which denote 'the relations within bodily and mental experience as much as the interconnections of 
society' (156-7), in both space and time. Gisela Argyle, on the other hand, finds that Casaubon's 
'narrow selfishness is... evident in the British insularity of his research', leaving Casaubon 
doomed by his inability to save himself or his research by reading German and "knowing what is 
being done by the rest of the world" (Middlemarch cited Argyle 43), an argument shared by 
Rosemary Ashton (153-4). 
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colours and 'vapour[ous]' 'ghostly' (264-6) insubstantiality. Casaubon's home is 
clearly in opposition to Dorothea's life-affirming substance and consequently 
presents a fatal threat to her, and she sinks into the dark and gloomy passages 
(20, 190) of despair which confine their relationship. Her inward contemplations 
of light, 'absorb[ed] into the intensity of her mood' (3, 28), are shadowed by 
images of death in her marriage to Casaubon, Dorothea's youth, life and light 
literally overshadowed by the self-despair of a living death. The avenue of limes 
'whose shadows touched each other', situated outside the windows of her 
marriage home, represent the emotional and spiritual vista of her marriage to 
him, obscuring the 'long swathes of light' (28) beyond them from Dorothea's 
view. These echo the 'long vistas' of 'marble eyes' in Rome which 'seem[] to 
hold the monotonous light of an alien world' (20, 188) she finds herself in 
instead of the 'world of warm activity and fellowship' (48, 455) she was hoping 
for in her marriage. As it is: 
.the light has changed [.1 in the weeks since her marriage, [and] 
Dorothea had not distinctly observed but felt with a stifling depression, that 
the large vistas and wide fresh air which she had dreamed of finding... 
were replaced by ante-rooms and winding passages which seemed to lead 
nowhither. (20, 190) 
This unveiling, where Dorothea's imagination-fuelled hopes and expectations 
have given way to the reality of her situation, shows a distinctly Schopenhauerian 
emphasis. Dorothea's ideal thoughts about her 'future' with Casaubon 
'contain[ed] only concepts and fancies' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §54, 181), but 
her 'knowledge' has now 'attain[ed] to distinctness' as her 'consciousness 
intensifies' and she feels 'a proportionate increase in pain.., the more distinctly' 
(IV, §56, 196) she knows, as the reality of her present and future with Casaubon 
is made clear to her. Yet Schopenhauer insists that 'everyone has to regard all 
the suffering of the world as his own' in order to understand that the 'happy 
temporal life.., amid the sufferings of countless other people... is only... a 
dream from which he must awake in order to find out that only a fleeting illusion 
had separated him from the suffering of his life' (IV §63, 218). This suggests 
that Dorothea's awakening consciousness is not wholly Schopenhauerian here. 
Jones argues that imagined '[p]ossibilities' in Middlemarch 'become more real 
than actuality, and dwelling upon them becomes a surrogate for action; at this 
stage men become passive victims of their distorted mental vision and thus of the 
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world around them, of which they remain ignorant' (34). Whilst this brings 
Jones close to my argument regarding the significance of what Casaubon is 
unable to perceive, it ignores the key role that Dorothea's awakening recognition 
of actuality plays in the novel. As Brian Swann argues, for Eliot 'the crumbling 
of the ideal is the construction of the real', pointing out that 'the tradition of the 
ideal is transformed and incorporated into a new reality' ("Realism" 284). 
Swann sees Feuerbach as the influential factor here, whereas the new reality that 
Middlemarch exposes will be shown to critique the Feuerbachian ideal on a 
fundamental level. The reality of Dorothea's marriage brings her beyond 
disappointment to intense despair, Dorothea finding 'with a certain terror, that 
her mind was continually sliding into inward fits of anger and repulsion, or else 
into forlorn weariness' (Middlemarch 20, 191). This reaping of "nothingness" 
has significant resonance with Dorothea's experience in her marriage on every 
level, yet this is an experience not confined to Dorothea alone and, whilst her 
consciousness of the reality of her situation may mark a Schopenhauerian 
emphasis on one level, this gradually reveals itself more deeply Schopenhauerian 
in significant and fundamental terms. In the meantime, Dorothea's desires 
continually resurface and focus on a desperate quest to transcend despair. Whilst 
Dorothea is not a direct representation of Schopenhauerian will-to-life, that for 
Schopenhauer '[b]efore us, certainly, remains only nothingness.... what resists 
this disintegration into nothing, our nature, is simply only the will to life' (WWJ 
IV §71, 261) does emphasise Dorothea' s essentially life-affirming nature. In 
searching for a cause which will allow 'the reaching forward of the whole 
consciousness towards the fullest truth, the least partial good', Dorothea 
recognises that here 'was clearly something better' for her to turn to in her 
marriage 'than anger and despondency' (Middlemarch 20, 197), but also places 
at the forefront an attempt to resign herself to never attaining her own subjective 
realisation. Yet there appears to be no real escape from the negative emotions 
Dorothea reaps in this marriage as her resurgent hopeful expectations are 
invariably crushed by Casaubon. 
Dorothea's hopes focus on her relationship with Will as this appears to 
offer the only avenue where such hopes might be expressed, from enabling 
Dorothea to effect some practical assistance (if she could persuade Casaubon to 
make some form of restitution to Will for the loss of his inheritance) to her 
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necessity for empathic conversation. Her human need for both emotional and 
"spiritual" sustenance lies in receiving 'direct fellow-feeling with individual 
fellow-men' (61, 590-1) as well as giving it. Will's mere introduction into her 
relationship with Casaubon is enough to allow the 'sun' to 'pierce[ } the grey', 
yet 'the avenue of limes' still 'cast shadows' (9, 75) as this hope will be 
forbidden her by Casaubon's attempts to ban his young cousin from their lives. 
This leaves Dorothea facing only the shifting selection of negative emotions that 
entrapment within Casaubon's 'lifeless embalmment of knowledge' (20, 191) 
effects as her sense of corporeal, emotional, and "spiritual" human life - of 
'manifold pregnant existence' - is severed, remaining only 'painfully as an 
inward vision' (28, 265) represented by her reflections upon light. Casaubon's 
work brings himself as much as Dorothea to an intense consciousness of self-
despair, however, trapping them both in the dark 'winding passageways' of his 
mind 'which seemed to lead nowhither' (20, 190), offering neither himself nor 
Dorothea an avenue towards life in any sense, either corporeal sensuous human 
life or that transcendent "spiritual" path to greater understanding' 2 . Dorothea had 
expected to find both "spiritual" and emotional affirmation in her relationship 
with Casaubon, confirmation of 'that spiritual religion, that submergence of self 
in communion with Divine perfection' (3, 26) and 'a fuller life' (5, 44), thus 'the 
pregnant, complete unity of I and thou' (Feuerbach Essence VI, 66): a fruitful, 
life-affirming union which keeps 'the embryos of truth a-breathing' 
(Middlemarch 48, 458). Instead she reaps the 'nothingness' (Schopenhauer WWJ 
IV §71, 261) of an emotionally, spiritually, and literally barren union in which 
she is entombed among the 'shattered mummies' and 'crushed ruins' of 
Casaubon's life and work, the 'food for a theory which was already withered in 
the birth like an elfin child' (Middlemarch 48, 458). 
The light which accurately represents Dorothea's quest for 'a fuller life' (5, 
44), 'the highest purposes of truth' (2, 20) and a realisable 'directly beneficent' 
(48, 455) ideal, is light from natural rather than artificial sources: from gloriously 
illuminating sunlight (9, 75) and the 'vivid' intensity of 'lightning' (83, 771) 
12 The marriage proposal and acceptance between Casaubon and Dorothea themselves contrast 
Casaubon's self-seeking utilisation of Dorothea's 'elevation of thought and capability of 
devotedness' to be 'adapted to aid' his own dry and death-like 'graver labours' (Middlemarch 5, 
43) with her mistaking his attentions towards her as 'loving me' (45): an unbreachable bifurcation 
between lifelessness and vital life. 
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rather than the ephemeral and 'dim light' (42, 404) of the lamps, candles and 
tapers associated with Casaubon. The most significant source of light for 
Dorothea is of course Will, who is associated with light from the first (9, 75), and 
he and Dorothea are drawn to one another with such intensity that an essential 
connection is suggested between them, expressed through her seeking light and 
he providing it. When Dorothea first sees Will he is positioned as 'conspicuous' 
against 'a dark background of evergreens' (77), lending him associations of light 
against dark and the promise of both life and renewal. This promise of renewal is 
emphasised when they are in Rome where his feelings for Dorothea are 
expressed through his 'showing such originality as we all share with the morning 
and the spring-time and other endless renewals' (22, 217): sexual love. Here, 
Dorothea sits 'between the fire and the light' (21, 199), representing both 
passionate human life and transcendent human ideals. Will's light grows in 
intensity and significance at this meeting, his 'smile was delightful.., it was a 
gnsh of inward light illuminating the transparent skin as well as the eyes, and 
playing about every curve and line as if some Ariel were touching them with a 
new charm' (199). Significantly, Will's 'transparent complexion flush[es] 
suddenly' at meeting the ardent and honest humanity of Dorothea's 'exquisite 
smile of goodwill... unmixed with vanity' (198), and Will's 'smile was 
irresistible, and shone back from her face too' (199, my emphasis), emphasising 
their reciprocal feeling and that this is focused through light. Their "elemental" 
connection is clear despite Dorothea being unaware that it is his disturbance at 
the incongruity of her marriage to that 'dried up pedant' Casaubon that partly 
causes Will's own confused reaction, albeit a reaction born of his own feelings 
regarding her as an 'adorable young creature' (199) nonetheless. Dorothea's own 
troubled feelings regarding Casaubon have lately made her 'all the more 
susceptible' (201) to any implied criticism of her husband, symbolised in her 
being 'perhaps not insensible to the contrast' (203) between Will and Casaubon, 
exhibiting light and gloom respectively, to a significant degree: 
Mr. Casaubon was less happy than usual, and this perhaps made him look 
all the dimmer and more faded; else, the effect might easily have been 
produced by the contrast of his young cousin's appearance... of sunny 
brightness, which added to the uncertainty of [Will's] changing expression. 
Surely, his very features changed their form... and the little ripple in his 
nose was a preparation for metamorphosis. (203). 
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This symbolism goes to extreme lengths, Will appearing to emanate light from 
his very being as '[w]hen he turned his head quickly his hair seemed to shake out 
light', whereas 'Mr. Casaubon, on the contrary, stood rayless' (203). Whilst 
Dorothea's experience of the contrast between Casaubon and Will as of dark and 
light is played out in their relationships, this moment of contrast itself propels her 
further towards the realisation of I-thou ethical human relations. It is here that 
she first recognises Casaubon's own 'equivalent centre of self; whence the lights 
and shadows must always fall with a certain difference' (205), thus engendering 
her 'first stirring of a pitying tenderness fed by the realities of [Casaubon's] lot 
and not by her own dreams' (203). 
Through recognising the apparently essential differences between Will and 
Casaubon, Dorothea's 'moral stupidity' that '[w]e are all of us born in' gives way 
from 'reflection' to 'feeling' (205), and thus becomes moral understanding. The 
significance of consciousness of self and other in engendering I-thou human 
relations for Feuerbach arises from the ability the human has to think about itself 
as a species: 
a being to whom his own species, his own nature, is an object of thought, 
can make the essential nature of other things or beings an object of 
thought... [thereby] is himself at once! and thou; he can put himself in the 
place of another, for this reason, that to him his species, his essential 
nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of thought. 
(Feuerbach Essence 1, 2). 
Yet for Dorothea Fenerbachian delineations of ethical I-thou human relations are 
only half the story. Whilst Dorothea's recognition of Casaubon's 'equivalent 
centre of self (Middlemarch 21, 205) arises from her consciousness of his 
essential nature as one equivalent to her own, it is a consciousness of the 
essential 'difference' (205, my emphasis) between Casaubon and Will which 
both emphasises Casaubon's 'lot' (203) (and thus stresses the irreconcilable 
differences between Casaubon and herself) and triggers her 'moral... feeling' 
(205)13. This leads to two more crucial aspects here. Dorothea's 'pitying 
tenderness' for Casaubon is balanced by her equally painful awareness of her 
own needs for the 'greater freedom' (203) that Will offers her, and her 
compassion itself arises from her sympathy for Casaubon's own suffering, his 
Whilst Feuerbach also claims I-thou recognises that which is both the same and different 
(Essence VIII, 82), this is a false distinction as for Feuerbach difference, limitation, is always 
absorbed into the species, the same (1, 3-5); and see Chapter 2 (57-8) above. 
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own 'shadows' (205). In the first of these issues, her appreciation of Will's 
'young equality' and 'openness to conviction' is directly linked to her feeling 'an 
immense need of someone to speak to, and she had never before seen anyone 
who seemed so quick and pliable, so likely to understand everything' (203). This 
insists on her own need for individual realisation and emphasises Casaubon's 
preclusion of this, issues which raise significant questions about Feuerbachian 
salvation in terms of both Dorothea's journey and Eliot's delineations of I-thou 
relations and salvation. In Will offering Dorothea the 'greater freedom' (203) 
she needs, and in his seeking a cause to which he can devote himself 'not [to] 
anything in general, but something in particular' (10, 82), he has other 
"elemental" qualities which are pertinent to his relationship with Dorothea, and 
shows that his need for Dorothea is equally significant thus that they are 
mutually, "elementally" compatible. 
Will terms himself 'Pegasus' regarding his refusal of 'every form of 
prescribed work' as a "harness" (9, 81), he affords 'a glimpse of the sunny air' 
to Dorothea in 'her prison' (37, 348), and his 'wings' (34, 317) and the 'Ariel' 
that plays with the 'inward light' (21, 199) emanating from his face reveal Will's 
other element to be "air". This is significantly epitomised by his aimless floating 
around Europe waiting for 'the intentions of the universe' to show its hand 'with 
regard to himself (10, 82). His inability to identify 'some vocation' (9, 81) is a 
problem with which Dorothea sympathises (81) but Casaubon condemns as 
hedonism and 'a dislike to steady application' (80). On one level Casaubon 
could be forgiven for terming Will thus as the young man's confidence that 
'Genius ... is necessarily intolerant of fetters' (22, 216) might be seen to betray 
his youthful arrogance and his freedom from those very fetters that Casaubon's 
allowance privileges him. Yet he does come to recognise the danger it also 
represents for him, and it is significant that it is meeting Dorothea that effects his 
realisation, in both senses of the word (216). Will's tilt towards arrogance is one 
that the narration is at pains to undermine in seeing 'Will's generous reliance on 
the intentions of the universe with regard to himself" and that of 'Genius' as 
'certainly.., no mark to the contrary' (10, 82), and this sense of genius - of 
perfection - is played out in his union with Dorothea. Dorothea's passionately 
life-affirming character and "spiritual" aspirations (fire and light) aim that 'her 
life might be filled with action at once rational and ardent' (85) and thus 
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necessarily grounded in the corporeal, existential world (earth). She is excluded 
from light, however, and left entombed in the lifeless earth and consequential 
self-despair that Casaubon effects. Will's wait for 'the intentions of the universe' 
(82) leaves him, for the time being, floating in a transcendent but groundless 
realm (air), albeit one inhabited by the light of genius as he is 'like an incarnation 
of the spring whose spirit filled the air - a bright creature, abundant in uncertain 
promises' (47, 451). That their meeting is both mutual and mutually beneficial is 
evident in Will providing both the 'freedom' (21, 203) and the 'promises' (47, 
451) Dorothea needs (however uncertain these may be, as will be discussed later) 
and Dorothea providing the passionate, corporeal, and ethical humanity his "airy" 
promises need to ground them. It is first seeing life against death, seeing 
Dorothea's vital 'breathing blooming' energy and passion (focused on the "light" 
of life and "spiritual" ardour the 'sunlight' represents), against the back-drop of 
'reclining marble' and 'grey drapery' (19, 183-4) in Rome that propels Will into 
direction as 'something had happened to him with regard to her' (186). His 
recognition of Dorothea as 'breathing blooming' (183) life but also 'an angel 
beguiled' (21, 202) (thus an idealised but less-than-divine, fallible human) 
prompts Will's simultaneous realisation that Casaubon's 'generosity has perhaps 
been dangerous' to him, thus he 'renounce[s] the liberty it has given' him and 
returns to England determined to 'work my own way - [and] depend on nobody 
else than myself' (22, 216). This independence does relate to the sense of 
obligation towards someone who resents the relationship, however, as he clearly 
depends on Dorothea's good opinion of him, a dependence that mutually 
increases as their relationship progresses 14 . Will is propelled into a course of 
action by responding to life in both corporeal and "spiritual" terms, Dorothea 
effecting his descent from 'that indeterminate loftiest thing' into 'subjects which 
were visibly mixed with life and action, and the easily-stirred rebellion in him 
helped the glow of public spirit' (46, 441) in return. This leads to his work 
towards social and political Reform as he relinquishes his wanderings to settle 
close to her in England, 'because no one cares for him elsewhere' (37, 356). As 
Casaubon does not care for him at all it is clearly Dorothea alone who draws Will 
there and, whilst their relationship progresses into a Feuerbachian union on one 
"Middlemarc/i (37, 354; and 39, 375). 
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level, this is simultaneously undermined. Whilst Dorothea is already making her 
own inroads into improving living conditions for local people, work that clearly 
impresses Will who vows he 'will not forget what she has said' (39, 375), Will's 
progression into Reform issues might itself be seen to eventually offer Dorothea 
a fuller opportunity to pursue the 'directly beneficent' (48, 455) activity she 
desires, although this vision of Dorothea's future is also troubled, as will be 
discussed later. In the meantime, this 'breathing blooming girl' (19, 183) seeks 
both the light of 'illimitable satisfaction' (Prelude, 7) and a practical activity in 
the world of 'here - now' (3, 30). Whilst Will brings her not only freedom but 
'something which had gathered new breath and meaning', something 'alive now' 
(266, my emphases), she appears to provide the human grounding for his 
transcendent 'indeterminate loftiest' (46, 441) quest at the same time he brings 
the element of lightllife to Dorothea. 
Will also provides the air of freedom of course, his referring to Dorothea as 
an 'iEolian harp' (21, 203) further placing their relationship as reciprocal, 
suggesting that it is Will's air of "freedom" and recognition of Dorothea's 
'poet[ic] consciousness' (22, 217) that allows the 'melodious fragments in which 
her heart and soul came forth so directly and ingenuously' (21, 203) to "sing". 
Eliot was reading Theocritus whilst preparing Middlemarch, and using Idyll XVI 
to meditate characters for the novel (see Baker ixv' 5). Here it is human song - 
poetry - that ensures meaning in life, and which is given 'grace' only through 
'those [who] all love to sing' (Theocritus Idyll XVI, lines 123; 116). Theocritus' 
focus is on transient human lives given meaning through the immortalising 
elevation of the minstrel's song, but Eliot shifts this song into Dorothea herself 
who is personally forgotten rather than immortalised. It is the 'diffusive' effects 
she has on the world around her that continue to exist rather than Dorothea 
herself, who 'live[s] faithfully a hidden life, and rest[s] in [an] unvisited tomb[]' 
(Middlemarch Finale, 795) as will be discussed further later. Dorothea embodies 
this human poetry, her corporeal but yearning human life is represented by her 
passionate 'fire' (3, 29), her 'poet[ic] consciousness' (22, 217), and her desire 
that 'her life might be filled with action at once rational and ardent' (10, 85). As 
such, the immortalised heroism of classical mythology is rendered both mortal 
Baker discussing J. C. Pratt "A 'Middlemarch' Miscellany: An Edition with Introduction and 
Notes of George Eliot's 1868-1871 Notebook" (280, fii.5, 120ff): see Baker (xlix, ixv). 
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and humble. Casaubon's earth, devoid of all life, is her antithesis whilst Will's 
air of 'freedom', light of "spiritual" empathy and 'openness to conviction' (21, 
203) appears to be Dorothea's perfect complement' 6 . Miller recognises that 
Dorothea makes Will 'feel that "the quality of [his] action is not a matter of 
indifference", thus "[b]ut for the desire to be where Dorothea was" Will would 
never be fighting the political struggles of Reform' (147). Miller also argues that 
'Will abandons the order of surprise and discontinuity' (147) in favour of 
Dorothea's 'final, all-embracing totality' (146), however, finding the 
'consistency of Dorothea's character offers so strong and simple a unity that it 
virtually commands imitation by one whose life has been programmatically 
dispersive' (147). Yet Dorothea is clearly as "incomplete" as Will, the 
apparently elemental compatibilities that each bring to their relationship being 
that which elicits their responses to one another, providing both with the unity of 
a reciprocal and sustaining relationship which bears fruit in every respect. Whilst 
Dorothea's 'fire' (Middlemarch 3, 29) needs the air of 'greater freedom' (21, 
203) that Will offers, and his floating inclinations need corporeal earth to ground 
them (Dorothea leading Will to his 'meditat[ions] on the needs of the English 
people' (46, 441)), the element of light is clearly the most significant in Dorothea 
and Will's relationship, signalling both 'spiritual communion' (2, 24) and the 
principle of life itself, the 'fuller life' (5, 44) Dorothea had hoped her relationship 
with Casaubon would reap. Dorothea's and Will's union closely echoes the 
Feuerbachian ideal on many levels, embodying 'the pregnant, complete unity of I 
and thou' (Essence VI, 66) unified by love (67), and thus 'the self-assertion of 
the human heart [as] the principle of duality, of participated life' (68) in terms 
which clearly recognise such unity as of two essentially limited individuals made 
whole in their species-union (VIII, 83). Theirs is a union which itself appears to 
provide the Feuerbachian promise of spatial and teleological realisation, as will 
16 Swann recognises a significance in Eliot's use of symbolic elements in Middlemarch, 
acknowledging Casaubon's association with 'the verbal imagery of ruin and decay' ("Realism" 
293), and 'Will's "inner ligh ..... complementing Dorothea's "inward fire", but Swann argues that 
Will's link to the 'sun which shines so brightly' (298) represents Dorothea's 'effectively barring 
herself from the sunny presence' of a 'new start seeming possible' (298, my emphasis). Swann 
suggests that Eliot's use of light centres on the library as representative of the 'malignant influence 
of Casaubon' (298), although also finds that Will's association with light suggests a new start for 
Dorothea who, interestingly, 'at the end of the novel is well on the way to integrating the dual 
aspects of her personality, "sensuous force controlled by spiritual passion" (293, quoting 
Middlemarch). 
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be discussed fUrther later. In the meantime, Dorothea's exclusion from life in her 
relationship with Casaubon centres on Will: it is he she sees from 'the door of the 
tomb.., receding into the distant world of warm activity and fellowship - turning 
his face towards her as he went' (Middlemarch 48, 455). With Will, Dorothea 
has found a mutual and empathic sharing of her own ideas and aspirations, the 
antithesis of the 'depressing' effect of Casaubon's 'blank absence of interest or 
sympathy' (20, 192). Lightllife needs to be mutually felt, mutually shared to 
bring the other elements to unity and fruition, to perfection and the salvation in 
unity with species-essence that the essentially limited Feuerbachian human can 
attain. It is significant that Dorothea and Will's first real union of feeling - one 
could say communion - with fire and air and earth and light meeting and 
focusing through the reciprocal smiles which 'shone' (21, 199) from their faces 
in response to one another, is literally a moment of baptism and blessing as water 
is also introduced into their elemental union for the first time. In their first 
moment of mutual union, their empathic I-thou human emotions are evoked in 'a 
certain liquid brightness in her eyes, and Will was conscious that his own were 
obeying a law of nature and filling too' (22, 217) 1 . 
On an obvious level, this union of feeling between Dorothea and Will 
allows each to surpass individual limitation through Feuerbachian I-thou 
"religious" feeling, leading to the unity of the individual with species-essence 
through consciousness, and the salvation that 'feeling' (Essence 1, 9) effects' 8 . 
Their union is that of 'the absolute.., essence of human nature' in 'religious' and 
'divine' (28, 270-1, original emphasis) human relations in exalted Feuerbachian 
terms. For Feuerbach two persons, I and thou, provide 'the principle of 
multiplicity and all its essential results', the second person being 'the self-
assertion of the human heart as the principle of duality, of participated life' (VI, 
68, my emphasis). This unity is most perfect for Feuerbach in sexual union 
' For Feuerbach, the water of Christian baptism represents Nature rather than the mind (this latter 
represented by the bread and wine of communion) (Essence 28, 275-7). For Eliot, light unifies and 
directs the otherwise disparate/damaging elements. Water in Middlemarch represents human 
emotions such as love (rather than passion which is represented by fire), whether empathic I-thou 
love as between Dorothea and Will or egoistic love-of-self as illustrated by Rosamond whose 
element of water 'fell and trickled like cold water-drops' (64, 628), her 'blank unreflecting surface' 
of vanity and self-absorption reducing Lydgate's ardour to 'a creeping paralysis' (58, 559). 
See Chapter 2 (61 and 68) above; Feuerbach Essence (1, 9-10); & Appendices (2, 283 & §3, 
284). 
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between a man and a woman rather than 'the monotonous thou between friends' 
(IX 92). Unity 'rests only on the reality of the distinction between I and thou' 
(Principles §59, 71). Yet for Feuerbach, whilst reality is that which also exists 
for others (that is, is not thought only (25, 39)), reality, existence, is only found 
in the essence of the species (Essence VIII, 83) while the limited phenomena (the 
individual manifestation of human species-essence) are negated in favour of 'the 
essence, the positive.., humanity' (I, 27) thus, in the end, reality only occurs in 
the species. This elision of reality from individual existence leaves Feuerbach's 
intention of grounding his exalted I-thou consciousness in the existential human 
with a fatal flaw: whilst '[e]verything that exists has value, is a being of 
distinction', this is 'at least... true of the species' (I, 7) 19 . The essential union 
affirmed through Eliot's "fifth element" of living, yearning and transcendent 
humanity gives rise to a mutuality of human love that affirms both self and other, 
however, conferring value and meaning onto both individual and communal life 
and thereby engendering human relations based on mutual relations between two 
existential human individuals. This emphasis thus questions one aspect of 
Feuerbachian union as Eliot insists this must also affirm the individual in 
equality of realisation in human relations, and in salvation. Most significantly of 
all, however, Dorothea's I-thou moral growth allows Dorothea to begin to feel 
empathy with Casaubon's own hopes and failures, recognising his own 
'equivalent centre of self' (Middlemarch 21, 205), but this is not through 
Feuerbachian species-consciousness as Casaubon is unable to reciprocate, as will 
become clear. Eliot's use of alchemic "elemental" forces to create metaphorical 
relationships in Middlernarch questions the realisation of Feuerbachian divine 
and perfect human relations and human salvation. This marks a shift away from 
Feuerbach towards Schopenhauerian delineations of human place, human ethics, 
and human destination on several levels, each more significant than the last. The 
first aspect of this is the novel's insistence that human relationships need 
particular elements in order to be fruitful, thus rendering the salvation of unity 
extremely rare as these elements appear to be something that certain characters 
are essentially unable to realise. 
See Chapter 2 (65-6) above. 
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II. 'That element of tragedy': despair, self-consciousness, and the ethics of 
salvation. 
It is evident that Dorothea's union with Casaubon can never achieve any form of 
happiness for either of them, reaping nothing but the despair which threatens to 
destroy them both. All three characters in this relationship cannot be united into 
a fused relationship of a marriage on the one hand and friendships on the other - 
perhaps more representative of a broader Feuerbachian species-community - as 
Casaubon's diminishing sense of self and inability to recognise 4fe prevents him 
from sharing in I-thou human relations on any level and, significantly, also 
prevents his own move away from polarised despair. Newton implicitly 
recognises Eliot's delineation of character as essentially determined by particular 
'characteristics' and 'qualities' (140) although does not examine the implications 
of this in the context of success (salvation) or failure in the novel. Whilst 
Dorothea does come to recognise Casaubon's 'equivalent centre of self 
(Middlemarch 21, 205), Casaubon cannot return the complement as his 'soul' is 
'too languid to thrill out of self-consciousness into passionate delight', thus 
'never flying', and he is therefore essentially unable to 'transform[ ] into 
sympathy' and thus remains concerned only with 'self-preoccupation' (29, 270). 
Casaubon clearly faces his own struggle against self-despair but is unable to 
perceive the route to salvation as he fails to become conscious of other living 
human beings, thus finds only the possibility for self-despair before him as the 
transcendent flight 'out of self-consciousness' into the transformation of either 
'passionate delight' or 'sympathy' (270) eludes his consciousness. Casaubon's 
essential inability to recognise the crucial importance of existential human life 
either inside or outside of his own preoccupations necessarily includes 
Dorothea's own 'equivalent centre of self (21, 205), her own human needs, 
desires and frailties. This prevents his relationships from becoming true I-thou 
empathy and thus renders Feuerbach's 'participated life' (Essence VI, 68) 
something Casaubon's relationships are essentially unable to realise, condemning 
both himself and Dorothea to polarised despair. Dorothea's I-thou sympathy for 
Casaubon also includes her deeper perception of 'her husband's failure' - which 
significantly includes her awareness of 'his possible consciousness of failure' 
(Middlemarch 37, 352, my emphasis). This points her 'along the one track where 
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duty became tenderness' (352) and towards another disagreement with 
Feuerbach. This second aspect is the negative potential of I-thou human relations 
epitomised in the destructive affects of Dorothea's and Casaubon's relationship. 
These destructive effects impact on Casaubon as well as Dorothea, and 
recognise human relations in clearly more negative than "divine" Feuerbachian 
terms. Casaubon's perception of his own failings are exacerbated by his fears 
that other people's eyes are also judging him, illustrating the negative effects that 
I-thou relations have on Casaubon who comes to feel that acquiring a wife has 
brought into his life yet another condemnatory judge of all of his efforts instead 
of the helpmate he expected. Instead of providing himself with a buffer 'against 
the cold, shadowy, unapplausive audience of his life, he had only given it a more 
substantial presence' (20, 195). This further compounds his sense of failure and 
diminishing self-worth, and acts upon his own dread to the extent that he tries to 
escape his own self-despair through coercing Dorothea into becoming his last 
hope. By using her to continue his work beyond the grave, regardless of what 
this would cost Dorothea, Casaubon hopes to finally lift his 'small... shivering 
self' (29, 271) out of the despair into which he is irretrievably trapped. There is 
no possibility of him either attaining salvation for himself or effecting such for 
others, even had he lived, as his essential character prevents this. The only 
escape from the polarised despair their relationship effects is death; Casaubon's 
death thus freeing Dorothea whilst acknowledging that Casaubon's own 
realisation is precluded on every level. The extent to which Dorothea and 
Casaubon's relationship is destructive for both of them is laid at the door of their 
"elemental" incompatibility which, however metaphorically illustrated, 
nonetheless represents an essential incompatibility20 . In the Dorothea-Casaubon- 
20 The elemental disunion between Dorothea and Casaubon is echoed in Lydgate's and 
Rosamond's relationship, and the disastrous personal consequences of their failings are rendered in 
equally essential and thus unchangeable terms. Lydgate's desire for medical reform and the 
successful treatment of illness is expressed in terms of 'light' (Middlemarch 15, 139) and Lydgate 
is 'fired with.., possibility' (142): his 'native warm-heartedness took a great deal of quenching' 
(58, 569). Rosamond pours water on his fire, however, her 'voice.., fell and trickled like cold 
water-drops' (64, 628) and her 'blank unreflecting surface' reduces Lydgate's ardour to 'a creeping 
paralysis' (58, 559). Rosamond is the 'siren' (31, 290) and 'mermaid' whom Lydgate helps to 
create in his own idealising 'dreamland, in which Rosamond... appeared to be that perfect piece of 
womanhood who reverences her husband's mind after the fashion of an accomplished mermaid... 
singing her song for the relaxation of his adored wisdom alone' (58, 555). Her eyes are like 
beautiful 'forget-me-nots [viewed] under the water', causing this 'warm-hearted and rash' (31, 
292) man to pause by the wayside with the offer of an aesthetic, restful repose from his labours. 
Rosamond's stifling of Lydgate echoes Casaubon's affect on Dorothea, both Rosamond and 
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Will triangle then, Middlemarch emphasises how Feuerbachian delineations of I-
thou human relations ignore the repercussions of less than divine relationships, as 
well as the negative impact on the essentially and self-consciously imperfect 
individual. As the self-awareness of I is dependent on the perceived relations 
with thou, this also includes negative relationships, exacerbating the diminishing 
sense of self-worth that the Feuerbachian individual is caught up in 21 . 
Feuerbach's I-thou relations can act to compound the individual's consciousness 
of their own essential imperfections and limitations, seen in opposition to the 
perfection that is not only in the species in an abstract sense, but embodied in the 
perfection that is the individual's necessary aim and destiny, their own 
potentially perfect self (Essence 1, 6). This can be further echoed in and 
exacerbated by the perceived "more-perfect" other, as Dorothea experiences in 
the early part of her relationship with Casaubon when seeing her own knowledge 
as very much inferior to his. Yet in the end, the novel makes it clear that 
Dorothea's apparently "instinctive" or essential knowledge, her awareness of the 
necessity for the ground, aim and means of human life that light represents, is the 
true path all along. 
Middlemarch's essentially determined characters echo aspects of 
Feuerbachian essentialism whilst subverting his optimism, certain characters not 
only illustrating the failings in Feuerbachian delineations of I-thou human 
relations, but are themselves apparently essentially precluded from attaining 
salvation on any level. The negative affects on Dorothea are clear, and begin in 
the early days of her relationship with Casaubon when she feels a significant 
sense of her own limitations, and of herself as excluded from the perfect 
knowledge which will show her the path she needs to take. Once she realises her 
hopes in respect of Casaubon providing her with the "key" to this knowledge are 
mistaken, and Casaubon's own 'denial' (Middlemarch 42, 409) effectively 
negates both Dorothea's existence and his own aims, their negative relationship 
shifts, into one of near hopelessness, Casaubon effecting an alienation from life 
itself, that 'participated life' (Feuerbach Essence VI, 68) without which 'the 
world' is 'not only dead and empty, but meaningless' (VIII, 82). Dorothea's 
Casaubon offering a false path which lures the hero to their doom. Lydgate's ambitions are 
thwarted by the increasing mire of 'new elements in his life as noxious to him as an inlet of mud' 
(58, 558), obscuring his clear view of his aims and sapping all his energy. 
21 See Chapter 2 (56-7, and 69-70) above. 
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exclusion from a meaningful human existence propels her towards self-despair, 
Casaubon's denial of life ensuring their relationship is fatally destructive for both 
of them, a living hell for which Casaubon's death acts as the only release - for 
Dorothea from an intolerably oppressive relationship and his own unhappy 
release from his own tenors. That this is a release only effected for Dorothea 
through the circumstance that she was too late to promise Casaubon what he 
wished leaves her potential submission to Casaubon a significant one, and its 
interpretation is equally crucial to the question of individual realisation or 
salvation, and is one in which the issue of character is key. 
Penelope LeFew-Blake's discussion of the influence of Schopenhauer on 
four women writers argues that Will Ladislaw signifies Schopenhauer's 
'unrestrained, troubling, and seductive will', with Dorothea 'assuming the role of 
the tortured ascetic' (17, original emphasis). Their union thus causes the 
'sensuous, hot-blooded, undisciplined Will [to] become[] submissive and docile' 
(28)22 . 
 For LeFew-Blake Will's 'own power is diminished' by Dorothea's 
asceticism because '[w]hen Will first meets Dorothea, "his admiration was 
accompanied with a chilling sense of remoteness"... [as] here was a force which 
did not embrace him' (28). Yet this sensation of 'chilling.., remoteness' 
(Middlemarch 39, 374) occurs in Will long after he has met Dorothea, indeed 
occurs after he has moved to Middlemarch in order to be near her. Will has just 
witnessed her 'return to that... impethous manner which had been subdued since 
her marriage' (373) when she is talking to Brooke about the need to improve the 
cottages on his land, giving vent to her passionate 'emotion[al]... eloquence' 
(374). Will's 'admiration' and 'love' for Dorothea is here coupled with his 
feeling separated from her 'greatness' (374) of vision, however, and also reflects 
the separation which has been enforced by Casaubon as it is immediately 
overcome once they speak to one another alone (375). LeFew-Blake also 
misinterprets Schopenhauer's will-to-life as will-to-live here, leading to a 
22 Joseph Nichols echoes this recognition of Dorothea as ascetic, but for Nichols, Will and 
Dorothea's union plays out as an 'analogical reminder.., of self-perpetuating cycles in Britain of 
persistently similar national divisions and conflicts' (173), from the recent struggles and 'divisive 
confrontation that plagued the nation just before the first Reform Bill' (171) to the Civil War 200 
years earlier, thus the 'wedding of Puritan [Dorothea] and... Royalist [Will]... [becomes] 
emblematic of what a nation needs, but has failed to achieve' (173). Nichols does agree with my 
argument against other critical readings of Will as a 'failure' or of Dorothea's and Will's 
relationship as 'non-sexual' (165), however. 
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misreading of particularly Dorothea as struggling 'between... the need to be and 
the desire to cease to be' (LeFew-Blake 24, my emphasis). LeFew-Blake finds 
Dorothea's ability to 'accept [the] oppression' (22, ibid) of her marriage to 
Casaubon becomes her 'once again wish[ingJ to escape 4fe' (23, ibid); her union 
with Will causing Dorothea to 'experience[] a literal renewal of her will to live' 
(29) at the same time as it emasculates Will (28). Dorothea not only refuses to 
willingly accept Casaubon's oppression, however, but also does not desire to 
"cease to be" on any level. Her earlier asceticism, as discussed above, is no more 
true to her essential nature than sympathy is to Casaubon's 23 . Whilst it is 
possible to argue LeFew-Blake's reading of Will Ladislaw as will-to-life in some 
respects, her argument ignores Dorothea's own will-to-life which continually 
asserts itself against Casaubon 's life-denial 24 . LeFew-Blake also misses the 
intimate and broader implications of Dorothea's and Will's essential cormection, 
over-simplifies the complexity of Eliot's pessimistic shift, and ignores the crucial 
position that both the individual and ethical salvation hold in the novel. Dorothea 
already is life-manifest thus her relationship with Will is more complex, its 
immediate juxtaposition with Dorothea's relationship with Casaubon illustrating 
an ethical argument which has implications concerning both Feuerbachian and 
Schopenhauerian philosophical positions. Feuerbach's "elements" are the 
tripartite human essences of Reason, Affection and Will, and on an obvious level 
Casaubon, Dorothea, and Will could be seen to exhibit these "elements" in the 
necessarily unbalanced form that the individual manifests in much the same way 
each could be seen to exhibit the purely Schopenhauerian qualities that LeFew-
Blake argues25 . Rather than LeFew-Blake's interpretation, it would be more 
23 As argued above (129), Dorothea's asceticism is a false ideal, as both Jones (32) and Newton 
(128) recognise. Whilst LeFew-Blake's minimal use of quotations from Schopenhauer or an 
illustrative interpretation of his philosophy limits her argument in more general terms, her 
interpretation of particularly Will Ladislaw is interesting although she does not explore the 
ramifications of Knoepflmacher's recognition of 'Schopenhauer's belief in sympathy and 
compassion as the only salvation, the only manner of coping with the will short of asceticism' (17). 
24 LeFew-Blake sees Casaubon as Schopenhauer's 'will turned inward, making its fitful way 
through the task of life only to arrive at the culmination of nothingness' (22), but ignores 
Dorothea's own will-to-life, and ignores ethical relationships in both Schopenhauer and 
Middlemarch where Casaubon exhibits Schopenhauer's egoistic character in key terms. 
25 Casaubon shows a predominance of Reason, which has 'relation to existences, as things' and 
also 'annihilat[es]... personality' (Feuerbach Essence App. §4, 285), annihilating the real, 
existential person from his theoretical approach to his studies and from his more day-to-day 
considerations; Dorothea's predominant essence is Affection (or Feeling), and as such embodies 
'aesthetic, human sensation.., alive to the sorrows, the joys of another as [her] own' (App. §2, 283) 
and 'has relation to existences.., as persons' (App. §4, 285); and Will as Will of course is the 
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telling to examine Dorothea as the phenomenal manfestaIion of Schopenhauer's 
will-to-life, particularly in the light of her relationship with Casaubon as life-
denial. Here, the essential connection between Dorothea and Will would show 
that Schopenhauer's will-to-life is the thing-in-itself the essence, the genius of 
all existence. Will, as Schopenhauer's will, here shows the necessity for the will-
to-life to manifest itself in the corporeal realm, and be thus subject to 
'existence.., with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, plurality, and 
causality' (Schopenhauer WWI II §27, 76). Such a reading would still be 
somewhat reductive, however, positing a simple will-to-life vs ascetic self-denial 
dichotomy (or a will-to-live vs self-annihilation for LeFew-Blake). Aligning 
particular characters in the novel with either Feuerbachian or Schopenhauerian 
"essences" ignores the complexity of both philosophical systems on a number of 
levels, and also ignores the complexity of Eliot's own position here. 
Middlemarch's use of the alchemic elements reflects a far more complex 
relationship with both Feuerbachian and Schopenhauerian thinking, particularly 
in relation to character and ethical relationships. 
Swann recognises significant aspects of Dorothea's elemental relationship 
with Will, claiming that Will is a sun god, Casaubon... Pluto, and Dorothea... a 
cross between Proserpine and Ariadne (Swann "Myth" 5). Swann also sees 'all 
the ardour and fire... associated with Dorothea... finally subsumed in Will, a 
kind of solar deity' where "the sun... [is] an all-conquering hero" (3), however, 
a Feuerbachian subsumption this chapter will argue that Middlemarch refuses26 . 
'energy of character' through which the individual exerts theft character-as-object, and we will 
'that we may be free' (1, 3), freedom being Feuerbach's will's and Middlemareh's Will's aim. 
Their individual faults and imperfections are attributable to their inharmonious because imperfect 
manifestation of all three of Feuerbach's human essences, limitations only overcome in the 
balancing of these elements in the spatial and temporal species, a union that Middlemarch 
questions on every level, not least in Casaubon's essential inability to realise I-thou relations and 
thus salvation. 
26 Swann is discussing John Fiske Myths and Myth Makers here, although Fiske's book was not 
published until 1873. Beer notes the relationship between Will and light, 'issuing perhaps not only 
from Apollo' but from the myth of an angel connected to St. Dorothea' and 'set in... too easy 
contrast' with Casaubon, finding '[t]these figurative presences give no guarantees of human 
perfection, but they do enlarge the scale of reference for the fallible present day' where 'Casaubon 
cannot grasp the ongoing nature of experience, or of knowledge' (166). Beer argues that 
Dorothea's significance here is that Casaubon 'cannot recognise the Ariadne who could deliver 
him out into sunlight' (167), echoing my own argument to some extent but in finding that Eliot 
utilises Max Muller's 'solar symbolism', Eliot 'does not allow it to dominate her created world' as 
'the book embraces a free-ranging lateral world of meaning beyond Mr Casaubon's awareness' 
(167). Gisela Argyle finds that Eliot's 'constant association of Ladislaw with light' is a potential 
connection between the "sweetness and light" of Arnold's culture (47). 
Om 
Elsewhere Swann does recognise the pertinence of Eliot's insistence on form in 
art as "an element of human experience [which] must begin with the perception 
of separateness... before they can be recognized as wholes composed of parts" 
("Realism" 289, quoting Eliot2). As such, '[t]he concept of symbolic form which 
George Eliot was working towards is one in which everything is related to 
everything else without sacrificing its own quidditas, the actuality of its present 
existence' ("Realism" 289, original emphasis). Despite this recognition, Swann 
suggests this reaches completion in an implicitly positive relationship with self-
sacrifice, and in terms which accept the denial of the individual (Dorothea) this 
effects. As well as arguing that Dorothea is 'subsumed in Will' ("Myth" 3), 
Swann also argues that Dorothea 'wishes to sacrifice her life on Casaubon's 
altar' as 'an exercise in self-knowledge involving the giving up of large and 
grandiose ideas, personal pride and dignity' ("Realism" 289). Further, Swami 
argues that once 'she is able to do this, she is able to give herself hilly, able to 
break down the egotism of Rosamond and the reticent pride of Lydgate' (289, my 
emphasis). As argued earlier, Dorothea's early tendency towards martyrdom is 
always countered by her equal yearning towards self-realisation, thus forms a 
more balanced position that emphatically argues against being a blind sacrifice at 
the expense of the individual self This is why she 'could not submit' her own 
'soul to [Casaubon's]' (Middlemarch 54, 514, original emphasis). Dorothea's 
struggle with self-despair at the prospect of capitulation to Casaubon's wish is a 
struggle against saying "Yes" to her own doom' (48, 460). At the same time, 
her near-capitulation is due to the 'moral... feeling' (21, 205) which arises out of 
her I-thou recognition of Casaubon's self-despair, and the prospect of being the 
person whose refusal could crush 'that bruised heart' (48, 459). Dorothea's 
potential capitulation arises from 'tenderness' rather than 'duty' (37, 352) then, 
and thus her struggle is itself due to her recognition of each individual's self-
despair, both Casaubon's and her own: the very 'perception of separateness' Eliot 
deems necessary 'before they can be recognized as wholes composed of parts' 
(Eliot "Art" 355, my emphasis). For Eliot, the part should not be sacrificed to the 
whole. That Casaubon's request is clearly negative and would be explicitly fatal 
to Dorothea (Middlemarch 48, 460) directly opposes critical arguments such as 
27 
 See Eliot "Notes on Form in Art' in Selected Critical Writings (355). 
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Swann's and LeFew-Blake's that Dorothea willingly sacrifices herself to 
Casaubon or anyone else, and counters Feuerbachian delineations of essential 
human nature and salvation this self-sacrifice suggests. Dorothea's near-
capitulation arises from a 'moral... feeling' (21, 205) which is Feuerbachian as it 
overcomes Dorothea's own wishes, just as 'the noble habit of the soul reasserts 
itself (42, 411) and earlier overrides her 'rebellious anger' (409) towards 
Casaubon. Feuerbach's delineation of human ethical behaviour is a force of 
human essence operating outside of individual wishes, where the impulse to do 
"good" is an 'inward necessity' sprung 'out of.. human nature' (Essence V, 60), 
being not 'thy own personal power' but an external force 'which governs and 
absorbs thee' (1, 4). This Feuerbachian moral force appears to act to override 
Dorothea's individual "imperfect" desires, but is finally refused in Middlemarch 
as her Feuerbachian "imperfections" (her own individual desires) continually 
resurface and may have caused her to refuse Casaubon still, his death precluding 
a definitive answer. Newton, on the other hand, argues that Dorothea has a 
'strongly egotistic' nature which here 'threatens to gain control', but her 
'continuity of self allows her to overcome [her egotistic] crisis' (132) regarding 
Casaubon. Dorothea is not an egoist on any level, however, but is struggling to 
realise her own value - struggling against an absorption into Casaubon's blind 
ego - and Newton ignores the explicitly destructive affects this sacrifice would 
have on Dorothea. This crisis is only overcome by Casaubon's death as she is 
not only saved from having to capitulate to save his feelings, but would have 
remained trapped in Casaubon's world of despair had he lived on 28 . That 
Dorothea's potential self-sacrifice is clearly a negative act in Middlemarch 
emphasises the problematic aspect of Feuerbachian species-unity which 
sacrifices the individual to the "goodness" of species-essence, overriding 
Dorothea's individual "imperfect" feelings, a sacrifice the novel marks as 
iniquitous and a submission Dorothea explicitly struggles against. On one level, 
28 Pauline Nestor also sees Dorothea's 'self-narration.., distorted by egoism' (136), although 
interestingly recognises that the 'ultimate ethical challenge' of Middlemarch is to 'transcend the 
isolation and solipsistic blindness of the individual narrative' by living 'vigilantly conscious of the 
fact that the other has "an equivalent centre of self", and this is only ever 'aspirational rather than 
achievable' as 'the non-self remains intractably alien' (137). Beer argues against seeing Dorothea 
in terms of 'the desolate privacy of the Romantic ego' as Eliot is 'seeking communal insights' 
through 'allusions' which 'always yield insights into the accord between any individual's 
experience and the lived remote world of others' (163). 
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however, Dorothea's struggle against Casaubon's wish that she should sacrifice 
herself to his work is apparently a seif-sabrifice rejected in the novel only 
because carrying on Casaubon 's work is antithetical to life-affirmation and thus 
will trap Dorothea in self-despair. Dorothea recognises the 'deep difference 
between that devotion to the living, and that indefinite promise of devotion to the 
dead' (Middlemarch 48, 459), her later 'superstitious' note to her dead husband 
explains 'I could not submit my soul to yours, by working hopelessly at what I 
have no belief in' (54, 514, original emphasis). On this level then, there appears 
to be a division of the "right" cause for which to sacrifice the self from the 
"wrong" cause. Dorothea is later apparently 'absorbed into' (Finale, 793) Will's 
life, and into a cause she can believe in. Yet this later Feuerbachian "sacrifice" 
to the "right" cause is also questioned in the novel, as will be discussed later. In 
the meantime, the delineation of I-thou relations in Middlemarch in elemental 
terms echoes aspects of Feuerbach's essentialism at the same time it also acts to 
undermine his overt optimism. Crucially, however, Eliot's essentially pre-
determined characters, positioned as unchangeably either able or unable to 
progress towards salvation, closely echo Schopenhauer's delineations of 
character and ethical salvation in increasingly significant respects. 
Whilst for Schopenhauer human intellect can act to override the impulse 
towards selfishness or "evil" driven by the egoistic essential force of the will-to-
life, there are four essential "types" of human: the egoist, the just person, the 
compassionate person, and the ascetic. Whilst Schopenhauer does argue that the 
human species has an inherent tendency to 'act justly and do good, or 
counterbalance the strong tendencies to injustice and harshness', and that this is 
an 'appeal that actUally exists in everyone' (Morality III §12, 120), there are 
certain human individuals who are essentially precluded. Each individual 'is not 
free, but subject to necessity... in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he 
does not alter his conduct' (WWI II §23, 46). As 'individuality is a dominant 
feature of mankind', each 'person has a character of his own; hence the same 
motive has not the same influence on everyone' (23, 51) and each individual's 
'actions follow with absolute necessity from the coincidence of character with 
motives' (IV §55, 190). As the manifestation of the will-to-life in each 
individual shows itself in 'the ambition of [each] inmost nature, and the aim 
[each] pursues accordingly, this we can never change by outside influence' (193). 
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Each individual, who 'shows by his behaviour that he also recognises his own 
nature' in another individual, can behave ethically 'in so far as he places the 
other being on a par with himself as 'he [thus] does the other no harm' (IV §66, 
233). In 'the higher degree', the individual is moved 'to positive benevolence 
and beneficence, and.., philanthropy' which 'may happen irrespective of the 
strength and energy of the will manifest in... [the] individual' as 'Knowledge can 
always counterbalance it in him' (234). The egoist is the most reprehensible of 
all human individuals for Schopenhauer as the egoist 'regards and treats only his 
own person as a real person, and all others as mere phantoms' (II §19, 37). Thus 
the egoist affirms her or his own will-to-life to the extent that 'the same will 
manifest in another individual' (IV §62, 212) is denied, directly causing suffering 
to those other individuals 29. This is clearly reflected in the delineation of 
Casaubon to a significant extent, the effect of his life 'denial' (Middlemarch 42, 
409) entraps Dorothea in a 'virtual tomb' (48, 455) and a home of explicitly 
'ghostly' (28, 264-6) insubstantiality, leaving her in despair. Schopenhauer 
places the egoist as far away from redemption as it is possible to be (WWI IV 
§60, 207), a redemption (like Feuerbach's) enabled through I-thou ethical 
relations, but unlike Feuerbach's, Casaubon has an essential inability to 
'transform[] into sympathy' (Middlemarch 29, 270). This leaves Casaubon as 
the unredeemable egoist, perpetually enmired in 'self-preoccupation or at best an 
egoistic scrupulosity' (270), and only able to respond to motive in a manner 
determined by his essential character. Casaubon embodies Schopenhauer's 
essential egoist rather than Feuerbach's as-yet-unconscious individual as his 
consciousness is essentially untransformable. 
Dorothea is not, however, Casaubon's opposite in terms of 
Schopenhauerian delineations of essential character as she refuses 
Schopenhauer's most extreme position of salvation, asceticism, as she 'could not 
submit' her 'soul' (54, 514, original emphasis) to Casaubon's. For 
Schopenhauer, the deliberate acts of 'renunciation' that are practised 'in order to 
relieve the sufferings of others' (WWI §66, 235) are 'the source and essence of 
love and nobility of character' (68, 237) of the compassionate individual. 
Whilst this may suggest that such self-sacrifice is required by Dorothea here, to 
29 The egoistic act is 'as such wrong because... it aims... to extend the authority of my will to 
other individuals, and so affirm my will by denying theirs' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §62, 214). 
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relieve Casaubon's suffering, this is an ethical renunciation which acts to relieve 
another's suffering by not affirming one's own will at another's expense rather 
than asceticism. The ascetic takes this a stage further, being 'even ready to 
sacrifice his own individuality if others can be saved thereby' (p68, 237), a self-
sacrifice Dorothea wishes to refuse despite knowing that her refusal would 
'seem[] as if she would be crushing that bruised heart' (Middlemarch 48, 459). 
Her life-affirmation continually reasserts itself despite her earlier ascetic urges 
and Casaubon's egoistic will repressing her own, but always with compassion as 
both means and object. In Dorothea's I-thou sympathy she is aligned with 
Schopenhauer's ethics as the compassionate human. Middlemarch moves even 
further away from both Schopenhauer's ascetic and Feuerbachian ethics in more 
deeply significant terms, however, as will be discussed shortly. In the meantime, 
whilst social form is marked out as a clearly contributory factor in defining 
aspects of the characterisations and situations in Middlemarch (18, 175), Nature 
appears to be more significant than nurture. Nurture or experience will not reveal 
that which is essentially unable to be. Casaubon's 'soul' is concerned only with 
'self-preoccupation', unable to lift 'out of self-consciousness' and therefore 
unable to 'transform[ into sympathy' (29, 270). Whilst Casaubon is to be 
viewed with our 'sympathy', he is 'never to be liberated from a small hungry 
shivering self (271, my emphasis), a very bleak and pessimistic vision of 
Casaubon's lot. Unlike Casaubon, Dorothea is essentially able to 'transform[] 
into sympathy' (270) and, whilst she has progressed significantly towards 
salvation during her relationship with Casaubon, following his death Dorothea's 
burgeoning I-thou awareness awaits a final transition. 
The widowed Dorothea's belief that Will and Rosamond are lovers propels 
her into a deeper consciousness of self-despair than she has hitherto experienced, 
and this new consciousness leads her to the final reconciliation of self-despair 
with 'the rapturous consciousness of beyond self (Prelude, 7) she has been 
seeking. Whilst this effects Dorothea's move into salvation (a salvation that 
appears to be effectual in both personal and community terms, as will be 
discussed later), this appears to be a salvation only allowed by her own 
compassionate 'nature' (80, 749). This echoes Schopenhauer's determination of 
character wherein actions are not free, 'for every individual action follows with 
strict necessity from the impact of motive on character' (WWI II, §23, 45), yet the 
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form of Dorothea's salvation also marks a more significant Schopenhauerian 
movement. The despair necessarily comes first, Dorothea literally writhing in 
agony 'within the clutch of inescapable anguish' at the loss of 'her sweet dim 
perspective of hope' (Middlemarc/i 80, 747-8) and, 'with a full consciousness 
which had never awakened before... she discovered her passion to herself in the 
unshrinking utterance of despair' (748, my emphasis). Her self-despair is both 
experienced and perceived 'with the clearest consciousness', but becomes an 
acceptance of despair which simultaneously refuses to languish in its polarity: 
she had waked to a new condition: she felt as if her soul had been liberated 
from its terrible conflict; she was no longer wrestling with her grief, but 
could sit down with it as a lasting companion and make it a sharer in her 
thoughts... It was not in Dorothea's nature, for longer than the duration of a 
paroxysm, to sit in the narrow cell of her calamity, in the besotted misery 
of a consciousness that only sees another's lot as an accident of its own. 
(80, 749, my emphasis) 
Dorothea still needs the compliment of sharing this new awareness with the full 
consciousness of 'beyond self' (Prelude, 7), however, to complete the transition 
into that salvationary point, this a consciousness beyond those connected to her 
own life in personal terms - 'those three' (80, 750) (Will, Rosamond and 
Lydgate) who form the first direct object of action for her compassionate 
thoughts - and out into a more complete I-thou consciousness. This occurs 
literally moments later in the first of two pivotal events which draw symbolic 
relationships between Dorothea's internal struggles for individual realisation and 
salvation and the view outside the window, the second of which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
The first of these significant events immediately follows her newly-
awakened 'full consciousness' (748) and acceptance of self-despair. Dorothea 
looks out of the window and finally 'felt the largeness of the world and the 
manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance', and knows herself 'a part of 
that involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her 
luxurious shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining' 
(750, my emphases). On one level Miller recognises the subtlety of this position. 
Dorothea, having '[o]nce more' returned to her 'struggle[] to assert a vision in 
which "everyday things mean the greatest things" now asserts this vision, 
'though this time with a crucial difference... [as] Dorothea's grief can now yield 
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to a less disabling vision precisely through a new interest in detail together with a 
speculation about meanings' (Miller 176, original emphasis). Miller posits this 
attention to detail a 'moment' in which '[m]eaningfiilness and life are... 
reconciled' in terms which ensure 'the everyday emblematically extends and 
insinuates itself beyond its borders so that it comes to implicate.., the entire 
world.., which.., now encompasses all that there is to live for' (177). Yet for 
Miller, however, the 'outside' here offers 'the possibility of fully absorbing the 
inside and of abolishing the polarity between them' (187, my emphasis). Thus 
Dorothea's vision fails for Miller as this moment also encompasses a 'telling 
lapse of vision' for her, which passes over 'the social dimension of the landscape, 
along with the social conditions of her own observation... [as] she is looking 
down, both literally and in terms of social hierarchy' (178, original emphasis). 
On two crucial levels here Miller ignores the implications of the connection 
between Dorothea's virtually simultaneous acceptance of despair and full 
consciousness of 'life beyond self (Middlemarch Prelude, 7). This is a moment 
which deliberately validates both "detail" and "meaning", inside and outside, in 
validating Dorothea as a part of that world in a positive ethical development 
which does indeed abolish the polarity between self and world, but also validates 
both I and thou rather than herself as remaining separated from or absorbed into 
it. The idea of I-thou ethics as a separation, self-sacrifice, or dissolution is 
explicitly challenged in Middlemarch, refusing both Miller's absorption and that 
the world 'encompasses all there is to live for' (Miller 177, my emphasis) 30 . 
Here Dorothea is looking 'out' (Middlemarch 80, 750, my emphasis), not down, 
in a movement which explicitly dissolves the class barrier and links directly with 
Dorothea's later physical move away from that 'luxurious shelter' which is now 
no bather at all to Dorothea's being 'part of that... life' (750), refusing the 
alienating principles of both spectatorship and selfishness for empathic sympathy 
and action. Dorothea's refusal of spectatorship links directly with her refusal of 
the idealisation of the community around her through art. Those 'simpering 
pictures', juxtaposed with her experience of the grim reality of those bucolic 
30 Swann also argues that Dorothea reaches a positive form of dissolution, echoing LeFcw-Blake's 
self-sacrificial Dorothea (see 147 above). Beer, on the other hand, obliquely recognises the value 
of the figures Dorothea sees from the window as 'the numinous must express itself in this book 
solely through the human', but finds them 'impersonal' and largely mythological figures who 'tell 
stories' which 'satisfy the need for recurrence' (162). 
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scenes such as we see at Brooke's aptly-named tenant farm 'Freeman's End' (39, 
382) which leaves 'all that dirt and coarse ugliness like a pain within [her]', were 
thus 'a wicked attempt to find delight in what is false' instead of trying 'to alter 
the evils which lie under our own hands' (374). For Schopenhauer human 
consciousness is the key, and is based in understanding that: 
The suffering which he sees in others touches him almost as closely as his 
own... He becomes aware that the distinction between himself and others, 
which to the wicked person is so great a gulf, belongs only to a fleeting, 
deceptive phenomenon... recognis[ing] directly and without argument that 
the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others, namely the will-
to-life, which constitutes the inner nature of everything.., hence he will not 
cause suffering... (WWI IV §66, 235) 
Existence is recognised as predominantly one of suffering for Schopenhauer, but 
as fundamentally shared, and as necessarily one in which each individual is of 
value. Our uniquely human intellect allows us to transcend our will and 'there 
results either the aesthetic challenge to contemplate [the inner nature of the 
world] or the ethical challenge to renounce' (IV §60, 207) suffering. 
Schopenhauer calls the transcendent possibilities of art that 'pure knowledge to 
which all willing is alien, pleasure in the beautiful, true delight in art - this is 
granted to only a very few, because it demands rare talents, and even to these few 
it is granted only as a fleeting dream', as it simultaneously 'lifts us out of real 
existence and transforms us into its disinterested spectators' (IV §57, 200, my 
emphasis). For Feuerbach, artistic perfection is found in the representation of the 
human as a species, as human perception finds itself 'more beautiful, more 
sublime.., the form which is itself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good' 
whereas art cannot represent the individual as this is not only imperfect but 
'vanity' (Essence 1, 6-7). Schopenhauer also insists that '[b]ecause true, lasting 
happiness is not possible, it cannot be the subject of art' (WWJ IV §58, 203), thus 
directly links with Dorothea's ethical rejection of the artificial frame, whether it 
is framing an idealised painting or a world falsely positioned as 'outside' 
(Middlemarch 80, 750) of her own concerns. 
Whilst recognising that this moment at the window 'has only given voice to 
"an approaching murmur that would soon gather distinctness" (Miller 179, 
quoting Middlemarch), Miller argues that Dorothea's translation of the 'largeness 
of [her] vision' into the 'smallness... of the first opportunity to carry it through' 
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(179) (being the determination to "save" Rosamond) is a reduction of her vision 
as it only succeeds in saving Dorothea, Rosamond only responding as "a reflex 
of [Dorothea's] own energy" (Miller 184, quoting Middlemarc/i). Thus for 
Miller, Rosamond's inability to sustain the sympathetic impulse beyond their 
meeting renders Dorothea's vision valueless. Dorothea's intervention is an 
ethical attempt to help both Rosamond and Lydgate, and enables Rosamond's 
temporary new awareness 'that she had been walking in an unknown world 
which had just broken in upon her' (Middlemarch 81, 757) and thus leads to 
Rosamond exhibiting another 'little mark of interest' (760) in Lydgate (as 
representative of her relations with others). That Dorothea can have had such an 
affect on an essentially resistant character validates the truth of Dorothea's vision 
in the novel at the same time it again questions the accessibility of Feuerbachian 
species-unity through I-thou-consciousness. It also suggests a more significantly 
Schopenhauerian vision of reality. Dorothea's urge to 'save Rosamond' (80, 
751) does prompt a 'need to express pitying fellowship' (758) in Rosamond, who 
thus puts Dorothea's misapprehension right and enables her to make a choice 
about her own future. Rosamond's and Lydgate's own relationship is only 
temporarily eased as Rosamond, like Casaubon, lacks the necessary "elements" 
to sustain this fellow-feeling 3t . Newton argues that Dorothea's 'sympathetic 
feeling' not only 'discipline[s]' her own 'egotistic impulse', but her 'intuitive' 
intervention with Rosamond shows it can therefore 'break down even the most 
impenetrable egotistic barriers' (155), although does later concede this 
'significant moral effect' on Rosamond is in the end 'only a temporary one' 
(157). Newton is much closer to my argument, however, in arguing that 
Dorothea's journey in the novel is one in which the conditions of reality do not 
'invalidate' Dorothea' s 'feelings': 
Dorothea's early religious idealism is vulnerable because she believes that 
the world possesses an order and structure which corresponds to her 
beliefs. Her hopes are inevitably disappointed, but this does not invalidate 
the feelings which underlie her beliefs. In her later development in the 
novel, she is able to preserve these feelings while discarding the theoretic 
religious frame. (Newton 162) 
Lydgate recognises that Rosamond 'had no more identified herself with him than if they had 
been creatures of different species and opposing interests' (Middlemarch 58, 568), and this is a 
lack of identification Rosamond is unable to overcome, despite the brief moment offered through 
Dorothea's compassionate sympathy. See also fn 20 above. 
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Whilst this implicitly acknowledges the essentialising of character in the novel, it 
is also the case that Dorothea's development is itself a result of her consciousness 
of the basis upon which this hope is lost: that the reality which awakens her 
consciousness is a far more pessimistic premise than Newton recognises. 
Dorothea's transition of consciousness, realising the equal presence of both 
despair and participated life, has enabled her ethical completion and is also her 
salvation - indeed the former consciousness has effected the latter. This is a 
realisation which marks a significant shift away from Feuerbachian ethical 
relations and salvation as it has taken place in a significant respect outside and 
regardless of her final union with Will (a union which marks the second pivotal 
event relating Dorothea's internal struggles to what is happening outside the 
window, as will be discussed shortly). Feuerbach does at one point refer to the 
consciousness of shared sorrows, as 'Love does not exist without sympathy, 
sympathy does not exist without suffering in common... Sympathy presupposes 
a like nature' (Essence IV, 54), apparently echoing Schopenhauer's grounding of 
I-thou relations in the consciousness of suffering. Feuerbach's position actually 
arises from a recognition of the human species which is in essence good, perfect, 
and divine, however, in terms that not only intend to end alienation/suffering 
through only positive communal human relations - that also absorb the always 
imperfect individual - but also philosophically denies the real existence of 
suffering and the realisation of the imperfect, unhappy individual 32 . Most 
crucially, Feuerbachian I-thou salvation is something that Middlemarch 
recognises as something the majority of individuals are essentially precluded by 
their fixed character from ever attaining. Whilst Dorothea's union with Will 
marks Feuerbach's sublime I-thou apotheosis in personal terms, her own 
salvation has been effected through a Schopenhauerian acceptance of the 
perpetual existence and equality of suffering long before this final union takes 
place. 
Jones links Eliot's view that 'no one "could be prepared for true fellowship 
without having had his share of sorrow as well as of joy" not only to 
Feuerbach's one reference to "suffering in common", but also to Hume and 
Locke and the view 'that all one's ideas are ultimately based upon sensory 
32 See Feuerbach Essence (1, 3-7, 18-23, and 27-8); Appendices (2, 283 & §3, 284); and Chapter 
2 above. 
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impressions' (Jones 65, citing Eliot Letters V, 21 3)33 	 Yet Schopenhauer 
recognises that the consciousness of suffering is that which actually leads to 
ethical human relations and salvation, whilst always keeping the experiential 
individual and the reality of human suffering clearly in view. Schopenhauer's I-
thou ethical relations arise only from the consciousness of suffering, that the 
'misery both experienced by oneself and inflicted upon others... always affect 
the one and the same ilmer being' (WWI IV §63, 219), and thus the knowledge of 
suffering and shared existence allows the individual to recognise that 'this thou 
art' (220). As such, 'virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which 
recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own', 
individual 'ethical value' being 'the chief business in human life' (66, 230) 
which finds its 'expression not in words, but only in deeds, in action, in the 
course of a human life' (232). In his discussion of the philosophical aspects of 
Eliot, predominantly in respect of egoism and imagination, Jones does not 
explore the pivotal role that the self-consciousness of suffering plays in the 
novel. This is despite his key recognition that to "feel the truth" of a 
commonplace, such as "we must all die", is very different from the "acquired 
knowledge" of "merely knowing" that this is true', and that this realisation is 'a 
necessary step not only towards self-knowledge, but also towards understanding 
of others' (Jones 46, quoting Middlemarch). Thus 'imagination' can either allow 
each to 'understand the actual world' or 'deny himself knowledge of himself; his 
world, and other men' (48). The egoist 'fails to grasp that knowledge of himself 
and others go hand in hand' (46) thus is unable to 'escape... some of "the 
miserable isolation" of egoism' (50). All the while '[c]ircumstances never, of 
themselves, bring about any fundamental change in... character... at most they 
bring to light, and challenge, previously hidden traits' (37). Whilst the novel 
suggests "a human being... is a slow creation of long interchanging 
influences", for Jones both 'Casaubon and Garth are said to have unalterable 
traits... in each case dominating ones, and it is unclear how much weight should 
be attached to the notion of changing character' (31). Despite these key 
recognitions, Jones' acknowledgement of 'an occasional effect of gloom which 
" Schopenhauer acknowledges his own indebtedness to Hume and Locke regarding his 
delineations of the fundamental ground of knowledge: see Schopenhauer (WWI I §9,9; 17 and 19); 
and Berman in Schopenhauer (WWlxviii-xxiii). 
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attends George Eliot's moral precepts' is finally only 'attributable to [a] purely 
logical postulate about causes' (68). Eliot argues that one's own 'heart-cutting 
experience' should influence a necessary 'effect' in ethical terms, including in 
literature where the reader 'should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains 
and the joys of those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact 
of being struggling erring human creatures' (Eliot Selections 217, original 
emphasis). This is an insistence upon the direct relationship between the 
consciousness of human individuality, human suffering, and human ethics which 
pervades Middlemarch. 
Dorothea's consciousness and acceptance of the equal presence of both 
'self-despair' and 'beyond-self (Middlemarc/i Prelude, 7) appears to be a 
recognition that others in the novel are prevented from attaining by their essential 
character, yet it is identified as the necessary place in and through which 
salvation can be attained. Dorothea's essential character has enabled her fttll 
consciousness of both presences and their necessary interconnectedness: the 
reconciliation between them foregrounds both detail and meaning, individual and 
species, matter and spirit. These are reconciled within herself, and subsequently 
sees herself united with but not absorbed by community. Eliot's position here 
appears to mark crucial differences between herself and Feuerbach, and aligns 
her far more closely with Schopenhauer. This is marked in an ethical realisation 
and transition to salvation based on the equivalence, reality, perpetuity, 
consciousness, and acceptance of suffering; the inescapable determination of 
character; and the equal presence then, of 'lights and shadows' (21, 205), 
transcendence and despair. Through recognising the apparently essential 
differences between Will and Casaubon, Dorothea's 'moral stupidity' that '[w]e 
" For Jones, 'although experience is the foundation of views about causal sequences, the 
universality of causal relations' he identifies in Middleniarch is only 'a postulate' (68) which fails 
to bear up under philosophical scrutiny. Whilst there are two types of egoism in the novel, 
epistemological egoism (private experience) and ethical egoism, this latter 'can be defeated only by 
further use of the human capacity which helped to sustain it: imagination' (49). Imagination has a 
'dangerous freedom' (50) as it also enables the false constructions of the world that feeds egoism 
(48-9). Yet Jones sees that the role of imagination in the novel 'enables a man to postulate causal 
connections between phenomena... to construct probable conjectures about the future and 
unobserved phenomena... [and] for understanding our fellow beings; for we have to interpret the 
manifestations of their inner lives which are only indirectly available for our inspection' (18-19). 
Jones is thus remarkably close to Schopenhauer, but without Schopenhauer's double-knowledge of 
ourselves as manifestations of the same will-to-life which provides Dorothea with that direct 
knowledge of others. 
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are all of us born in' gives way from 'reflection' to 'feeling' (205) and thus 
becomes moral understanding. Dorothea's compassion is not self-sacrificing, 
however, as her equally painful awareness of her own needs for the 'greater 
freedom' (203) that Will offers her attests. This also marks a Schopenhauerian 
rather than Feuerbachian emphasis in Eliot's refusal to invalidate the suffering 
individual, placing this consciousness at the heart of individual realisation and 
ethical community. Middlemarch clearly recognises the destructive nature of 
life-denial and its potential to inhabit either "optimistic" or "pessimistic" 
philosophical positions, placing the consciousness of existential, individual 
human beings at the heart of both life-affirmation and these apparently 
oppositional philosophical positions themselves: 
whether we believe in the future perfection of our race or in the nearest 
date fixed for the end of the world; whether we regard the earth as a 
putrefying nidus for a saved remnant, including ourselves, or have a 
passionate belief in the solidarity of mankind. [ ... ] There is no general 
doctrine which is not capable of eating out our morality if unchecked by the 
deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men. (61, 
5 90-1). 
Dorothea's realisation is effected through her experience, consciousness, and 
acceptance of self-despair, and this itself provides the necessary basis for her 
consciousness of 'life beyond self (Prelude, 7) - but without moving from one 
polarised position into the other. As such, it is a balance - a reconciliation - of 
two necessary forces rather than a totalising transcendence. This is a salvation 
effected through her having the necessary elements to allow it to occur, however, 
'the dominant spirit of justice within her' having 'once overcome the tumult' of 
despair had 'shown her the true measure of things', but by keeping that presence 
of despair with her 'as a lasting companion' (80, 749). Eliot shifts and reduces 
Feuerbach's emphasis from the perfect, divine human (Essence Preface xvi) to 
what she admires in Goethe, the value of each essentially limited human 
individual who makes up this 'living, generous humanity - mixed and erring, and 
self-deluding' (Eliot "Meister" 131). Yet for Eliot, these individuals are not all 
'saved from utter corruption by the salt of some noble impulse, some 
disinterested effort, some beam of good nature' (131), even while they provide 
the necessary basis of value for the attainment of salvation by those essentially 
able to realise it. Whilst Dorothea's revelation does appear to enable effective 
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salvation both in herself and in her relations with others to an extent (the terms of 
which will be discussed shortly), this is a salvation which refuses to transcend the 
individual, refuses to recognise human relations as divine, is always subject to 
essential character and, crucially, arises from the conscious and perpetual 
presence of suffering. Middlemarch fundamentally questions the accessibility 
and validity of Feuerbachian salvation for both individual and community, and 
places Dorothea's moral growth firmly in Schopenhauer's ethics of salvation. 
162 
III. The 'new real future' and the issue of salvation: 'that roar which lies on 
the other side of silence'. 
Dorothea's final union with Will occurs after her moment of salvation, that 
reconciliation between the two consciously-present forces of 'self-despair' and 
'beyond self (Middlemarch Prelude, 7) which will remain with her from now on. 
Her union with Will marks her own personal happiness, as is symbolised in the 
second event which draws a relationship between Dorothea's internal struggles 
and what is happening outside the window, whilst retaining a markedly 
Schopenhauerian basis in terms of what comes after. For Miller, whilst the 
moment of Dorothea's final union with Will brings 'the ideal of fellow feeling... 
to its full and final expression', it also serves to illustrate how her 'desire for Will 
is a reduction of her original desire and, in the end, perhaps even a destruction of 
what its original value had been' (187). As such, whilst Dorothea's earlier 
moment alone at the window is one where the 'outside offered the possibility of 
fully absorbing the inside and of abolishing the polarity between them' (Miller 
187) (an absorption this thesis argues that Middlemarch refuses whilst 
Dorothea's awakening does abolish polarity), this is effectively countermanded 
for Miller by what the window represents during Dorothea's later meeting with 
Will. Miller argues that the later window scene 'shows only "the drear outer 
world" and thus undermines the earlier 'proposed union between Dorothea and 
the world', replacing it with 'a union between Dorothea and Will - against the 
world' (187-8, original emphasis). Whilst on one level Dorothea and Will are 
against the world in going against Middlemarch's idea (not to mention 
Casaubon's) of what they ought to do by pursuing their lives together, their 
relationship and future lives become part of the world in a clear extension of 
Dorothea's new awakening to that 'involuntary, palpitating life' (Middlemarch 
80, 750) in significant terms. Miller argues that there is a contrast at this later 
meeting between what is happening outside the window and inside the room, as 
shown by the 'angry spirit' (Middlemarch 83, 771) of the storm, which 
'symbolically reduces and destroys the original import of Dorothea's [earlier] 
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vision' (Miller 187). As already argued, the first window incident does not 
present the 'outside offer[ing] the possibility of fully absorbing the inside', 
although it does abolish what Miller calls 'the polarity between them' (Miller 
187, my emphasis), marking as it does Dorothea's revelatory moment of 
consciousness, of knowing herself part of life rather than dissolved into it, and 
thus realising and validating the human individual as the necessary basis for 
positive I-thou human relations. This later pivotal moment of apotheosis 
between Dorothea and Will, during which the view outside the window shows 'a 
coming storm' (Middlei'narch 83, 767) and the 'light' becoming 'more and more 
sombre' (770), does not reinstate a polarity between the outside and inside 
worlds. Instead, it reflects again the symbolic alchemic elements and the 
necessity for a union which effects both individual and communal realisation, 
and which must be grounded in and by "light" in both of its aspects: the 
animating principle of individual human life and the transcendent principle of!-
thou consciousness that together form 'palpitating life' (80, 750). The elemental 
storm symbolises that this appears to be Dorothea's and Will's final meeting, 
both of them aware of 'a fatality that kept them apart' (83, 770). It is the storm 
too that ensures Will is 'delivered.., from the necessity of going away', and 
ensures that they are united at last: the first flash of lightening triggers their 
'look at each other, and then smile', prompting them to speak what they 'had 
been thinking of' (770); the second 'vivid flash... lit each of them up for the 
other - and the light seemed to be the tenor of a hopeless love', leading to their 
clearest declarations of mutual feeling and a kiss 'tremblingly' before they again 
'moved apart' (771). It is this move apart that triggers the rain to 'dash[] against 
the window-panes as if an angry spirit were within it' (771, my emphasis), the 
element of water again representing human love. The angry water spirit is 
appeased when Dorothea's subsequent contemplation of a 'drear outer world' 
parted from Will becomes him 'seat[ing] himself beside her, and [laying] his 
hand on hers, which turned itself upward to be clasped', a moment of union 
which extends 'until the rain abated' and became 'quiet' (771). The anger now 
becomes Will's own repeated 'anger' (771-2) at their parting, and his final 
" Swann echoes Miller in also arguing that the 'wild stupidity of the elements' ("Realism" 298, fn) 
of the storm symbolises 'the hostile world outside' (297), predominantly 'the forces of the past' 
(298, fh), the later ceasing of the rain suggesting that 'fairer weather is ahead as Dorothea begins to 
see truly' (297) and that they are both 'about to enter the adult world' (299). 
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exasperated "Good-bye" forces the last metamorphosis, echoing their earlier 
baptismal union as Dorothea becomes the water spirit and refuses to let them part 
as she 'start[s] from her seat, the flood of her young passion bearing down all the 
obstructions.., the great tears rising and falling in an instant' (772). Dorothea's 
union with Will is the perfect manifestation of I-thou relations, a union of equals 
which affirms both individual and species in their perfect compliment of 
elemental forces. "Light" again forms that unifying force, the element of life and 
the transcendent principle of "spirit", that 'manifold pregnant existence' (28, 
265) of emotional, physical, and 'spiritual communion' (2, 24). 
Feuerbach's own privileging of male-female love above all other forms of 
human love (Essence IX, 92) may well play a part in the delineation of their 
union here, as sexual love is clearly a significant part of Dorothea and Will's 
feelings for one another 36 . On one level their relationship illustrates the positive 
vision of Feuerbach's I-thou relations, through which individual self-
consciousness limitation is realised in unity with the perfection of species-
consciousness. Here both land thou provide 'the principle of multiplicity and all 
its essential results', the second person being 'the self-assertion of the human 
heart as the principle of duality, of participated life' (Essence VI, 68). Yet 
Eliot's elemental delineations insist on the realisation of the individual as the 
necessary basis of communal union at every level, and also exposes Feuerbachian 
mutual I-thou human relations as something that other individuals are essentially 
precluded from ever attaining. Feuerbach's I-thou relations can unwittingly act 
to compound the individual's consciousness of their own essential imperfections 
and limitations, seen in opposition to the perfection that is not only in the species 
in an abstract sense, but embodied in the perfection that is the individual's 
necessary aim and destiny, their own potentially perfect self. Eliot exposes this 
36 Schopenhauer argues that sexual relations between men and women arise from the will-to-life 
seeking its own perpetuation in the species, thus the will-to-life actually fools those individuals 
into believing they will be happy together, thus, once the 'genius of the species achieves its object' 
(WWR "Metaphysics", 553) and the sexual urge has been frilfilled, 'everyone who is in love finds 
himself duped' (540) as the reality of their incompatibility becomes apparent. Yet Schopenhauer 
also concedes that, although 'happy marriages are rare', it is the case that 'passionate sexual love is 
sometimes associated with... real friendship based on harmony of disposition, which nevertheless 
often appears only when sexual love proper is extinguished in its satisfaction. That friendship will 
then often spring from the fact that the.., physical, moral, and intellectual qualities of the two 
individuals, from which arose the sexual love... [for a child to be produced] are also related to one 
another with reference to the individuals themselves.., and thereby form the basis of a harmony of 
dispositions' (558). This is a rare compatibility of relationship that Middlemarch echoes. 
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at the same time as insisting that imperfection is inescapable, the fallible human 
is at perpetual risk of self-despair and inhabits an imperfect world in which 
suffering is a reality. This is not only a necessary acceptance but the necessary 
basis upon which any form of salvation is possible. Not only did Dorothea 
initially misrecognise Casaubon as her key to the knowledge she seeks, wherein 
reconciliation between self-despair and the transcendent consciousness of 
'beyond self (Middlemarch Prelude, 7) can take place, but Casaubon will never 
be able to recognise that Dorothea had the key all along. 
The quest for human realisation on any and every level must have that 
which light represents as its overarching principle: human life in its corporeal 
manifestation, but existing in a Schopenhauerian pessimistic consciousness of 
reality, must form the basis of 1-thou consciousness. The living, breathing, 
human individual leads to the transcendent consciousness of a 'participated life' 
(Feuerbach Essence VI, 68), both I and thou, individual and species, matter and 
"spirit", despair and transcendent joy, without which 'the world' is 'not only 
dead and empty, but meaningless' (VIII, 82). Eliot's privileging of the element 
of light in Dorothea's and Will's union encompasses the vital spark of both 
corporeal life and of transcendental union. This reflects Feuerbach's own 
delineation of love-as-holy "spirit" (VI, 67) as the unifying force of I-thou 
relations, of love in community, whilst also questioning the accessibility of this 
by emphasising individual realisation, the imperfect reality of human relations, 
and the presence of self-despair. That this I-thou-unity is something few 
characters in the novel can recognise or attain illustrates the failings in 
Feuerbach's position here. Middlemarch argues for a more pessimistic 
consciousness of human place and human destination as the necessary basis for 
human ethics, and for both individual and communal realisation. Dorothea's 
relationship with Casaubon imprisons them both in despair, a place which proves 
finally inescapable for Casaubon. Yet salvation in Middlemarch is not an equally 
polarised transcendence of the corporeal realm (as offered in Feuerbach's final 
vision of species-unity which absorbs the individual into the faceless community 
of species-essence), but the midpoint between self-despair and rapture which 
retains consciousness of both. Eliot agrees with Feuerbach in recognising human 
consciousness as crucial, but insists on equating the corporeal and the spiritual in 
the ethical validity of the existential human individual. Dorothea's salvation is 
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attained through her consciousness of self-despair reconciled with her 
consciousness of being 'a pan of that involuntary, palpitating life' (Middlemarch 
80, 750), a 'unity of the material and the spiritual in [the] individual' (Feuerbach 
Essence V, 64) which shifts salvation away from the totality of Feuerbachian 
species-consciousness and its attempt to 'escape from the sense of limitation into 
unlimited feeling' (App. §3, 284) which completes the Feuerbachian negation, 
devaluing, and 'absorb[tion]' (I, 4) of the individual. Dorothea's union with 
Will, and her renunciation of wealth and position to marry him (Middlemarc/z 
Finale, 792), occurs after her salvationary moment. On one level her relationship 
with Will marks a choice regarding her own personal happiness and fulfilment, 
the false distinction between self and world having already been destroyed in 
favour of ethical action. On another level their union also raises concerns about 
the endpoint of Feuerbachian salvation in relation to what comes after for 
Dorothea. 
Dorothea's salvation marks a Schopenhauerian shift on three crucial levels: 
the predetermined nature of character which allows some individuals to behave 
with sympathy or compassion towards others, but not all (many characters in the 
novel are apparently precluded from attaining salvation in essential terms); the 
necessary condition of salvation being the acceptance of both despair and 
transcendence (thus must not invalidate the individual); and, most fundamentally, 
the basis of ethics grounded in the consciousness of suffering. In terms of the 
future, Eliot's Schopenhauerian vision is heralded in Dorothea's burgeoning 
Some discouragement, some faintness of heart at the new real future 
which replaces the imaginary is not unusual, and we do not expect 
people to be moved by what is not unusual. That element of tragedy 
which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought itself 
into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could 
hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all 
ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the 
squirrel's heartbeat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the 
other side of silence. (Middlemarch 20, 189) 
This reflects a Schopenhauerian insistence on seeing beyond the imaginary state 
of things and into a reality which has the consciousness of suffering, '[t]hat 
element of tragedy', at its heart, and a direct link of consciousness and 
compassion for comrades-in-suffering, that 'keen vision and feeling of all 
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ordinary human life' (189). Whilst Eliot places human life alongside itself and 
other living things in a reflection of Schopenhauer's equation of all 
manifestations of the will-to-life here, it is the directly ethical connotations for 
human relations that are crucial to the novel. That 'element of tragedy' is an 
insistently 'real' and 'frequent' presence, and both the 'imaginary' future and the 
day-to-day 'silence' are broken by a 'roar' (189) of suffering at its heart which 
recognises a view of human existence, including the present and the Ibture, fed 
by a Schopenhauerian pessimistic consciousness of 'one's real inner nature' 
(WWI II §21, 41) and of the 'suffering.., in others [which] touches him... as his 
own' (IV §66, 235). Eliot echoes Schopenhauer's ethical practice as well as his 
theory, including his essential delineations of character wherein each individual 
is firmly rendered a particular manifestation of the will-to-life and as such, 
cannot change in essentials. Only those characters predisposed to exhibit more 
ethical behaviour can choose to do so. The pessimistic premise which underlies 
Schopenhauer's ethics appear at the heart of Dorothea's journey to salvation. 
The consciousness of the perpetuity of suffering, and the vital link which 
recognises the self as part of all manifestations of the same essence in terms 
which do not assimilate, sacrifice, or negate that self out of existence, foltows 
Schoperihauer's route of ethical compassion rather than his severest form of 
salvation, ascetic self-denial. The ascetic needs to constantly and intentionally 
break their own will by 'seeking out the disagreeable, the freely chosen life of 
penance and self-chastisement for the continual mortification of the will' (68, 
247), a position clearly rejected by the novel's recognition of Dorothea's 
essential character as one incompatible with ascetic urges. Dorothea's struggles 
against sacrificing herself to Casaubon (albeit her freedom only enabled in the 
pessimistic terms of Casaubon's death which also offers Casaubon his only non-
salvationary escape route), and the explicitly destructive effects such a move 
would have (and which Casaubon's life-denial does have) on Dorothea, 
foreground her need for a compassionate but 'palpitating life' (Middlemarch 80, 
750). Feuerbach's species-unity, that totality of Feuerbachian species-
consciousness and its attempt to 'escape from the sense of limitation into 
unlimited feeling' (Essence App. §3, 284) (which simultaneously completes the 
Feuerbachian negation, devaluing, and 'absorb[tion}' (4) of the individual), is 
also questioned in the novel's Finale. 
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Dorothea, 'enamoured of intensity and greatness' (Middlemarch Finale, 
793), begins the novel searching for 'some lofty conception of the world' (1, 10) 
which will enable her to engage in a corporeal 'directly beneficent' (48, 455) yet 
transcendent activity, and attain 'some illimitable satisfaction' through the 
'reconcil[iation of] self-despair with the rapturous consciousness of life beyond 
self (Prelude, 7). Her consciousness and acceptance of the perpetual reality of 
self-despair has lead to her consciousness of the equally perpetual and real 
presence of 'life beyond self (7), thus the point of personal and of practical 
ethical salvation is reached even before her final union with Will. Whilst her 
relationship with Will offers her individual "happiness" in a relationship of 
mutual compatibility, and opens out the possibility of her attaining that 
'illimitable satisfaction' (7) in both personal and communal terms, it also forms a 
Feuerbachian union which both echoes and undermines Feuerbach's vision of 
salvation. Whilst Dorothea's and Will's final union is baptised by a suspended 
moment in which they both 'escape from the sense of limitation into unlimited 
feeling' (Feuerbach Essence App. §3, 284) as 'the flood of [Dorothea's] young 
passion bear[s] down all the obstructions' (Middlemarch 83, 772) between them, 
the end of the novel raises questions about the relationship between Dorothea's 
vibrant and unique character and her apparent dissolution. Dorothea ends the 
novel 'absorbed into the 4fe of another, and ... only known in a certain circle as 
a wife and mother', and it is held by '[m]any who knew her' to be 'a pity that so 
substantive and rare a creature should have been absorbed' (Finale, 793, my 
emphasis). From the begiiming of the novel Dorothea is characterised as 'likely 
to seek martyrdom', although finally to 'incur [it] after all in a quarter where she 
had not sought it' (1, 10). Yet the extent to which Dorothea's "end" in the novel 
can be seen as a martyrdom, or can be viewed in either optimistic or pessimistic 
terms is explicitly blurred, refusing a polarised position which echoes Eliot's 
delineation of salvation in the novel. On one level Dorothea is clearly where she 
wishes to be: 
bound to [Will] by a love stronger than any impulses which could have 
marred it. No life would have been possible to Dorothea which was not 
filled with emotion, and she now had a life filled also with a beneficent 
activity which she had not the doubtful pains of discovering and marking 
out for herself. (Finale, 792) 
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She has clearly attained personal fulfilment, yet the novel refuses the 
straightforward "happy ending" with the enigmatic precursor that Dorothea 
'feel[s] that there was always something better which she might have done, if she 
had only been better and known better', suggesting that the perfect Feuerbachian 
self (Essence 1, 6) is always receding into the future. Yet the novel also insists 
that 'she never repented that she had given up position and fortune to many Will' 
(Middlemarch Finale, 792). Dorothea's life is not explored beyond this moment 
through her own thoughts and feelings but by distanced reports, which leave 
Dorothea's future life an unknown quantity, or rather quality, and provides 
conflicting "optimistic" and "pessimistic" views of her. 
Dorothea's "end" and her relationship with Will troubles many critics, 
Miller finding that the novel transfers 'the original unsolvable opposition 
between "the meanness of opportunity" and an "epic life" onto 'an equivalent 
but reduced opposition between Casaubon and Will' (148). Dorothea's story is 
thus 'at once fittingly concluded and irrelevantly sidetracked... [and,] knowing 
that this settlement only appears to satisfy her original and still persisting desire, 
she gratefully makes do with the appearance' (149). Yet Miller also argues that 
Middlemarc/i becomes a vehicle of meliorism as the 'conventions of writing and 
reading the novel will prove to contain its most basic model for "the growing 
good of the world" (154). Interestingly, Miller finds that the role of sympathy in 
the novel is a 'touchstone' which has 'a strategic double valence... [b]y its 
"deep", quasi-primal character, it is exalted to a position of transcendence' (155). 
Further, whilst the 'nature' of sympathy 'may be supra-ideological... its actual 
role is not', thus sympathy forms a 'middle position, between the ideologies of 
community and romantic individualism', inspiring 'the religion of humanity on 
which the hopes both for a better community and for a more workable 
transcendence are founded' (original emphases, I 55)37 
 The oscillation between 
"optimism" and "pessimism" at the end of the novel echoes Dorothea's path to 
and realisation of salvation, and takes its questioning of Feuerbachian salvation 
to its problematic endpoint, simultaneously questioning Feuerbach's teleological 
" Whilst Miller also points out the 'symptoms of a missing sympathy between self and other 
(indifference, fascination, fear, hostility)' as 'the "continually-alienating influences".., that 
threaten to divide' (164-5) relationships, these pertinent points merely confirm the limits of 
narrative form, illustrated in the Finale 'by briefly extending them to show more of the same' 
(191), and 'the consequent suspension of the meanings that might be attached to them' (192). 
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optimistic vision of 'the hopes both for a better community and for a more 
workable transcendence' (Miller 155) Miller argues this middle-ground forms. 
For Feuerbach, salvation is both a consciousness and a teleological endpoint in 
the 'escape from the sense of limitation [desire, passion, the conditions of time 
and place] into unlimited feeling' and the 'joy' (Essence App.3, 284) of species-
consciousness. Time is 'the medium of uniting opposites, contradictions, in one 
and the same subject' (1, 23), yet each individual is a limitation (28), and 
species-essence 'absorbs' (4) this individual who is also negated in its ground, 
process (27-8), and existence (18). Schopenhauer sees time as not only revealing 
the (pessimistic) reality of human existence behind the dreams of the human 
imagination, but is also the one place where reality exists as 'real existence is 
only in the present' (WWI IV §57, 197), and is thus where ethical human actions 
can take place. As such, for Schopenhauer the individual-in-time has both 
meaning and value. Whilst for Feuerbach '[e]verything that exists has value, is a 
being of distinction', this is in the end only 'true of the species' (Essence 1, 7). 
Whilst Dorothea's fate is clearly of smallness and limitation, where the 
spark towards achieving great things ends at the very least in an undeserved and 
ineffectual anonymity, Dorothea's literal absorption 'into the life of another' 
(Middlemarch Finale, 793) suggests she becomes nothing other than her husband 
and child. As such, Dorothea as a unique individual effectively ceases to exist, 
echoing the negation of the individual that Feuerbachian I-thou salvation-
through-species-unity effects. Feuerbach's vision of salvation, an "elemental 
union" of the essentially imperfect individual manifestation of human essence 
with the perfect manifestation of the spatial and teleological species, also 
simultaneously absorbs the "imperfect" individual as the negative connotations 
of Dorothea's apparent dissolution recognises. That Dorothea's dissipation into 
nothing more than the anonymity of wife- and motherhood is an absorption 
which appears to render her ineffectual is compounded by the recognition that 
what she has become absorbed into is itself also ineffectual. This relates not only 
to Dorothea herself, but to the son and particularly the husband into whom she is 
'absorbed' (Finale, 793). Whilst Dorothea's son later 'declined' the opportunity 
to 'represent[] Middlemarch... thinking that his opinions had less chance of 
being stifled if he remained out of doors' (794), suggesting that the influence of 
Middlemarch will not 'assimilat[e] him very comfortably' (15, 149) and thus 
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'paralyse' (58, 559) him as it has Lydgate, he does not appear to have particular 
aims or abilities which might be so reduced. Dorothea's son lives an equally 
unheroic, suggestively ineffectual life. Will's own career as 'an ardent public 
man, working well in those times when reforms were begun with a young 
hopefulness of immediate good' being effected in the lives of others, is also 
undermined by such 'hopefulness' having 'been much checked in our days' 
(Finale, 792). Such checks to hope and effectiveness render Dorothea doubly 
ineffective, particularly as her union with Will is also associated with issues of 
social reform (Dorothea's own aims coupled with Will's need for direction). Yet 
this ineffectiveness is countered to a humble but significant extent by the 
suggestion that Dorothea's 'being' does have 'incalculably diffusive' effects on 
'the growing good of the world' (795). This not only offers a more optimistic 
perception of her fate but renders both her person and actions effective, albeit 
"diffusely", and links back to Dorothea's urgency regarding the necessity to try 
'to alter the evils which lie under our hands' (39, 374). Thus the 'hopefulness' 
invested in epic projects that is 'checked' (Finale, 792) over time is given 
palpable if humble effects on a more immediate level. A further pessimistic twist 
is formed through the perception that this small but 'growing good of the world' 
is itself reduced from being seen as an optimistic Feuerbachian teleological 
inevitability. This is because the reason 'that things are not so ill with you and 
me as they might have been' is 'partly dependent on unhistoric acts' and 'half 
owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited 
tombs' (795). Meliorism is thus rendered at least partly dependent then, on the 
nature of human relationships and the essential character of individuals who 
make up those relationships, rather than an inevitable (Feuerbachian) result of 
human relations themselves 38 . Most tellingly of all, human existence is here 
38 Interestingly, whilst Marx also recognises this fundamental flaw in Feuerbach's delineations of 
human relations, Eliot's emphasis on practical acts also echo in Marx's reading of Feuerbach. 
Marx insists on the priority of practical means over Feuerbach's 'liberation' through 'self-
consciousness' (Marx Theses VI, 122; see Chapter 2, 68-9 above). Eliot deliberately emphasises 
the ordinary playing out of humble, unhistoric acts and their subtle and diffusive - but nonetheless 
effective - impact, however, rather than any form of Historic revolutionary act, as emphasised in 
the contrast between the checked hopes of Reform and Dorothea's own subtle "diffusive" effects. 
Whilst it is not outside the realms of possibility that Eliot's critique of Feuerbach could have been 
fuelled by reading Marx, Eliot is clearly capable of recognising the ramifications of these flaws for 
herself. Suggestions that Marx enters into Eliot's reading is limited, although J. F. Blumenbach's 
Anthropological Treatises.., includes Memoirs [of Blumenbach] by Maa... Thomas Bendysche 
(trans), listed in the Eliot-Lewes Library: see Baker (entry 249, 22). 
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rendered in Schopenhauerian terms, being clearly much less than positive in that 
lives appear to be delineated in terms of 'ill' rather than "good", but capable of 
potentially being rendered less 'ill' than 'they might have been' (795) through the 
actions of others. Therefore Dorothea, and others who also 'live[] faithfully a 
hidden life' of 'uthistoric' obscurity, may help to make the lives of others less 
unpleasant than they might otherwise have been, which renders the idea of an 
optimistic, inevitable 'growing good' (795) at the very least questionable, if not 
negated. 
Probably the earliest critical appreciation of a Schopenhauerian quality to 
Eliot's novels is W. H. Mallock who wrote in 1879 that, on the one hand Eliot 
'has expressed her convictions somewhere as a creed of "meliorism" 
(presumably in her non-fiction writings), yet '[ut might seem that her philosophic 
theories and her true natural vision were at hopeless war with one another... her 
diagrams refut[ing] instead of illustrating the text of her proposition' (Mallock 
"Eliot" 457). Whilst: 
• . .her entire philosophy is an impassioned protest against pessimism... 
present[ing] the human life and the human lot to us as worthy of all our 
piety - all our love and reverence.., yet the picture she presents to us of the 
world we live in almost exactly answers to the description given of it by 
Schopenhauer, as nothing better than a "penal settlement".., the race of 
beings [she presents]... forms no happy and rejoicing brotherhood... but a 
sad and labouring race of chained convicts, whose highest glory it is not to 
attempt escaping. We are all born, she teaches, with bonds about us, and 
we inevitably increase their number, prompted by our own cravings, as we 
live on. (457) 
Mallock is himself almost unremittingly pessimistic, not only reading 
Schopenhauer in the most negative light possible but surpassing Schopenhauer's 
most pessimistic arguments with his own views about human nature and the 
secularisation of society 39 . For Mallock, Eliot's "accurate" 'observation of life's 
meanness, sins, and miseries.., does not under-estimate the causes for despair', 
yet her "unrealistic" 'higher characters' are only 'principles' (459) rather than 
real human beings, and thus leave Eliot 'over-estimat[ing] the causes for hope' 
(458). Yet Mallock's identification of Eliot's position as one that aligns itself 
with a Schopenhauerian world-view, particularly in its questioning of the creed 
of meliorism, is clearly a pertinent if rather generalised and overtly pessimistic 
" See Mallock Is Life Worth Living? and Chapter 3 above. 
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one. Whilst Eliot's position in Middlemarc/z is Schopenhauerian rather than 
Feuerbachian, this is in terms which recognise Eliot's position as more 
perceptively Schoperthauerian than Mallock's own reading of either 
Schopenhauer or Eliot suggests. Whilst T. R. Wright argues that Middlemarch is 
'firmly anchored in the material world... [t]he leading characters.., involved in a 
perpetual struggle against those [external] conditions' (Wright "Middlemarch" 
91) in which they live, this only tells half the story 40 . Wright's recognition that 
the novel ends with 'a sober and somewhat sad affirmation, the product of a self-
critical and sophisticated liberal humanism, no longer full of confidence in the 
grand narrative of progress but committed to a gradual, difficult and possibly 
only partial improvement' (92) points equally towards Eliot's shift away from 
Feuerbach into Schopenhauerian pessimism. Her questioning of an optimistic 
teleological meliorism merely adds to the Schopenhauerian delineations of 
essential character, and to a modest but palpable ethics of compassionate acts 
arising from the consciousness of despair. The only sure knowledge by the end 
of Middlemarch is that lives will indeed suffer 'ill' (Eliot Middlemarch Finale, 
795), but may be rendered less so by the unsung actions of others - subject to 
essential character and human relations. This echoes Schopenhauer's own 
critique of teleological optimism, the core of his philosophy insisting that 
suffering is the one inescapable inevitability in the world, and itself leads to a 
'humble path to... ethics' (Morality III §13, 130). Here suffering might at least 
be relieved and existence rendered less painful for those who feel the immediate 
effects (WWI IV, §66, 233) of the actions of compassionate individuals. Whilst 
bringing 'unerring certainty.., to an end', intellect frees the human from being 
'bound to the present' of willing, a state in which less self-conscious animals 
remain, and thus enables us to reflect 'over the future and the past, and, as a 
consequence, deliberation, careful concern, [and] the capacity for premeditated 
40 U. C. Knoepflmacher similarly argues that Dorothea's ideals, and those of the other characters, 
have to learn to 'confonn[] to the motions of an imperfect world' (Laughter 172), arguing that Will 
Ladislaw is 'malleable' rather than having his own ideals, thus he is excepted from all other 
characters' necessary modification or abandonment of their 'goals' (73). Yet, interestingly, 
elsewhere Knoepflmacher also finds that Eliot 'stress[es] man's dependence on the actions of his 
fellow man' (Humanism 112), Middlemarch 'test[ing] the efficacy of ethical conduct... reduc[ing] 
mystery to a verifiable experience', although her fiction is 'concerned with an artistic interpretation 
of "truth" and not with the resolution of metaphysical inconsistencies' (113). 
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action independent of the present' (II §27, 76-7) subjection to suffering becomes 
possible. 
Wright acknowledges Suzanne Graver's argument that Middlemarch 
'reveals... "a double consciousness", aware both of the need to continue the 
search for "truth" and of its inevitable failure, holding out a vision of human 
fellowship while revealing "the conflicts that obscure and complicate" such a 
vision' (Wright "Middlemarch" xii, quoting Graver 148). Yet Wright argues for 
a further stage of abandoning 'all attempts to impose unity on the novel, focusing 
instead on the play of voices in the text... whose truth-claims can only be 
relative' (xii). Wright recognises that Middlemarch is concerned with 'a world 
no longer to be seen as a stable, fixed reality but to be described in terms of 
complex patterns of relationship... "the search for the thing in itself [being] 
chimerical: the thing [is] a group of relations" (Wright "Middlemarch" 5, citing 
Lewes Problems II, 27). Wright does not recognise the significance of these 
relations, however, or why and how the novel refuses a form of totalising unity. 
Graver's position hints towards the crucial issue at the heart of Middlemarch, a 
'double-consciousness' (Graver 148) which refuses Feuerbachian totalities 
through the insistent presence of the existential human individual, living in a 
less-than-ideal world and forming the necessary basis for individual, social, 
intellectual and emotional realisation-in-community on any level. Middlemarch 
offers a Schopenhauerian double-consciousness of self and other, despair and 
transcendence, and an intellect which allows us to transcend our will either for 
'the aesthetic challenge to contemplate [the inner nature of the world] or the 
ethical challenge to renounce' (Schopenhauer WWJ IV §60, 207) suffering. As 
such, a form of balance rather than either "unity" or "totality" can be achieved, a 
balance which acknowledges desire and contingency, transcendence and despair, 
success and failure, whilst arguing against Graver's 'inevitable failure' (148, my 
emphasis) by marking the small successes and the ongoing potential for relieving 
suffering. All the while the novel insists on the truth of Dorothea's path, which 
runs between two polarised and polarising positions and offers the middlemarch, 
the middle ground as the only route, and where there is what we might call 'a 
"mature" acceptance of human limitation' (Wright "Middlemarch" xiii) and of 
ethical human transcendence rather than the final lack of signification that Miller 
argues (191-4), a 'gloom' based on a 'purely logical postulate about causes' 
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(Jones 68), or a question about the relativity of truth (Wright "Middlemarch" 
xii), albeit one which 'need not lead to the lack of a strong moral response to 
experience' (Newton 167). Wright's "mature" acceptance of human limitation' 
(xiii) echoes what Schopenhauer would see in terms of our having 'recognised 
that pain, as such, is essential to life, and inescapable.., it might induce a 
considerable degree of stoical equanimity' (WWIIV §57, 201). 
Whilst Schopenhauerian asceticism is clearly rejected in Middlemarch, thus 
rejecting his most pessimistic form of salvation, Eliot's novel marks a significant 
departure from Feuerbachian ideals towards a Schopenhauerian "humble ethics" 
and the small, individual acts that relieve the inevitable suffering in the world, 
the consciousness of this suffering itself giving rise to 'directly beneficent' 
(Middlemarch 48, 455) ethical behaviour. Eliot does not progress as far as 
Schopenhauer, who would emphatically deny any possibility of this contributing 
to a "growing good" or of 'diffusive' (Finale, 795) effects, the only effects being 
both immediate to the individuals involved, and momentary. Yet that Dorothea's 
'incalculably diffusive' effects are 'on those around her' (795, my emphasis) 
does limit such effects to a Schopenhauerian immediacy. Whilst Dorothea's 
journey and how she ends the novel recognise a Schopenhauerian delineation of 
the inevitability of suffering in the world, and the necessity for a human ethic 
which thus seeks to actively relieve suffering by transcending the egoistic 'partial 
good', that this is the 'least partial good' (20, 197, my emphasis) always insists 
on the continued presence of partiality, of individuality, and thus of individual 
realisation. Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion resonate at the heart of Eliot's 
novel which insists on the value of each individual within the community, albeit 
rejecting any form of ascetic self-negation 4t . The modesty but immediacy of 
Schopenhauer's ethical premise is not only reflected in the basis of Dorothea's 
ethics being the consciousness of human suffering, but also in both the unhistoric 
and the accessible nature of these acts. Whilst claiming that, in the end, 
Dorothea 'fail[s]' (Miller 145) then, Miller's point that Fred Vincy 'is able to 
reduce his desire to the scale of what "reality" can actually satisfy' (145) is 
equally transferable to Dorothea, although this "reality" is very much a 
Schopenhauerian one. In Miller's own terms, whilst both Fred and Dorothea can 
" Or a 'martyrdom' (Middlemarch 1, 10) which renders the individual a utility to be sacrificed to 
the greater good: see Feuerbach (Essence XVIII, 170; and Chapter 2 (57-8) above. 
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be seen to be as successful and happy as it is possible to be in a world which 
recognises the contingencies of both external and internal realities, being the 
elements both within and without the individual which contribute to the 
realisation of their 'human lots' (Middlemarc/z 15, 137), it is clear that 
Middlemarch posits something more: that human transcendence and human 
despair can and should find their satisfaction in empathic and corporeal human 
relations, thus in a necessarily limited rather than 'illimitable' (Prelude, 7) form 
for the individual. For Schopenhauer, that 'real existence is only in the present', 
individual value, ethical behaviour and salvation become both positive and 
accessible, yet 'this present flees without hindrance into the past, constantly 
passing over into death' (WWI IV §57, 197, my emphasis). Because the will is 
endless: 
all endeavour springs from deprivation - from discontent with one's 
condition - and is thus suffering as long as it is not satisfied; but no 
satisfaction is lasting, rather it is always merely the starting-point of a new 
striving... [which is always] frustrated in many ways, everywhere in 
conflict, and therefore we always see it as suffering. (IV §56, 195) 
Thus, coupled with Dorothea's self-knowledge of suffering and the knowledge 
that all are manifestations of the same existential life, and that each individual 
phenomena is of value, the ethics of compassion are born and, perversely but 
fruitfully, the positive knowledge of suffering itself makes both the pessimistic 
consciousness and ethical behaviour purposeful. Feuerbach's 'undisturbed, 
uninterrupted feeling.., for which there exists no limits, no opposite' (Essence 
App. §2, 283) remains a transitory moment, the baptismal moment of union 
between Dorothea and Will being one which momentarily 'escape[s] from the 
sense of limitation into uninterrupted feeling' (3, 284). This is necessarily 
followed by existence in the world, thus such 'feelings are interrupted; they 
collapse; they are followed by a state of void; of insensibility' (2, 283). In 
Middlemarch, however, this interruption is the ongoing reality of a more 
mundane but 'palpitating' (Middlemarc/i 80, 750) human existence, not a 
Feuerbachian 'void'. That 'illimitable satisfaction' (Prelude, 7, my emphasis) 
shimmers on in possibility and actuality in those 'incalculably diffusive' (Finale, 
795) effects which may ripple outwards and onwards into the broader 
community, both spatially and teleologically, the individuals of which are 
therefore less unhappy than they might otherwise have been. 
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Whilst Eliot owes an undeniable debt to Feuerbach's revealing of the "true 
essence" of religious constructions of the positive aims of humanity as already in 
human beings in essential, individual, and communal terms, she moves away 
from his overtly optimistic delineations of the divinity of human essence, human 
relations, and human destiny into a significantly Schopenhauerian framework. 
Eliot's use of the alchemic element of light in Middlemarch is a doubled aspect, 
embodying both the animating and transcendent principles, the reality of the 
human individual and transcendent human realisation: the living, breathing and 
aspiring actuality of the individual human 'soul' (48, 458). Eliot's novel 
balances both living matter and transcendent spirit, despair and rapture, 
individual and community, brought together into the human individual who thus 
forms the basis of ethics and salvation, indeed individual self-realisation and 
communal human relations can only be effected on these terms. Middlemarch 
identifies and refuses the problematic aspects of Feuerbachian transcendence 
which ignores, absorbs, and effectively invalidates the individual. Casaubon's 
denial of life echoes Schopenhauer's condemnation of 'theoretical egoism, 
which.., holds all phenomena, excepting its own individual self to be phantoms, 
exactly as practical egoism does in respect of practical matters - a man regards 
and treats only his own person as a real person, and all others as mere phantoms' 
(WWI II §19, 37) rather than material reality, affirming her or his own egoistic 
will to the extent that 'the same will manifest in another individual' (IV §62, 
212) is denied. Eliot clearly argues the necessity of grounding both philosophical 
theory and practice in the living human, recognising the implications for 
Feuerbach's own vision of salvation that without our 'fellow-man.., the world 
would be... not only dead and empty, but meaningless' (Essence VIII, 82). In 
using the alchemic elements to symbolically represent the central characters and 
relationships in Middle,narch, particularly Dorothea's relationships with 
Casaubon and Will, Eliot's novel emphasises that without the principle of 
existential human life at its core the other necessary elements of life remain 
without meaning, either transcendent or corporeal, theoretical or practical. 
Ignoring this principle leads to the real danger of remaining polarised in self-
despair, as shown most disturbingly with Casaubon essentially trapping not only 
himself but Dorothea in his barren existence of fruitless researches amongst the 
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relics of the dead. 
	 This pessimism is paralleled in Lydgate's fate, its 
juxtaposition with Dorothea's escape from Casaubon and positive future with 
Will showing that certain relationships remain not only meaningless but 
essentially destructive42 . 
Whilst Dorothea's relationship with Will appears to provide the personal 
empathy, practical direction and activity they both need, on one level her 
relationship with Will appears to merely shift her subservience from trying to aid 
one man's great ideal to another's, thus still sacrificing herself albeit this time to 
the "right" course. It is clear, however, that their relationship is a mutual union 
not an assimilation, Dorothea "grounding" Will's floating inclinations into the 
necessary focus of living, breathing human life and a corporeal aim, his reaction 
to her propelling him into the determination to 'work my own way' 
(Middlemarc/z 22, 216). At the same time, Will values and acts upon Dorothea's 
opinion, his eventual work towards Reform echoing her own desires to actively 
relieve the miserable conditions affecting the community around them. The 
suggestion at the beginning of the novel that Dorothea might finally become a 
'foundress of nothing ... [whose] loving heart-beats and sobs after an unattained 
goodness tremble off and are dispersed among hindrances, instead of centring in 
some long-recognisable deed' (Prelude, 8) proposes that she may not achieve or 
effect the salvation she craves. That Dorothea has had a significant (if not 
lauded) impact on ordinary human lives (Finale, 795) questions the extent to 
which her influence can be argued to have been completely 'dispersed', however, 
and focuses on how the 'long-recognisable deed' (Prelude, 8) is itself interpreted. 
Eliot bases this in the 'unhistoric' (Finale, 795) nature of ordinary human lives, 
even if those equally unremarked lives do not know to whom they are indebted 
42 Dorothea is set in juxtaposition with Lydgate in the Finale. Lydgate not only 'always regarded 
himself as a failure [as] he had not done what he once meant to do' (Middlemarch Finale, 791) but 
is conscious that he has been effectively 'murdered' (792) by Rosamond. Lydgate's failure is not a 
mirror of Dorothea's final dissipation as she escapes her own 'doom' (48, 460) that her relationship 
with Casaubon effected, thus emphasising Dorothea's own escape from a similar fate. Whatever 
their future hardships, Dorothea's and Will's mutual I-thou relationship ensures they will not suffer 
this polarised despair. Mutually sympathetic human relationships are necessary to endure whatever 
webs entangle 'certain human lots' (15, 137), and thus how that ever-present sense of self-failure is 
perceived determines whether the 'rapturous consciousness of life beyond self (Prelude, 7) is ever 
realised. Dorothea's association with Lydgate and Rosamond does have some positive affects on 
Lydgate's lot and his relationship with Rosamond, yet this alone is insufficient to remedy Lydgate 
and Rosamond's essential incompatibility, marking a literally hopeless relationship which echoes 
Dorothea's and Casaubon's. Lydgate's fate is the perpetual despair of loneliness as Rosamond is 
unable to develop the spark of true I-thou relations and as such, both Lydgate and Casaubon are 
only relieved of their self-despair by death. 
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for any relief from their suffering. Theocritus' focus is on transient human lives 
given meaning through the immortalising elevation of the minstrel's song. Eliot 
shifts this song into Dorothea herself, who is personally forgotten rather than 
immortalised as it is the 'diffusive' effects she has on the world around her that 
continue to exist rather than Dorothea personally, who, once she has 'lived 
faithfblly a hidden life', rests 'in [an] unvisited tomb[]' (795). Placing 
Dorothea's "end" as merely 'the negative image of a successful transcendence' 
(Miller 145) ignores what it actually is Dorothea has been seeking and has 
achieved. She was seeking the balanced mid-point between despair and 
transcendence, and this becomes the necessary condition of her own realisation, 
providing the only form in and through which human salvation and positive I-
thou relations can be attained. Transcendence is only half the story, and is 
clearly a position which must simultaneously hold on to the fully human, 
recognise the equal presence of despair and thus truly ethical I-thou human 
relations which value both I and thou, Middlemarch countering those paths which 
perpetuate the elision of living, breathing human beings or the absorption of the 
individual. By the end of the novel Dorothea has attained that point of 
reconciliation between polarised despair and transcendence, and thus realises the 
path to salvation in more than purely personal terms, bringing not only 
reconciliation to the individual but identifying the path to ethical I-thou relations, 
albeit only in immediately Schopenhauerian terms. 
For Miller, the novel's solution ensures the 'problem... remains unsolved' 
(149), yet Middlemarch places both the problem and its means of address in 
Dorothea's quest for the reconciliation between polarity. Both the question and 
its potential for resolution are raised in Feuerbachian terms and addressed from a 
Schopenhauerian perspective. Middlemarch does not present a neat solution, but 
insists on the necessity of keeping a Schopenhauerian reality of human despair 
and the realisation of the existential individual always in view as the necessary 
basis of approach to the question. For Dorothea 'all that dirt and coarse ugliness 
like a pain within [her]' leads to the ethical challenge 'to alter the evils which lie 
under our own hands' (Middlemarch 39, 374). For Eliot it is human 
consciousness that effects this transition, but in fundamentally Schopenhauerian 
terms as 'pain must enter into its glorified life of memory before it can turn into 
compassion' (78, 741). This itself is rendered in pessimistic terms as the ability 
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to transform from despair into sympathy is precluded from many characters in 
essential terms, and if pain remains estranged from compassion, it leaves the 
sufferer 'tottering in the midst [of a world in ruins] as a lonely bewildered 
consciousness' (742). Casaubon is left in polarised despair and thus 'never to be 
liberated from a small hungry shivering self (29, 271), a very bleak and 
pessimistic vision. It seems that even the "perfect" Feuerbachian union between 
Dorothea and Will is one that can only occur through a rare and unique meeting 
of complementary elements which must keep the significance of that 
'involuntary, palpitating life' (80, 750) clearly in view. This ethical position 
offers the only means of salvation, and forms a vision of salvation which retains 
individual realisation as a necessary condition of communal realisation. Indeed, 
salvation itself becomes nothing more nor less than this very awareness, this 
balanced mid-point between the equal consciousness of 'self-despair' and 'life 
beyond self (Prelude, 7). This is the only route through which both individual 
realisation and broader community needs can be attained on any level, and even 
here only in a humble but immediate manner which may at the very least pass 
unnoticed, or even fail. Eliot moves away from Feuerbach's premise of 
inevitable teleological progress, through which the human condition will 
necessarily improve, by insisting on the perpetual presence of suffering, and the 
humble path to salvation. In moving into Schopenhauerian pessimism, Eliot 
stops short of Schopenhauer's refusal of any teleological improvement by 
suggesting that individual acts may have 'diffusive' effects on 'the growing good 
in the world' (795) (subject to essential character), a spark of teleological and 
broader spatial hope Schopenhauer refuses. 
The Feuerbachian moment of 'infinite joy' (Essence I, 6) in Dorothea's and 
Will's elemental union of perfect human essences is recognised as a necessarily 
finite moment rather than infinite, followed as it is by the knowledge of the 
'hindrances' (Middlemarch Prelude, 8) that come after, and coupled as it is with 
the insistence that the consciousness of self-despair for each finite individual 
remains the insistent basis as well as equal part of salvation. Dorothea's ongoing 
'feeling that there was always something better which she might have done, if 
she had only been better and known better' (Finale, 792) recognises that the 
Feuerbachian perfect self is endlessly receding into an unattainable future. 
Dorothea's and Will's union refuses the absolute optimism Feuerbach places in 
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this fusion of the individual with species-essence, Middlemarch recognising the 
pessimism inherent in the negation of the individual this appears to entail. 
Dorothea does continue to exist, albeit "diffusely", and crucially, in a 'new real 




Pessimism, Optimism, and Dissimulation. 
Thomas Hardy appears most likely to have come into contact with Schopenhauer 
through secondary sources first of all, and read Schopenhauer directly between 
the I 880s and early 90s, some years before the publication of Jude the Obscure 
between 1894 and 1896 1 . A selection of Schopenhauer's writings were translated 
and published from 18802, 
 and The World as Will and idea was first translated 
into English in 1883. According to Deborah Collins, Hardy read The World as 
Will and idea 'in the late I 880s' (61), although she does not show her sources for 
this3 . Carl Weber discusses only the Fourfold Root, which he claims Hardy 
purchased within 1 year of its publication in 1889 (219), suggesting that the 
extensive notes Hardy made in it show that it 'kept his mind and eye riveted' 
(221). According to Leimart Bjork, Hardy's Literary Notebooks show he 'may 
first have approached Schopenhauer through secondary sources before he read 
Jude the Obscure was initially serialised in Harpers New Monthly Magazine from December 
1894 to May 1895: Vol. 90, New York: Harper & Bros., 1895. The first instalment was entitled 
"The Simpletons", subsequent instalments "Hearts Insurgent", finally published in novel form as 
Jude the Obscure in 1896. 
2 The translations of Schopenhauer available in English during the 19th 
 century are as follows 
(source: COPAC, see Bibliography): 
Beethoven: With a Supplement from the Philosophical Works by Arthur Schopenhauer (1880) by 
Richard Wagner [includes "On visions and matters connected therewith" (1851) & "On the 
metaphysics of music" (1818)]. tr. Edward Dannreuther. London: Reeves, 1880. 
Religion: A Dialogue, and Other Essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, selected and translated (from 
Parerga and Paralipomena (1851)) by T. B. Saunders. London: S. Sonnenschein & Co, 
1889. 
Select Essays. tr. G. Droppers and C.A.P. Dachsel. Milwauke: Sentinel Co, 1881. 
Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, selected and translated by T. 
Bailey Saunders. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, [1872?]; 1891; 1892. 
The Complete Essays ofArthur Schopenhauer trans T. Bailey Saunders. New York: Willey, 1896. 
The World as Will and Idea (1819) tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 3 Volumes, London: 
TrUbner/Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1883-1886; 1891. 
Two Essays: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; On The Will in Nature. 
Tr. Mme Karl Hillebrand. London: Bohn's Philosophical Library/G. Bell & Sons, 1889. 
Walter Wright suggests that Hardy's copy of WWI could have been either the 1883 or the 1896 
edition (39). 
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Studies in Pessimism in May 1891' (LN Q. 28-31). Björk notes elsewhere that 
Hardy also owned The World as Will and Idea and Two Essays: The Fourfold 
Root, and On the Will in Nature (Oxford 388). WaIter Wright dates Hardy's 
copy of Two Essays as the 1889 edition (40). 
Björk finds that 'there are surprisingly few direct allusions' to 
Schopenhauer 'in Hardy's writing' (LN vi. 374) given the critical interest in this 
area. Hardy mentions Schopenhauer a number of times from 1881 onwards as 
well as noting a couple of extracts from Eduard von Hartmann 4 . Two of the 
secondary references to Schopenhauer in Hardy's Notebooks are particularly 
significant, however, as they suggest a fairly comprehensive exposure to 
Schopenhauer. The first is an extract from Theodule Ribot's La Philosophie de 
Schopenhauer, noted in 1886 or 7 in the original French. This describes 
Schopenhauer's Will or "Force" as the basis of all manifestations of life in 
substance and essence, as the reality of all existence, and the basis of knowledge, 
consciousness and suffering. It also includes a section about the tragedies of 
love, suffered for so little reward (Hardy LN vl, entryl 436, 182-3). The second 
is at least as pertinent as in early 1886 Hardy notes extracts from James Sully's 
substantial work Pessimism: A History and a Criticism (el 367-68, 170). This 
work is a critical discussion (in English) which includes fairly comprehensive 
discussions and comparisons of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, including a 
discussion of Schopenhauer's ethical 'virtue' (Sully 100-1), albeit Sully views 
both philosophers largely negatively (82-105). It seems evident from Hardy's 
own Notebooks then, that his secondary associations with Schopenhauer's 
thinking are fairly comprehensive by 1886, and by May 1891 at the latest Hardy 
is reading Schopenhauer directly, making notes from Schopenhauer's essays 
published as Studies in Pessimism (LN v2, el 782-1800, 28-31). As such, the 
'few direct allusions' (Bjork LNvI. 374) to Schopenhauer in Hardy's Notebooks 
may be less surprising if Hardy has access to substantial bodies of work 
including Sully, and by 1891 at the latest Schopenhauer directly. 
For Hardy's direct references to Schopenhauer, see Literary Notebooks vol. 1 (entry 1232, 141; 
e1367-8, 170; e1436, 182-3; e1529, 203; e1630, 219). Hardy's references to Eduard von 
1-lanmaim's Philosophy of the Unconscious are in vi (e14434, 185): see also Chapter 3 (76) above 
for discussion of von Hartinann. 
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As well as Hardy's well-known determination to ensure a particular version 
of himself is left to posterity 5, he is often contradictory in respect of certain 
works which may have influenced him, as Robert Schweik (68) and Björk 
(Oxford 388) also note6 . Weber argues that 'one must be all the more cautious in 
attempting to draw conclusions' (220) in the light of the number of erroneous 
claims made by critics on very little evidence. Whilst Weber claims that Hardy 
reads Fourfold Root in 1889, at least five years before Jude the Obscure is 
published, Weber ignores Jude in his own discussion, concentrating - like a 
number of critics - almost entirely on The Dynasts 7 . Unlike his fellow critics, 
however, Weber ignores von Hartmann here in seeing The Dynasts' emergent 
Consciousness as purely Schopenhauerian (224), whereas more recent critical 
assessments of Hardy recognise the influence of von Hartmann on this particular 
work8 . Schopenhauer emphatically refuses any idea of teleological progressive 
development, whether individual or evolutionary, and thus The Dynasts offers 
more useful relationships with von Hartmann than Schopenhauer on this level at 
least, albeit inverted into a more positive Consciousness than that espoused by 
von Hartmaim. Bjork shows that in 1908 Hardy 'claimed.., the Will in The 
Dynasts is "regarded as becoming conscious; & it teaches other evolutionary 
doctrines that have grown up since Schopenhauer's time ... 9, a view that also 
'makes him "hope" in the following year that his own philosophy is "much more 
modem than Schopenhauer" (Bjork Oxford 388). Whilst Hardy lists 
Schopenhauer among pessimistic philosophers 'who have my respect' (Personal 
58) as late as 1922, Björk argues that from 1907 Hardy begins distancing himself 
from Schopenhauer, and by 1924 'downgrades Schopenhauer's importance' 
(BjOrk Oxford 388)' 0. This does not mean that Hardy's later comments 
necessarily show an accurate assessment of his earlier reactions to 
Schopenhauer's philosophy, nor do Hardy's fluctuating emphases and assertions 
refute the potential influence that Schopenhauerian thinking may have had on 
Hardy destroying papers, which included 'most of his personal notebooks and diaries' (Bjork LN 
xxxi), and penning his own Biography, The Life of Thomas Hardy, to be published by Florence 
Hardy after his death. 
6 See also Michael Millgate Biography (199). 
See Deborah Collins (57-8), Helen Garwood (77),Ralph Goodale (253) and Robert Schweik (68). 
See especially Walter F. Wright and Deborah Collins. 
As Deborah Collins also notes (60-2). 
'° See also Hardy Thomas Hardy's Personal Writings (58), and Hardy Letters (vol.6, 259). 
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Jude, written a decade earlier than this 'sensitivity to remarks about his 
"pessimism" (Orel 58) appears to escalate. Even had .Hardy been absolutely 
clear about the extent of Schopenhauer's influence on any of his works, the 
specific nature of that relationship still remains to be examined. Considering 
Hardy's gradual attempts to distance himself from Schopenhauer between 1907 
and 1924, it seems a reasonable assumption that he will have been reading The 
World as Will and Idea some years before this period, and reasonable to assume 
this will have been at around the time he has left the clearest evidence of his 
active interest in Schopenhauer, therefore most likely between 1881 and 1891 
when he is reading his other primary Schopenhauer texts. 
Whilst Schopenhauer is frequently mentioned in critical appraisals of 
Hardy for much of the past century, this has largely been in relation to the most 
deeply pessimistic aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophical position, rarely 
addressing the nuances of Schopenhauer's philosophy nor how Hardy appears to 
engage with these - whether positively or negatively. The question of whether 
Hardy was influenced ' beyond the level of... popular summaries' (Schweik 69) 
of Schopenhauer's philosophy is an important one, not least because, as this 
thesis shows, the critic interpreting the extent of this influence is often prone to 
similar such generalisations. Most critics rarely unpack Schopenhauer beyond 
the popular themes of Will as blind purposelessness, and self-renunciation as the 
only route to salvation, and frequently equate the denial of the egoistic will-to-
4fe with negating the will-to-live, thus to be advocating suicide or self-
destruction in some form. Schopenhauer's ethical position involves the denial of 
what would more accurately be termed the selfish egoistic Will in order to effect 
the relief of suffering in 4fe, rather than a 'renunciation of life' (Schweik 69) 
altogether. Chapter 7 will examine the extent to which Hardy's novel engages 
with Schopenhauerian philosophy in specific terms, including how issues of 
character and ethics are delineated, and how the idea of renunciation is itself 
determined. 
Helen Garwood discusses Hardy and Schopenhauer, although the latter is 
unpacked in somewhat superficial terms, leaving the "illustration" to be 
presumed from the issues raised in a more general sense. Garwood discusses the 
irony of chance in Hardy's novels and how "brute chance" runs riot' (60), 
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arguing that 'fortunate chances, the saving encounters are never [his] theme', 
such one-sidedness 'mak[ing] it untrue to life as a whole' (61)". Ralph 
Goodale's judgement is that '[a]s Hardy had read from both' Schopenhauer and 
von Hartmaim, 'he could not himself have told to what extent he was indebted to 
either' (253), although Goodale does not examine the fundamental differences 
between them nor to what extent either evidence themselves in Hardy's works in 
specific terms. Goodale does point out that Hardy was writing about 'the cruelty 
of Nature in verse composed in 1866', seeing this as 'too early for probable 
influence from Schopenhauer' and relating Hardy's influences here 'to the 
disclosures of modem science' (253). Other influences are important 
considerations but nonetheless do not exclude Schopenhauer's influence on these 
issues in later decades. Walter Wright argues that 'Hardy was rather well 
acquainted with Schopenhauer's theories before he turned to the modification of 
them by Hartmann' (39). Wright also points out that, in 1893, Hardy finds the 
suggestion that a 'spiritual society' is 'slowly climbing' to ascendancy over a 
pessimism which 'has had its day' a 'comforting but false' (Hardy, quoted 
Wright 42) idea' 2 . Robert Schweik's discussion of Hardy and Schopenhauer is 
also invariably interlinked with von Hartmann, suggesting that the influence of 
both leads to Hardy's 'interest in more abstract questions about the nature of 
what fundamental force or forces might underlie the universe' as these concern 
Hardy more than a Feuerbachian and Comtean 'repudiation of religious belier 
and provision of 'an alternative to Christian ethics and values' (68). The issue of 
Feuerbachian influence will be addressed shortly, but in respect of Schopenhauer, 
Schweik finds Hardy's 'unsystematic and generalized "impressions"... no doubt 
Interestingly, Garwood states that Hardy's response to her query about the influence of 
Schopenhauer confirms that his philosophy is 'a development from Schopenhauer through later 
philosophers', thus Garwood argues that '[i]nfluence is too strong and definite a word for the result 
attained, sympathy comes nearer to it' (11). Garwood's interpretation of Hardy's reply is queried 
by Carl Weber, however, who suggests that Hardy's reply to Garwood actually states that his 
works 'show harmony of view with Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, flume, Mill, and others, all of whom 
I used to read more than Schopenhauer' (Hardy ci 911, quoted Weber 220, my emphasis), thus 
Hardy's letter to Garwood reflecting his post-1907 distancing of himself from Schopenhauer. 
12 See Hardy LN (v2, e1908, 55). This note by Hardy also quotes the Contemporary Review's 
comment that 'in philosophy Schopenhauer has given place to Hegel - the hope of cosmic suicide 
to the thought or this 'spiritual society' (55), so whether Hardy would agree with the Review's 
idea that it is Schopenhauer rather than von Hartmann who is associated with 'cosmic suicide' or 
sees that as equally 'false' is an interesting question, which again can only be addressed by 
analysing how potential influences manifest themselves in his works. 
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in part influenced by the writings of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann' (68) 1 
. 
Schweik also recognises an eclecticism in Hardy, who ties the 'central ideas' of 
both philosophers to 'such concepts as Herbert Spencer's suggestion that there 
may be no ultimate comprehension in the universe and John Stuart Mill's 
observation that consciousness may arise from unconscious causes' (68). 
Nonetheless, despite von Hartmann's divergence from Schopenhauer in 
fundamental respects, not least in his philosophical endpoint, Schweik 
concentrates predominantly on the "philosophy of life" underlying The Dynasts 
in his discussion, and at times implicitly joins those critics who see in this work 
an over-arching Hardyean philosophy (68) 1 
. 
Hardy's changes of opinion and emphasis permeate his writings, 
particularly his (auto)biography L(fe where he tries to preclude the 
"uncontrollable" would-be biographies' 5 . In 1907 for instance, over a decade 
after Jude is published, Hardy claims that in The Dynasts he uses a 'philosophy 
of life' which is 'a generalized form of what the thinking world had gradually 
come to adopt, myself included', that 'the Unconscious Will of the Universe is 
gradually becoming aware of Itself,., and ultimately, it is to be hoped, 
sympathetic' (Ltfè 334-5). This suggests a "positive" Hegelian contra a 
pessimistic von Hartmann evolutionary Consciousness, although Hardy also 
claims it is his 'own idea solely' (335). By December 1914, however, Hardy 
'would probably not have ended The Dynasts as he did.., if he could have 
foreseen what was going to happen within a few years' (368) with the outbreak 
of war. Many years earlier, in 1888, Hardy suggests an unconscious, static 
Schopenhauerian universe in noting that 'He, she, was ashamed and sorry; but 
not as the Prime Cause would be ashamed and sorry if it knew' (215). The 
following year Hardy notes the 'woeful fact' that 'the human race is too 
extremely developed for its corporeal conditions, the nerves being evolved to an 
activity abnormal in such an environment' (218), more suggestive of a Darwinian 
negativity as well as a pessimistic interpretation of Schopenhauer's human 
13 Patricia Ingham similarly argues that Hardy uses Schopenhauer and von Hartmann 'to present a 
more logical explanation for life's cruelty' but finds that Hardy evidences 'no final commitment to 
any of these ideas' (207). 
Including Garwood (77), Collins (57-8), Weber (224), Goodale (253), and see Walter Wright. 
15 See BjOrk Literary Notebooks (xxxi). 
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consciousness such as Sully recognises (Sully 94). In 1890, however, Hardy 
makes an observation which is deeply resonant of Schopenhauerian ethics, noting 
that 'Altruism.., will ultimately be brought about... by the pain we see in others 
reacting on ourselves, as if we and they were part of one body... members of one 
corporeal frame' (Lfè 224). This suggests that Hardy has by now moved from 
Sully's less nuanced interpretations into a direct engagement with Schopenhauer. 
There are also numerous examples where Hardy moves away from a focus on 
"essential laws" altogether. In 1893, a year before Jude first puts in an 
appearance in Harper's Magazine, there are two such instances on one page 
alone. The first is a report of a conversation about 'the marriage laws', involving 
such issues as 'the difficulties of separation' and 'the nervous strain of living 
with' someone 'you know.., can throw you over at any moment' (258). The 
second is Hardy's letter to the editors of Parisian newspaper L 'Ermitage, in 
which he wrote: 
I consider a social system based on individual spontaneity to promise better 
for happiness than a curbed and uniform one under which all temperaments 
are bound to shape themselves to a single pattern of living. To this end I 
would have society divided into groups of temperaments, with a different 
code of observances for each group. (258) 
These latter points show that Hardy speculates as much about sociological issues 
as "universal" ones, and it is evident that Hardy's opinions and emphases 
fluctuate across issues and time in his personal writings as well as his fiction. 
Jude the Obscure's relationship with both essential Nature and society forms the 
key focus of the analysis in Chapter 7, and will be shown to raise equally 
ambiguous questions about Jude's journey through life, but which nonetheless 
create a dynamic framework within which to approach potential answers. 
Hardy's conflicting and ambiguous opinions will be shown to relate directly to 
his recognition and prioritisation of the 'individual spontaneity' (258) he 
foregrounds in his letter to L 'Ermitage. On the last day of 1901 Hardy urges that 
'every man' should 'make a philosophy for himself out of his own experience. 
He will not be able to escape using terms and phraseology from earlier 
philosophers, but let him avoid adopting their theories if he values his own 
mental life' (310, original emphasis). The day after he notes his 'every man... 
philosophy' (310), Hardy states that 'pessimism... is the only view of life in 
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which you will never be disappointed' (311), suggesting that his 'every man' 
philosophy is nonetheless a predominantly pessimistic one. 
Whilst critics do recognise the eclecticism of Hardy's influences' 6, his 
eclecticism of viewpoints is at least as pertinent. Bjork finds that Hardy has 
'ambiguous feelings' in a number of areas, including sociological philosophy 
where Hardy disagrees with Comte's belief 'that the social feeling is as strong as 
selfish aspirations' as Hardy 'did not... believe that any significant growth of 
altruistic feelings had taken place' ("Reading" 109). Björk also suggests that 
Hardy is 'not likely to have sympathized whole-heartedly with the more 
pronounced anti-individualistic tendencies of Comte's social psychology' (109). 
Hardy's prioritisation of the individual, and the question of social feeling in both 
individual and community relations, will be shown to be central to the analysis of 
Jude, a novel which itself evidences apparent contradictions, not least in bringing 
both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian delineations of the world into 
prominence. 
The quest to examine the less pessimistic - even potentially optimistic - 
elements in Hardy's work began at least as early as the decade following the 
publication of Jude. Ernest Bates' 1905 essay argues that Hardy's 'religious 
pessimism' arises from the 'deepest misery... forced upon him by the... lack of 
justice in the soulless Order of Things' absolute[] carelessness of human 
happiness' (473), yet still finds that his novels attest to an 'heroic optimism' 
(469). Whilst Bates' argument implicitly recognises Schopenhauerian 
perspectives here, he also frames the optimism he sees overlying this pessimistic 
world in terms of the 'honor and purity.., found based firm as eternal nature in 
the very character of humanity' (471) where 'the law of cause and effect 
render[s] possible all ethical activity' (477). Bates does not discuss the specifics 
of this, however, let alone its Feuerbachian overtones, only emphasising that 'the 
world for Hardy is not a world where permanent happiness and tranquillity are 
generally attainable' as 'Misery is all about us, and increase of love inevitably 
brings increase of suffering' (484, my emphasis). Again an un-named 
o See Björk Literary Notebooks v2 (xxviii) and "Hardy's Reading" (103, 107-8, 112-13), Schweik 
(68), Geoffity Harvey (26) and Ingham (69). 
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Schopenhauer haunts Bates' argument, although the results of 'a worthy 
humanity, true to itself, unconquered by destiny, sanctified by love' (484) again 
echoes a Feuerbachian ethos. Whilst Bates does not examine how these issues 
operate, Jude refuses the noble sanctity of 'heroic optimism' (469), as Chapter 7 
will argue, yet the novel does raise the issues of ethics and 'eternal nature in the 
very character of humanity' (Bates 471) in specifically Feuerbachian terms. 
Hardy's direct contact with Feuerbach is less easily definable than with 
Schopenhauer, being mentioned but rarely in Hardy's personal writings. As 
Walter Wright argues, however, Hardy probably read 'most of the major 
philosophers' either 'in the original' or 'in paraphrases and commentaries' 
despite his autobiography and notebooks 'provid[ing] only fragmentary 
evidence' (28). Feuerbachian ideas were also fairly widespread amongst literary 
circles by the time Hardy's writing career is underway' 7 . In 1902 Hardy includes 
Feuerbach in an extract in which the antithesis between Hegel, for whom 'Man is 
the product of God', is opposed by the anti-Hegelian materialism of Feuerbach's 
'God is the product of Man' (LN Q. e2274, 166), and there are numerous entries 
which engage with Feuerbachian issues. These include the recognition (and 
often lament with Hardy) of a 'hollowness' in the Church which 'is in no true 
sense a real part of ourselves', having distanced itself from 'all that seething 
multitude of men & women' so that no 'thought or feeling.., habit or ceremony' 
was left untouched, leaving us 'worship[ping]' only 'the immediate' (LN vi. 
e1316, 156-7). Hardy also makes a number of references in his Literary 
Notebooks to other thinkers who engage with Feuerbachian issues to a greater or 
lesser extent, including William Clifford, thus the specific sources of 
Feuerbachian influences are quite difficult to determine. 
Clifford recognises society in exalted but also political Feuerbachian terms, 
seeing it as 'the highest of all organisms' where "actions which, as individual, 
are insignificant, are massed together into.., important movements. Co-
operation... is the life of [society]" (quoted Mallock Living 37). Further, it is 
co-operation (or 'band-work') that has created 'two specially human faculties, 
the conscience and the intellect', the former of which 'gives us the desire for the 
See Chapter 3 above. 
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good, and the latter instructs us how to attain this desire by action' (ibid). Whilst 
Clifford views 'Belier as a 'Sacred faculty' which 'is ours not for ourselves but 
for humanity' (Ethics 3), his emphasis is on its social applications. Hardy's 
references to Clifford in the Notebooks are often concerned with Clifford's 
arguments about consciousness in Nature, which Hardy has noted close to 
references to von Hartmann and Hegel as well as Feuerbach. Hardy's own 
response in 1892 to the view 'that.., a man's consciousness may be said to 
pervade the world' is that 'nothing is gained' as '[e]ach is, to all knowledge, 
limited to his own frame', Hardy unable to 'find the link.., of one form of 
consciousness with another' (LN vl. n1215, 371). At this point in time, then, 
Hardy's concern is with the practical, the achievable, rather than the transcendent 
evolutionary consciousness he later becomes interested in for The Dynasts. 
Hardy's reading is equally eclectic even within similar theoretical areas, 
including a number of broadly Positivist thinkers who themselves had differences 
of opinion and emphasis, including James Cotter Morison and Frederic Harrison 
who both make appearances in Hardy's Literary Notebooks, although Morison 
less frequently' 8. Morison identifies the focus of Christianity as 'an 
anthropomorphic deity' which is 'an infinitely glorified and exalted man' (43), 
recognising on a political level the damage that Christianity has caused to human 
aims (241). Morison is far more concerned with issues of social rather than 
personal transformation, and in more scientific terms, although he does tend 
towards a more negative view of human nature than Feuerbach. Harrison also 
appreciates that Christianity engendered a "pessimism as to the essential dignity 
of man" t9, and urges a Positivist vision that recognises the necessity for practical 
and effective improvements to human well-being. Harrison terms 'Religion... 
the combination of beliefs & emotions which train [man] to live the best life in 
the completest way' (quoted Hardy LN v2, el 650, 4). BjOrk notes Hardy's long-
lasting and close friendship with Harrison, their letters 'suggesting a harmony of 
attitudes and taste in various areas' including 'political and social events' and 
'the Positive view of the Universe', but also notes their friendship ended in 1919 
'when Harrison criticised the pessimism of Hardy's Moments of Vision' (Oxford 
'See Chapter 3 above for discussion of J. S. Mill, Clifford and Morison, amongst others. 
' Harrison quoted Mallock (Living 17, original emphasis). 
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183). To the last then, Hardy's 'every man... philosophy' (Life 310) may be 
exposed to a broad range of potential influences but nonetheless pursues its own 
direction. 
Few critics recognise a direct relationship between Hardy and Feuerbach, 
but Schweik is one of those exceptions 20. Schweik notes eight of what he terms 
Hardy's most predominantly influential philosophical thinkers, four generally 
influential and four where it is 'possible to identify [the effects] with somewhat 
greater specificity' (66), these latter four including both Schopenhauer (68-70) 
and Feuerbach (66-8). Schweik notes that 'Feuerbach's idea that the Christian 
god is the product of man's need to imagine perfection was twice summarized by 
Hardy in the phrase "God is the product of man": once in a notebook and again in 
a letter to Edward Clodd' (Schweik 65)21. 
 Schweik mentions Feuerbach's 
potential influence in The Return of the Native 22 , and that there are indications in 
some of Hardy's poetry in the human creation of god (66). Schweik does not 
discuss the potential influence of Feuerbach on Hardy beyond the general terms 
of "Man maketh God", however, nor unpack Feuerbachian issues in relation to 
Hardy's work in specific terms. Schweik discusses Comte and Positivism in 
much more depth than Feuerbach, including Hardy's own exposure to Comte, 
although does not examine the overlap between the Comtean ideas he discusses 
here and Feuerbach's own philosophy (such as altruism and the humanist 
adoption of the Christian love-thy-neighbour ethic). Schweik does point out that 
Hardy's response to Comte is 'qualified', and recognises that he particularly 
criticises 'the Positivists' optimistic view of human progress' (67)23. 
 The 
relationship between optimism and pessimism in Hardy's work is little-explored, 
most critics concerned only with pessimism on the whole, and frequently in 
"essentialist" terms, whether relating to the external order of nature or an internal 
failure of character. There is little assessment of the potential Feuerbachian 
influences on Jude on any level, let alone how the 'tragic machinery of the tale' 
(Hardy Jude Postscript viii) might be delineated in Feuerbachian terms. Whilst 
20 See also Deborah Collins (24), and discussion of Collins and potential optimism in Hardy below. 
21 See Hardy Literary Notebooks (v2 e2274, 166), and Hardy Letters (0, 244). 
22 - in the narrator's comment 'that humans always make a "generous endeavour to construct a 
hypothesis that shall not degrade a first cause" (Return V1.i, 387 cited Schweik 66). 
23 See also Hardy Personal (126-7). 
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Collins predominantly focuses on Schopenhauer, she does 'perfunctorily 
acknowledge' that the 'pessimism' in Schopenhauer's 'philosophy of the evil and 
essentially worthless nature of life.., was only one aspect of his complex theory' 
(62), although does not go on to examine the other aspects herself. Collins 
mentions but does not elucidate 'Schopenhauer's reserved optimism', mentioned 
rather intriguingly in terms of it not being that 'which attracted Hardy to 
[Schopenhauer's] ideas' (62). How Collins can know that Hardy was not 
influenced by 'Schopenhauer's reserved optimism' is not clarified, however, any 
more than what this reserved optimism might be. Whilst Collins does 
occasionally mention Feuerbach, arguing in similar terms to Schweik that Hardy 
'agreed in principle' with 'Feuerbach's message that "Man has his highest being, 
his God, in himself"24 , she believes Hardy 'approached it more cautiously' than 
George Eliot 'in practice' (24). Chapter 7 will argue that, in Hardy's ethical 
delineations in particular, Jude engages with both Schopenhauer and Feuerbach 
to create a specific framework in the novel which evidences what might be 
termed Hardy's own contingent pessimism rather than 'reserved optimism' 
(Collins 62) as such. 
Collins makes the arguable claim that 'Hardy recognised more astutely than 
any other Victorian novelist that all endings are fictions because however 
alluring resolution may seem, the "spinner's wheel onfleeing" continually 
unravels change upon change in pursuit of variation and impermanence' (147). 
That Hardy can be seen to be more astute than others here is clearly questionable 
in terms of a number of other authors, not least George Eliot as this thesis shows, 
Eliot engaging with the impermanence and fictitious nature of endings in the 
final stages of Middlemarch. This way of thinking about Hardy does, however, 
relate well to his refusal to adopt a single uniing theory or philosophical 
approach. Hardy's final book of poems, Winter Words, has in its introductory 
remarks the statement that 'no harmonious philosophy is attempted in these 
pages - or in any bygone pages of mine, for that matter' (Hardy Winter vi). 
Despite this, Collins argues that the final poem in the collection, "He Resolves to 
Say No More", itself represents a form of unification in denoting 'Hardy's final 
24 Collins quoting Feuerbach Essence (App. §1,281). 
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articulation', a final and deliberate 'silence' (Collins 154) which shows that 
Hardy is finally 'ready to "hush this dinning gear" and to escape the polyphonic 
clattering of voices he has sent into articulation over the past sixty years' (152). 
Here Collins ignores her own points which show that Hardy frequently engages 
with the idea of "the final end" in his poetry, and wonders whether some of his 
later works might be his last (147). Whilst Collins makes some interesting points 
regarding the relationship between Hardy and Schopenhauerian thinking in 
particular, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, here she denies Hardy's poetic voice 
its artistic integrity. In showing a Hardy figure resigned to death, Collins ignores 
the possibility that he may well have continued to write after completing this 
particular poem. Florence Hardy 'denied that the poem should be regarded as 
[Hardy's] final statement' and 'insisted that he had in fact experienced a great 
outburst of creativity late in 1927 and felt that he could almost have gone on 
writing indefinitely' (Millgate Biography 528). Norman Page warns against 
reading Hardy's works beyond the 'poetic deception' of the 'pseudo-
autobiographical fragment', the 'mendacious "I", as 'we ought always to bear in 
mind that the impulse of self-expression and self-revelation is constantly overlaid 
by the urge to make a formally satisfying "contraption" (Thomas Hardy 182-3). 
As such, even if Hardy specifically intended this poem to be his last published, 
and therefore to be read as though his final word - from his deathbed so to speak 
- it is a particularly Hardyean aesthetic, providing a closing chapter which 
explicitly refuses to allow any critical attempts to 'gather what I hide!' (Hardy 
"Resolves" 184). 
Laurence Lerner argues that the little objective "evidence" that remains 
after Hardy's meticulous preservation of his privacy gives us little insight into 
Hardy's 'process of composition', and even 'less about Hardy's philosophy of 
life than the "official" [Hardy ghost-written] biography already has' (80). This is 
an important point when considering• the influences of philosophical and other 
contemporary thought on Hardy's writing. At the same time, Lerner critiques 
attempts which end in 'arbitrariness as an aesthetic criterion' (83), and this is 
equally pertinent. Schweik points out that, as many of Hardy's potential 
influences often overlap with one another, 'identification of how they affected 
Hardy's work must sometimes be no more than a tentative pointing to diverse 
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and complex sets of possible sources whose precise influence cannot be 
determined' (54). Hardy's scepticism and hesitancy 'to embrace wholeheartedly 
any of the various systems of ideas current in his day', and the use of such 
tending to be 'unsystematic and inconsistent "impressions", also ensures that 
'elements of contemporary thought in Hardy's works tend to be embedded in a 
densely intricate web of imaginative connections and qualifications' (Schweik 
54). At the same time, it is of course possible to analyse Hardy's literary 
writings and ascertain which issues are of concern to him in particular works, and 
how he engages with them. It is clear that Hardy's influences are diverse and 
eclectic, as indeed are Eliot's, but where Eliot increasingly recognises the 
tenuousness and failings of any holistic view of the future (hence the 
tremulousness of the optimism in the ethical salvation in Middlemarch), Hardy 
deliberately avoids an holistic view, weaving a complex and fluctuating series of 
world-views within an over-arching cynicism in Jude the Obscure through which 
the central protagonists Jude and Sue try to negotiate their way. Nonetheless, as 
Chapter 7 will argue, Jude does evidence a dynamic yet consistent framework in 
which both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian perspectives play a central role. 
It is clear that Hardy certainly read Schopenhauer and is familiar with 
Feuerbachian thinking, leaving written evidence in quotations, allusions, and 
even denials which confirm he actively engaged with a broad range of 
pessimistic and optimistic thinking during his career. Even had Hardy declared 
that his novels had been directly influenced by either Schopenhauer or 
Feuerbach, however, it would still remain for the forms of that influence to be 
ascertained, whether positive or negative in form and whether minutely or only 
generally evident. 
Collins recognises that Hardy expresses both optimistic and pessimistic 
"voices", but returns to The Dynasts as somehow encompassing Hardy's 
complete philosophy, arguing that Hardy's 'silence' in "He Resolves" and the 
ethos of The Dynasts leaves Hardy resolved 'to say no more', yet 'informing 
God's emerging percipience' by 'silently reiterating... his faith in immanent 
goodness' (166, my emphasis). There are obvious flaws in an argument which 
conflates all of Hardy's literary works into one holistic philosophy with an 
impossible presumption of meaning from Hardy's silence. Collins enigmatises 
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Hardy's finally unavoidable silence to present us with 'a silence which comprises 
his entire canon', leaving 'his last line' as 'his avenging shade, to resonate with 
possibilities hopefiñ and gloomy' and bequeathing his readers 'a round collective 
[of work] which we can finally possess and understand' (169). It is the ease that 
'possibilities' both 'hopeful and gloomy' (Collins 169) are evident in Jude, but it 
is important to identify what these are and how they operate, and what insight 
and perspective they provide for Hardy's work without attempting to identify an 
holistic philosophical approach which somehow encompasses all of Hardy's 
canon onto one text. Andrew Radford argues that Hardy 'moves promiscuously' 
between 'styles which best appeal to his own idiosyncratic temperament' (101) 
and, in some of his works, 'undercuts the ideologically limiting construction' of 
him 'as a pessimistic author' (111)25. 
 Roger Robinson makes a equally pertinent 
point in seeing it as 'a mistake.., to cite any one version' of Hardy's "Life Force" 
as his 'ultimate theological conclusion, as so many interpreters have jostled to 
do' because 'each version is so imaginatively appropriate to the mood of its 
context' (135). For Robinson, Hardy seems 'to have operated always at a 
personal rather than philosophical level.., inventing such variations of the Life 
Force as he needed them, to explain humanity's plight, to blame for it, or to make 
it bearable' (135). This is why Hardy does not evidence a 'final answer' about 
his "philosophy".., and it is a mistake to read him as if he tries to do so' 
(Robinson 147). 
Hardy is frequently ambivalent, his comments often contradictory or 
evasive depending on where and to whom he is speaking. In the 1895 Preface to 
the first volume edition of Jude, Hardy places the novel as an 'endeavour to give 
shape and coherence to a series of seemings, or personal impressions, the 
question of their consistency or their discordance, of their permanence or their 
transitoriness, being regarded as not of the first moment' (Preface, vi). Yet these 
'seemings' are equally given a more concrete form in his claim that the novel: 
• ..attempts to deal unaffectedly with the fret and fever, derision and 
disaster, that may press in the wake of the strongest passion known to 
humanity; to tell, without a mincing of words, of a deadly war waged 
25 
- albeit Radford not including Jude in these less pessimistic works. 
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between flesh and spirit; and to point [to] the tragedy of unfilled aims, 
[and] I am not aware that there is anything in the handling to which 
exception can be taken. (vi) 
That exception was indeed vociferously taken in a number of quarters apparently 
led Hardy to give up writing novels, a similar uproar with both Tess and the 
volume publication of The Well-Beloved leading Hardy to declare an 'end[]' to 
'his prose contributions to literature, his experiences of the few preceding years 
having killed all his interest in this form of imaginative work' (Ljè 286). In a 
letter written in 1895, Hardy claimed that the "grimy" features' of Jude 'go to 
show the contrast between the ideal life a man wished to lead, and the squalid 
real life he was fated to lead' (Collected v2, 93)26•  The question of what Hardy 
sees as perverting Jude's aspirations is suggested in that Jude 'is really... about 
two persons who, by a hereditary curse of temperament, peculiar to their family, 
are rendered unfit for marriage, or think they are' rather than 'a sort of manifesto 
on the marriage question' (93). Whilst this 'hereditary curse or temperament' 
and Hardy's first preface regarding the purpose of Jude appear to suggest a 
somewhat "essentialist" perspective in the novel, Chapter 7 examines the 
relationship between issues of determinism and what Hardy himself later terms 
'the tragic machinery of the tale' (Jude Postscript, viii) in the postscript added to 
the 1912 edition. This later Postscript denotes a change of emphasis regarding 
the frames of reference for Jude, avoiding much of the ambivalence of the first 
Preface and his earlier letters and identifying the key concerns of the novel in 
more explicit - and less essentialist - terms. Here Hardy recognises the 
prominent and iniquitous role that 'the civil law' plays in the tale, as this 'should 
be only the enunciation of the law of nature' (viii). Hardy argues that 'a marriage 
should be dissolvable as soon as it becomes a cruelty to either of the parties - 
being then essentially and morally no marriage' (viii) but instead, we have 'the 
forced adaptation of human instincts to rusty and irksome moulds that do not fit 
them' (ix). Chapter 7 will analyse the role of essentialism in the novel, and the 
significance of its relationship with 'the civil law' (viii) on a number of levels. 
John Paterson points out that the manuscript of Jude shows 'what was undertaken 
as a critical examination of the educational system in Hardy's time came... in its 
26 See also Hardy Selected (101); and Ltfe (271). 
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working out, to take in an equally critical examination of the sacrament and 
institution of marriage' (328), the extent and the philosophical context of which 
will be examined. 
Hardy's novel finds 'its tragedies in the forced adaptation of human 
instincts to rusty and irksome moulds which do not fit them', and thus not only 
delineates a clear indictment of contemporary 'marriage laws' and other 
'venerable institutions' (Hardy Jude Postscript ix) such as the educational 
colleges in the novel, but marks the relationship between human nature and 
social institutions as very significant indeed. Chapter 7 will examine how Jude 
the Obscure engages with both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian delineations 
of determinism, human nature, ethics and social mores in relation to the quest for 
salvation - for the fiJfilment of Jude's aspirations and personal happiness in life. 
In this analysis, Hardy's novel will be shown to evidence a dynamic framework 
which incorporates two co-existing but not mutually exclusive worlds within 
which Jude and Sue are subject to conflicting forces. In examining how a sense 
of pessimistic fatalism operates alongside the obstacles to Jude's salvation, in the 
plot, narrative, and denouement, Chapter 7 will show how Jude's footsteps are 
constantly haunted by other, less pessimistic, possibilities which shadow his and 
Sue's journey. In Jude, Hardy signposts those elements which act as the triggers 
to disaster whilst also showing how these same elements offer the means to an 
alternative ending, one in which individual realisation and a more sympathetic 
social dynamic might have been possible. As such, Jude the Obscure is haunted 
by the possibility of salvation. 
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Chapter 7 
Jude the Obscure, 1896. 
'Nature's Logic' and the Crippling 'Gin Trap': 
Overlapping Circles of Tragedy and Salvation. 
'Nature's logic was too horrid for him to care for. That mercy 
towards one set of creatures was cruelty towards another 
sickened his sense of harmony. As you got older, and felt 
yourself to be at the centre of your time, and not at a point in 
its circumference, as you had felt when you were little, you 
were seized with a sort of shuddering, he perceived. All around 
you there seemed to be something glaring, garish, rattling, and 
the noises and glares hit upon the little cell called your l(fe, 
and shook it, and warped it'. 
'the social moulds civilization fits us into have no more 
relation to our actual shapes than the conventional shapes of 
the constellations have to the real star-patterns'. 
Thomas Hardy Jude the Obscure 1896' 
I. Schopenhauerian consciousness and Jude's haunted landscape: 'ghostly 
presences' and 'the defective real 
In Jude the Obscure, Thomas Hardy uses light as a key element to express a 
yearning towards something beyond the world in which the central character 
finds himself, in some respects echoing George Eliot's use of light in 
Middlemarch. In Eliot's novel, Dorothea's yearning towards light represents her 
desire for self-transcendence, but this is necessarily grounded in the practical, 
corporeal world. Light also exists in essentialist terms in Middlemarch, part of 
an elemental relationship between the different qualities inherent in individual 
character (albeit in imbalanced form and remaining essentially and 
pessimistically inaccessible for some characters). In Jude, however, light is in 
key respects representative of aspiration in a more traditional sense whilst 
'Jude the Obscure. 1896. London: Penguin Books, 1994, (Part!. Chapter ii, 15; & Part IV.i, 245). 
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simultaneously undermining the accessibility of that dream. Jude's 'yearning of 
his heart to find something to anchor on, to cling to - for some place which he 
could call admirable' leads him to see Christminster as the vision of a better 
future for himself, hoping to achieve an education and a learned career in the 
'city of light' (Hardy Jude Part I. Chapter iii, 24), but his quest is revealed to be a 
false vision from the beginning of the novel. Jude must learn to see through his 
false perceptions of the world as his 'happy temporal life.., amid the sufferings 
of countless other people... is only... a dream from which he must awake in 
order to find out that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the suffering 
of his life' (Schopenhauer WWIJV §63, 218). That Jude is not alone in aspiring 
for something beyond his narrow circumstances not only brings significant 
parallels to his own journey in the experiences of both Sue and Phillotson, but 
their shared means of defeat is of as much significance as their shared 
aspirations. It is no small irony that it is his effective predecessor Phillotson who 
Jude mistakenly imagines 'promenading at ease' in 'the glow' (Jude I.iii, 21) of 
Christminster when in fact Phillotson's dream has already failed 2 . Whilst Jude's 
landscape is 'haunted' by 'ghostly presences' (ll.i, 94) who are on a key level the 
figurative spectres of Jude's genealogical and aspirational ancestors, they also 
appear to be pre-empting his own failure which is seen as somehow an 
inevitability, a 'predestinate' (I.vii, 49) fate. This chapter will examine the 
novel's apparently ambiguous relationship between an essentialist, deterministic 
universe and the social world of human agency. In analysing how Jude appears 
to be inescapably trapped within the cyclical rhythms of a Schopenhauerian 
vision of existence, this chapter will discuss the extent to which he is subject to 
the same 'restless strain and stress... passing continuously from wish to fear... 
joy to sorrow' (Schopenhauer WWI IV, §71, 261) that all manifestations of the 
will-to-life are 'involved in' - a 'constant suffering.., without any lasting 
happiness' (IV §56, 195). In Jude's own position as 'seeming... almost his own 
ghost' (Jude II.i, 94), however, there is a subtle but crucial shift in emphasis. 
Whilst on one level this reflects the apparently pre-determined Schopenhauerian 
landscape of repetitive failure, it simultaneously reveals his own role as the latest 
2 When Jude discovers Phillotson's failure, it 'destroy[s] at one stroke the halo which had 
surrounded the schoolmaster's figure in Jude's imagination ever since their parting' (Jude lI.iv, 
120). 
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in a progression of failed dreamers on an entirely different level. Jude's own 
'ghostly presence[]' (94) leads Hardy's novel into specifically Feuerbachian 
territory, occupying a key link between two distinct philosophical and corporeal - 
but not mutually exclusive - levels of existence. 
In Jude the aspirational future which 'the city of light' (Liii, 24) represents 
is revealed as a mirage from the beginning, as Jude's visionary light is always 
juxtaposed with oppositional or negative imagery. Jude's first sight of 
Christminster is infused with what he has already created in his imagination as 
his earthly and spiritual salvation, the sunlight glinting upon '[t]he heavenly 
Jerusalem' (18) reveals a vision shining like a jewel. This vision is immediately 
exposed as a mirage, and particularly as a fatal end to his aspirations (and even 
his life) as the 'shine' goes out 'almost suddenly like extinguished candles' (19). 
Jude's shimmering vision of hope is revealed to be a 'funereally dark... 
chimra[]' (24), yet in his hopes and dreams it continues to shine as a vision of 
possibility. The light of Christminster represents a false hope for Jude, being 
'only a fleeting illusion' which 'separate[s] him from the suffering of his life' 
(Schopenhauer WWI IV §63, 218), as the pessimistic reality beneath his dreams 
will gradually reveal to him. Constantly juxtaposed with his vision of light is the 
overt negativity of Jude's landscape, a dark and brooding world to which Jude is 
fundamentally connected, traversed as it is by 'the too familiar road towards the 
upland whereon had been experienced the chief emotions of his life' (Jude I.xi, 
86). Jude is situated in a 'bleak open down' (I.ii, 16) from the beginning, a 
landscape in which his parents separated and his mother later drowned herself 
(I.xi, 82; 86), where he first sees Christminster lit up in its false glory (I.iii, 19-
20) and begins his disastrous relationship with Arabella (I.vii, 50-I). This same 
landscape is where he is beaten by Farmer Troutham (I.ii, 15), and later attempts 
his own suicide-by-drowning (I.xi, 83) once he realises he and Arabella are 
trapped in their marriage, and it is where his ancestry has associations with the 
gibbet which used to stand here (I.xi, 82-3). His final visit to that landscape is 
his "suicidal" last visit to Sue, an 'uphill walk' (VI.viii, 464) undertaken in ill 
health, where Jude courts his final destruction 'in the teeth of the north-east wind 
and rain' through which he 'pursued his way' (468). 
FAIM 
William Siebenschuh argues that 'Hardy's symbolic use of a highly 
personal sense of the relations between identity, community and place' delineates 
a landscape which is a 'rich new language for revealing aspects of character and 
registering.., social, class, and moral distinctions' (774). Siebenschuh's concern 
is not with the 'general rubric of the concept of place' (the focus of much Hardy 
criticism), but 'a metaphor' for what Hardy perceives in 'the psychologically 
"dislocated" condition of modem men and women' (775-6), Jude dissociated 
from his landscape through migration 3 . For Siebenschuh, landscape is 
psychologically representative of 'both the causes and the effects of the 
emptiness, disconnection, and sense of exclusion that will characterize Jude... 
and be echoed symbolically again and again' (777) in the novel. Landscape 
becomes a 'symbolic.., medium rather than the primary object of perception' 
(778), carrying: 
the connections between physical places and the larger issues of identity 
and belonging.., in part because of [Hardy's] keen sense of the literal 
presence of the past in physical objects and spaces and in part because of 
his certain knowledge that the old physical ties between people and places 
were being destroyed by the changing modem world. (780) 
For Siebenschuh, if Jude could recover a sense of connection with his 
community-landscape, this would provide a positive and sustaining sense of 
'continuity' (775)4, 
 Whilst Jude is situated within this framework of dislocation 
from tradition and community, and an historic landscape which reflects this on 
one level, this chapter will show that these 'larger issues of identity and 
belonging' and those 'old physical ties' are registered in largely negative terms, a 
negativity fundamentally connected to Jude's alienation and his tragedy. 
Jude's landscape has 'attached associations enough and to spare' for him in 
a rich 'history' (Jude I.ii, 10) of aspiration, work, and love, but these are the 
negative associations of inevitable failure. It is in Jude's landscape that 'songs' 
Siebenschuh is explicitly developing Michael Millgate's recognition of Hardy's use of landscape 
in his final novel as one which (contra his previous novels) 'is singularly devoid of individuality 
and association' (Millgate Biography, 332 quoted Siebenschuh 776). Patricia Ingham discusses 
Hardy's use of landscape as one which marks passing generations of 'past and present human 
beings who share reciprocal relationship with it', albeit where 'nothing is static or certain' (8). 
Siebenschuh's argument takes an assertion Hardy makes in the Preface to Far from the Madding 
Crowd forwards to Jude: that the 'supplanting of the class of stationary cottagers, who carried on 
the local traditions and humours,.by a population of more or less migratory labourers... has led to a 
[fatal] break of continuity in local history... [and thus] close intersocial relations' (Hardy Madding 
Preface, quoted Siebenschuh 782). 
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of 'harvest', 'spoken words' and 'sturdy deeds', 'energy, gaiety' and 'love 
promises' have become 'bickerings, weariness', rejection and the 'trembl[ings]' 
(10) of love turned sour. These 'echoes' (10) of the past represent Jude's 
community history, and also symbolise the transient nature of life and happiness. 
Both of these are placed on a Schopenhauerian philosophical level as here it is 
the ephemeral nature of individual aspirations and existence which predominates. 
Jude's landscape is where: 
Every individual, every human being and his life-span is only one more 
short dream in the mind of the endless spirit of nature, of the persistent will 
to life; is only another fleeting form which it playfully sketches on its 
infinite page - space and time - allows to remain for a moment so brief that 
it is infinitesimal by comparison, and then rubs out to make room again... 
every one of these fleeting forms, these shallow notions, must be paid for 
by the whole will to life, in all its passion, with much profound pain, and 
finally with a bitter death. (Schopenhauer WWI IV §58, 204). 
In Jude 'everyone' is the Schopenhauerian will-to-life 'whose manifestation is an 
ephemeral existence, an always vain, constantly frustrated endeavour' (IV §68, 
250), both the 'energy' and 'gaiety' becoming 'weariness' (Jude I.ii, 10). Jude's 
landscape is one haunted by perpetual failure, a place where 'all endeavour 
springs from... discontent with one's condition' but 'no satisfaction is lasting, 
rather it is always merely the starting-point of a new striving' which is in turn 
'frustrated', thus engendering more 'suffering' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §56, 
195). Jude is conscious of his subjection to the external forces of nature, and is 
simultaneously conscious that this jars against his sense ofjustice, as: 
Nature's logic was too horrid for him to care for. That mercy towards one 
set of creatures was cruelty towards another sickened his sense of harmony. 
As you got older, and felt yourself to be at the centre of your time, and not 
at a point in its circumference, as you had felt when you were little, you 
were seized with a sort of shuddering, he perceived. All around you there 
seemed to be something glaring, garish, rattling, and the noises and glares 
hit upon the little cell called your life, and shook it, and warped it. (Jude 
I.ii, 15) 
Schopenhauer's blind, non-moral and all-consuming will-to-life creates Jude's 
world, each manifestation of the will oppressing another as 'everywhere in nature 
we see strife, conflict, and the fickleness of victory, and... the discord which is 
essential to the will... compet[ing] with the others for matter, space, and time' 
(Schopenhauer WWI II §27, 73-4). This simultaneously sets itself against his 
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sense of ethical justice as a consciously aware and suffering being, and resonates 
within the Schopenhauerian vision of the external world which operates here. 
Helen Garwood notes that a 'feeling of gloom in nature analogous to the 
gloom of man' in Hardy's works is 'of trivial importance beside the sense of a 
lack of order in the outside world' (28). Like Siebenschuh, U. C. Knoepflmacher 
recognises the linic between Jude and his landscape, albeit in more negative terms 
as Jude's choices in life are represented by the roads and places he chooses, but 
these choices/places fail for both Jude and Sue because their 'wanderings have 
been circular, overlapping, objectless' (Laughter 210). Jude's return to 
Christminster is to 'a necropolis, the burial ground of dead illusions' and 'the 
only road left for Jude to travel leads to the obscurity of the grave' (210). Whilst 
Knoepflmacher does not move beyond this immediate connection, nor explicitly 
align Jude's world with the Schopenhauerian will-to-life here, the link between 
Jude and landscape and in particular his fellow creatures appears on this level to 
emphasise that all corporeal phenomena, including the human, are merely 
manifestations of the Schopenhauerian will and subject to all of its forces, both 
on the micro and the macro-cosmic scale. 
The juxtaposition of Jude's negative landscape with his false vision of 
Christminster and his sense of intimate connection with his fellow creatures 
frames Jude within a pessimistic world where he appears doomed to failure from 
the start. Jude's misconceptions of his world are Schopenhauerian in his dream-
like idealism which ignores the reality of his existence, focussing on 'the future' 
which 'contain[s] only concepts and fancies' whereas 'the present is the essential 
form of the phenomenon of the will, and inseparable from it' (WWIIV §54, 181). 
Where the 'halo' of light over Christminster 'had been to his eyes when gazing at 
it a quarter of an hour earlier, so was the spot mentally to him as he pursued his 
dark way' (Jude I.iii, 24) - ostensibly home, but also framing his journey through 
life as an equally dark way across that 'bleak open down' (I.ii, 16). The 
Schopenhauerian reality beneath Jude's visions is revealed, as the 'happy 
temporal life... amid the sufferings of countless other people... is only... a 
dream from which he must awake in order to find out that only a fleeting illusion 
had separated him from the suffering of his life' (WW1 IV §63, 218). Jude's 
apparently fatally pre-determined landscape is the world of external Nature, the 
First Cause or will-to-life. Within this existential world Jude seems to be no 
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more than a puppet in a repetitive cycle of human suffering - of hope and 
inevitable failure - suggesting that his own failure is pre-told, 'predestinate' 
(Jude I.vii, 49). On a key level there is a profound sense of negativity and loss 
inhabiting Jude's landscape, visible in the 'ghostly presences' (II.i, 94) of his 
forebears. Jude is 'haunted' yet fundamentally alone in 'a wide and lonely 
depression' (I.ii, 9) of the land which is 'the scene of his labours' and of 
'accentuated.., solitude', and into 'the midst' of which he 'descend[s]' (10). 
Jude's descent into the landscape suggests a negative entrance into his own life 
and circumstances from the start, and is evocative of what is on one level a 
"universal" human condition within a landscape where the failed aspirations of 
endless generations invisibly linger, their perpetual life-cycle of hope and failure 
echoing around him. Jude's final 'uphill walk' (VI.viii, 464) towards the end of 
the novel reflects the grindingly hard task that his existence has involved, its 
metaphorical familiarity again echoing a common "universal" human condition 
within a Schopenhauerian pessimistic framework. This cycle of perpetual 
disappointment is not just the transient nature of contemporary life for 
agricultural and village labourers and artisans, or the rapidly changing 
agricultural climate which has wrought such dramatic changes to a long history 
of relative stability, but represents the necessarily transient nature of hope and 
happiness in human existence. At the same time, however, Jude does experience 
moments of rare but 'true illumination' (II.ii, 100, my emphasis), not only 
recognising the reality of his situation outside of his visionary dreamscape at 
times but also that there are alternative routes to satisfaction. His recognition that 
his skill as a stonemason 'was a centre of effort as worthy as that dignified by the 
name of scholarly study' (100) is one of those moments. Jude initially loses sight 
of these brief glimpses of reality 'under stress of his old idea', however, the novel 
positioning Jude and his false vision within the 'modem vice of unrest' (100). 
This is a vision of modernity within which Jude's "fatal flaw" appears to be his 
inability to fully recognise the 'deadly animosity of contemporary logic and 
vision towards so much of what he held in reverence' (101). This sets up a clash 
not only within modernity itself, and particularly the displacement of Jude's 
historic community by the pressures and changes of modem life, but taps into a 
deeper philosophical relationship between Jude and the world he inhabits on two 
fundamental levels. Jude's landscape shows that he inhabits a Schopenhauerian 
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world, but also identifies another key level of existence which has a more 
significant role to play in the tragedy. That Jude is 'almost his own ghost' (ll.i, 
94) there places his landscape into a different framework altogether. Whilst Jude 
inhabits an unconscious Schopenhauerian universe, another world is operating on 
a more conscious level, and gradually reveals itself to him. 
In this first Schopenhauerian world, Jude is caught within an apparently 
pre-determined pessimistic landscape which is as relevant to his own character 
and motives as it is to the unconscious world around him. For Knoepflmacher 
Jude 'take[s] up the dilemma of characters who discover that their identities are 
predetennined', and '[f]or Jude and Sue, this discovery only accentuates their 
helplessness' as 'a man's capacity for change does not match the motions of the 
fluctuating world into which he is placed' (Laughter 212). Yet this idea of 
helplessness in the face of predetermined nature is only half the story. The will-
to-life: 
.is the inmost nature, the kernel, of every individual thing, and also of the 
whole. It is manifest in every force of nature that operates blindly, and it is 
manifest, too, in the deliberate action of man; and the great difference 
between these two is a matter only of degree in its manifestation, not in the 
nature of what is made manifest. (Schopenhauer WWIII §21, 42) 
Whilst this has implications for the relationships between characters in the novel, 
as will be discussed shortly, Jude's landscape is also one in which '[n]ot a soul 
was visible' (Jude I.iii, 17), a landscape of 'accentuated... solitude' (I.ii, 10) both 
spatially and temporally, thus it remains a fundamentally alienating place for 
Jude - albeit on more complex levels than may at first appear. Jude's fellow 
travellers along the implicitly negative 'path athwart the fallow by which he had 
come' (10) are Jude's contemporary dreamers Sue and Phillotson. Phillotson's 
own failure not only foreshadows Jude's subsequent failure but will be seen to 
impact on the schoolmaster's own relationships with both Jude and Sue. 
Arabella also plays a significant role in Jude's journey and its culmination in 
despair, a despair Sue not only also reaps but marks in both corporeal and 
philosophical terms, as will become clear, leaving Arabella the only real survivor 
among them as Phillotson's own victory is a hollow one. Siebenschuh argues 
that as Jude cannot read the history of the landscape around him, he therefore has 
'no access to' and 'cannot be sustained by a sense of continuity within a 
particular community' (775). Yet whilst Jude's first real experience of failure 
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leaves him wishing 'that he had never been born' (Jude I.iv, 31), it is crucially 
that 'nobody' came - 'because nobody does' - which ensures Jude is left 
perpetually isolated, even within his society, and thus 'continue[s] to wish 
himself out of the world' (32, my emphasis). Whilst a predestined sense of 
failure haunts Jude throughout the novel, it is his relationships with other people 
which are fundamental in engendering his hope in life, and his despair. In a key 
sense, for Jude the death of his hopes and dreams is the death of himself, and that 
the novel places Jude as somehow already a ghost within his negative landscape 
is intrinsically connected to his sense of alienation and the role that his society 
plays in the tragedy. In considering the relationship between the idea of 
determinism and character here, Jude's most prominent characteristic after that of 
his dreams (his aspirations, and his imaginative constructions overlying reality) 
is his sense of sympathy with others who, like the birds in Troutham's field 
'seemed, like himself, to be living in a world which did not want them' (I.ii, 11). 
Jude feels himself to be in the same position as they, 'for his aunt had often told 
him that she was not [interested in him]' (11). One issue here is the relationship 
between character and the question of 'what' a character 'was born to be' (lviii, 
266); and another is the relationship between human sympathy and the nature of 
the external forces to which Jude and Sue (and for that matter, the birds in 
Troutham's field) are subject. In continuing with the link between Jude and 
Nature as a blind and pervasive force, and which apparently predetermines Jude's 
character, there is a particularly strong element of Nature that is as much a part of 
Jude as it is part of the Schopenhauerian will-to-life, and which appears to 
compel Jude against his own volition. 
Arabella's role in Jude's tragedy illustrates a central ambiguous issue, 
Arabella appearing most clearly in the role of sexual determinism in some form. 
Yet she is also a key element in understanding the relationship between the idea 
of a predestinate fate and human agency in the novel. Arabella's intervention 
thwarts Jude's plans, not just in the beginning but throughout the novel, and 
proves to be a determining factor in Jude's tragedy, thus it is important to 
examine how this operates. The question here is whether and how she represents 
an element of Jude's predestined failure on the level of a Schopenhauerian blind 
universe. Jude is day-dreaming when he first meets Arabella, the paradox 
between the chimerical nature of Jude's dreams and Arabella as the first major 
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stumbling block to realising them is illustrated by Jude staring at the ground 'as 
though the future were thrown thereon by a magic lantern' (I.vi, 41) when he is 
disturbed from this vision by Arabella throwing the pig's penis at him. 
Arabella's missile spells out her objective in explicitly carnal rather than sensual 
terms, but more fundamentally, in terms of a predestinate (lvii, 49) moment 
where that 'unvoiced call of woman to man, which was uttered very distinctly by 
Arabella's personality, held Jude to the spot against his intention - almost against 
his will, and in a way new to his experience' (lvi, 44). It also links Jude's own 
life with that of the pig he is later forced to slaughter, with whom Jude 
empathises. Jude momentarily recognises the pertinence of Arabella's missile 
'with his intellectual eye, just for a short fleeting while, as by the light of a falling 
lamp' before he is 'enshrouded in darkness... and Jude was lost to all conditions 
of things in the advent of a fresh and wild pleasure... hitherto unsuspected' (46). 
When first in Arabella's presence Jude 'felt himself drifting strangely, but could 
not help it' (45), therefore sexual attraction is an irresistible force which appears 
to override individual intent, operating: 
as if materially, a compelling arm of extraordinary muscular power seized 
hold of him - something which had nothing in common with the spirits and 
influences that had moved him hitherto... [which] seemed to care little for 
his reason and his will, nothing for his so-called elevated intentions, and 
moved him along.., in a direction which tended towards the embrace of a 
woman for whom he had no respect, and whose life had nothing in 
common with his own except locality.., and the predestinate Jude sprang 
up and across the room. (l.vii, 49) 
For Schopenhauer the sexual impulse is intrinsic to human nature being, '[n]ext 
to the love of life.., the strongest and most active of all motives' (WWR 
"Metaphysics" 533) as it is the clearest manifestation of the will-to-life. The 
sexual impulse causes Jude to 'strive[] after' Arabella 'in defiance of all reason' 
(539), and 'in spite of difference of disposition, character, and mental tendency' 
(538). The sexual urge not only overcomes Jude's 'misgivings' (Jude I.vii, 50), 
but actually causes him to forget about Christminster and his aspirations that the 
landscape around him previously harboured for his imagination, associating his 
landscape now with the scenes of his courtship with Arabella. Jude's new 
associations with landscape here are explicitly created by 'the embroidery of 
imagination upon the stuff of nature' (55) as Arabella clearly has nothing in 
common with Jude other than proximity, being 'a woman for whom he had no 
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respect, and whose life had nothing in common with his own except locality' 
(49). Arabella passes across the same spot 'unheedingly' (55), echoing the 
earlier sense of a landscape upon which such scenes of hope turning to despair 
are endlessly played out across time. The immediate and apparently 
uncontrollable physical response in Jude points to sexuality as pan of the 
predestinate fatal trajectory which binds him to an animalistic universe despite 
his 'elevated' (49) intellect and aspirations. Jude's response to an awakening 
sexuality appears to be an uncontrollable and inevitable - and inevitably fatal - 
reaction. Jude falls into the 'delusion' (Schopenhauer WWR "Metaphysics" 538) 
that the sexual instinct creates, his ephemeral person and individual volition 
effectively possessed by a 'malevolent demon, striving to... overthrow 
everything' (534), the will-to-life pursuing its aims regardless of individual 
aspirations in its 'mandate of.. objectifying itself in the species' (554). 
Mary Ann Kelly argues that it is Jude himself who is a destructive force, 
his apparent inability to resist either his sexual impulses or his idealising of both 
Arabella and Sue leading him to self-destruct (240). Kelly links this to extracts 
from Schopenhauer that Hardy copied into his Notebooks, including that 'women 
are, + remain, thoroughgoing philistines... Hence ... are a constant stimulus to 
ignoble ambitions', this leading to Jude's 'distraction from noble ambitions' by 
'the sexual urge'; and 'Schopenhauer. - No man loves the woman - only his 
dream' (quoted Kelly 239). Whilst both of these quotations resonate in Jude's 
relationship with Arabella, and to some extent Sue, Kelly argues that Hardy's 
novel is not sympathetic to Sue as it does not recognise gendered relations in 
anything other than misogynistic terms. It is the case that aspects of gendered 
relations in Jude are questionable in key respects, not least Arabella's 
representation as both calculating and "wanton" as well as quasi-bestial in being 
seen as 'a complete and substantial female animal - no more, no less' (Jude l.vi, 
42) (albeit also emphasising Jude's subjection to the animalistic universe here). 
The idea that the male sexual impulse is on the one hand virtually uncontrollable 
(I.vii, 49) contrasts with Sue's equally questionable suggestion that no man short 
of a sensual savage - will molest a woman.., unless she invites him' (III.iv, 177). 
Hardy LN v2 (e1800, 31) from Schopenhauer "On Women" (86); second quotation Hardy LN v2 
(e2230, 143), noted by Hardy from R. V. Risley "Schopenhauer" [New York] Reader 1 (Jan 1903) 
(273-5): see also BjOrk LNv2 ( note 2230, 526). 
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Another contentious issue is Jude's own coercion of a reluctant Sue into sexual 
relations by using Arabella to trigger Sue's jealousy and override her reluctance 
(V.ii, 316-7). Yet the issues of both sex and gender are far more complex - and 
far more progressive - in Jude, despite these more questionable issues. Kelly 
argues that Jude's 'appetites' are self-destructive, finding 'Hardy's preoccupation 
with the blind and irrational tendencies which cause his main characters to 
behave in a destructive manner' (240) to be the key to the novel. Whilst Jude's 
sexual impulse is an internal, choice-less compulsion, driven by the will-to-life, 
this is equally related to Schopenhauerian character which is in a key sense 
determined or fixed by and within the will. As each individual is a manifestation 
of the will, each character 'is not free, but subject to necessity' thus, 'in spite of 
all his resolutions and reflections he does not alter his conduct' (Schopenhauer 
WWI II §23, 46). Jude reflects just such a 'weakness' (Jude Iii, 13) for Arabella 
on more than one occasion, despite his own reason and volition, and his sexual 
pressurising of Sue can be seen in similar terms. Yet sexual desire is not the only 
element in Jude's character, and he is neither bound wholly to the sexual impulse 
nor inherently self-destructive in his character or his behaviour. The 
manifestation of the will-to-life in each individual shows itself in 'the ambition of 
[each] inn-iost nature, and the aim [each] pursues accordingly', and is something 
'we can never change by outside influence' (Schopenhauer WWJ IV §55, 193). 
Whilst each individual's 'actions follow with absolute necessity from the 
coincidence of character with motives' (IV §55, 190), it is clear that Jude has 
aspirations and sympathies .beyond sex, 'individuality' also being 'a dominant 
feature of mankind' as each 'person has a character of his own; hence the same 
motive has not the same influence on everyone' (23, 51). 
Whilst Jude's relationship with Arabella incorporates the predetermined 
role of sex and character as a result of the will-to-life manifest in everything, the 
question of ethical choice is equally pertinent. One of Jude's key character traits 
is his ethical sympathy. For Schopenhauer ethical "choice" is only available to 
those who have the required character and motive, have perceived the true nature 
of the world, and thus use their knowledge to override their own wi11 6. Jude's 
sympathy with the birds who 'seemed, like himself, to be living in a world which 
6 See Schopenhauer WWJ (IV §55-56, 187-195) 
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did not want them' (Jude Iii, 11) makes him aware of the shared nature of 
subjection to the blind and non-moral universe. Jude becomes consciously aware 
that both he and they are equally subject to the 'conflict.., essential to the will', 
every manifestation of which 'competes with the others for matter, space, and 
time' (Schopenhauer WWJ II §27, 73-4). Jude thus perceives the 'flaw in the 
terrestrial scheme, by which what was good for God's birds was bad for God's 
gardener' (Jude I.ii, 12-13). Schopenhauer's ethics are clearly visible in Jude's 
'magic thread of fellow-feeling' (11) as Jude instinctively understands that the 
'misery both experienced by oneself and inflicted upon others.., always affect 
the one and the same inner being' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §63, 219), his 
knowledge of suffering and shared existence allowing him to recognise that 'this 
thou art' (220). That Jude's ethics are specifically Schopenhauerian is evident in 
the inclusive scope of his ethical realisation: 
The suffering which he sees in others touches him almost as closely as his 
own... He becomes aware that the distinction between himself and others, 
which to the wicked person is so great a gulf, belongs only to a fleeting, 
deceptive phenomenon... recognis[ing] directly and without argument that 
the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others, namely the will 
to life, which constitutes the inner nature of each and everything.., indeed, 
that this applies also to the animals and the whole of nature, and hence he 
will not cause suffering even to an animal. (66, 235) 
Whilst Jude 'was the sort of man who was born to ache a good deal before the 
final fall of the curtain upon his unnecessary life should signify that all was well 
with him again', he feels sheer 'misery' at being responsible for or witnessing 
'hurt' and thus deliberately treads carefully among the coupling earthworms to 
avoid 'killing a single one' (Jude I.ii, 13). There are strong echoes of 
Schopenhauer in both respects here. The first is the idea that life is a temporary 
departure from the more permanent state of nothingness beyond life, the 
individual being 'only phenomenal' and a temporary manifestation of the will-to-
life, thus 'receives his life as a gift, rises out of nothing, then suffers the loss of 
that gift through death, and returns again to nothing' (WWI IV §54, 177). The 
second is of course the consciousness that suffering is the basis of all life, not just 
the human, and that each individual is an equal part of life. This leads to 
deliberately ethical behaviour as 'virtue must spring from that intuitive 
knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in 
our own' (IV §66, 230), finding its 'expression not in words, but only in deeds, in 
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action' (232). Jude exhibits a Schopenhauerian 'double-knowledge' in 
recognising his innermost links with other manifestations of life as well as what 
each 'suffers as a result of outside intervention' (II §19, 36). There is a 
recognition of the inevitability of suffering in life here, before the release that 
only death can bring. At the same time this consciousness of suffering is equally 
clearly something which does enable ethical choice, of choosing not to take a 
nest of birds, lop trees out of season, or walk blindly ahead and thus crush other 
lives beneath 'regular steps' (Jude I.ii, 13). Jude's 'weakness of character' is 
something which 'may be [so] called' (13, my emphasis), thus the idea of it as a 
weakness is questioned on one level at the same time as his sensitivities are 
suggested as ethically right whilst socially weak. Kelly recognises the 
significance of Schopenhauer's human ethics in that 'magic thread of fellow-
feeling' which Jude feels unites 'his own life with theirs', arguing that Jude's 
own suffering is exacerbated by his knowledge of the principium individuationis 
(that each individual is merely a part of the whole). Yet Kelly focuses on death 
as the ultimate goal, as 'the correction of a "mistake" (244), seeing this as the 
central ethos of the novel. For Schopenhauer death is not the purpose of life but 
merely the inevitable endpoint of individual existence, the return of each 
existential manifestation back to the unconscious whole 7 . It is clear that in the 
meantime, compassionate behaviour towards one's fellow sufferers is the ethical 
object of life as 'virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which 
recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own', 
individual 'ethical value' being 'the chief business in human life' (WWI IV §66, 
230) which finds its 'expression not in words, but only in deeds, in action, in the 
course of a human life' (232). 
Whilst Jude's character is fixed and determined, and potentially 
unchanging then, his conscious actions are as often prompted by his ethical 
sympathy for other manifestations of life. Arabella on the other hand is only ever 
prompted by her own egoistic ends, as she herself recognises: despite knowing 
'what I should do... I don't do it' (Jude V.viii, 375). It is clear that Arabella acts 
in a deliberate manner with respect to Jude from their first meeting, choosing him 
as her targeted partner (lvi, 42-7) and setting out to marry him by whatever 
See WWJIV (54, pp 177-9), and Chapter 1(20) above. 
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means (I.vii, 52-7). It is Arabella who sees their relations progressing in her 
chosen direction when they are 'as she had desired, clasped together' (53). Jude, 
on the other hand, feels their embrace does not matter 'since it was dark' (53), 
and is relieved once he escapes from her presence. Yet sex in the form of 
'Arabella soon reasserted her sway in his soul' (54) as Jude's apparent inability 
to resist the sexual urge blinds him to her true character. Any compunction she 
feels for Jude is consciously discarded in favour of her own ends (V.viii, 375), 
and she even leaves him alone when he is dying, well aware that he could 
therefore die alone (VI.xi, 482-3). The depressing bar in which Jude sits with 
Arabella during their first date, with its portentous picture of a Samson undone 
by Delilah's deliberate scheming (lvii, 52), lends weight to the appearance of 
tragic predestination suggested earlier whilst clearly recognising Arabella's 
deliberately unethical actions. Indeed, years later, when Arabella is keeping Jude 
drunk long enough to trick him into marrying her for the second time, he is 'her 
shorn Samson' (VI.vii, 453). Whilst her character is explicitly unsuited to Jude, 
Arabella's contribution to Jude's failure in life is equally explicitly linked to her 
deliberate actions in how she sets herself 'against his intention - almost against 
his will' (I.vi, 44), determined to 'have him' (I.vii, 56) at whatever the cost to 
himself or others, her 'triumphant laugh' that 'of a careless woman who sees she 
is winning her game' (52). Jude is consciously sympathetic to his fellow 
creatures, whereas Arabella is consciously egoistic. 
Jude's characters appear to be able to choose whether to act out of 
compassion for others. The death of the pig emphasises a direct relationship 
between Jude and his fellow sufferers, and points to the role of others in this 
relationship. Jude is horrified that the pig - bound to the stool and crying a 'long-
drawn, slow and hopeless' note of 'despair' (I.x, 75) - will suffer a slow death to 
ensure the meat is well bled. He refuses to torture the animal in this way and 
kills him 'mercifully' (75), yet even this "merciful" death is tortuous, the cuts 
explicitly detailed along with the stages of the animal's suffering. The pig's 
voice begins with 'despair', moves into a continuous 'shriek of agony', then 
becomes its dying breath 'coming through the hole' (75) Arabella slashes in its 
windpipe to silence it. At this moment, the pig's 'glazing eyes rivet[] themselves 
on Arabella with the eloquently keen reproach of a creature recognizing at last 
the treachery of those who had seemed his only friends' (75-6). That it is 
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Arabella on whom the pig fixes its reproachfiul gaze emphasises its alignment 
with Jude as Arabella is indeed a "friend" who betrays Jude throughout the 
course of his life, and even contributes to some extent to the tortuous nature of 
his death. Knoepflmacher recognises that the 'pig-sticking... scene is crucial to 
Hardy's purpose' and, whilst seeing this as 'Darwinian' because 'men, like 
animals, must kill to live' (Laughter 228-9), argues that the pig also represents 
Jude, equally 'betrayed by' (229) Arabella. This is not to suggest that Arabella is 
in any ethical sense culpable in Jude's tragedy for Knoepflmacher, however, as 
she represents a universal 'Darwinian world of struggles' into which Jude 
'cannot fit' (229). The role of Arabella as Delilah, deliberately trapping Jude, 
lifts her relationship with him out of predetermined fatalism, however, as it 
reveals the role of human agency and particularly of ethical choice operating 
here. Jude recognises that Arabella is not suited to him, that it is his 'idea of her' 
which is 'the thing of most consequence' (Jude I.ix, 66) to him rather than her 
person, as she is 'quite antipathetic to that side of him which had been occupied 
with literary study and the magnificent Christminster dream' (lvi, 46). Sue, on 
the other hand, is identified by the narrative as Jude's natural partner, there being 
an 'extraordinary sympathy, or similarity, between' them, so closely matched 
that they seem to be 'one person split in two!' (IV.iv, 274). The idea of 
essentialism of character and nature is strongly evident in Jude and Sue's 
relationship, yet is framed in terms that lift the novel out of a Schopenhauerian 
world and into another framework altogether. The character of Phillotson also 
illustrates this shift, being strongly ethical in the first instance and explicitly 
sympathetic to Sue in particular (274-5). Towards the end of the novel, 
Phillotson changes his mind and puts his own egoistic needs over Sue's (VI.v, 
438), and in so doing demonstrates the limited extent to which character is 
trapped by determinism as such as each character also demonstrates ethical 
awareness and choice. Phillotson's choices are deliberate and reasoned on every 
level, thus ethical actions are recognised as a choice with him as much as they are 
with Arabella. Yet the reason for Phillotson's later decision to act against his 
ethical instincts has even more pertinent implications for questions of ethics and 
culpability, whilst also recognising the significance of Jude's and Sue's 
relationship in key terms. 
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Sue's character traits and often ambiguous feelings conflict with one 
another on a number of levels, and her changeability appears to drive Jude and 
the novel's critics to distraction in equal measure on occasion. Despite this, she 
and Jude are intimately connected from the first, appearing to be 'just the same' 
(I.ii, 9), a connection which extends into a shared - and apparently "doomed" - 
trajectory. They are connected to the same gloomy landscape in aspiration and 
place, in tragic early circumstances, and an apparently predetermined history of 
failure because of their shared genealogy. They also share a fragility which 
renders them apparently ill-equipped for the world they inhabit: Jude has a 
'Slender.., frame' (8), and Sue is 'a little maid' forced to 'know such changes' 
(9) brought about by the tragedy of her parents' lives. This fragility suggests that 
both of their characters have an "essential" inability to overcome the strength of 
opposition they are likely to meet in the world, reinforcing the idea that they are 
mere puppets in a predetermined universe. As both are members of a family 
whom above all should not 'ever marry' as "Tisn't for the Fawleys to take that 
step any more' (9), their genealogy appears to determine that their intimate 
relationships will inevitably fail - particularly their own - a fear intensified by the 
failures of their respective parents' marriages (II.ii, 107). Sue is often termed the 
destructive element in Jude, Robert Langbaum suggesting that Arabella 'did less 
harm' to Jude 'than... Sue', and that the 'contrast between Sue and Arabella is 
the contrast between attractive idealism and unattractive reality, and reality in 
Hardy is always respected' (223). Knoepflmacher argues that Jude, 'torn 
between the dualities represented by Arabella and Sue, becomes the victim of an 
idealism that proves futile and debilitating', Hardy refusing 'to endow Jude's 
alienation and death with any kind of hopeful overtones or redemptive touches' 
(Laughter 205). There is an obvious sense in which Sue and Arabella are 
opposites, each matching a need in Jude which simultaneously leaves the other 
corresponding space depleted, but this is not a simplistic sexual vs. non-sexual 
dichotomy, as Penny Boumelha recognises (443)8• 
 With Arabella, Jude knows 
from early in their relationship that she is not his equal in intellect or aspiration - 
in "soul", perhaps; and with Sue his intellectual, spiritual and companionable 
Peiuiy Boumeiha argues that reducing the contrast between Arabella and Sue to sexuality vs. the 
mind 'is too simple an account of the self-evident contrast' (443) between them as, for Sue, 'mind 
and body, intellect and sexuality, are in a complex and disturbing interdependence' (444). 
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needs are fulfilled in his relationship with her but initially without the physicality 
of sex, Sue's minimal sexual inclination frequently as troubling to critics as it is 
to Jude. The most significant aspect of Sue, however, is pinpointed in her 
relationship with Jude, a relationship which reveals itself to be fundamental 
within the framework of the novel on a number of levels. The key to this 
relationship is her desire for comradeship - for an equality of discourse and 
feeling and intimacy (Jude III.iv, 183), albeit an intimacy which is predominantly 
non-sexual for Sue (V.i, 308-9). Jude recognises that '[iJf he could only get over 
the sense of her sex, as she seemed to be able to do so easily of his, what a 
comrade she would make; for their difference of opinion on conjectural subjects 
only drew them closer together on matters of daily human experience' (IlI.iv, 
184). Jude recognises that Sue's attitude betrays a 'curious unconsciousness of 
gender' (179) yet, despite her wish to live as a comrade among men and not a 
sexual partner, Jude has trouble accepting this, feeling 'that she was treating him 
cruelly' by not caring for him 'more' (179, original emphasis) than anyone she 
has ever met. By this he means that she does not reciprocate the sexual side of 
his feelings, but Sue is caught between other's expectations of her and her own 
desire for Jude's comradeship. Boumelha suggests that, in Jude, Hardy: 
gives for the first time an intellectual component to the tragedy of the 
woman - Sue's breakdown from an original, incisive intellect to the 
compulsive reiteration of the principles of conduct of a mid-Victorian 
marriage manual - and, to the man's, a sexual component which resides not 
in simple mismatching, but in the very fact of his sexuality. (Boumelha 
438) 
Whilst Boumeiha raises pertinent issues here, she not only echoes the idea that 
Jude is condemned to tragedy by the 'disruptive force' of his 'sexuality' (443), 
but argues that Sue is 'the instrument of Jude's tragedy, rather than the subject of 
her own' (445)9 Despite recognising the failings in critical attempts to interpret 
Sue in terms of whether she is a 'pathological' or 'representative woman' (439), 
or even 'frigid[]' (440), Boumelha argues that Sue is 'representative of her sex' 
afier all as 'her sexuality is the decisive element in her collapse' (440). Here Sue 
is condemned by 'the "inexorable laws of nature" and the "penalty of the sex" to 
'injustice, loneliness, child-bearing, and bereavement' (441). Sue 'must learn 
Kelly (240-4), Knoepflmacher Laughter (117-221; and 229), and Collins (98; 142) recognise 
Jude as self-destructive in similar terms, whilst Langbaum (223) blames Sue for the tragedy. 
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that sexuality lies to a large degree outside the control of rationality, will, 
choice', thus she occupies an essentialist world where she must relinquish her 
'fantasy of freedom and control' - albeit a 'fantasy' she does not 'willingly 
surrender' (441). Boumelha sees Sue as trapped by her gender in essentialist 
terms, yet does recognise that Hardy himself argues that Sue wishes 'to retain 
control of her sexuality' (442). This is because whilst 'uncontracted she feels at 
liberty to yield herself as seldom as she chooses' (Hardy Life 272)10.  In this, 
Boumelha pertinently recognises Sue's 'identification of the three 
commandments' as "something external" which ironically mock the Hebraic 
Ten Commandments', but only sees this in terms of 'preserving the polar 
opposition of marriage and non-marriage', and thus Sue finally 'subjects herself 
filly to the legalistic and Hebraic codes of the ideology of marriage' (442). 
Boumelha points towards conflicting aspects of nature vs nurture in Sue's role in 
the novel here, particularly in terms of Sue 'as victim of her sexuality and... of 
religious ideology' (444), although does not see beyond the marriage/non-
marriage dichotomy - and above all Sue's 'physiological' gender - in the quest 
for 'a sufficient programme for liberation' (442). Adrienne Rich suggests that 
patriarchal society perpetuates a 'cluster of forces within which women have 
been convinced that marriage, and sexual orientation toward men, are inevitable, 
even if unsatisfying or oppressive components of their lives' ("Heterosexuality" 
148) and Jude appears to recognise this on a key level. What Rich terms 'the 
socialization of women to feel that male sexual "drive" amounts to a right' (146) 
does impact on Jude's perception of his relationship with Sue as much as on 
Sue's perceptions of her relationships with both Jude and Phillotson. Sue's 
relationships with Jude and the socialization to which she is subject have more 
significant implications, however, which will be shown to directly relate to the 
irony of Sue's final subjection. 
It is clear that landscape is more than a backdrop to Jude's journey, and 
more than a metaphorical representation of the displaced agricultural community. 
Jude's landscape represents a philosophical and corporeal position in its haunted 
Jude/Jude also recognises that Sue's 'natural instincts are perfectly healthy; not quite so 
impassioned, perhaps, as I could wish; but... the most ethereal, least sensual woman I ever knew to 
exist without inhuman sexlessness' (Jude VI.iii, 412). 
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ghostly presences of hope and failure, Jude here consciously subject to the 
external and internal non-moral forces of a pessimistic Schopenhauerian 
universe. The role of essential character in Jude simultaneously shows that 'the 
deliberate action of man' (Schopenhauer WWI II 21, 42) also identifies that each 
character is consciously aware to a significant level of their responses to ethical 
motive in particular. At the same time, Jude's relationship with ghosts in his 
landscape has implications which lift him into a completely new philosophical 
level, albeit one which has equally corporeal implications. Whilst Jude's 
external forces suggest that Jude's failure is inevitable and predetermined, his 
tragedy is of course bound up with his apparently unrealistic ideals. It is here 
that Jude's haunted landscape also identifies how and why all of his potential 
routes to salvation are closed off, one by one, by circumstances which are 
explicitly placed in the world of human agency, as will be discussed shortly, and 
the issue of ethical choice has already shown itself to be significant here. 
Deborah Collins argues that there are 'two levels of tragedy operating' (142) in 
Jude, but relates these to the external world on one level and Jude's individual 
failure on another. For Collins, echoing the idea that Jude is self-destructive 
(98), the novel is about 'the disillusionment of the idealistic, intelligent young 
man by circumstances outside his control, and - by far the greater calamity - his 
failure to employ intellect and heart in defiance of those circumscribing forces' 
(142), finding Jude exhibits only 'meek, disinterested resignation' and 'self-
willed defeat' (142). Whilst there are indeed 'two levels of tragedy' (142) 
operating in Jude, the first of these is the Schopenhauerian external world but the 
other is not Jude's individual self-destructive failure, but is a world identified by 
Jude's own role as a ghost in his landscape. Hardy's novel appears to establish a 
relationship between the non-moral Schopenhauerian universe and the 
consciously suffering human world, and it is in Jude's own position, 'impressed 
with the isolation of his own personality, as... [though] a self-spectre' (Jude Iii, 
94), that this relationship is most intriguingly developed. Despite seeing Sue as 
the main culprit in facilitating Jude's tragedy, Langbaum recognises that Jude 'is 
a bitter protest against everything: against the injustice of nature, society, and 
God' (223), although he does not examine how this operates. Sue's disregard for 
the confines of social constraints show how Sue recognises rather than facilitates 
219 
Jude's tragedy, however, and this relates to issues of religion, education, gender 
and marriage, as well as to human relations themselves. 
Jude's initial misinterpretations of both Sue and his surroundings is due to 
'the superstitions of his beliefs', Jude seeing the world as one dictated by the 
'exercise of forethought on the part of a ruling Power' (Jude III.i, 156). This has 
resonant implications for both Jude's and Sue's journey but also for the 
philosophical framework of the novel. Jude's sympathy is a 'magic thread of 
fellow-feeling' which 'united his own life with [others]' (Iii, 11) and it is this 
key ethical recognition which marks the place where the two levels overlap, Jude 
'seeming almost his own ghost' (!I.i, 94) forming that link. Jude's landscape is 
one of 'accentuated... solitude' (Iii, 10) in which '[n]ot a soul was visible' (I.iii, 
17), and his isolation is central to the novel, marking the world of human souls 
that invisibly linger, a series of 'ghostly presences' (JJ.i, 94) haunting Jude's 
landscape and his journey but as yet unperceived by him, whilst the narrative 
suggests the key elements of his tragedy lie very much within the remit of the 
human world. For Jude his position in the landscape is not just a metaphor for 
his tragedy but is key to understanding his alienation in both corporeal and 
philosophical terms. 
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H. Jude's 'ghost' and 'the isolation of his own personality': Hardy's 
Feuerbachian consciousness. 
Jude is established as an isolated figure in a landscape populated by ghosts from 
the beginning of the novel, and when he approaches Christminster at last he is 
placed as a ghostly figure himself, 'appear[ing] gliding steadily onward through a 
dusky landscape' (Jude II.i, 91). This uncanny tableau divorces Jude from a 
sense of warm-blooded physicality and he becomes the image of a ghost, an alien 
figure propelled across a grey and fading landscape. The images of spectrality 
continue, along with further negative associations, as Jude enters Christminster 
'between pollard willows growing indistinct in the twilight' (93), trees whose 
natural growth is deliberately stunted herald his entrance and their spectrality 
forms direct associations with Jude, suggesting his own aspirations will be 
likewise curtailed and fade into darkness. The pollarded trees further recall 
Jude's early empathy with the sufferings of others including the deliberate 
lopping of trees' limbs, thus suggesting his own aspirations will also be stunted 
by the actions of others rather than an external or "natural" course of events. 
Jude's first wanderings through Christminster are through a city haunted by 
a sense of isolation and negativity, and more 'ghostly presences' (94). As he 
walks 'fewer and fewer people were visible' in the 'obscure alleys, apparently 
never trodden now by the foot of man, and whose very existence seemed to be 
forgotten', and Jude ignores these absent-presences as he still ignores any 
'objects out of harmony' with his own vision 'as if he did not see them' (93). 
Christminster is a crumbling, mouldering relic of unenlightened sympathies, the 
chimerical nature of its role as the 'city of light' (l.iii, 24) revealed as he walks 
through streets full of 'dark corners which no lamplight reached', illuminated 
instead by Jude's imagination, led by his 'spirit [which] was touched to finer 
issues than a mere material gain' (II.i, 93) - or indeed, to material reality itself. 
As he walks around Christminster: 
Knowing not a human being here, Jude began to be impressed with the 
isolation of his own personality, as with a self-spectre, the sensation being 
that of one who walked but could not make himself seen or heard... 
seeming thus almost his own ghost. (ll.i, 94) 
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Jude's recognition of himself as a ghost is key here, despite his imagination still 
deliberately maintaining its hopefUl vision in converting this sense of self-
ghostliness into a positive image of comfort - thinking instead about 'the other 
ghostly presences with which the nooks were haunted' (94, my emphasis). These 
are his aspirational forebears, 'the worthies' he has read about 'who spent their 
youth within these reverend walls, and whose souls had haunted them in their 
maturer age' (94). Yet even here Jude is still surrounded by negativity, the 
double-meaning of spent youth echoing the idea of lost youth and exhausted 
aspirations, leaving haunted souls in their wake, and suggesting a relationship 
with Jude who also perceives these ghosts correctly as 'the mutterings of.. 
mournful souls.., making him comrades in his solitude' (95). The aspirational 
'worthies' (94) Jude deliberately imposes onto his haunted solitude are countered 
with 'gloom', 'deserted' streets, 'wrinkled foreheads' and the shade of death in 
the shroud-suggesting 'sheeted' 'divines' (95). Whilst the ghosts co-inhabiting 
Jude's landscape echo Schopenhauer's cyclical vision of the ephemeral human, 
emphasising how Jude's 'human aspirations are dwarfed in the vast dimensions 
of archaeological time' (Schweik 61-2), this is only half the story. Jude's ghosts 
show that landscape is the site rather than the cause of the note of pessimistic 
"fatalism" in the novel and, crucially, Jude's own role as a 'ghost' - not only to 
himself but also to others - places culpability for his unfolding tragedy not at the 
feet of a blind universal will-to-life but elsewhere. 
Jude's own ghostly presence is effected as a direct result of his human 
world as what is emerging here is a recognition of two levels of existence in 
Jude, the second level being the consciously human world which overlaps that 
vast and "universal" Schopenhauerian landscape in both spatial and temporal 
terms. Kelly recognises that Hardy's use of ghosts is significant in Jude, seeing a 
relationship between these and Schopenhauerian aspects of human existence 
wherein Jude's imagination shows 'the human mind creating "for itself an 
imaginary world" and wasting "time and strength upon it" in 'a "dreamlike 
staggering through the four ages of life and death" (Kelly 237, citing 
Schopenhauer)". Kelly argues that '[w]hat Hardy believed and found reinforced 
Andrew Radford's argument shares similarities with Schweik and Kelly here, and the 
Schopenhauerian perspective of my own argument, in suggesting that 'the brutal therapy of 
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in Schopenhauer was the conviction that all individuals suffer from such illusive 
dreams because of their unquestioned, faulty perceptions about the nature of 
reality' (Kelly 237). Whilst Jude's relationship with the 'ghostly presences' 
(Jude II.i, 94) in his landscape do reflect these aspects of Schopenhauerian 
existence in terms of the blind forces of the universe and in Jude's imaginary 
constructions of reality, it is in Jude's own ghostly manifestation where the 
relationship between his aspirations and their failure is more clearly marked. 
This relates on one level to Schopenhauer's critique of the individual egoist who 
'regards and treats only his own person as a real person, and all others as mere 
phantoms' (WWI II § 19, 37) rather than material reality, affirming her or his own 
will to the extent that 'the same will manifest in another individual' (IV §62, 
212) is denied. But on another level this also relates to Schopenhauer's critique 
of 'theoretical egoism, which.., holds all phenomena, excepting its own 
individual self to be phantoms' (II §19, 37, original emphasis). For 
Knoepflmacher, Jude's occupation as a stonemason echoes his own 
'obsolescence', evidenced in the inability to 'repair the ruins of an irretrievable 
past' (Laughter 215). Knoepflmacher blames Jude for his 'stupid fancies' at 
'see[ing], in a way, those spirits of the dead again', these being the recognition 
'of the futility of all ideals' (215) after earlier being 'seduced by those bodiless 
voices that emanate from the walls of Christminster' (216). It is, however, 
Christminster's inability rather than Jude's, its 'extinct air' and 'rotten[]... 
stones' are unable to measure up to 'modem thought' which it 'seemed 
impossible' to 'house.., in such decrepit and superseded chambers' (Jude Iii, 
94). This reality is of course ignored by Jude at this stage as it counteracts his 
imaginary ideal, but the key lies in the unenlightened and outmoded nature of the 
colleges showing that this ignorance is mutual, and it is here that Jude's own role 
as always already a ghost is most clearly signalled in Christminster. Jude is 
explicitly treated by the colleges and their inhabitants as though he is a ghost as 
they 'did not even see him, or hear him, rather saw through him as through a 
pane of glass at their familiars beyond' (lI.ii, 102). This human blindness 
extends into their rejection of Jude from study by virtue of his class, advising him 
that 'as a working-man... you will have a much better chance of success in life 
Time... fully awakens [Jude] from his enthralment to dreams of "high" Christminster culture into 
prosaic concrete history... stripped of ameliorating vision' (203). 
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by remaining in your own sphere and sticking to your trade than by adopting any 
other course' (II.vi , 140). Yet the novel explicitly recognises that Christminster 
relies on the labours of such as Jude to literally prop up its crumbling façade, 
Jude understanding his 'destiny' lay not within the colleges 'but among the 
manual toilers in the shabby purlieu which he himself occupied, unrecognized as 
part of the city at all by its visitors and panegyrists, yet without whose denizens 
the hard readers could not read nor the high thinkers live' (139, my emphasis). 
This recognises the one-way relationship the colleges impose, allowing Jude's 
skills to literally maintain the colleges' position whilst their exclusion of him as a 
prospective student maintains Jude's alienation from his aspirations to self-
realisation, denying Jude as a working-class man his opportunity to study' 2. At 
the same time the novel recognises that the colleges are redundant, alienating 
themselves from the real Christminster life with out-moded thinking which bears 
no relationship to the real people of the town (11.1, 94; 1I.vi, 141). Merryn and 
Raymond Williams term Jude 'perhaps Hardy's most devastating attack on 
established religion and the class system of his day', and points out the 'terrible 
indictment of the university' in the novel 'that it should ignore those who keep it 
going' (Oxford 58) 1 . Interestingly, Williams also notes the presence of sparse 
'optimistic notes' in the novel, these being that in 'the future' working men may 
achieve their dream of education, arguing that 'Hardy feels keenly how much has 
been lost' (58) through Jude at the end of the novel, although he does not extend 
his discussion of these 'optimistic notes' further. 
For Feuerbach, religion is a human construct which objectifies 'the 
immediate object, the immediate nature, of man' (Essence xxii, original 
emphasis) by converting human nature into the reified God-head as the 
salvationary aim, yet all along human nature is the true object of religion in 
disguised form, and human nature itself is therefore divine to the human (1, 30). 
Through religious dogma the human is alienated from realising its own "divine" 
12 Jude's social alienation begins much earlier than this, of course, from the beginning of the novel 
where his aunt is perpetually '[m]orc angry with Jude for demeaning her by coming there than for 
dereliction of duty' (Jude Iii, 14), and she sees Christminster as 'much too good for you ever to 
have much to do with' (14), which leaves Jude 'feeling more than ever his existence to be an 
undemanded one' (15), and his devastation once he realises 'what shoddy humanity [Vilbert]... 
was made of' (liv, 29) shows Jude's sense of alienation even amongst his community, but the 
significance of this alienation extends into a wider social context as the novel progresses. 
13 Geoffrey Harvey recognises 'the bnitality of the social order', but argues that Jude merely 
demonstrates 'a naïve self-indulgen[ce]' which stems from his 'disillusion' (90). 
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essence, its "goodness", its perfect self as, in the religious pursuit of salvation, 
the human is seeking to unifS' itself with God or Christ (reified and deified human 
nature) as unifying object in place of its own nature. By consciously recognising 
the true aim of the human as its own "divine" human nature instead of "God" 
then, the human can finally overcome this alienation and attain salvation (App. 
§3, 284). This occurs through a conscious "unification" of each individual with a 
sense of a shared goal of unity of human nature in the time and space of the 
species, a unification effected through the essential elements of human nature 
themselves, which are limited and imperfect in each individual but unlimited and 
perfect in the 'infinite plenitude or multitude of different beings or individuals' 
(I, 23) across the space and time of the species' 4. Feuerbachian species-
consciousness offers salvation from human disunity or alienation in a teleological 
and spatial process of realisation wherein the universal human condition can be 
improved. This is a key distinction between Feuerbach and Schopenhauer, 
whose salvation is a temporary transcendence from a non-evolving but 
perpetually revolving cycle of misery from which individual suffering may be 
immediately relieved through ethical behaviour but the human condition itself 
cannot be changed on any level. Feuerbach also notes that not just religious but 
philosophical constructions of the human likewise alienate the individual human 
from its true nature, by obscuring its relationship with its true aim, and it is in his 
recognition of the form of human social constructs themselves which alienate the 
individual from their true nature and realisation that Feuerbach has pertinent 
implications for Jude on a number of levels, not just the religious. 
Whilst Collins recognises that Jude is alienated in the novel, she argues that 
Jude deludes himself into believing that 'self-expression is the only rhetoric 
worth listening to', and this leads to a form of alienation through 'self-
absorption', an 'anti-social crime... committed by Jude... in his neurotic 
preoccupation with Christminster' (II). Collins' argument sets up a sense of 
friction between Jude and his community which blames his alienation on his own 
self-absorbed egoism, thus Jude is condemned by his own 'anti-social' (11) ego. 
14 These human essences are: Reason, which is the self-consciousness of the species' (Essence 
App. §4, 285) and therefore relates to existences as parts of the whole, subsuming individual 
personality into species-consciousness; Affection, which is 'the self-consciousness of 
individuality' and therefore 'has relation to existences.., as persons' (App. §4, 285); and Will, 
which for Feuerbach, is the 'energy of character' (1, 3) and is that through which we exert our 
human and individual character-as-object as well as moral influence: see Chapter 2 (50-52) above. 
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This argument misses both the ground and the significance of Jude's alienation, 
however, and blames Jude for his own failure' 5 . With Jude's first recognition of 
the true extent of the external forces to which he is subject, he 'awoke from his 
dream' (Jude II.vi , 139), and it is an awakening which reflects a Feuerbachian 
consciousness of the alienation of the individual by the artificial constructs of 
social form. Here the divinity of God is the college system, placing itself as 
antithetical to Jude as a working-class man and positioning him as antithetical to 
realising a more educated self, whereas 'the antithesis of divine and human is... 
illusory' (Feuerbach Essence I, 13-14). As such, Jude's elevation of 
Christminster as the divine sum of his aspirations to a college education in '[t]he 
heavenly Jerusalem' (Jude I.iii, 18) falls into place, and reveals that it is the 
artificial system which alienates Jude from realising his potential. Jude's 
elevated aspirations show his natural human instinct for self-realisation, that 
'yearning of his heart to find something to anchor on, to cling to - for some place 
which he could call admirable' (24), reflecting Feuerbach's human whose aim is 
'the conscious, voluntary, essential impulse of life' and which itse/f acts to effect 
'the unity of the material and spiritual in the individual' (Essence V, 64). Jude is 
precluded from realising a more perfect Feuerbachian self in that consciousness 
of 'self-verification, self-affirmation, self-love, joy in one's own perfection' 
which 'is the characteristic mark of a perfect nature... exist[ing] only in a self-
sufficing, complete being' (I, 6). It is not Jude's personal failing which is to 
blame, only belatedly recognising the reality of his situation in his subjection as 
alienated individual in this process, but the process itself, which operates whether 
or not Jude is conscious of its corporeal, psychological or philosophical 
significance. Jude's own aim follows social form on a number of levels, not just 
in echoing Phillotson's route but in his acceptance of the social beatification of 
Christminster as 'noble-minded' (Jude I.iii, 23), and in his wish to be 'a scholar' 
or 'a Christian divine' (Iv, 36). Christminster is unable to measure up to 
'modern thought' (II.i, 94) because the colleges have not attained a contemporary 
Feuerbachian recognition of their culpability in this alienation process. As a 
result of his alienation, in respect of both his Christminster aspirations and his 
Collins (98), Kelly (240-1) and Knoepflmacher Laughter (117-221, and 229) also blame Jude for 
his own failure. Garwood, on the other hand, argues that Jude is an individual who 'has reached 
the limit of his power of resistance to evil, and is blameless' (41) thus 'our protest' is aimed at the 
universal' (42) on a cosmic rather than individual or social scale. 
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relationship with Sue, Jude feels himself '[d]eprived of the objects of both 
intellect and emotion' in clearly Feuerbachian terms, and 'could not proceed to 
his work' (H.vii, 143). 
Jude's self-recognition at Christminster is compounded by an encounter 
with other ghostly 'shades' (II.vi, 141) on the streets of the city. Gone are his 
imaginary ghosts of scholars and poets in the streets around the colleges, 
replaced by the ghostly 'shades' of real people like Jude, the landscape around 
him now 'literally teeming, stratified, with the shades of human groups, who had 
met there for tragedy, comedy, farce.., for loving, hating, coupling, parting; had 
waited, had suffered, for each other' (141). These 'shades' echo those inhabiting 
Jude's early Schopenhauerian landscape in resonant terms, whilst also showing 
Jude's Feuerbachian alienation in accompanying his own spectral form and its 
subjection to the alienation of collegial Christminster. In his preclusion from 
realising his more perfect sense of self, his exalted aspirations being that 
'conscious, voluntary, essential impulse of life' which acts to effect 'the unity of 
the material and spiritual in the individual' (Feuerbach Essence V, 64), Jude is 
precluded from full participation in real human existence, the colleges seeing 
'through him as through a pane of glass at their familiars beyond' (Jude lI.ii, 
102). Jude's landscape is now haunted by the 'shades' of real people, the 
'struggling men and women' who form 'the reality of Christminster' (II.vi , 141). 
The irony in Jude is clear: 'That was one of the humours of things. The floating 
population of students and teachers... were not Christminster in a local sense at 
all' (141), the colleges also alienating the ordinary inhabitants of the town. Later, 
however, the real inhabitants of the community will in turn alienate Jude from 
achieving his alternative aims in life, precluding that apotheosis of realisation 
which 'arises only in the love of man to man', therefore 'only in community' 
where 'man is related to his fellow-man as to himself., alive to the sorrows, the 
joys of another as his own' (Feuerbach Essence App. §2, 283) in significant 
terms. In the meantime, Jude's realisation shines 'a cold northern light' (Jude 
II.vi , 136) of reality onto his vision as he understands that he is as far away from 
being a part of 'the intellectual and spiritual granary of this country' (135) as 
ever. The message he writes beside the closed gates of the college resonates with 
bitter irony, epitomising the collegial alienation of him, both personally and as 
one of those working men without whom the colleges could not function. It also 
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recognises their ignorance as much as his emerging Feuerbachian consciousness: 
'I have understanding as well as you; I am not inferior to you: yea, who knoweth 
not such things as these?' (142). 'Whilst the 'magic thread of fellow-feeling' (I.ii, 
11) in Jude appears to be a Schopenhauerian ethic on one level, particularly in its 
all-encompassing scope and Jude's ethical recognition of his fellow-sufferers, its 
apparent invisibility to many of Jude's fellow-humans links directly to his role as 
a 'ghost' (Iii, 94) and leads Hardy's novel into Feuerbachian delineations of 
ethical salvation. The question is whether there is a sense in the novel in which a 
Feuerbachian social realisation is either imminent or possible. The question also 
extends into whether Jude urges that such a realisation is desirable, and it is in its 
delineations of the social form of marriage that this receives its most significant 
expression. 
In Jude's marriage to Arabella, the novel lays the blame for Jude's 
'entrap[ment]' (I.x, 79) on the socially-imposed criteria of their situation rather 
than Arabella's intent or actions. In this case, quasi-religious social morality is 
seen to determine that what is no more than a transient sexual desire should incur 
a life-sentence with one another regardless of whether those involved are suited 
to one another as companions. Jude terms the sexual urge a 'transitory instinct 
which had nothing in it of the nature of vice, and could only at the most be called 
weakness' (I.ix, 72), yet it reaps a 'life-long penalty' (I.x, 79) in 'a gin [trap] 
which would cripple him, if not her also, for the rest of a lifetime' (I.ix, 72). 
Jude indicts Jude's and Arabella's marriage as a life-sentence of suffering, the 
wedding ceremony itself is both undermined and culpable, being the place where 
these two young people 'swore that at every other time of their lives till death 
took them, they would assuredly believe, feel, and desire precisely as they had 
believed, felt, and desired during the few preceding weeks' (Lix, 66) - an oath 
which is as 'remarkable' in its 'undertaking' as 'the fact that nobody seemed at 
all surprised at what they swore' (67). This undertaking explicitly entraps both 
Jude and Arabella into a permanent but grossly incompatible relationship which 
is effected and sanctioned by social form. Boumelha finds it a 'curious' anomaly 
that Jude's and Sue's 'exceptional relationship' should become the 'replica' of 
marriage as this shows that 'it is in the lived texture of the relationship that the 
oppression resides, and not in the small print of the contract' (447). Considered 
in a Feuerbachian philosophical framework, however, marriage is a religious- 
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sociological construct which posits marriage itself as the aim rather than a truly 
compatible relationship. Jude's relationship with Sue signals this recognition, 
and emphasises that their relationship is compatible, is not in itself oppressive, 
whilst also taking the Feuerbachian level much further. 
Feuerbach's highest ideal of human society is where two persons (I and 
thou) provide 'the principle of multiplicity and all its essential results', the 
second person being 'the self-assertion of the human heart as the principle of 
duality, of participated life' (Essence VI, 68). Feuerbach's I-thou relationship 
affirms a positive sense of self and world as it confers meaning onto existence as, 
without the fellow human through whom one recognises that which is essentially 
the same and thus that which is essentially different, the world is meaningless 
(VIII, 82). This is because reality, existence, occurs only in the participation that 
is found in community (25, 39), thus Jude's ghostly existence represents his 
alienation by social form on a number of levels. Feuerbachian I-thou 
participation is particularly exalted in terms of intimate male-female relations 
these are far more profound than 'the monotonous thou between friends' (IX, 
92). In being self-consciously 'at once I and thou' (I, 2), love - the essential 
human element of Feeling - occupies the unifying aspect, which in Christianity is 
the position of the Holy Spirit in the Father-Son-Holy Ghost trinity 16 . Thus for 
Feuerbach I-thou-love (VI, 67) is the most perfect form of self-realisation. Yet in 
Jude this Feuerbachian ideal of I-thou participation is perverted in two respects. 
The first is the conflation of this I-thou ideal with the object of marriage, 
explicitly condemned for its lack of concern regarding the actual nature of the 
relationship being cemented (Jude lxi, 81), its only concern being the upkeep of 
the narrow-minded constraints of social morality (IV.iv, 275-7). This is 
epitomised in the heavy irony of the marriage oath Jude and Arabella 'swore' 
(I.ix, 66) despite Arabella clearly having 'nothing in common' with Jude other 
than 'locality' (I.vii, 49), and despite that she is (like the colleges) 'quite 
antipathetic to' his character and aspirations, including his 'magnificent 
Christminster dream' (I.vi, 46). The second is the related issue of Sue as she 
forms Jude's perfect thou, there being an 'extraordinary sympathy, or similarity, 
between' them, so closely matched in character and temperament that they seem 
16 Feeling or Affection is 'the self-consciousness of individuality' and therefore 'has relation to 
existences... as persons' (Feuerbach Essence App. §4, 285). 
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to be 'one person split in two!' (IV.iv, 274). Further, Sue also effects the novel's 
Feuerbachian consciousness on two fundamental levels, and the significance of 
Sue as Jude's 'social salvation' (VI.iii, 423) encompasses both of these aspects, 
as will become clear. 
The necessary role that hope plays in Jude's ability to carry on functioning 
in life is crucial as, without having the hope of his relationship with Sue to 
sustain him, Jude's aspirations shift from the failed hope of academia in the 'city 
of light' (I.iii, 24) towards the equally false light of the Church, in desperate need 
for 'any kind of hope to support me!' (lI.vii, 150) to prevent himself sliding into 
despair. Jude is a 'shabby and lonely' figure, alienated within and by his own 
society but 'cheered' (liii, 154, my emphasis) once more by a new vision: that 
the life of a 'humble curate.., might have a touch of goodness and greatness in 
it', that it 'might be true religion, and a purgatorial course worthy of being 
followed by a remorseful man' (153) (a 'purgatorial course' which also alienates 
human nature of course). Yet it is the intervention of 'human interest', in the 
form of Sue once more, which acts as the motive for Jude to leave a 'stagnant 
time' of odd-job employment back at Marygreen (and his position 'as a social 
failure' to its inhabitants) and pursue 'the most spiritual and self-sacrificing' 
course of 'reading up Divinity' (154) in Melchester - where Sue is now studying 
for her teaching qualifications. It is another significant process which sees Jude's 
new ideal of religion dissipate into what the narrative already recognises as a 
false consciousness, however, religious constructs being nothing but 'a dim light 
and [a] baffling glare' (IJ.iii, 198) and a 'distraction' (II.vii, 143) in explicitly 
Feuerbachian terms. Jude is constantly left alienated with all the 'painful details' 
of 'his awakening to a sense of his limitations' (II.vi, 139), 'convinced' of his 
own worthlessness and 'that he was at bottom a vicious character, of whom it 
was hopeless to expect anything' (II.vii, 143) just as '[t]he holy is a reproach to 
my sinfulness' (Feuerbach Essence 1, 28). For Feuerbach, in the holy: 
I recognise myself as a sinner; but in so doing, while I blame myself, I 
acknowledge what I am not, but ought to be... I can perceive sin as sin, 
only when I perceive it to be a contradiction of myself with myself - that is, 
of my personality with my fundamental nature. (28) 
Already left feeling 'as if he had awakened in hell... "the hell of conscious 
failure", both in ambition and in love' once he has lost both Sue and his 
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Christminster dream, Jude is left 'in misery' and isolation as a 'mournful wind 
blew through the trees' (Jude II.vii, 149). His subsequent loss of religious faith 
is a direct result of his love for Sue as his feelings for her cannot be suppressed. 
Whilst his love for Sue is 'the purest thing in his life', it is an 'unlicensed 
tenderness' which automatically leaves Jude 'condemned ipso facto' by his 
religion and, most significantly 'as unfit... by nature, as he had been by social 
position, to fill the part of a propounder of accredited dogma' (lviii, 259). With 
Sue, Jude finds 'the human [is] more powerful in him than the Divine' (IV.i, 
246), and realises at last that his 'point of bliss is not upward, but here' (IV.v, 
283). 
Whilst both Feuerbach and Schopenhauer see sexual love as an essential 
object of life, for Feuerbach the male-female relationship affirms the "essence" 
which is 'thy whole principle' (Essence IX, 92) in overtly positive terms, 
engendering the most perfect form of I-thou realisation' 7 . In this respect Jude's 
relationships with Arabella and Sue, rather than simply representing polarised 
stereotypical representations of femininity (base sexuality vs. idealised angel), 
appear to delineate Schopenhauerian sexuality and Feuerbachian I-thou salvation 
respectively in resonant terms, even down to the emergence of Little Father Time 
as the perpetuity of suffering that Schopenhauerian sexuality engenders on the 
one hand, and Jude's recognition of Sue as 'almost a divinity' (Jude III.iii, 174) 
and as his 'social salvation' (VI.iii, 423) on the other. Schopenhauerian will-to-
life has a significant bearing on Arabella's and Jude's relationship, in terms of 
Schopenhauerian sexuality as well as Schopenhauerian unethical egoism. Yet 
Arabella's artificiality (I.ix, 68), emphasised from the moment she first enters 
Jude's life when she creates artificial dimples in her cheeks (I.vi, 43) to the end 
of his life when she tricks him into a second marriage (Vl.vii, 452-7), sets up a 
17 For Schopenhauer, the sexual impulse of the will-to-life also affirms and perpetuates the essence, 
the will, but in also perpetuating the existence of suffering, it is not therefore to be welcomed 
philosophically-speaking (although he does concede the possibility of a positive, even happy, 
male-female relationship: the will-to-life fools individuals into believing they will be happy 
together, thus, once the 'genius of the species achieves its object' (WWR "Metaphysics" 553) and 
the sexual urge has been fulfilled, 'everyone who is in love finds himself duped' (540) as the 
reality of their incompatibility becomes apparent. Although 'happy marriages are rare', it is the 
case that 'passionate sexual love is sometimes associated with.., real friendship based on harmony 
of disposition, which nevertheless often appears only when sexual love proper is extinguished in its 
satisfaction. That friendship will then often spring from the fact that the... physical, moral, and 
intellectual qualities of the two individuals, from which arose the sexual love... [for a child to be 
produced] are also related to one another with reference to the individuals themselves.., and 
thereby form the basis of a harmony of dispositions' (558). 
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dynamic between nature and social form which shows another significant 
Feuerbachian relationship, and which cements Sue's role as Jude's perfect thou. 
Jude only discovers Arabella's counterfeit "nature" in gradual stages, 
beginning on their wedding night and the revelation that some of her hair is a 
wig, Jude's 'distaste for her' (lix, 68) starting at this point. Arabella is somehow 
both Schopenhauerian sexuality but also in a key sense counterfeit, her 'unvoiced 
call' (I.vi, 44) of sexuality is juxtaposed with her scheming, trickery and 
subterfuge to lure Jude into marriage, and it is evident that this is a practised 
norm amongst her social circle (I.vii, 56-7). Arabetla admits her 'mistake[]' 
(I.ix, 69) about the pregnancy to her friend but not to Jude, even though she 
claims he would not care - although the crucial factor here is that Arabella 
recognises that even if Jude did care he is trapped by social form because 
'Married is married' (69). Once Arabella has admitted the truth of the matter to 
Jude (at the same time he realises even the dimples in her cheeks are counterfeit), 
he recognises the cause and extent of his entrapment in the same terms. Jude 
does not blame Arabella for the 'gin' trap which would 'cripple' them 'for the 
rest of a lifetime' (lix, 72), but the consciousness of an iniquitous and binding 
social contract which is itself counterfeit to both common sense and nature: 
Illuminated with the sense that it was all over between them... [Jude] stood 
still, regarding her. Their lives were wined, he thought; wined by the 
fundamental error of their matrimonial union: that of having based a 
permanent contract on a temporary feeling which had no necessary 
connection with affinities that alone render a life-long comradeship 
tolerable. (I.xi, 81) 
His fleeting sexual attraction for Arabella is no basis for a lasting relationship, 
separated from any connection between their individual characters and 
aspirations, and from their essential natures. The recognition of marriage as a 
construct contra human nature is clear and, as Lennart Björk recognises, Hardy 
articulates similar views to Shelley on love and marriage in Jude, suggesting that 
"Love withers under constraint; its very essence is liberty... A husband and wife 
ought to continue united only so long as they love each other" (Shelley quoted 
Bjork "Reading" 105 1 ). Jude's aunt echoes Shelley's emphasis whilst also 
suggesting that genealogy and nature are equally "to blame": another potentially 
ambiguous conflict between causes but with a key emphasis. She recognises the 
Percy Shelley Note V.189 from 'Notes on Queen Mab' 
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institution of marriage itself as at least part of the problem, but combined with a 
fundamental incompatibility in the Fawleys' who are unable to 'take kindly to the 
notion of being bound to do what we do readily enough if not bound' (Jude I.xi, 
82). Both Jude and Sue are less likely by their very natures to fit easily into the 
social mould of marriage, yet clearly the 'extraordinary sympathy' (IV.iv, 274) 
between them is seen as both natural and moral by the narrative, including 
Phillotson's instinctive 'convictions on the rightness of his course' (IV.iii, 428) 
in releasing Sue. This is in direct contradiction with social morality, a 'logically' 
and 'religiously' termed 'received opinion' which fears 'general domestic 
disintegration' (IV.iv, 275-7) if the prescribed and proscribing rules are not 
adhered to. Jude's consciousness of his and Arabella's plight simultaneously 
reflects the genuine compatibility of his relationship with Sue, identifying those 
very 'affinities that alone render a life-long comradeship tolerable' (lxi, 81) that 
he shares with 'the one affined soul he had ever met' (I1.vii, 143), he and Sue 
'almost the two parts of a single whole' (V.v, 347). Jude is prevented from 
making his feelings clear to Sue during their early relationship because he 
initially sees himself as still married to Arabella (despite their separation), and 
this is Jude's 'hopeless, handicapped love' (1I.v, 130), 'tied and bound' (II.vi, 
133) to Arabella even though their incompatibility is obvious and essentially 
unchanging. In the conflict between forces in Jude there is a dynamic between 
nature and other forces which recognises nature in both Schopenhauerian 
negative and Feuerbachian positive terms. Kelly recognises "natural law" in 
Jude as Schopenhauerian on the whole, seeing it to be as much Jude's enemy as 
social forces because 'Nature's logic' is that which becomes 'the scorn of Nature 
for man's finer emotions' (Jude 15 and 249, cited Kelly 240). Kelly recognises 
that social 'mores and superstitions' also have an influence on Jude and Sue, 
however, in 'adding to their difficulties, hindering their struggle, fighting natural 
law' (241, my emphasis). Kelly does not follow this point further, yet it is clear 
that the role of Nature is dual in Jude, having the negative elements of a 
'Nature's law' which is 'mutual butchery' (Jude V.vi, 366) and positive elements 
in Jude and Sue's natural suitedness to one another (V.v, 347). Significantly, 
these positive elements in nature are crucial to Phillotson's recognition of a 
natural law which is 'right, and just, and moral' (V.viii, 377), this being his 
motive in freeing Sue from their first marriage. The social opposition to 'natural 
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law' is the most significantly damaging force to which Jude and Sue are subject, 
indeed, society actually creates Jude and Sue's struggle and final tragedy. 
Hardy's emphasis on the idea of a natural 'moral' law which is inherently 'right, 
and just' (377) is a natural "truth" which is set against social and religious 
dogma' 9. As such, natural impulses are rendered negative in the consequences 
society imposes upon them, which includes sexuality. Jude's recognition of 
Nature is Schopenhauerian in the destruction of the ephemeral individual 
wrought by the will-to-life in time, but is taken into Feuerbachian territory in 
significant terms in the alienation of nature and the individual effected by the 
artificial constructs of social form. It is in Sue that the positive of Nature is most 
significant. 
A trick of the light in Sue's photograph suggests to Jude that she is 
'radiating... the rays of a halo' (II.i, 92), and when he first sees her she appears 
to him as a 'light... slight.., half-visionary form' (I1.ii, 106-7). Sue is someone 
'for whom he was beginning to nourish an extraordinary tenderness' (lI.iii, 109) 
before they even meet, Jude's imagination again leading to a false perception but 
crucially, this is of Sue's opinions rather than of her essential character. Jude 
comes to idealise Sue in the same way he does Christminster, and she echoes his 
vision of that city in also being associated with 'light' (1I.ii, 106) and ethereal 
insubstantiality. Yet Sue also echoes Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch in one key 
respect here as Sue's light is an essential part of her nature, unlike other visions 
of light for Jude which are always chimerical. Jude's central misconceptions of 
Sue are related to her beliefs, and it is these which not only reveal to Jude Sue's 
true nature outside of his preconceptions of her but, significantly, reveal to Jude 
'the defective real' (99) of his existence. Despite the loss of Jude's ambitions in 
respect of both Christminster and the Church, the biggest blow of all is still the 
loss of Sue as with her 'as companion he could have renounced his ambitions 
with a smile' (II.vi , 139). It is the nature of his relationships with others which is 
most important, but with Sue in particular, she being his 'one affined soul' (II.vii, 
143), their role as 'almost the two parts of a single whole' (V.v, 347) reflecting 
19 Phillotson argues: '1 know I can't logically, or religiously, defend my concession to such a wish 
as hers; or harmonize it with the doctrines I was brought up in... I know one thing: something 
within me tells me I am doing wrong in refusing her' (Jude IVy, 275). Interestingly, this implicitly 
Feuerbachian consciousness is also given a Schopenhauerian ethic in Phillotson's recognition that 
'it is wrong to so torture a fellow-creature.., and I won't be the inhuman wretch to do it, cost what 
it may' (ibid.). 
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the perfect Feuerbachian I-thou relationship, Jude seeing 'in her almost a 
divinity' (III.iii, 174). The two as individuals are incomplete, alienated, and are 
only unified in their mutual relationship as equals, as comrades (III.iv, 183), their 
unity-through-Feeling is clear as 'there was ever a second silent conversation 
passing between their emotions, so perfect was the reciprocity between them' 
(lvi, 242) representing their I-thou-love (Feuerbach Essence VI, 67). Their 
emotions and natures are essentially compatible, emphasising a positive truth in 
nature and their relationship, having 'an unpremeditated instinct' for one another 
and being alike in 'heart' and 'feelings' but not in 'head' and 'thoughts' (Jude 
IV.i, 240-I). In this the significance of Sue being less like Jude in 'thoughts' 
(241) shows the extent to which their relationship is Feuerbachian. Sue's 
'intellect' is to Jude's 'like a star to a benzoline lamp', seeing 'all my 
superstitions as cobwebs that she could brush away with a word' (VI.x, 480, 
original emphasis). Sue's radical religious and social beliefs reveal to Jude the 
lull extent of 'the defective real' (II.ii, 99) of his existence. It is Sue who 
'haunt[s]' Jude, finally prompting 'his latent intent' (II.i, 92) to go to 
Christminster at last, and there Jude finds 'the spirit of Sue' seems 'to hover 
round him', preventing him from seeking solace with the local women 'who 
made advances' (II.vi , 142) to him, emphasising her role as his "spiritual" soul-
mate in contrast with the Arabellas of the purely sexual world. Sue's ethereal 
nature in her role as 'spirit' (142) also signifies her role as Jude's 'social 
salvation' (VI.iii, 423) and places her emphatically in the role of Feuerbachian 
species-consciousness. This is the key significance of Sue's spectral quality, 
presented as an essential element in her nature alongside her intense sensitivity 
and animatedfeeling. 
Sue is ethereal, light, spirit, insubstantiality, 'a phantasmal, bodiless 
creature' with 'little animal passion' thus able to 'act upon reason' (V.i, 308-9). 
Yet she has a sensitive nature (II.v, 127-8) and 'nervous temperament' (II.iii, 
111) but, most crucially, she is dominated by her strength of feeling as she is 'so 
vibrant that everything she did seemed to have its source in feeling' (II.iv, 122). 
Feeling is the unifying human essence through which I-thou-love salvation is 
attained (Feuerbach Essence VI, 67) as feeling 'is the essential organ of religion, 
the nature of God is nothing else than an expression of the nature of feeling' (I, 
9), and Jude finds his 'bliss' in 'her company' (Jude III.i, 157). At the same 
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time, Sue's already-Feuerbachian consciousness effects his own awakening. Sue 
is a 'negation' of 'civilization' (III.iv, 176) in her recognition of the artificial 
social constructs of 'gender' (179); the obliteration of 'ecstatic, natural, human 
love' by the 'ecclesiastical abstractions' of religion (182); the bifurcation of 
natural ethics and social morality (lvii, 256; v, 286); and the intellectual and 
educational ignorance of Christminster. It is Sue who recognises that Jude is 
'one of the very men.., intended for... college[]' with his 'passion for learning', 
yet she sees him 'elbowed off the pavement by the millionaires' sons' (IlI.iv, 
181). Jude's and Sue's relationship offers the possibility, the desirability, of 
attaining self-realisation through the unified consciousness of 'self-verification, 
self-affirmation, self-love' which 'is the characteristic mark of a perfect nature... 
exist[ing] only in a self-sufficing, complete being' (Essence 1, 6). Sue is 
Feuerbachian species-essence, the spirit of humanity, shown by her natural and 
perfect compliment to Jude, her nature as sensitivity and feeling epitomising 
Feuerbach's most perfect I-thou relationship. Sue is the genuine light of 
unfettered human nature whose 'soul' (Jude V1.iii, 419) and 'intellect' both 
'sparkle[] like diamonds' (IV.iv, 274), representing Jude's 'social salvation' 
(VI.iii, 423) as he represents her own, and effecting his - and the novel's - 
emerging Feuerbachian consciousness. 
Sue's role as the Feuerbachian consciousness of the novel extends from 
Jude's potential self-realisation in I-thou-love into his intellectual awakening, and 
beyond this in Sue's own physical and psychological illustration of the damage 
artificial social constructs effect on the alienated individual. This first makes an 
appearance when Sue has been living and studying at the women's teaching 
college where Jude finds her 'subdued', with a change in 'her curves of motion' 
which have become 'clipped and pruned by severe discipline' (lIl.i, 157)20.  This 
denotes the impacts that social constraints are already having on Sue which 
gradually crush her vital human nature, although as yet her association with light 
remains, its 'under-brightness shining through from the depths which that 
discipline had not yet been able to reach' (157), emphasising it as an essential 
and positive part of her nature. This is why of all forms of light in the novel 
20 See also J. S. Mill regarding the coercion of woman's nature by social forces in Subjection, 21. 
Hardy says in a letter to Florence Henniker in September 1895 that he intends to 'get Mill's 
Subjection of Women - which I do not remember ever reading' (Hardy Selected 98). 
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Sue's is natural and genuine rather than false, and directly relates to her as 'spirit' 
(II.vi, 142), the 'divinity' (III.iii, 174) of I-thou-love (Feuerbach Essence VI, 67) 
effected through 'feeling' (Jude II.iv, 122). Sue encompasses Jude's compliment 
of human nature, the essence of the species before the alienation of this in the 
individual by the artificial constraints of social and religious forces. This is 
emphasised most clearly in her gradual subjection to those very forces explicitly 
showing the destruction these effect on human nature, as 'the social moulds 
civilization fits us into have no more relation to our actual shapes than the 
conventional shapes of the constellations have to the real star-patterns' (IV.i, 
245). 
It is social form that effects Jude's and Sue's tragedy. Whilst Jude's desire 
for his relationship with Sue to be fully intimate - despite Sue's reluctance - leads 
Jude to coerce Sue through her jealousy of Arabella (V.ii, 314), he eventually 
realises that they 'ought to have lived in mental communion, and no more' 
(VI.iii, 422), emphasising their relationship as more profound than "merely" 
sexual21 . Yet even had he recognised it earlier and they had remained celibate, it 
would have made no difference to their treatment at the hands of the wider 
community. Social form only recognises their relationship in sexual terms, thus 
society already condemns their co-habitation even despite their initial celibacy. 
Sue's recognition that social morality has 'limited' 'views of the relations of man 
and woman' as '[t}heir philosophy only recognises relations based on animal 
desire' (JII.vi, 200-1) is significant here on two levels. Social determinism 
impacts on Sue both physically and psychologically, as on one level she could be 
seen to end the novel 'psychologically trapped, trying to fit mind, spirit, and 
sexuality into a prescribed script' because neither she nor they can 'look beyond 
the parameters of the acceptable' (Rich, "Heterosexuality" 165). The more 
crucial issue here, however, is that Sue's final collapse and return to Phillotson 
after the deaths of the children denotes her inability to battle against a hostile 
society any longer in both individual and philosophical terms. In Sue's voile-
face 'her bereavement seemed to have destroyed her reasoning faculty' (Jude 
VI.iv, 432), and her repentance takes on the full force of religious and moral 
21 Jude understands that Sue's 'natural instincts' are perfectly healthy; not quite so impassioned, 
perhaps, as I could wish; but... the most ethereal, least sensual woman I ever knew to exist without 
inhuman sexlessness' (Jude VI.iii, 412). 
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constructions - and thus alienation of - the human. Echoing Jude's own 
psychological alienation earlier, Sue feels herself to be 'wicked' (431), the deaths 
of her 'sin-begotten' children forming 'the first stage of my purification' (435), 
and she progresses into an appalling capitulation to the 'fanatic prostitution' 
(432) of marriage (an explicitly coercive expectation regardless of the desires of 
the parties involved, Jude taking a clearly radical position in respect of the 
institution of marriage) 22 . Radford argues that 'the stark irony of a once 
"freethinking" New Woman wearily capitulating to the ceaseless excoriation of a 
religious mania' suggests that the 'approved acts of penance, far from being 
hallmarks of a proud "Christian" community, are an atavistic throwback to a 
superstitious and barbaric past' (205). Robert Schweik argues, however, that in 
both Tess and Jude Hardy is 'particularly concerned with the inimical 
relationship of religious mores to human lives.., in contexts which suggest that 
Christianity is a pervasive hindrance to the fulfilment of human aspiration' (56), 
although Schweik does not pursue this further. In Jude, whilst the issue of 
Christian teachings having a malign influence is a Feuerbachian position, this 
clearly extends beyond the terms of religion into all other artificial social 
constructs, and explicitly terms Christian and social morality barbarous. This 
culminates in Sue's adoption of the Christian moral code of self-punishment after 
the children have died, but also her capitulation to the iniquitous imprisonment of 
marriage where Sue's all-embracing and appalling submission has corporeal, 
psychological and philosophical implications for the alienating constructions of 
social form which resonate throughout the novel. 
Jude understands that marriage has the capacity to render a person 
'squashed up and digested... in its vast maw as an atom which has no further 
individuality' (Jude JII.ix, 226), and only later recognises how social 
determination against individuality has the capacity to reduce both himself and 
Sue in those same terms, whether inside or outside marriage and whether 
22 Hardy's stance regarding marriage in Jude extends to a number of radical levels: Sue terms her 
marital predicament regarding her physical aversion to Phillotson something that 'I daresay... 
happens to lots of women; only they submit, and I kick... When people of a later age look back 
upon the barbarous customs and superstitions of the times that we have the unhappiness to live in, 
what will they say!' (Jude IV.ii, 256, original emphasis); Sue also argues that 'in a proper state of 
society, the father of a woman's child will be as much a private matter of hers as the cut of her 
under-linen, on whom nobody will have any right to question her' (IVy, 286). lngham recognises 
that Hardy 'held advanced views on the role of women in society' which 'were such that they 
shocked even those arguing for allowing women to vote' (23). 
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concerning education, aspirations, religion or relationships. Whilst it is Sue who 
now argues that 'the Power above us has been vented upon us... and we must 
submit' (VI.iii, 409), the irony here is on a number of levels. Sue and Jude have 
now 'mentally travelled in opposite directions' (411) since the deaths of the 
children. Jude is no longer 'frill of the superstitions of his beliefs' and now 
understands that the 'exercise of forethought on the part of a ruling Power' (III.i, 
156) is on social terms, their fate determined by the power of a society hostile to 
their 'actual shapes' (TV.i, 245) on every level. Sue's complete reversal now 
accepts that higher external Power she earlier condemns as a social construct, 
contra Jude who now understands it is 'only... men and senseless circumstance' 
(VI.iii, 410). The oscillation between social and essential forces in Sue's 
breakdown nonetheless emphasises the senselessness apparent in the dictates of 
social form throughout, as 'Nature's law and raison d'être that we should be 
joyful in what instincts she has afforded us... civilization had taken upon itself to 
thwart' (VI.ii, 405). Sue's 'self-sacrifice' (VI.i, 441) emphasises the damage the 
social moral order inflicts on the individual, the details of her subjection 
demonstrating the appalling impact of those artificial constructs as much as 
Jude's refusal to submit, raging 'in his mental agony... [with] terribly profane 
language about social conventions' (VI.x, 480) which he now recognises have 
destroyed them both. All along Sue has presented a Feuerbachian consciousness 
in the novel, most emphatically in her intellectual recognition of the false but 
coercive constructs of social form, in her positive human nature and I-thou-love 
unity in her relationship with Jude, and finally in showing the terrible devastation 
the crushing of the individual's 'actual shape' (IV.i, 245) effects in material, 
psychological and social terms. On one level 'neither the woman praised for 
reducing herself to a brood animal nor the woman scorned and penalized as an 
"old maid"... has had any real autonomy or selthood to gain from this subversion 
of the female body (and hence the female mind)' (Rich, Woman 35). But on 
another level this ought to recognise that 'the man [is] the other victim.., the 
helpless transmitter of the pressure put upon him' (Jude V.iv, 342), and further, 
that the destruction of them both has been effected by the 'oppressive 
atmosphere' which 'encircle[s] their souls' (V.vi, 355) - an oppression wrought 
by 'the virtuous' (VI.iv, 428) in their community all along. 
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Throughout the novel, Jude and Sue are subject to the contemporaneous 
forces of essential determinism and social form, but the narrative recognition of 
where the culpability for the tragedy lies and how this is effected remains the 
only means of redress: salvation from this tragedy can only be realised through 
consciousness of the true cause and effect. Jude implores Sue not to 'do an 
immoral thing for moral reasons! You have been my social salvation. Stay with 
me for humanity's sake!' (VI.iii, 423), their relationship with one another the key 
to their salvation and escape from despair, but clearly having implications 
beyond their own individual lives. That Jude's and Sue's Feuerbachian I-thou 
consciousness represents their means to salvation is exemplified at the end of the 
novel. Here even Arabella understands the significance of their relationship, 
knowing that Sue 'may swear on her knees to the holy cross... till she's hoarse, 
but... [s]he's never found peace since she left his arms, and never will again till 
she's [as dead] as he is now!' (VI.xi, 490). 
Social dogma and the social alienation of human nature not only play a 
significant role in the destruction of Sue and Jude at the end of the novel, but in 
the deaths of the children as will be discussed further shortly, effecting the 
subsequent disintegration of Sue and her relationship with Jude. In their 
subjection to the Schopenhauerian will-to-life in Nature and the dictates of 
society, it is human agency and social form which refuses all of them their due 
portion. Jude believes '[t]here is enough for us all' (I.ii, II), reflecting a 
consciously human ethic which other individuals choose to ignore. Troutham is 
just one character in the novel who does not consider other manifestations of the 
will-to-life (whether human or animal) in even remotely compassionate terms, 
his sympathy extending only as far as his wallet and his own prestige, beating 
Jude for his "dissent" whilst himself being responsible for subscribing to 'the 
brand new church tower' which echoes back the blows Jude receives from him 
'to testify [Troutham's] love for God and man' (12)23. 
 Jude's sympathy extends 
itself to all manifestations of life as 'the suffering which he sees in others touches 
him almost as closely as his own', including 'the whole of nature, and hence he 
will not cause suffering even to an animal' (Schopenhauer WWI IV §66, 235). 
23 Siebenschuh discounts critical readings of Jude in Troutham's field from both the perspectives of 
a critique of 'human life wholly subject to the control of nature', and as the 'painflul lesson.., of 
the way his instincts will be in conflict with society's customs and rules' (778), here discussing 
Peter Casagrande, Unity in Hardy: "Repetitive Symmetries" in particular. 
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Arabella recognises what she ought to do regarding Jude but chooses her own 
selfish ends over others' needs in every respect, even despite her later 'spiritual' 
and 'social superiority' (Jude V.vii, 372). Phillotson is ethically aware but 
gradually closes his mind to this 'magic thread of fellow-feeling' (Iii, 11), 
showing it is a choice in Jude. Yet crucially, Phillotson's own volte-face has, 
like Sue's, come about as a direct result of social form, his own suffering 'at the 
hands of the virtuous' has been 'almost beyond endurance', including that he has 
'nearly starved' (VI.iv, 428) because of it. Social coercion is the driving force 
behind his change of mind, Phillotson recognising in the end that 'artifice was 
necessary... for stemming the cold and inhumane blast of the world's contempt' 
(428). By 'getting Sue back and re-marrying her on the respectable plea of 
having entertained erroneous views of her... he might acquire some comfort, 
resume his old courses, perhaps return to the Shaston school, if not even to the 
Church as a licentiate' (428). The episode in Troutham's field in a sense pre-
empts the later exclusion of Jude and Sue and their children from their due 
portion by society's condemnatory "morality". It is clear that Jude and Sue are 
not inherently destructive as it is the social determination of sexuality/morality 
which destroys their relationship, their children, and their lives. Jude's finally 
self-destructive behaviour only becomes his predominant impulse once he has 
lost Sue as she is his only true hope, his genuine 'light' (Il.ii, 106) of 'salvation' 
(VLiii, 423). This also has repercussions '[for humanity's sake' (423) as 
impulses in Jude only become destructive when they are explicitly acting against 
social and religious dogma, rather than being inherently destructive in 
themselves. The issue of Jude's sexual desire for Arabella is a case in point as it 
is the institution of marriage which carries the penalty rather than sexual desire 
itself or the consummation of that desire. Whilst it is clear that many of Jude's 
and Sue's impulsive actions ultimately prove to be destructive, the recognition 
that it is social and religious dogma that renders them destructive is a crucial 
distinction, and this has significant implications for all of those 'actual shapes' of 
individual humanity 'civilization' is trying to fit into its 'social moulds' (IV.i, 
245). 
Jude's perpetual return to his "fatal" landscape emphasises it as the ground 
upon which his life's labours are enacted, the beginning and end of his hopes and 
dreams, from his early role as a scarecrow to his central role as his 'own ghost' 
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(Iii, 94) alienated from self-realisation, to his final, "suicidal" journey. Jude's 
destruction is effected by human actions upon his aspirations in all instances, 
contra readings that the tragedy is driven by blind fate or Jude's 'self-destructive' 
impulses (Collins 168). Whilst Jude's own journey closely echoes the other 
'ghostly presences' haunting his early landscape - the historically and spatially 
transient Schopenhauerian life-cycle of his forebears and his fellow human 
creatures - his own presence as 'almost his own ghost' (Jude II.i, 94) represents 
his alienation on a key Feuerbachian level, human agency and social rather than 
essential determinism effecting his and Sue's destruction. That Jude does not die 
out in that desolate Marygreen landscape, returning from his final meeting with 
Sue, prevents his death from attaining any sense of heroic or transcendent 
meaning24 . This highlights it as an uimecessary and pointless tragedy whilst his 
lonely death, abandoned by Arabella and raging against social conventions' 
(V1.x, 480), ensures that the cause and thus the only redress for his alienation is 
emphasised. Significantly, Sue and Phillotson echo Jude's spectral form towards 
the end of the novel. Sue's alienation is complete: she is reduced to 'a figure 
mov[ing] through the white fog' (lviii, 430) in a haunting echo of Jude's 
recognition of himself as 'his own ghost' earlier (II.i, 94), and her remarriage to 
Phillotson 'was like a re-enactment by the ghosts of their former selves' (VI.v, 
442), Phillotson's own victory a hollow one. The destruction of their lives, their 
natural humanity, is complete: 'the self-assertion of the human heart' that is 'the 
principle of duality, of participated life' (Essence VI, 68) and their 'whole 
principle' (IX, 92) has been destroyed. 
Hardy's novel clearly has a close relationship with Schopenhauerian 
delineations of existence in the non-moral universe of blind forces and of 
essential character, but also in the ethics of Jude's all-inclusive I-I/iou sympathy 
triggered by the consciousness of a shared existence in a suffering world. 
Equally, Jude also recognises that this ethical recognition is not enough in the 
broader framework where social form is effecting its own coercive pressures to 
uphold the social moral order. Even here, however, Feuerbachian I-ti-iou 
24 Radford also recognises that Hardy refuses to elevate Jude's death to 'heroic' (204) status here 
(contra Bates (469) see Chapter 6 (190-1) above), although Radford's own focus is largely on the 
role of Time as that which awakens Jude 'from his enthralment to dreams... into prosaic concrete 
reality.., stripped of ameliorating vision' (204). 
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sympathy is pretty much a pointless framework in personal and individual terms 
if thou is not playing ball. The ineffectiveness of Jude's own anti-egoism 
recognises the severe limitations of this as a means to salvation when the ethical 
individual remains subject to the restrictive practices of social form, as Phillotson 
epitomises. Jude's ethical sympathy is thus prevented from contributing 
anything to his or anyone else's salvation. Hardy's novel recognises that 
something more than individual consciousness and individual acts of justice and 
compassion are needed, and it is the narrative engagement with a Feuerbachian 
recognition of social form which is the key. 
243 
M. Overlapping circles: 'Nature's logic' and the crippling 'gin trap'. 
Jude engages with a complex series of philosophical positions throughout the 
novel, raising questions of human place and destiny, of human consciousness and 
human relations, individual and society, existential time and place, and of 
progressive evolution and stagnation. Jude's decision to 'battle with his evil star' 
and follow his dream of going to Christminster is seen in conjunction with a 
'faint halo' on the horizon, which is of such a 'small dim nebulousness' it is 
'hardly recognizable save by the eye of faith' (Jude I.xi, 87). Yet the question of 
faith in the future is still a possibility which is identifiable within the framework 
of the novel, albeit one which can only be effected outside of the novel itself. 
Jude's aspirations appear doomed to failure from the start, the conditions of his 
existence subject to an omniscient predestiny outside of human intervention on 
one level yet revealed to be not only within the remit of, but directly affected by, 
human agency and the restrictions of social form on another. Jude's questioning 
of himself— that 'surely his plan should be to move onward through good and ill 
- to avoid morbid sorrow even though he did see ugliness in the world?' (I.xi, 
87) engages with a teleological progressivism at the same time it undermines this 
by foregrounding a pessimistic world-view, the emphasis on the pessimistic 'ill', 
'morbid sorrow', and 'ugliness in the world' far outweighing the more optimistic 
'onward' and 'good'. At the same time his decision is given an ethical 
framework in a Spinozan intention 'to do good cheerfully' (87), albeit this 
cheerfulness seems ironically - even farcically - out of place in this context. 
Jude's decision here appears to be a choice between the pessimism of morbidity 
and an explicitly optimistic philosophy, and he makes decisions fed by his 'eye 
of faith' (87) until he loses all hope with Sue's final return to Phillotson - a 
return effected by Sue's intemalisation of the condemnation of religious and 
social strictures regarding the rules of engagement in human relations. 
Roger Robinson argues that Hardy tended towards 'depressive revelations 
such as Darwin's' (130), and that he is nowhere more Darwinian than in the 
chronological and physical landscape which diminish his characters (131). It is 
here where Darwinian evolution extends into the evolution of our emotions and 
sensitivity particularly which provides the 'tragic dimension in all this' 
(Robinson 132). Arabella has an 'unreflecting acceptance of life and her own 
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place in it' and she is '[l]iving entirely for the present... without compunction', 
and thus she 'accepts the reality of the struggle for survival with matter-of-fact 
self-interest' (134). In Jude and Sue, however, Robinson argues that 'Hardy 
takes... his concept of the over-evolution of sensitivity' (134) further as the 
'especial pathos of their situation is that they not only suffer themselves, but 
suffer with others' sufferings' (134). Robinson recognises that Jude's 
sympathetic nature 'is helpless against Arabella's self-interest', seeing Jude and 
Sue's 'sensitivity part of a still-continuing evolution towards yet greater pain' 
(134). Robinson relates this idea of evolution to Sue's reflections on why she 
and Jude should not marry, Sue claiming that '[e]verybody is getting to feel as 
we do. We are a little beforehand, that's all' (Jude V.iv, 341). Knoepflmaeher 
also notes this issue although finds that Sue's suggestion that 'she and Jude are 
"beforehand" is an 'inability to adapt', and this leads to 'Jude [dying] from the 
burden of an excessive self-consciousness' (Laughter 212-I 3)25•  Whilst these 
examinations are from a Darwinian perspective and elucidate a number of 
pertinent arguments, there are a number of issues here which are at least as 
relevant to Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian positions, including ethical 
sympathy. The key issue, however, is that the novel is concerned here with the 
lack of "evolution" in social form in respect of public morals regarding male-
female relationships and marriage, quite apart from the evolutionary development 
of other social forms such as the education and religious systems. In respect of 
other evolutionary ideas, Eduard von Hartmann's philosophical development of 
Schopenhauerian thinking is a pertinent consideration in respect of the figure of 
Little Father Time. Robinson takes his own point on to include Little Time as an 
'even more abnormal' evolution of the 'sensitivity which torments and finally 
destroys Jude and Sue' (134), embodying a Darwinian 'extreme of evolutionary 
pessimism' (135) which represents 'the beginning of the coming universal wish 
not to live' (Jude VI.ii, 402 cited Robinson 135). Knoeptlmacher largely echoes 
this critique, seeing Jude as 'a victim', not of 'the incomprehension of society or 
25 Gillian Beer, on the other hand, sees Hardy's relationship with Darwin as more complex, finding 
that he 'shared with Darwin that delight in material life in its widest diversity, the passion for 
particularity, and for individuality and plenitude which is the counter-element in Darwin's 
narrative and theory' (240). Yet Beer goes on to argue that '[t]he death of the children.., leaves 
Jude and Sue as aberrant, without succession, and therefore "monstrous" in the sense that they can 
carry no cultural or physical mutations into the future and must live out their lives merely at odds 
with the present' (240). 
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of obsolete marriage laws, but of his creator's dim view of an existence drained 
of all hope, an existence governed by natural forces that "obscure" all noble 
action and devastate men like pigs' (Laughter 221). Knoepflmacher argues that 
the pessimistic unconscious universe is the sole driving force in Jude (226)26. 
Collins also sees Little Time as less evolutionary and more a 'resurrected... 
grotesque caricature' of Tess's earlier position as 'unwanted chaff in the scheme 
of things', an implicitly Schopenhauerian construct who 'discharges his family 
obligations by hanging all the children "because we are too menny" (128). In 
Sue and Arabella reflecting philosophical aspects of nature vs. artifice (Jude I.vi, 
43), it is interesting that Arabella's purely sexual union with Jude should produce 
an "unnatural" child in Little Time, who murders the other children and himself 
The obvious recognition here is the extension of Arabella's relationship with the 
Schopenhauerian universe into the point that Time kills all, dreams and 
individuals, perpetually consuming phenomenal manifestations of itself, thus the 
murder-suicide merely illustrates the inevitable - and particularly the suffering 
that comes along with it. Little Time is a complicated - and particularly 
ambiguous - figure in the novel. On one level his framework stems from this 
Schopenhauerian ground, but is also given the role of an evolutionary pessimistic 
Consciousness which Schopenhauer refuses in the Doctor's comment to Jude 
that: 
there are such boys springing up amongst us - boys of an unknown sort in 
the last generation - the outcome of new views of life. They seem to see all 
its terrors before they are old enough to have staying power to resist them. 
He says it is the beginning of the universal wish not to live. (Jude VI.ii, 
402) 
This echoes significant aspects of von Hartmann's philosophy, a melding of 
Schopenhauerian pessimism with a transcendent evolutionary Consciousness 
which leads to a form of voluntary species-suicide 27 . Yet on another level the 
question of why he acts as he does is crucial. David DeLaura argues that "the 
26 For Knoepflmacher, Little Time becomes 'a symbolic representation of a universal sadness that 
Hardy caimot really fit into the intellectual schemes or psychological explanations to which he 
resorts throughout the book... the conflict between the claims of religion and intellect, the 
opposition between society and the individual' (Laughter 221-2), becoming 'an allegorical 
representation of the terrors of a nihilistic view of existence' (223). It is 'the cosmic cruelty' that is 
to blame, and which 'permeates the novel from beginning to end', the 'brutality' of life itself, 
which Jude and Sue as "horribly sensitive" individuals 'cannot bear' (226). 
27 See Chapter 3 (76) above for discussion of von Hartmann. 
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decline of belief in a beneficent Power" (Tess XVIII) in Tess has become 'the 
more fragmentary but fascinating theme of "the coming universal wish not to 
live" (Jude VI, ii) in Jude. Yet DeLaura does recognise that the key to 'Hardy's 
major ethical contrast' is 'between an unspecified "Nature", evidently as the 
norm of some more genuine and personal ethical mode, and "Civilization", 
identified with social law, convention, and... the moral and intellectual 
constraints of Christianity' (397). This merely leaves Hardy 'telling his 
contemporaries that they had not yet imagined the human consequences of 
honestly living out the modernist premise', however, and with 'no alternative' to 
offer 'for Arnold's and Mill's formulations of what the perfected life might be', 
leaving Hardy with 'a certain contempt for, and distrust of; the optimistic ideal of 
a modern secular and rational culture' (DeLaura 399). It is clear, however, that 
the focus of that contempt and distrust is quite specific in Jude as the triggers of 
the tragedy are down to social form every time, Little Time's actions stem 
directly from the pressures to which the family are subject by the coercive and 
destructive forces of social morality, just as Phillotson's volte face is equally a 
response to those same pressures. Geoffrey Harvey, on the other hand, finds 
'society's implication in the tragedy... qualified by Hardy's emphasis on 
psychological determinism in his allusions to the Fawley curse of proneness to 
insanity and suicide' (91-2). Whilst arguing that Little Time is 'an agent of 
dislocation and erasure', expressing 'Hardy's pervasive sense of things falling 
apart' (Radford 201), Radford does recognise that the child is 'a product of his 
circumstances rather than an inert highly stylized figure' (202). Yet Radford 
finally blames Sue for Little Time's actions as her 'rejection' of him, alongside 
her 'self-pitying statements... drive the already morbid child to despair' (202). 
Jude points towards the family's socially-alienated circumstances as the 
motivational forces which trigger Little Time's actions, however, as a direct 
consequence of the family's alienation from community - an alienation effected 
by deliberate actions fed by the artificial constraints of social morality. 
Throughout their relationship Jude and Sue are 'observed and discussed by other 
persons than Arabella', and their circumstances 'bore only one translation to 
plain minds' (Jude V.vi, 354). This interference gradually leads to 'an 
oppressive atmosphere' created by their community which 'began to encircle 
their souls' (355). Even Little Time is personally subject to social condemnation, 
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'taunted' (358) at school before the whole family are finally starved out of their 
home and forced to auction their belongings as Jude's commissions are 
withdrawn (362). Despite the ambiguous nature of Little Father Time, the 
family's oppressive treatment at the hands of their community directly causes 
their poverty and homelessness, and it is this which provides the motive for Little 
Time's murder-suicide as the child declares that if there had 'been room' for Jude 
in their lodgings '[tJhen it wouldn 't matter so much!' (VI.ii, 397, my emphasis). 
In his discussion of the nature of tragedy, Richard Eldridge asks '[h]ow and 
why can we care about the tragic, other than through accidental sympathy with 
the frustration of another's will?' (287). Eldridge sets up an interesting 
relationship between 'Nature and culture' here, as both 'set constraints on what 
we can make ourselves to be' (294). As such 'we experience the changing 
givens of culture and nature not as simple measurable worldly phenomena that 
resists our wills, but rather as something to come to terms with' (294, original 
emphasis). This coming to terms is 'not so much a matter of... overcoming sheer 
obstacles to will' as a 'matter of envisioning how to blend personality with 
possibilities, cultural and natural' (Eldridge 294). This is exemplified in Jude for 
Eldridge as 'even in this most relentless novel of the defeat of humanity by its 
present cultural forms, we find.., the survival of a human aspiration to expressive 
power' (294)28. 
 Whilst Eldridge's main concern here is the conflict between 
Hardy's own subjectivity and the constraints of cultural expression and form 
allowable in the Victorian novel (294), Eldridge's recognition is pertinent within 
the novel itself Here 'free human personality or subjectivity with aspirations to 
expressive power flnd[s] itself encountering cultural forms that simultaneously 
enable and inhibit these very aspirations' (295). Thus in seeking 'to reach some 
understanding of the mind and its places in culture and nature[,]... tragic 
representations have some claim to being regarded as the most illusion-free 
representations of reality' (297). Eldridge's argument points towards a 
consideration of the friction between nature and culture in the novel itself which 
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- and 'a housing of the author's, Hardy's subjectivity' (294). For Eldridge, Hardy's own 
subjectivity as reflected in the available cultural expressions, constraints, and form of the novel 
allows a 'blending of individuality with [Hardy's] cultural possibility' (294). In Aristotelian 
eudaimonia, Eldridge finds 'virtuous activity in the world that is the realization of one's natural 
purpose as a human being [which] is here [in modernity] supplanted by a vision of working on 
nature to make it accord with one's desires and will', leaving '[c]hoice, rather than the laws of 
either God or human nature' as 'the central source of value in modem life' (292). 
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recognises a struggle between Jude's (and Sue's) personality and aspirations and 
the cultural as well as natural opportunities and restraints upon them both. These 
leave '[c]hoice, rather than the laws of either God or human nature' as 'the 
central source of value in modem life' (292). The key to understanding the 
genuinely tragic element in Jude is marked by the relationship between the 
cultural and natural landscapes in which Jude and Sue move. These are the 
means by which the novel foregrounds the immediate understanding that their 
tragic experiences are caused by the cultural rather than natural landscape, thus 
the tragic events were not how it should or could have been. For Schopenhauer 
tragedy is 'the high-point of literature' as it reveals 'the internal conflict of the 
will... at the highest grade of its objectivity, and shows itself as something to be 
dreaded' (WWI III §51, 159-60). Whilst this is primarily concerned with the 
'suffering' caused by the will-to-life in all of nature, it is significant that this also 
'proceeds... through the conflicting desires of individuals' and 'through the 
malice and perversity of the majority' (159-60). It is in the 'kind of tragedy' 
caused 'by human action and character' which 'shows us that those powers 
which destroy happiness and life are such that their path to us... is always open' 
(161-2), as both victim and perpetrator. Whilst Schopenhauer is not directly 
concerned here with social form per se, his point that tragedy caused through 
deliberate human actions and 'the malice and perversity of the majority' (159-60) 
is the most deplorable is clear, as this is effected through choice rather than the 
unchangeable 'tyranny of mere chance' (159). For Feuerbach, in aesthetics the 
human form is 'the highest form of self-assertion' because it is 'the form which is 
itself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good' and particularly because it has 
'consciousness' (Essence, I, 7). This representation can only be perfect, 
however, if it represents the ideal, the species (7). As such a Feuerbachian 
aesthetic points towards the possibility and desirability that, through art, human 
consciousness can be directed towards its true object, aspiring for the genuine 
realisation of human nature by representing that ideal form. In Jude this is 
evidenced in Jude's aspirations for a divine self-realisation, in the revelations of 
Sue's Feuerbachian consciousness and her relationship with Jude, and destroyed 
for both Jude and Sue within a recognisably Feuerbachian framework. Jude and 
Sue identify the ideal of self-realisation whilst embodying the impacts of its 
destruction, effecting the novel's Feuerbachian consciousness and identifying the 
causes of the tragedy and thus their preclusion from salvation. 
Radford recognises that in Jude Hardy 'can no longer defuse the fact that... 
a pioneering modernity of outlook and sincere human feeling are continually 
subject to crushing extinction on the part of social custom' (206). Yet this 
recognition ends 'with the portrayal of a deadening "survival" that cannot be 
ousted by a more humane and charitable social order' (205). Collins recognises 
that Hardy's position is one in which only the possibilities that the present offers 
are of value, however, as 'today is the only life mankind is assured of 
experiencing, now is the moment for intelligent, human action and articulation' 
(167). Whilst Collins disperses this useful point into an argument that 'humanity 
is consumed by Jude's self-destructiveness', she does acknowledge that Hardy 
defines a need to 'gather intellect, heart, and will into a realistically sanguine 
voice which endorses Feuerbach's reassurance' of the continued existence of 
'goodness, justice, wisdom' (Essence 21, quoted Collins 168). Quite how or why 
Collins finds that 'humanity is consumed by Jude's self-destructiveness' is not 
made clear, nor is Feuerbach's 'reassurance' analysed beyond this generally 
Feuerbachian phrase, although Collins makes interesting references to 
Darwinism as enabling 'the social instincts' and the ability to act 'for the good of 
others' (Darwin quoted Collins 168), but this is confined to individual ethical 
behaviour. For Collins, Hardy's views on human development appear to 
incorporate only Schopenhauerian terms in the end, his characters 'consistently 
misapprehend their human condition' only in "universal" and never social terms, 
achieving only the realisation that '[w]hat happiness [each] might achieve will be 
shadowed always by a certainty that the greater configuration of.. life will 
unfold as a series of mishaps until death arrives at the reigns of a sleeping driver' 
(46). Yet Collins does find that Hardy still posits something positive in that 
'[e]ven the most oppressed' will find 'a sun of some sort for his soul' (Hardy Life 
218, quoted Collins 53). Collins does not discuss how this might operate in his 
novels, yet it has pertinent echoes in Jude. Here Jude has attained a true 
consciousness of his subjectivity to both the external non-moral universe and the 
human world, the "sun" of his "soul" being Sue, his 'social salvation' (Jude 
VI.iii, 423) in her role as his (and the novel's) Feuerbachian consciousness on an 
intellectual, corporeal and philosophical level. This of course needs to be a 
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social-wide recognition to effect real changes in social form, from access to 
education, gendered relations and marriage issues, to religious constructs and 
social morality. The question of whether this is possible in Jude's world appears 
to have been answered by the pessimism of Jude's despair and isolation at the 
end of the novel, and in Sue's living purgatory with Phillotson. As such, the only 
avenue for more optimistic possibilities appears to lie outside the novel itself, 
which rages against (VI.x, 480) 'the tragic machinery' (Postscript viii) of 
'civilization', and in so doing indicates where changes need to be wrought to 
effect a more flexible shape in those 'social moulds' to accommodate the 'actual 
shapes' (IV.i, 245) of the limited, imperfect, and finite individual manifestations 
of the species (Feuerbach Essence App. §1, 28 1) — the Jude's and Sue's of this 
world - more comfortably. Barbara DeMille sees the collapse of belief in 
religion or any enlightened social alternative in Jude to be a Victorian 
recognition that everything which might impart order is nothing but 'fluctuating 
chaos' (710), but does not suggest any positive qualifications 29. As such, 
'serious thinkers, Hardy... among them, questioned whether it were better to 
grant man the illusion of his illusions, be they the most rigid convictions, for fear 
of an opposite of "anarchy... loosed upon the world" (DeMille 71030). 
DeMille's argument creates a paradox - even an impasse - with Jude showing 
that 'the mass of mankind will continue to need unquestioned conviction' whilst 
remaining 'ignorant of the intellectual and artificial quality of the ideal' (711). 
Thus to 'naively follow the dream.., is to court death', yet 'the reverse of the 
dream, the denial of social and moral codes, the admission of all concepts of 
conduct as shadowy artifice, is psychic and political disaster' (DeMille 711). 
For DeMille, Jude represents the "enslavement to forms" and the consequent 
"pitiless wedding to a shadowy ideal of conduct" that neither comforts nor 
rewards but... succeed[s] in occluding man's essential growth and has led him... 
29 DeMille argues that Hardy's world is Nietzschean in Jude's identification of 'man's struggle 
between "instinctive truths and cultivated lies" (699), where 'categorical "connnon nouns" come 
to tyrannize and betray their adherents' (700). For DeMille, such 'metaphorical bindings preclude 
growth, prevent change, and impede an evolution to Nietzsche's higher man, the ubermensch' 
(700). DeMille is right in arguing that Jude and Sue finally recognise they have been "enslave[dJ 
by forms" as they 'have been acting by the "letter" and "the letter killeth" (709, citing Jude 394, 
383), but does not recognise that Jude's aspirations to higher things are not aspiring to be above the 
human, but aspiring to self-realisation on a more democratic level, seeking only the freedom to 
pursue his chosen path in life and love 
° DeMille citing W. B. Yeats "The Second Coming" (line 4) 
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to his wasteful death' (712). Whilst in significant respects this is the case for 
Jude and Sue, pursuing vain ideals but destroyed by the trap that social form (and 
their own beliefs in this at certain stages) constructs, for Jude it is his recognition 
of what those forms have cost him which destroys him. Further, for Jude the 
recognition of why their ideals are vain simultaneously posits the terms of 
change. 
For Collins, Hardy creates a 'chronological split-second between two 
worlds' in Jude in which he 'isolates the essence of individual personalities.., as 
they attempt to conciliate Nature with law, experience isolation, confront 
absurdity in the form of coincidence, search for a reclusive God, destroy or 
cultivate human bonds, and prepare to encounter death' (143). In this Collins 
recognises the relevance of nature and law, isolation, and human bonds, and 
particularly 'that labour and love are the vital means whereby man can attain a 
modicum of happiness in life' (143). Collins does not examine the relationships 
between them, however, or the means whereby Jude and Sue are alienated from 
nature, human bonds, labour, and love - nor indeed the Feuerbachian nature of 
such realisation. Rather than marking a 'chronological split-second between two 
worlds' (Collins 143), however, Jude marks the contemporaneous existence of 
two worlds, in time and space, within which the individual human exists and is 
subject to the external forces of both. Whilst Patricia Ingham argues that 
Schopenhauerian ideas in Jude are 'black in the extreme', finding Schopenhauer 
'a nihilist' (211), interestingly Ingham also finds that these ideas 'co-exist with 
the idea of humanity as sometimes profoundly significant' (212) in Jude, 
although she does not discuss this point further. Collins argues that Hardy's epic 
poem The Dynasts presents his melioristic hope that the evolutionary 
Consciousness informs the Will 'till It fashion all things fair!'31 , finding that 
Hardy exhibits an 'inverted Feuerbachian philosophy' as the awakening Will 
'defines its [own] character according to the morality it perceives in its creatures' 
(92) thus God creates himself in man's moral image. This becomes 'man's sole 
hope for freedom from Necessity', applying 'his intelligence toward making 
visioned choices about those things which he allows to happen and prudent 
responses to those coincidental haps which threaten his endurance' (87). As far 
Hardy Dynasts (525) quoted Collins (92), original emphasis. 
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as Jude is concerned, however, the issue of choice and response to coincidence 
here does not necessitate the unconscious universe evolving into consciousness 
as choice and responsibility are already situated in the individuals who make up 
the forms of Jude's society. Jude recognises that the pessimism of human 
constructs is a changeable agency, marking a clear distinction between the 
unchangeable external forces of nature and the culpability of the social moral 
code. Jude's is a world in which human aims, love and social relations offer the 
only form of salvation that life can offer, as even Arabella realises in the end 
(Jude V1.xi, 490). 
Whilst acknowledging 'the arraignment of man-made conventions in Tess 
and Jude', all Garwood 'can discover' in Jude 'is that some power which is 
either blind, or automatic, or both, has set in motion a world whose basic note is 
pain', and it is here that Schopenhauer and Hardy 'are alike in starting from the 
same basis... of utter purposelessness' (39-40). Further, Garwood argues that 'a 
point unrecognized or unemphasized by both Schopenhauer and Hardy' is the 
question of 'growth' as the aim in life, rather than happiness or 'the avoidance of 
pain', as the issues of pain and tragedy do not need to matter 'so long as we may 
be sure that we are all advancing and expanding' (62). Whilst Schopenhauer's 
entire philosophy fundamentally argues against Garwood's notion that pain is in 
some sense acceptable here, as suffering can never be justified let alone be 
acceptable, Schopenhauer also objects to the idea that the question of suffering 
can be considered less important than anything else. Further, Schopenhauer 
argues that there is no growth or advancement in any form (other than ethical 
realisation on an individual rather than species-developmental basis), rather what 
might be termed a misery-go-round. These issues are evidently foregrounded by 
Hardy in the emphasis placed on Jude's own suffering as the central and 
lamented concern of the narrative. At the same time, the novel's Feuerbachian 
consciousness identifies the 'tragic machinery of the tale' (Jude Postscript, viii) 
whilst simultaneously pointing to the very places where growth and advancement 
would be possible, if only individual behaviour and social form will allow it to 
occur. This is not as an acceptable counterbalance to suffering but specifically in 
order to relieve the avoidable suffering caused by human behaviour and social 
form. Collins argues that Schopenhauer's individual has no value for Nature 
(65), yet acknowledges that Schopenhauer's 'pessimism... was only one aspect 
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of his complex theory' albeit not discussing what she rather enigmatically terms 
'Schopenhauer's reserved optimism' (62). Schopenhauer's refusal to ignore the 
fundamental value of the individual forms the basis of his ethics and his 
pessimistic philosophy itself, and is also the key ethical focus in Jude. Both 
Schopenhauer's and Feuerbach's delineations of human existence have pertinent 
expression in the novel despite - and of course because of - what Schweik sees as 
Hardy's unequivocal 'conviction.., that human aspiration, human feeling, and 
human hope, however dwarfed in the cosmic scale of things, were nevertheless 
more important than all the rest' (70). Robinson recognises that Hardy privileges 
individuality and 'loving-kindness' so highly that '[t]hrough all the negating 
pressures of the post-Darwinian world[,] Hardy still asserts the value of 
individual life to the individual who possesses it and the responsibility of others 
to respect it - that is the one "great thought" he is determined to hold on to' 
(143). Garwood feels a 'real dissatisfaction with a Hardy interpretation of life... 
as it is man-centred', however, as '[t]o say that no future justification can 
recompense us for the pain we are now enduring, seems to make man unduly 
important' (81). The recognition that the conscious human individual is at the 
centre of the novel is the key to Jude's contradictory forces and the apparent lack 
of an overarching solution, Jude's position as a 'ghost' (Jude Iii, 94) in the novel 
identif'ing the place where the two worlds he inhabits overlap one another: in the 
conscious existential human subject. The question of whether human actions can 
effect change for the better does underlie key aspects of the machinery of the 
tragedy, Jude suggesting that an awakening consciousness to the cause and effect 
of both human behaviour and social form can at least offer improvements in the 
life-choices and possibilities for the individuals who make up those societies, 
whilst still remaining unchangingly subject to the movements of a blind non-
moral universe. 
This chapter shows that Hardy's work is not only difficult to align to one 
over-arching philosophical position or another, but that it is unproductive to do 
so. Not only is Hardy contradictory and ambivalent in laying bare his influences 
and convictions outside of his fictional writings, but also within them, Jude 
engaging its story, characters, and philosophies within a variety of viewpoints 
which often chafe against one another and refuse to settle on a definitive 
standpoint. Nonetheless, this does not posit what Laurence Lerner recognises as 
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a mistaken critical propensity towards 'arbitrariness as an aesthetic criterion' (83) 
onto Hardy's eclectic ambiguity, as Jude does incorporate a broad but consistent 
framework within which two levels of existence are operating simultaneously, 
and these evidence distinctly Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian perspectives in 
resonant terms. Whilst Hardy also utilises diverse elements from evolutionary, 
archaeological, aesthetic, scientific and philosophical perspectives within Jude's 
narrative, the two central co-existential worlds form the key framework within 
which constraints Jude and Sue are effectively trapped. The non-moral external 
world of nature is essentially pessimistic and unchangeable at the same time that 
elements of the natural, suppressed by the human world, are not negative 
elements in themselves but positive, as it is the friction between these in terms of 
social form which counteract Jude's and Sue's natural aspirations and 
relationships. The overlapping world of conscious human agency produces its 
own pessimism in the restrictive and coercive constructs of social form, yet it is 
here that the glimmers of potential optimism are also visible. Jude's progress is 
haunted by the ghost of his human alienation and thus of human possibility, of 
what might have been, highlighted by the human and social acts which 
precipitate each stage of his journey into tragedy. In Jude, it is clear that the 
most damaging elements to both Jude and Sue are the artificial constructs of 
social form, particularly of social morality and religious belief, all playing their 
part and finally crushing them both in the end. Hardy's novel delineates two 
overlapping worlds, one of which cannot be changed (but within which ethical 
necessity must still operate) and the other offering the relief of avoidable 
suffering where individual aims can be realised to a greater extent in life, but the 
key is that both worlds are inhabited by the conscious and fragile human subject. 
These two worlds co-exist, philosophically independent to a significant extent 
but not mutually exclusive. The individual human is at the heart of the novel and 
the two worlds within it, consciously aware of subjection to suffering in both, but 
the artificial constructs of 'civilization' stifle the individual phenomenal form of 
nature with its 'social moulds' which 'have no more relation to our actual shapes 
than the conventional shapes of the constellations have to the real star-patterns' 
(Jude IV.i, 245). 
In showing that there are certain areas where life and life-choices could be 
improved through individual and social actions to some degree, Jude merely 
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highlights the optimistic possibilities which are marked by and through a 
contingent pessimism. This contingency is illustrated in the machinery of the 
tragedy as these are predominantly human - and particularly social - dictates 
rather than the blind and random occurrences of a disinterested universe. Jude is 
a pessimistic novel haunted by optimism, haunted by the possibilities of what 
could have been, if the human and social agency which operates over and above 
a blind and non-moral universe had dictated otherwise. In 1876, Hardy notes that 
'Science tells us... in the struggle for life, the surviving organism is not 
necessarily that which is absolutely the best in the ideal sense, though it must be 
that which is most in harmony with surrounding conditions' (LN vi e392, 40, 
original emphasis). This evolutionary narrative is, of course, particularly 
pertinent to Arabella's survival by virtue of her self-serving adaptability, and 
what the novel identifies as Jude and Sue's particular unsuitedness for the world 
in which they find themselves. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily in an 
essentialist sense as Jude is at pains to point out the central role that social form 
plays in the tragedy. For all four main characters in the novel it is whether they 
fit, choose to fit, or are forced to fit into the artificial constraints of social form 
which is key. The question Jude raises is whether or not social form can evolve 
to adapt itself to those individual organisms better. Björk recognises that Hardy's 
'tendency' to relate 'human psychology to the social environment' forms 'a basic 
element in Hardy's brand of "social" criticism' ("Reading" 114), suggesting that 
Hardy comes very close to Matthew Arnold's criticism here, in particular that: 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system of institutions, 
established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, rules which have come to 
them from times not modern. In this system their life has to be carried 
forward; yet they have a sense that this system is not of their own creation, 
that it by no means corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual 
that, for them it is customary, not rational. The awakening of this sense is 
the awakening of the modern spirit. (Arnold32 quoted Hardy LN v I e 1017, 
105-6, Hardy's emphasis) 
Such awakening of consciousness to social and religious dogma is also, of 
course, Feuerbachian, and in Jude Hardy signposts the necessity of just such an 
awakening whilst simultaneously precluding its 'spirit' from having already 
32 See Arnold on "Heinrich 1-leine" in Essays in Criticism (154-86). 
256 
awoken: the spirit of Jude's age is the ghost of possibility which haunts his 
unenlightened society. 
The Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian elements in Jude form a pattern of 
two overlapping circles, within which Jude and Sue are subject to the external 
and internal forces of blind nature - in both negative and positive terms - and to 
human engendered alienation and social constraints. Both forces jar against 
Jude's sense of justice and self-realisation, and against his ethical perspective as 
a consciously aware individual subject in a suffering world. It is significant that 
his human world is one in which ethical possibility, both Schopenhauerian and 
Feuerbachian, can operate. On one level the ghosts haunting Jude's landscape 
represent the endless cycle of Schopenhauerian recurrence and failure but, more 
critically, the relationship between ghosts and the non-moral order is mediated 
through Jude's own role as always already his own ghost. Jude is alienated from 
achieving his natural potential and realising his true I-thou unity in his 
community, precluded from realising his own individual shape by the artificial 
constructs of social form. Siebenschuh's argument that 'Hardy's symbolic use of 
a highly personal sense of the relations between identity, community and place' 
(774) delineates a landscape which is a 'rich new language for revealing aspects 
of character and registering.., social, class, and moral distinctions' (774) is 
resonant. This is not because, in Siebenschuh's argument, Jude has only to 
access the past through its medium of landscape to sustain himself, however, but 
because landscape marks instead his isolation and alienation on two key levels, 
one of which is as a direct result of 'social, class, and moral distinctions' (774) 
but is crucially also the realm in which human agency operates. The key 
distinction between Feuerbach and Sehopenhauer is the accessibility of salvation. 
For Schopenhauer, salvation is a temporary transcendence from a non-evolving 
but perpetual cycle of misery wherein individual suffering may be relieved on an 
immediate level through ethical behaviour, but the human condition itself cannot 
be changed. Feuerbachian salvation, in its more perfect unity of species-
consciousness, is reflected in Jude and Sue's natural, self-affirming unity. But on 
a more broadly pragmatic level, Feuerbachian consciousness offers a process of 
realisation wherein the human condition could be improved through the 
conscious development of both human ethics and social form. Jude's 
Feuerbachian consciousness effects a radical humanism in respect of both women 
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and men, identifying key elements in their relationships between themselves and 
the 'social moulds' of 'civilization' (Jude lV.i, 245) which are iniquitous to a 
sense of genuine morality. The personal and 'social salvation' (VI.iii, 423) that 
Jude and Sue are precluded from attaining by the artificial constraints of their 
contemporary society haunt their footsteps. As such, the overlapping circles in 
Jude are recognisable on another level: throughout the novel the apparently 
doomed Jude and Sue, heading seemingly inexorably towards their own tragedy 
in their subjection to the blind forces of nature and to the coercive forces of 
social form, are constantly haunted by the ghostly presence of possibility. 
OW 
Conclusion 
Wandering Between Two Worlds 
'Wandering between two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born, 
With nowhere yet to rest my head, 
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn. 
Matthew Arnold' 
If the question all four key players in this thesis are asking is how can we live 
ethically and attain a form of salvation in a secularising world - a world which 
feels itself suspended between the loss of religious belief and the realisation of a 
positive human future - the answer for all four is addressed by grounding the 
theory in the practice: in that fragile individual human subject who explicitly 
forms the core value for each of them. In grounding the basis, means and 
endpoint of their philosophy in the material, existential human subject rather than 
a transcendent First Cause, Arthur Schopenhauer and Ludwig Feuerbach intend 
to frame philosophical salvation around the self-realisation of that conscious 
human subject in the time and space and reality of existence in the world. In 
taking the philosophical theories and exploring how these operate in the quest for 
that apotheosis of self-realisation in their fiction, both George Eliot and Thomas 
Hardy foreground the complexities and ambiguities that the human as an 
individual and as part of a community framework effects in practice. 
Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Eliot and Hardy examine the object of salvation 
as a corporeal yet exalted ethic of self-realisation in the existential world. Yet 
this thesis shows that all four interrogate the question from various perspectives 
and with different emphases which flag up the tensions between the theory and 
the practice, and between the questions of pessimism and optimism themselves. 
For Schopenhauer the question begins in the necessary consciousness of a 
pessimistic world of unavoidable suffering and ends in the humble but only ever 
immediate ethical acts which relieve that suffering where they can. 
"Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" c. 1852-5 (lines 85-8). 
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Schopenhauer's salvation refuses the possibility of broader or pervasive 
improvements beyond that immediacy, however, even while his ethical 
framework refuses to lose sight of the value of the existential individual in the 
world. Yet his most perfect salvationary point effectively negates existence in 
the world for the ascetic subject. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer offers salvation 
from real suffering in immediately accessible terms on every level of his ethical 
framework. Feuerbach begins his question in a deconstruction of the Christian 
belief system to reveal the divine value of the human at its core, and ends with an 
apotheosis of positive feeling, but which appears to ignore the reality of human 
existence on a number of levels. Feuerbach's philosophical optimism effectively 
negates human reality or individual value in some respect every step of the way, 
leaving that existential and consciously erring human individual receding ever 
further from their own positive self-realisation. Yet Feuerbach's revelation that 
the alienation of human nature - and thus the barrier to individual self-realisation 
- is effected by the artificial constructs of social form raises the consciousness of 
how these forms operate, and as such recognises the possibility of and focus for 
change. Eliot's Middlemarch begins with the quest for a corporeal direction of 
self-realisation which will simultaneously reveal an apotheosis of truth, and ends 
with the Schopenhauerian knowledge that self-despair is an ever-present and 
unavoidable reality for everyone. This is identified in terms which trouble any 
attempt to transcend the real existential human even where the novel suggests a 
sense of dissipation into the facelessness of community. Dorothea's pessimistic 
consciousness of reality reconciles the fragile human to an understanding of the 
shared nature of that very fragility, thus enabling those small but immediate 
ethical acts of amelioration in the world which may help to improve the lives of 
others around them to some modest but palpable degree. In the consciousness 
that suffering is a perpetual presence in the wider world is the equal 
understanding that this is shared with everyone outside of the self. 
Transcendence is effectively grounded in a new pessimistic consciousness of 
reality which recognises the essential interconnectedness of self and world on a 
fundamental and democratic level. Eliot's earlier hope for a clear vision of future 
'eminence whence we may see very bright and blessed things on earth' ("Future" 
137) makes way in Middlemarch for a more pessimistic recognition of human 
existence, both in the present and the future. Equally, the understanding that 
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there is suffering in the world points out the only known quality that the present 
and the fbture entail, and thus identifies the necessary - and only - route to 
salvation. Hardy's Jude the Obscure begins and ends in a world of existential 
anguish, but it also ends in the revelation that the individual is subject to two co-
existential forces in the world, one of which is fixed and unchanging while the 
other is both created and effected by human agency. Whilst revealing the 
ephemeral nature of human hope and individual existence in the 
Schopenhauerian non-moral world of essential Nature, Jude's Feuerbachian 
consciousness simultaneously reveals how those forces which operate only in the 
human world are the cause of unnecessary suffering. Hardy's novel shows how 
the artificial machinery of society alienates and negates the positive human 
individual, and crushes the lives of those who are unable or unwilling to fit 
themselves into its artificial course, and as such lays bare the route to a more 
humane self-realisation. For Hardy's Jude, the consciousness that Jude's and 
Sue's 'predestinate' (Jude I.vii, 49) fate is shifted out of the world of a blind 
universal will and into the world of human agency is a fundamental recognition 
which posits the simultaneous existence of two philosophical and existential 
worlds, both of which are inhabited by the human subject. 
In notebooks compiled during her work on Middlemarch, Eliot notes 
Arnold's two lines of conscious loss in 'Wandering between two worlds, one 
dead / The other powerless to be born' (Notebooks 78). On a significant level, 
this consciousness of loss is at the heart of Eliot's novel, no one illustrating it 
more clearly than Casaubon, 'wandering about the world and trying mentally to 
construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes' (Middlemarch 
2, 19), but he is 'never to be liberated from a small hungry shivering self (29, 
271), remaining essentially and inescapably trapped in despair. This thesis 
shows that Eliot's use of the alchemic elements in Middlemarch illustrates 
fundamental incompatibilities within and between certain characters which 
prevent Feuerbachian I-thou species-consciousness occurring between them. 
These essential failings are crucially focused on the critical principle missing 
from Casaubon's theory and Feuerbachian practice: the realisation of the 
existential human individual. Despite Dorothea attaining her own self-realisation 
in the novel, the sense of loss extends into her reduced potential and the 
dissipation of her existence into the anonymity of mass society. For Eliot, 
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Arnold's 'two worlds' ("Stanzas" 85) become reconciled in the space between 
them: in the existential human individual in whom the consciousness of both 
presences exists, thus this pessimistic but ethical consciousness effectively 
retains the uncertain present and future that Arnold's poem foregrounds even 
while escaping from polarised despair. Yet at the same time, there is also a more 
optimistic place in Eliot's recognition of the equal presence of salvation here, in 
this space 'between.., worlds' in Eliot's reconciliatory position, albeit a salvation 
not many characters in the novel can realise. Eliot nonetheless creates an 
essentially positive dynamic in the salvationary potential this dual-presence not 
only effects but insists upon. 
Hardy's novel also identifies 'two worlds', positioning Jude and Sue as 
effectively caught within two worlds rather than between them, however, as they 
are equally and inescapably subject to them both. At bottom, the unchangeable 
world to which Jude's characters are subject is the external and internal forces of 
a non-moral macrocosmic Nature. Nature is on one level a pessimistic and 
predetermined external and internal force which is blind to the aspirations of the 
individual human, and which is an unchanging and essential force in both macro-
and microcosmic terms. Yet it also imparts its own positive forces into their 
essential character, and these positive aspects of Nature are thwarted by the other 
world to which each character is equally subject. This thesis shows how Hardy's 
novel uses Jude's position as a ghost in the landscape and Sue's position as the 
novel's Feuerbachian consciousness to emphasise how Nature's forces are 
always juxtaposed with those of human agency, most centrally within the 
framework of social form, and as such, alienates the individual from their own 
self-realisation whilst also identifying the potential for change. Jude places 
ethical compassion in very similar Schopenhauerian terms as that delineated in 
Middlemarch, yet this is evidenced in more positive and in more negative terms 
than in Eliot's novel. On the positive side, unlike Casaubon, all four of Hardy's 
central characters appear to be able to recognise ethical choice. The negative to 
this is that most of them choose selfish ends (albeit Phillotson shows how some 
are driven to selfishness by the negative impacts he also experiences at the hands 
of social form). Hardy echoes the negativity of Eliot in that most characters do 
not appreciate the ethics of compassion, albeit for Hardy this is largely a choice 
rather than an essential character-trait, suggesting a more positive potential even 
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while the choice of selfishness is negative in actual terms in the novel. This 
negativity is further expressed in the apparent ineffectiveness of Jude's own 
ethical sympathy as this does not bring salvation in any form, to himself or those 
around him. Unlike with Dorothea in Middlemarc/i, in Hardy's novel there are 
no positive effects emanating from Jude's existence, yet the question of whether 
Jude's tragedy suggests potentially positive effects outside the text is another 
issue. 
Whilst both Schopenhauer and Feuerbach ground philosophy in human 
experiential and psychological existence, and place I-thou consciousness as the 
basis for ethical behaviour and the route to salvation in the world, the critical 
differences lie in the placing of the human individual on a number of levels as 
these affect both the value of the individual and the extent to which individual 
salvation is genuinely accessible. In Eliot's foregrounding the reconciliation of 
two conscious presences as the route to salvation in the world, reconciling the 
perpetual presence of both despair and transcendence, Middlemarch reveals the 
key to salvation to be already in the individual, who can thus understand the 
intrinsic value of and connection between each individual as an intimately shared 
and non-hierarchical community. This thesis shows that Eliot's future vision is 
reduced to a pessimistic but nonetheless redemptive immediacy, but the fixed 
nature of character remains a stumbling block, effectively precluding some 
people from attaining salvation on any level as their own nature is essentially 
unable to develop the necessary consciousness of that suffering, palpitating life 
beyond their own concerns. As such, whilst the pessimistic route to salvation in 
Middlemarch may be humble, democratic, and accessible on one level, it is a rare 
position indeed. In both of the novels analysed in this thesis essential character 
also leaves the Feuerbachian I-thou apotheosis an equally rare, finite and 
momentary realisation. Both novels recognise that the accessibility of 
Feuerbachian salvation is undermined for those individuals who are alienated 
from self-realisation, either by their own essential human nature, or by the 
coercive forces of social form. The Feuerbachian I-thou relationship is a rare 
union of necessarily complementary characters for both authors, thus is reduced 
from its overtly optimistic vision in key respects. This reduction raises a 
fundamental negativity in Middlernarch as salvation is not the species-wide 
apotheosis Feuerbach envisages. At the same time, Eliot and Hardy recognise 
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the personal apotheosis of Feuerbachian I-thou union as a positive and necessary 
key to self-realisation in reduced terms. This is an essential union for Dorothea's 
personal happiness in Middlemarch, albeit the suggested wider positive impacts 
in their future lives in the community are reduced to a Schopenhauerian 
immediacy and all its qualifications. Even where that apotheosis is attained, 
Eliot's novel troubles the simultaneous absorption of the individual that 
Feuerbachian union also effects. In Jude and Sue's relationship, Hardy echoes 
Eliot's positive recognition of an essential union as a personal apotheosis. 
Further, although Hardy also recognises the perfect I-thou to be less than perfect, 
he nonetheless emphasises its presence as a blissful comradeship which is 
fundamentally necessary to survive in the world, and to attain a broader social 
salvation. This is key to Jude's salvation in both personal and social terms for 
Hardy, who recognises the root of the Feuerbachian consciousness of alienation 
in more direct and political terms than Eliot. In identifying the specific 
obstructions to Jude's and Sue's self-realisation as social form, Hardy's novel 
marks a positive recognition of Feuerbachian salvation which has repercussions 
both in and beyond the tragedy in the novel. Feuerbach's recognition of the ways 
and means through which the individual is subject to alienation, prevented from 
realising her or his "essential" positive self or aspirational future by the artificial 
constructs of social form, is emphasised by Jude's own key experiences and yet 
more profoundly focused in and through Sue's role in the novel. In identifying 
the machinery operating in the world of human agency to be the causal elements 
of the tragedy rather than the existential non-moral world of Nature, Jude's 
Feuerbachian consciousness offers a valuable starting point in revealing the 
damaging nature of coercive but fundamentally human constructs, and identifies 
the potential and focus for positive and pervasive change. 
Both Eliot's and Hardy's novels analysed in this thesis insist that both the 
theory and the practice must be grounded in human lives from begirming to end, 
as to ignore the individual experiential human as basis, means, or as endpoint 
ignores, absorbs, transcends, or alienates and thus destroys the individual. Whilst 
Eliot recognises the problematic aspects of Feuerbach's unrealisable deification 
of human relations, particularly in respect of Casaubon who is perpetually 
alienated by his own sense of imperfection as well as his essential inability to 
recognise life beyond his own concerns, Hardy recognises the alienating effects 
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of social form and echoes Feuerbach's revelatory consciousness. Jude's 
characters are simultaneously identified with a Schopenhauerian pessimism in 
the inward compulsion towards certain behaviour, whether exhibiting the egoistic 
will or the ethical recognition of suffering and consequential humane ethics. In 
Middlemarc/z, whilst social form is marked out as a clearly contributory factor in 
defining aspects of the characterisations and situations, Nature appears to be 
more significant than nurture, not least in that nurture or experience will not 
reveal that which is essentially unable to be. Middlemarch grounds human 
existence and salvation in a Schopenhauerian consciousness of the human 
experience of suffering, and this in ways which expose the pessimistic 
ramifications of Feuerbach's vision and the more optimistic and pragmatic 
implications of Schopeithauer's consciousness of a suffering world. The 
relationship between Feuerbachian and Schopenhauerian positions pervades 
Eliot's novel on many levels and forms an intricate critique of Feuerbach from a 
Schopenhauerian perspective. Feuerbachian salvation is replaced by a 
Schopenhauerian consciousness of the ethical reality of human suffering, 
individual value, and individual realisation as its necessary ground, means, and 
endpoint. Eliot places Schopenhauer's pessimistic recognition of the inevitability 
of human suffering at the heart of Middlemarch, which gives rise to a form of 
transcendent consciousness which always keeps existential reality clearly in 
view. Indeed, it is the consciousness of despair that itself effects fill I-thou 
consciousness and thus ethical human relations, therefore insists on individual 
realisation as its necessary premise. Jude's landscape is also framed within a 
Schopenhauerian non-moral universe in key terms, yet its characters 
simultaneously inhabit a consciously human world in which each is aware of 
ethical choice, and where each is equally subject to the artificial social system 
rather than purely subject to the chance acts and inner compulsion of blind 
Nature. Here Hardy's novel evidences a positive Feuerbachian ethic of human 
self-realisation through individual aim and I-thou human relations, which are also 
an almost-deification of human aim and possibility, thus recognising an exalted 
sense of human potential. Jude's Feuerbachian framework simultaneously 
reveals the forces which preclude this positive self-realisation on every level, 
foregrounding the devastating consequences of the alienation of the positive 
elements of human nature. Hardy's novel identifies nurture to be more damaging 
than nature, in the end, in a world where human characters appear to have ethical 
choice and where the coercive affects of social form are the most damaging 
elements of all. As such, Hardy's refusal of an holistic system does not point to 
chaos or self-destruction but, in identifying the external and internal forces of 
both nature and society, simultaneously identifies the only one which is open to 
change. Hardy recognises a fundamental pessimistic truth in Schopenhauerian 
delineations of the world, yet also recognises the positive ramifications of a 
Feuerbachian consciousness of the alienating constructs of artificial social form - 
urging alternative possibilities if only the world of human agency would open 
itself to the possibility of changing its own shape to accommodate the ethical and 
aspirational self-realisation of that unique and fragile individual. 
In the same way that stepping back from Schopenhauer's most extreme 
form of salvation acknowledges his more positive and accessible forms of 
salvation for most people, taking a step back from Feuerbach's endpoint of 
transcendent negativity allows the positive recognition of the ground and means 
and affects of alienation, thus offering potential routes to more accessible and 
practical forms of salvation. Feuerbachian consciousness awakens the potential 
for effective change to those artificial social systems which enact and perpetuate 
human alienation, thereby offering the hope and direction of a more positive 
future life, whilst a Schopenhauerian consciousness awakens the necessity to act 
in the here and now in immediate terms to alleviate the suffering in the world. 
This thesis shows that the questions of pessimism and optimism in philosophical 
constructions of human place, ethics, and salvation in the world are necessarily 
balanced against the positive value both of and for the existential individual. The 
question of value extends into whether the basis of ethics is democratic and 
accessible to ordinary existential human individuals, and whether self-realisation 
or salvation is an accessible reality for real people in the world. Eliot's novel 
rejects the possibility of a pervasive Feuerbachian salvation in Middleinarch as 
here the hopes for social reform have faded, placing salvation in the awakened 
consciousness of suffering, thus the ethical framework of possibility is only in 
immediate, Schopenhauerian terms, in both time and space. There is no grand, 
teleological vision of human progress in Eliot's novel as it foregrounds a more 
mundane pragmatic of ethical survival rather than an apotheosis of self-
realisation in community or over time. Whilst I-thou Feuerbachian unity is 
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foregrounded as necessary to personal happiness even while it is emphasised as a 
rare complimentary union, the possibility of a Feuerbachian future is replaced by 
a fundamentally Schopenhauerian vision of immediacy. The ethical key in this 
novel is the recognition of suffering and self-despair as this is identified as the 
only route to salvation, and this a salvation which is found in the act of relief 
from suffering in immediate and local rather than pervasive, progressive, or 
evolutionary terms. Hardy's novel foregrounds a Feuerbachian consciousness, 
on both personal and broader social terms, even whilst underpinning this 
expressly human consciousness with a Schopenhauerian ethic of a suffering and 
non-moral world to which Jude and Sue are equally subject. Hardy's novel 
accepts both Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian views of human place, ethics, 
existential reality and destination, forming two co-existential worlds within 
which his characters are seeking their route to salvation. The most tragic element 
of Jude's and Sue's story simultaneously raises its most optimistic. The key 
recognition that the most damaging impacts on their lives are effected by the 
world of human agency rather than unchanging essential Nature simultaneously 
shows how such tragedies can therefore be changed, prioritised in the value of 
and focus on the unique individual and their aspirational and personal self-
realisation. 
This thesis raises significant questions concerning Eliot's relationship with 
optimistic and pessimistic philosophical thinking, particularly her acceptance of 
Feuerbach, showing that her novel Middlemarch undermines Feuerbachian 
salvation in its determination of character, its less-than-divine human relations, 
and its refusal of teleological meliorism, whilst it posits a radically 
Schopenhauerian emphasis in its ethical and salvationary framework. Eliot's 
novel traces the delineation of essential human essences in more 
Schopenhauerian than Feuerbachian terms, probing the inaccessibility of 
Feuerbachian salvation for the individual, a salvation only accessible to particular 
characters and even then realisable only through exceptional human relations, 
and as such, is essentially denied to all but a few. Even where it is accessible, 
this is a qualified and tentative form of salvation, albeit placed firmly in the 
conscious space between self-despair and transcendence. This thesis raises 
equally significant questions about Hardy's relationship with pessimism, 
showing that, in Jude, Hardy's pessimism is a complex philosophical 
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examination of the sources and forms and thus the extent of pessimistic views of 
human place, ethics, and salvation in the world, which simultaneously reveal a 
potentially optimistic and certainly deeply fundamental relationship with 
Feuerbachian salvation in both personal and social terms in the novel. For Jude, 
the world of essential, suffering nature and the world of human society are co-
existential worlds, one overlapping the other, simultaneously and perpetually in 
existence and simultaneously inhabited by the ephemeral yet unique human 
individual to whom they offer both aspiration and obstruction. For Middlemarch, 
the two worlds of self-despair and transcendence are equal partners, effecting the 
reconciliation of matter and spirit, despair and rapture, pessimism and optimism, 
in the same place that lies 'between two worlds' (Arnold "Stanzas" line 85): the 
experiential, living, breathing human individual. 
In their non-fiction writings, both Eliot and Hardy have stated their 
rejection of a single holistic system of philosophy. Eliot has argued that 
"System is the childhood of philosophy; the manhood of philosophy is 
investigation" as 'expressions' can only 'have their origin purely in the 
observations of the senses' ("Future" 133, 135), and Hardy that 'every man' 
should 'make a philosophy for himself out of his own experience' (Hardy Life 
310, original emphasis) whilst also suggesting that 'Pessimism ...is the only view 
of life in which you can never be disappointed' (311). In the two novels analysed 
in this thesis the idea of an holistic system of philosophy is also rejected by both 
Eliot and Hardy, yet two distinct philosophical viewpoints can be seen to form 
complex yet comprehensive relationships in both novels, and which also belie the 
compartmentalisation of either novelist as either "optimistic" or "pessimistic". In 
their explorations of the peculiar, individual human and the external and internal 
forces to which they are subject and within which they have to operate, both Eliot 
and Hardy interrogate Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian philosophical 
delineations of human place, ethics, and destiny in both positive and negative 
terms. Eliot's novel seeks a reconciliation between two polarised worlds in the 
immediate existence of the human individual as the only possibility of salvation, 
and Hardy recognises two co-existential worlds to which the existential human is 
simultaneously subject, only one of which is a changeable world which yet must 
be changed, by human agency, for individual salvation to be realised. 
CIE 
It is clear that the positions of "pessimism" and "optimism" are not clear-
cut in any of the four texts which form the central analyses in this thesis, nor 
indeed in the world around them. All four texts reveal dualistic conflicts on both 
the macro- and microcosmic scale in the many contradictions, slippages, 
agreements, refusals, and co-existential realities they evidence on a number of 
levels. The questions of pessimism and optimism, despair and transcendence, 
determination and choice, negation and salvation underlie the positive and 
negative aspects of that which cannot be changed and that which can. All four 
texts find their focus, their site of conflict and their realisation in the ethical 
value, consciousness and reality of the existential human. This thesis shows that 
both Eliot and Hardy entered deep and comprehensive engagements with both 
Schopenhauerian and Feuerbachian delineations of the human and the world, yet 
from very different perspectives. The findings of this thesis suggest a fascinating 
re-evaluation of other novels by both writers, and contribute a new dimension to 
engagements with other nineteenth century writers influenced by the 
philosophical quest for human place and realisation, both in fiction and non-
fiction of the period. These findings open out the possibilities for engaging in 
detailed analyses of other philosophical constructions of human salvation during 
the nineteenth century, reassessing the implications for the value and particularly 
the accessibility of ethical salvation for the existential human in the world, and 
how these implications are negotiated by and played out within fiction of the 
period. 
Eliot and Hardy recognise the reality of both pessimistic and optimistic 
visions of the world, foregrounding both worlds as the same world, and the 
individual human as subject to both forces in time and space. A Feuerbachian 
consciousness can lead to actual, affective change in the world by consciously 
working to overcome the alienation of the human by placing human self-
realisation as object in community relations on every level, including through 
work and other aims and aspirations. For Schopenhauer, suffering is unending 
and essentially unchanging, thus only mundane and immediate relief from 
suffering is the most we have to hope for in the world. As such, both offer 
pessimistic and optimistic possibilities in ethics, in the world and in literature. In 
art: 
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No individual and no action can be without significance; in everyone and 
through everything the Idea of man unfolds gradually. Therefore no event 
in human life should be excluded.., a scene from ordinary daily life may be 
of great intrinsic significance if... the inmost recesses of human action and 
will, appear in it in a bright, clear light [ ... ] the very transitoriness of the 
moment which art has fixed.., yet represents the whole... [and] seems to 
bring time itself to a standstill. (Schopenhauer WWI III §48, 144-5-6) 
For Feuerbach, the human form in art is 'the highest form of self-assertion' 
because it is 'the form which is itself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good' 
and particularly because it has 'consciousness' (Essence, 1, 7). This 
representation can only be perfect, however, if it represents the ideal, the species 
(7). As such a Feuerbachian aesthetic also identifies the possibility and 
desirability that, through art, human consciousness can be directed towards its 
true object, aspiring for the genuine realisation of human nature by also 
representing that ideal form. Eliot's and Hardy's novels are, in a sense, also 
caught between two worlds, between the philosophical theory and the practical 
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